I02. being? To say that the essence of a being does not What is include subsistence is equivalent to saying that contingent the perceived being has not in itself the ground of its own subsistence, and that it is contingent. "In the concept of being it is necessary that they [all limited modes] exist, otherwise it would no longer be the concept of being, which has unlimited extension. There are, therefore, two necessities, both arising from the nature of being "(1) The necessity that being should exist in itself, and, therefore, that it should have its proper terms, without which its existence in itself would be wanting, and therefore would annul itself in itself. This is the necessity of absolute being. "(2) The necessity that being should exist as intelligible, because, if it were not intelligible, it would lack the concept of being in itself, and therefore, à fortiori, would lack existence in itself. The necessity of the concept of being implies that in this concept are contained also all the limited modes of being, without which that concept would be another, and no longer that of being. This is the necessity of the possible (possibilium), or of the essences of limited things (cf. New Essay, §§ 307 n., 375 n., 1106, 1158, 1460). Hence comes the concept of contingency. Every necessity springs out of the nature of being, and reduces itself to this formula: Necessity is the property which being has of existing in itself.' The conditions of the existence of being are two: (1) that it exist with its proper terms; (2) that the concept of it, embracing all improper terms, exist. But it is not a condition of the existence of being in itself that it exist in itself with its finite terms. The real existence of these is not, therefore, necessary. The absence of this necessity is called contingency. Contingency, therefore, is that negative property of finite beings, whereby they do not necessarily exist in themselves, The prin- cause, and contains the reason why all peoples believe that God exists. 103. With the principle of cause, we run through the whole series of second causes; but finding them all contingent, we are not able to stop with them. Reflection does not rest until it has arrived at a first cause, in whose essence subsistence is included, and this cause is God. The principle of cause, which thus unfolds until it reaches its last operation, was called by us the principle of integration. All men, from a necessity which belongs to intelligent reflection, use the principle of integration with great rapidity, run through the second causes in a body, and, by an irresistible rational instinct, arrive at the knowledge of God. For this reason the existence of God has been admitted in all times and by all the peoples of the world (cf. Logic, §§ 680-684). This is true, and yet the proof of the existence of God derived from the supposed necessity of positing a first cause is an extremely fallacious one. The argument takes this form. If there be no first cause, there must be an infinite succession of caused causes; in other words, an infinite number of successive causes. But infinite number is a contradiction in terms, that is, an absurdity. Therefore there must be a first cause. The whole force of the argument lies in the unthinkability of an infinite number actually realized. It is quite true that, an infinite number is unthinkable, because all number, from its very nature, is finite. But number altogether is but an intellective mode of grouping, and does not lie in things themselves. It may, therefore, be admitted that in finite time it is impos- 104. principles tion are in the to the first Reflection is guided by other principles be- All other sides these; but, in the last analysis, all its ope- of reflecrations reduce themselves to comparing a known reducible object with ideal being, in order to see how far, san and in what mode, it partakes of the essence of and unibeing, and how far it falls short of that essence. truth, the Hence all reflection is by itself an instrument of being truth, having truth as its type and as the measure naturally intuited by of all things. versal essence of us. 105. of the art The validity of human reasoning being thus Purposes demonstrated, Logic undertakes to teach the art of reasonof it. The first purpose of the art of reasoning ing. is the avoidance of error, and the second, the attainment, by means of reasoning, of the end proposed. 106. errors in We avoid errors when we proceed so that the How mind affirms nothing gratuitously, and that the reasoning faculty of conviction is always guided by reason, ed. are avoid Des cartes' four rules of method. in such a way that what we say to ourselves is These four rules, expressed in succinct and comprehensive language, are: "(1) To accept nothing as true which is not clearly known to be such, from its presenting itself to the mind so clearly and distinctly as to give no occasion for doubt; (2) to divide, as far as possible, every problem into its natural parts; (3) to arrange one's thoughts in due order, advancing gradually from the more simple and easy to the more complex and difficult, and to suppose a definite order, for the sake of orderly progress in research, even when none such is furnished naturally by the subject under consideration; (4) by exhaustive enumerations and complete revisions, to take care that nothing be overlooked" (Discours de la Méthode, Part II.). Rosmini lays down six rules or norms, which he reduces to these two precepts— "(1) Never affirm anything you do not know, or in a mode different from that in which you know it. The same applies to denying. "(2) Affirm with your inner thought all that you know, but affirm it in the mode in which you know it, without addition or subtraction. The same applies to denying (Logic, § 168). Three aims of reasoning. Hence three methods apodeictic, heuristic, and didactic. 107. The aims proposed by reasoning are three : first, to demonstrate and defend truth: second, to discover new truth, and, third, to teach the truth to others. Hence the three methods, the apodeictic, the heuristic or inventive, and the didactic, each of which has its special rules. Rosmini devotes a considerable portion of his Logic to an examination and classification of these rules (Book ii. § iv. pp. 305-473, §§ 749-1038). He has also left a very valuable work, treating of the didactic method as applied to education. The title of it is, On the Supreme Principle of Method, and on Some of its Applications, for the Benefit of Human Education. This work, which is almost unknown outside of Italy, contains many excellent thoughts on education. 108. of the to which forms of are re The apodeictic method uses various forms of Artifice argumentation, but they may all be reduced to syllogism, that of the syllogism. The artifice of the the various syllogism consists in showing that the proposition to be demonstrated is already contained in ducible. another proposition, either evident or, at least, certain. The syllogism is composed of three propositions, the last of which is called the conclusion or thesis, and the other two the premises. The one of the two premises implicitly contains the conclusion, and the other proves that it really contains it. The proposition which we wish to show to be contained in the first premise must have either the same subject or the same predicate as that premise. If the subject is the same in both propositions, it is sufficient to show that the predicate of the conclusion is contained in the predicate of the proposition assumed. If the pre dicate is identical, it is sufficient to show that the subject of the conclusion is contained in the subject of the proposition assumed. In order to show that the predicate or the subject of the conclusion |