especially philosophy, have, as regards their method, been from the first involved in a vicious circle, which, at best, might be explained in some mystical, ontological way, but out of which it has seemed impossible to get. Wherever science has begun, it has always had to assume something, which had to be demonstrated by a process dependent upon that assumption. Under these circumstances we need hardly wonder if scepticism with regard to the validity of all knowledge has appeared at many times and under many forms. Science, from the days of Aristotle to our own, has been moving, for the most part, in a circle of correlates, not one of which contains any self-evident truth, but each of which appeals for support to the others.

Rosmini's great and chief merit in philosophy was that he found a way out of this vicious circle-found, by mere observation, and without assuming the truth of the method of that observation, a luminous point in thought, which clearly shone with its own light and defied all attempts not only to find, but even to seek for, an origin or ground outside of and beyond it. This luminous point was ideal being, at once the form of thought, the principle of truth, and the essence of objectivity. By means of this discovery he was able to lay the basis of a new science, which not only takes precedence of all others, but upon which all others, including logic itself, depend for their truth and their principles. This is the Science of Ideology, to have discovered and elaborated which is a merit not inferior to that of the father of logic. If finding an irrefragable basis for all truth is the greatest of scientific merits, then that merit unquestionably belongs to Rosmini.

"Ideology," says Rosmini, "is the science of the intellective light, whereby man renders intelligible to himself the sensible things from which he draws the sum total of knowledge. Of course, Ideology neither creates nor invents this light, which is found in the idea, or rather is the idea itself; neither does it impart the intuition of it, for the power to do this belongs solely to the creator and framer of human nature; but it does transport this light from the order of intuition into the order of scientific reflection, and thus forms the science of it.

"The sciences are the product of the reflex free thought, whereby man renders himself conscious of that which he already knows, and renders more explicit, orderly, and tractable, or applicable to action, the knowledge of which he is conscious. Order not only binds together the parts of each science, but even the sciences themselves.

"This order, which binds together all the sciences, renders conscious human knowledge not only useful but beautiful, and is what constitutes the Encyclopædia of the Sciences, that is, an encyclopædia, not in the sense of a mass of material flung together at random and distributed according to the letters of the alphabet, but in the sense of a whole, organic, one and harmonious.

“And as soon as Ideology has made scientifically known what is the natural light of the mind, the principle of such an encyclopædia is found, and, when the principle is found, there is found also the encyclopædia itself, that is, the natural order of the sciences, which is virtually contained in that principle and may be deduced from it. This is a new ground which proves that Ideology must be placed at the head of the sciences, since from it these derive their principal distribution. As soon as this is done, the position of every other science may be assigned. And we believe that all those persons who undertake to treat any science, ought first to take the trouble diligently to determine the place which belongs to that science in the great body of the knowable; because, when we know what place belongs to it, and what member it forms, in the great body, it receives completeness and beauty, its sphere may be defined and its limits assigned. And this is an indispensable condition of systematic progress in the treatment of the sciences" (Logic, Preface, §§ 1-3).

Ideology, which transports ideal being from the region of intuition into that of reflection and consciousness, is the science which accounts for and explains the origin of those concepts which logic necessarily uses and accepts as given, but which it has been wont to refer for explanation to a succeeding system of metaphysics dependent upon its own method of dealing with these concepts. It is, therefore,

the true fundamental science of knowledge, and furnishes the true solution of the problem so clearly stated, but so poorly solved, by Aristotle.*

II.

observa

Ideology.

The following is the method of Ideology. We Internal cannot know the nature of human knowledge tion the unless we observe it as it is. Hence internal method of observation, which fixes the attention upon cognitions and brings them clearly into view, is the instrument of ideology, and the method to be pursued in dealing with it.

