Rosmini distinguishes between regressive philosophy, which, by way of reflection, conducts the mind to find. the principle from which the science of being is derived; progressive philosophy, or Theosophy, which is that same science of being, derived from its principle; and mediate philosophy, which furnishes the conditions, formal (Logic) as well as material (Psychology), of the passage of the mind from regressive philosophy (Ideology) to progressive philosophy (Theosophy)" (Theosophy, i. § 16). Schelling made the same distinction between regressive and progressive philosophy. This whole subject is treated at considerable length in the New Essay, vol. i. Preliminary, §§ 31-35. The starting-point of the man who begins to philosophize is one of four starting-points which are frequently confounded, but which Rosmini distinguishes with care. These are (1) man's starting-point when he first begins to develop; (2) the starting-point of the human spirit; (3) the starting-point of the man who begins to philosophize; and (4) the starting-point of philosophy as science, or of the system of human cognition. The first he considers to be external sensation; the second, the notion of being; the third, the point of mental growth which the man has reached; and the fourth, "that luminous point from which all other cognitions derive their clearness of certainty and truth, viz., the idea of being" (New Essay, vol. i. Preliminary, § 5; more at length vol. iii. §§ 1468-1472). In regard to the third of these starting-points, which is the one that at present concerns us, he says, "When a man begins to philosophize, he is already developed. he cannot set out from any other point than that at which he is. To do anything else is impossible for him. Condillac and Bonnet, in their discourses, pretend to transport themselves to the first beginning of cognition and imagine a statue with one sense. But in doing so, no matter whether well or ill, they take an immense leap; they seek to cross an abyss in trying to forget, all at once, the intellectual condition in which they are, in order to watch, as spectators of another nature, the effect of the first sensations which a man feels. The time for that is past for them, for ever past" (New Essay, vol. iii. § 1471). ... Now Philosophy conducts from the certainty that things seem to the certainty that they are; in other words, from subjective persuasion to objective conviction. If being and knowing were the same, as Parmenides and Hegel allege, there would be no place for philosophy, inasmuch as there would be no distinction between an hallucination and a true cognition. It is curious that Tennyson, in the later editions of In Memoriam, has altered seems to is in the lines (cxiii. 6): "And what I am beheld again What seems, and no man understands." SCIENCES OF INTUITION. (Ideology and Logic.) Rosmini defines intuition as "the (receptive) act of the soul, whereby it receives the communication of intelligible or ideal being," and adds, "This act is called intelligence by Aristotle, who says that 'intelligence is of indivisibles,' calling indivisibles the essences of things which are seen in ideas. Hence, in the language of the Schoolmen, cognitio simplicis intelligentiæ means the same thing as cognition of possibles. For this reason it is clear that Kant perverted the language of philosophy, when he usurped the word intuition to mean sense perception. In making this alteration in the meaning of the word, he gave proof of the sensism which lies at the basis of his system, attributing to sense the act which specially belongs to intelligence" (Psychology, vol. i. § 53). Kant defines intuition thus: "Through the medium of sensibility objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions." t It is against this doctrine, than which nothing can be more false, that Rosmini's system is specially directed. Rosmini most emphatically denies that objects are given to us through the senses. Intelligence alone has an object: the *This is not strictly correct. Aristotle merely says, "H uèv oʊv Tŵv ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος” (De An., iii. 6, 1). † Kritik der rein. Vern., Die transcend. Esthetik, § 1. Ideology and Logic. senses have only terms.* When he says that "to have before the mind the essence of things, without any affirmation on the part of the subject, is called to intuite" (Logic, § 320), he agrees exactly with St. Thomas, who says, "Intelligere dicit nihil aliud quam simplicem INTUITUM intellectus in id quod sibi est præsens intelligible" (Sent., dist. iii. art. 5, q. 5). 1. Ideology. 