displaying actions totally or widely different from each other. The soul might be defined as the substance of the unity of sensation, or the substantial unity of sensation. It is thus that the soul is the substantial form of the body, as the Schoolmen said (see St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., Pt. i. q. 76). The human soul a principle at once sensitive and intellective. I22. But the human soul not only feels, but also intellectively perceives-perceives felt bodies and itself. The human soul, therefore, is a principle at once sensitive and intellective. The difference between sense and intelligence, now so frequently overlooked, was seen as early as Herakleitos, who says that "Those who hear without intelligence are like deaf persons ('Αξύνετοι ἀκούσαντες κωφοῖσι ἐοίκασι),” and "Eyes and ears are evil witnesses to men with barbarous souls (κακοὶ μάρτυρες ἀνθρώποισι ὀφθαλμοὶ καὶ ὦτα, βαρβάρους ψυχὰς ἐχόντων [ἔχουσι ?]” Bywater, Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiæ, pp. 2, 3). The distinction was more clearly brought out by Plato and Aristotle; but both made it far too wide, the former, by utterly separating the intelligible from the sensible world, the latter, by separating the intellective from the sensitive in man, and giving him, so to speak, two souls, one intellective and one sensitive. St. Thomas and the Schoolmen did not go much beyond Aristotle. They still continued to speak of the object of sense, as well as the object of intelligence, and of a common sense, as different from intelligence. Indeed, the true nature of the distinction was never cleared up until Rosmini showed that sense has only a term, while intelligence has an object, and that in cognition this term and this object are correlated as matter and form, as subject and object. This clearing up would not have been possible without the previous distinction between the matter and form of cognition. That this distinction found currency in philosophy, is mainly due to Kant, although, as Rosmini shows, it was previously made by Genovesi (1712-1769). That it was "ancient and, in Italy, well known," does not seem correct. (See New Essay, vol. i. § 328 n.). 123. When this sensitive principle pronounces it- In what sense the Ego expresses what sense the prin subject of logy. self, it uses the word I or Ego. I, therefore, is a word which expresses the soul, but expresses the soul, it in so far as it utters itself. It does not there- and in fore express the soul purely, but the soul invested it is called with certain relations to itself-the soul in a state ciple and of development. If we desire, therefore, to form Psychoa clear conception of the soul, pure and simple, we must carefully consider what the Ego contains, and then remove from it all that part which is known to have been added and acquired by the operations of the soul itself. It is the Ego as thus despoiled that is the principle and subject of Psychology. See above, under § 75. This is a most important distinction, and one which is, even to the present day, systematically and almost universally overlooked. The Ego is a selfaffirmed subject. Now, all affirmation belongs to the science of Logic. Hence the Ego, as such, is not the subject of Psychology, nor does any act of the Ego involving an affirmation form part of that subject. Aristotle saw this very plainly, and from his treatise On the Soul excluded everything involving the recognition of true objectivity. On the contrary, Herbert Spencer, who, as we have seen, does not understand the nature of the distinction between sensation and intelligence, introduces into his Psychology all the processes of reasoning. This is exactly the same thing as making Biology a branch of Inorganic Chemistry; for there is certainly as much difference between objectified and unobjectified sensation, as there is between animate and inanimate matter. It is not necessary to say that the soul's relation (objectively considered) to objectivity in general falls within the domain proper of Psychology. Complete definition of the human soul. I24. Proceeding in this way, we find, with the aid of Ideology, a more complete definition of the human soul, which may be thus expressed :-The human soul is an intellective and sensitive subject or principle, having by nature the intuition of being and a feeling whose term is extended, besides certain activities consequent upon intelligence and sensitivity. It is instructive to compare this definition with that of Aristotle, which for so many hundred years held possession of the philosophical world. According to that philosopher, "The soul is the first active form of a physical body having life in potentiality, and a body is such when it is organized” (“Ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δύναμις ζωὴν ἔχοντος. Τοιοῦτο δὲ ὁ ἂν ᾖ όρ yavikóv." De Animâ, ii. 1, 5; 411 b, 26 sq.) It will be seen at a glance that, while this is the definition