elements of matter, it will follow that the corporeal elements described by us resemble, in a certain way, the monads of Leibniz, which are representatives of the universe. Our elements, or, rather, our first sentient principles, would not, indeed, be representatives of the universe in the sense in which the monads of Leibniz were supposed to be, because that great man supposed these to represent the universe with all that it contains, corporeal as well as spiritual beings, whereas our sensitive principles embrace only unlimited, unmeasured space, in which corporeal beings subsist. . . ... "Having reached the result stated above, . . we are now obliged to propose to ourselves the question: Can there be a sentient principle which feels nothing but solid, unlimited space; and if there were such, would it be an individual? . . . "We say that the concept of such a principle involves no absurdity, and, if there were such a principle, it would certainly be an individual, on account of the simplicity and reality attached to the nature of principle and of such a principle. But hence there springs a consequence of some moment, which is, that there could only be one such individual. If two principles had an identical term, such as unlimited space, they could not in any way have a distinct reality, and hence they would not be two, but one; reality being the principle of individuation. Now, that such principles could not have a distinct reality, is proved in this way. Principles, as such, have no activity or reality but what they receive from their terms. If with the imagination we add any other reality to them, they will no longer be mere principles, as the hypothesis requires. If, therefore, the term is one and identical, the reality and activity of the correlative principle must likewise be one and identical. But solid, unlimited space is one and identical. Therefore the correlative principle of this term must also be one and identical. . . . If we admit this, what relation will such a single principle bear to the sensitive souls of bodies? These will rise and individuate themselves within this principle by means of new terms, that is, ... corporeal ones.* This primitive principle might receive, in a certain improper sense, the name of common soul, or, more correctly, principle of sensitive souls (corporeal feeling). The individuality of these souls would remain intact; but they would have a common act and a special act. This special act would constitute their proper reality and substance, and hence their substantial difference, and this proper reality would be the principle of their individuation. This would agree with the doctrine of St. Thomas, that matter is the principle of the individuation of souls; although this would hold good only for purely sensitive souls. In this there seems to be no contradiction" (Psychology, §§ 554-559). "" The doctrine which Rosmini here attributes to St. Thomas, and which the latter frequently repeats,† is, as every one knows, due to Aristotle, who says that "matter is chiefly and properly the subject of generation and the condition of decay” (“ ἔστι δὲ ὕλη μάλιστα μὲν καὶ κυρίως τὸ ὑποκείμενον γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς δεκτικόν. De Gen., i. 4 ; 320, a. 2 sq.). It is true that Aristotle does not say, in as many words, that matter is the principle of individuation; but it follows directly from the above statement. Specific differences and generic differences, of course, belong to species and genera (είδη καὶ γένη) themselves (“ἐπειδή ἐστι τὸ μὲν λόγος τὸ δ ̓ ὕλη, ὅσαι μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶν ἐναντιότητες εἴδει ποιοῦσι διαφορὰν, ὅσαι δ' ἐν τῷ συνειλημμένῳ τῇ ὕλῃ οὐ ποιοῦσιν.” Metaph. x. 9; 1058, a. 37 sqq.). Without matter, ideas, to use Rosmini's phrase, could not have subsistence. Each would remain a simple logical possibility, ideal, not real. Though the doctrine that individuation is the result of matter was not original with the Schoolmen, they derived from it another doctrine which, it must be admitted, Aristotle never dreamt of, viz., that the angels, being im* Cf. the lines of Tennyson (Epilogue to In Memoriam) :— "A soul shall draw from out the vast And strike his being into bounds, And, moved through life of lower phase, Result in man, be born and think." E.g. Sum. Theolog., i. q. 3, art. 3, concl.; q. 54, 3, 2; q. 56, 1, 2; q. 75, 4 and 5; q. 86, 1 and 3, concl., etc., etc. material existences, and thus lacking the principle of individuation, are of necessity each a distinct species.