In other words, the instrument of regressive philosophythat whereby it seeks to reach a principle of certainty—is observation of the phenomena of consciousness, apart from any theory respecting them, their truth or falsehood. Nothing is assumed in regard to these phenomena. That they are is not an assumption, but a certainty, which the most determined sceptic in the world cannot rid himself of. Their existence cannot even be denied without being first admitted. Of course, since the truth of the method cannot be assumed, so neither can that of the result. If the result is to be accepted as unconditionally true, its truth must be immediately self-evident. The process of observation is like that of finding one's way out of a labyrinth to the light of day. My certainty that I see the light, when I emerge, is in no way dependent upon the gropings and wanderings by which I escaped from the darkness. Observation is attentive groping. It is not the beginning of philosophy, properly speaking, but the starting-point of the

* Aristotle placed logic at the head of the sciences, but was obliged to treat its fundamental principle, the law of identity and contradiction, in the Metaphysics (iii. 3; 1005 b, 19). The difficulties herein involved were so great that his followers had to say that logic was not a part, but an instrument, of science. Hence the term organon. See Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. pt. ii. p. 182, n. 5.

man who means to philosophize (see under § 9). It involves no presupposition, and in this respect differs from all other possible starting-points. It ends in the discovery of a principle of certainty, from which philosophy may begin.

Philosophy, therefore, sets out with a certainty, and not with an hypothesis, and Rosmini on several occasions combats Hegel, who held the opposite view. Speaking of the question, With what must philosophy begin? he says, Hegel felt the importance of this question, and replied that whatever philosophy may begin with, that beginning must always be an hypothesis, since all immediate knowing is purely hypothetical.* This doctrine was suggested by sensism, from which the German school could never purge itself, although it assumed the title of Transcendental Idealism. In fact, it recognizes as immediate nothing but sense - experience, and this it calls the starting - point of philosophy. It accepts the Aristotelian dictum, Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu, and its system consists in adding that Nihil est in sensu quod prius non fuerit in intellectu. Hence it admits the two dicta as reciprocally true, and sums itself up in these words: 'What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational.' § Now, it is plain enough that, if philosophy have no other point of departure than sense-experience, internal or external, inasmuch as pure sense is non-cognition, and the cognition of sensible things presents itself to the mind of the philosopher as so many subjective cognitions, he must regard these as hypotheses, as data not yet fully verified. But is it true, as this philosopher asserts, that the startingpoint of philosophy is experience? This is, indeed, an hypothesis of his, and it is a curious thing to see, while he refuses to admit anything that is not demonstrated, and

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† “ Μὴ αἰσθανόμενος μηθὲν, οὐθὲν ἂν μάθοι (ὁ νοῦς) οὐδὲ ξυνείη” (De An., iii. 8, 3; 432 a, 7: cf. De Sens., 6, 445 b, 16, and Leibniz, Nouv. Essais, ii. 1). Hegel is hardly right when he says that this dictum is falsely attributed to Aristotle (Encylop., Einleitung, § 8).

§ "Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig" (Philosophie des Rechts, p. 17; cf. Encyclop., vol. i. p. 10, § 6).

denies philosophical value to all immediate knowledge, with what confidence he sets out with this assertion, supposing it to be an infallible truth that experience is the starting-point of philosophy, and not only omitting to prove it, but even neglecting to subject it to any examination. This habit of placing the starting-point of philosophy in sense-experience is peculiar to that class of philosophers who begin with the subject, that is, the soul. But Hegel, by admitting that to begin with experience is to begin with an hypothesis, admits, at the same time, that this is not truly the beginning of philosophy, which is not an hypothesis, but is, on the contrary, as we have said, a necessary doctrine. For this reason, it is only where the necessary begins that theoretic philosophy can begin.

"Moreover, when Hegel, assuming that philosophy sets out from experience, lays down the universal dictum, 'Whatever philosophy may begin with, that beginning must always be an hypothesis,' he only takes a leap from the particular to the universal, drawing one of those illogical conclusions so frequent in our philosopher, who persuades himself that there cannot be anything but what presents itself to his imagination, and that is very little. If he had reflected that external and internal sense, the sources of experience, as well as the other faculties of the human subject and the human subject itself, are merely material conditions, necessary, not to the existence of the truth, but to making possible its communication to man (it could not be communicated to a subject which did not exist or had not the power of receiving the communication), he would have readily understood that these material conditions cannot constitute the principle of the required theory of truth, albeit the search for the truth presupposes them, exactly as a scaffolding, though necessary for the construction of a building, is neither the principle of the building nor even the smallest part of it. How afterwards experience and the subject of it enter into the theory of the whole, which absorbs them without being the principle of them, remains to be seen from the theory itself" (Theosophy, vol. i. S$ 19, 20; cf. § 53).