of the soul as the principle of life, Rosmini's definition refers to the soul as the principle of cognition. But the two are by no means so distinct as at first sight might seem. This will appear if we note how the former was understood by the Schoolmen, and what by them seen to involve. St. Thomas * On the meaning of evreλéxela, see Trendelenburg, Aristot. De An., Lib. III., p. 295, sqq.; Biese, Die Philosophie des Aristoteles, vol. i. pp. 355, 452, 479 sqq.; ii. 129, 207 sq., 214 sq.; Bonitz, Aristot. Metaphys., pp. 387 sq. (1047 a, 30); Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, vol. ii. pt. ii. p. 480; Teichmüller, Aristotelische Forschungen, iii. pp. 55 sqq., 119 sqq., etc., etc. translates it thus: "Anima est actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis," and adds: “Comparatur igitur anima ad corpus, sicut forma ad materiem." Hence it is a standing principle with all orthodox Thomists that the soul is the substantial form of the body.* And when they say "the soul," they mean the intellective part of it, the νοῦς oι ψυχὴ νοητική, that which Aristotle calls the place of forms (τόπος εἰδῶν) and the form of forms (εἶδος εἰδῶν). St. Thomas, in the conclusio of the article above cited, says, "Since the intellective principle is that whereby man is originally intelligent, whether it be called intellect or intellective soul, it must be united to the human body as form." And this is correct, for the first active form of the human body, as such, must be intelligence. This is easily shown. The human body, as such, is the correlate term of the unity of human sensation, and must, therefore, be determined by the same form as that unity. But the unity of human sensation is intelligence. Since the unity of sensation must be something that is aware of all sensations, and since one sensation cannot be aware of another, the unity of sensation cannot be itself sensation. But that which is aware of all sensations without being itself a sensation, is intelligence. Hence, intelligence is the unity of human sensation, and consequently the unity or substantial form of the body, which is the correlate term of such sensation. Hence Aristotle's definition, as correctly interpreted by the Schoolmen, involves Rosmini's. The above reasoning may seem somewhat scholastic and wire-drawn; but it is the sober truth. It is worth while here to call attention to a definition of the soul which was given in ancient times, and agrees in several essential points with Rosmini's. It is that of Porphyry, who in the eighteenth of his Sentences (Apopμai πρòç τà voŋτá) says, "The soul is an essence, unextended, Zigliara, Summa Philosophica, vol. ii. p. 138, says, "Anima humana unitur corpori nostro ut vera ejus forma substantialis." "Cum principium intellectivum sit quo primo intelligit homo, sive vocetur intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, necesse est ipsum uniri corpori humano ut formam (Sum. Theol. i., q. 76, art. 4). immaterial, imperishable, endowed with essential, selfderived life, possessing being." This, of course, is a definition of the soul as separated from its sensible term, the body, and, as such, is very remarkable: first, because it identifies the soul with life, as Rosmini does (see § 125, 2); and second, because it attributes to it the possession of being, which, according to Rosmini, is the essential form of intelligence. Whether Porphyry saw all that this attribution involves, may be regarded as doubtful; but when one remembers that the whole of mediæval philosophy had its origin in a single sentence of the Eisagôge of this philosopher,† one will not pronounce very dogmatically upon the limits of his insight. Certain it is that very many of his utterances coincide, in a most remarkable way, with those of Rosimini, and seem to be based upon the same principles. Hence are deduced the other properties of the human soul. Simplicity. 125. From this definition, which expresses the essence of the soul, may be deduced its properties, the most important of which are these two-simplicity and immortality. The simplicity of the soul is shown by the facts that it is a single principle, and that it is unconditioned by space. That it is a single principle, is evident; for it is the same principle which feels and understands. That it is unconditioned by space, is shown from this, that the act of feeling excludes extension through the opposition by * “ Ἡ ψυχὴ οὐσία ἀμεγέθης, ἄϋλος, ἄφθαρτος, ἐν ζωῇ παρ' ἑαυτῆς ἐχούσῃ τὸ Šĥv, KEKTημÉVη Tò elva." Cf. my translation of these Sentences in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. iii. Another rendering is possible. † See Hauréau, De la Philosophie Scolastique, vol. i. cp. iv. ; cf. Ueberweg's Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie (American translation), vol. i. p. 365 sq. The sentence allu 'ed to refers to the nature of genera and species. See Berlin edition of Aristotle, vol. iv. p. 1 a. 8-13. |