* This doctrine, nevertheless, finds a parallel in Aristotle's theory that the stars are eternal and divine.t 132. Pursuing these investigations further, we come to the following results : term of (1) That the sentient principle, or sentient The first soul, has for its first term pure extension, or un- the sensimeasured space. tive soul is unmea sured Its second body (2) That it has for its second term a limited space. force diffused in space. Though this force, accor- term is the dingly, is a limited measure of space, space is which it not thereby sundered or made discontinuous, informs. This force is the soul's own body, which is informed by it and is the seat of all its corporeal feelings. mental (3) That the soul feels its own body with a Fundafundamental feeling always identical, although feeling. susceptible of variation in its accidents. By means of this fundamental feeling no distinct limits are assigned to the body, which, accordingly, has no distinct figure in the feeling of the soul. sensations. (4) That this body is modified by the action External of other bodies external and foreign to the soul. These modifications, in so far as they are felt, are called external sensations, and are of different * Vid. Sum. Theolog., i. q. 50, art. 2 sq., etc., etc. Cf. Sum. contra Gentes, iii. ch. 43. † Vid. Metaph., xi. 8; 1073, a. 34: sq.: De Mundo, 2; 391, b. 16 sq. How measured space is presented to feeling. kinds, according to the different organs of the body. But all these sensations give us a feeling of extended surface only, and by means of these surface sensations our own bodies acquire limits. and a determinate figure felt by the soul. (5) That our own bodies, as well as external bodies, occupy only one part of space, and are able to move in it, that is, to change place. These movements become the measure of so many parts of space, and thus there is presented to feeling, under certain conditions, a measured space, which may be indefinitely added to, since the possibility of movement is indefinite. The fundamental feeling, which plays so conspicuous a part in Rosmini's theory of cognition, has already been alluded to (under § 80). It is the feeling which the soul at all times has of its body, and is the direct result and form of the combination of the two. It has its seat in the sensitive parts of the body, and is entirely distinct from life. It is, so to speak, the calm ocean of feeling, of which all particular feelings are so many ruffles or waves. "When we perceive our own bodies, through the fundamental feeling, which is given to us by our being alive, we perceive our bodies as one with us. They become in this way, through individual union with our spirits, part of the sentient subject" (New Essay, vol. ii. § 702). Of course such a feeling as this, if undisturbed and uninterrupted, is not likely to enter into consciousness. But "we must distinguish between the existence of a feeling in us and the attention we pay to it. We may very well experience a sensation or a feeling, without reflecting on it or being conscious of it; now, without reflecting on it and thereby acquiring consciousness of it, we should never be able to say to ourselves that we had experienced that feeling; nay, if we could not observe it, we might pertinaciously deny it. . . . He who has not been able to distinguish feeling from the consciousness of feeling, has never come to understand the essential difference between sensation and idea. Sensation can never become aware of itself; it is the understanding that becomes aware of sensation. The consciousness which we receive of sensation is nothing but the intellective perception of it. . . . Although this feeling [the fundamental feeling] exists, it must be very difficult now to recognize and seize it, since we are not in the habit of attending to anything in us, except when we feel a change. Where no change takes place, there is no consciousness, no comparison, no reflection. At the same time, although a change is necessary in order to enlist our attention, it is not necessary, in order that we may feel. . . . The size and shape of our bodies, as perceived by vision and touch, are not included in the vital feeling of which we speak" (New Essay, vol. ii. §§ 710-712). Herbert Spencer, from an entirely different point of view, acknowledges the existence of the fundamental feeling. He says, "It will be manifest that, besides the few distinct waves of nervous change working their distinct effects, there are multitudinous indistinct waves, secondary and tertiary, travelling in all directions, working their distinct effects. Since such reflected and re-reflected disturbances everywhere act as stimuli, we must regard the entire nervous system as at all times discharging itself" (Principles of Psychology, vol. i. pt. 1. cap. 4, §§ 38, 39). What is this general and continual discharge but the obverse of the fundamental feeling? The assumption of this feeling enables as to solve the much-vexed question whether the human mind is always conscious. It is not always conscious, but it has always a fundamental feeling, through a disturbance in which attention may be roused and, thereby, consciousness awakened (cf. Psychology, vol. ii. § 1367, n.; and New Essay, vol. ii. § 537). As to the manner in which we become conscious of measured space, Rosmini forestalled by many years the doctrines of Bain, Spencer, and those who hold that it is acquired through the senses and the conscious movement of the U |