10. Ideology undertakes to investigate the nature of human knowledge; Logic, to show that the nature of this knowledge is such as not to admit. the possibility of error. Hence error must be looked for elsewhere than in the nature of knowledge. Error is not knowledge. Ideology forms the subject of Rosmini's earliest important work, the New Essay on the Origin of Ideas, as well as of the voluminous treatise, The Restoration of Philosophy in Italy, the treatise on The Idea, forming the second half of the fourth volume of the Theosophy, and the polemical work, Aristotle Explained and Examined (see Bibliography). As Ideology is presupposed in every science, it is frequently touched upon in every one of Rosmini's works. "Ideology," he says, "treats of being, the object of the mind; Psychology, of the soul, which is the principle of human feeling. These, therefore, are the two sciences which furnish the rudiments of all the others. All the others, in the last analysis, resolve themselves into these two" (Psychology, vol. i. § 46). As Rosmini's chief philosophical merits lie in the direction of Ideology, it will be necessary here to point out what he did for that science, as well as what that science, as developed by him, does for philosophy. *See under §§ 15, 18, 74. Aristotle, in the first chapter of the first book of his Psychology, calls attention, in concise terms, to a fundamental difficulty incident to all philosophical research. "It is difficult," he says, "to determine whether we ought first to investigate the different parts of the soul or their functions, the intellective principle or intelligence, the sensitive principle or sensation. And even if we begin with the functions, there remains still another perplexity, whether we ought not to investigate the terms of the principles before the principles themselves, the intelligible before the intellective principle, and the sensible before the sensitive principle." * In other words, if we consider merely intelligence and its conditions, it is difficult to know whether philosophy ought to begin with a theory of cognition, with logic, or with metaphysics. With whichever of the three we set out, we soon find that we have presupposed the other two. As Hegel puts it, “A beginning, in so far as it is an immediate, makes an assumption, or, rather, is itself an assumption." † If we begin with logic, we find that we have presupposed the main truths both of the theory of cognition and of metaphysics. Without the former, the nature of the form of concepts would be unintelligible; without the latter, the nature of their content. In regard to the former, Jaesche, the editor of Kant's Logic, says, "Kant never thought of trying to find a ground for the logical proposition of identity and contradiction, or of deducing the logical forms of judgments. He accepted and used the principle of contradiction as a proposition carrying its own evidence with it, and requiring no deduction from a higher principle. . . . Whether, however, the logical propositions of identity and contradiction, absolutely and in themselves, admit and require * σε Χαλεπὸν . . . διορίσαι . . . πότερον τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ νοεῖν ἢ τὸν νοῦν, καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον, πάλιν ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικεί μενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ νοητὸν TOÙ VONTIKOÛ" (De An., i. 1, 6, 7; 402 b, 10 sqq.). When Belger (Hermes, xiii. p. 32) proposes to read in the last sentence αἰσθάνεσθαι for αἰσθητικοῦ, and voeîv for voηTIKOû, he only shows that he does not understand the passage. † Encyclopædie, Einleitung, § 1, ad fin. a deduction from a higher principle, is another question, which leads to the important inquiry whether there is at all any absolutely first principle of all cognition and science. . . . But since, on the other hand, these highest principles of knowledge, considered as principles, with equal necessity presuppose the logical form, the result is a circle, which cannot, indeed, be resolved for science, but may be explained."* In regard to the dependence of logic upon metaphysics, Trendelenburg says, “Thought, with its forms, will hardly be known without an examination of the reciprocal action between it and the nature of its objects."† If, on the other hand, we begin with a theory of knowledge, we find that it involves both logic and metaphysics. As F. A. Lange says, “The theory of cognition is based upon logic, metaphysics, and psychology, and, therefore, has no unifying principle. It will appear farther on that this science is resolvable into a (Kantian) purely a priori search for the postulates which cognition presupposes, and the psychological theory of cognition, which is of a purely empirical nature. Both branches of the science presuppose an accurate investigation of the logical forms."‡ Again, if we set out with metaphysics, we plainly presuppose logic, and, therefore, also a theory of cognition. Zeller is perfectly correct when he says, "Logic, as scientific methodology, must precede all investigation of the real; and this is true with regard not only to all those sciences which deal with particular branches of the real (nature or the human spirit), but even to metaphysics and the most general portion of them, viz. ontology. Even ontology will never be successfully treated until we come to an understanding in regard to the mode of its treatment; that is, until we know whether it is to be handled in an à priori or in an à posteriori manner, by reflection upon something given or by dialectic construction."§ It is thus plain that science, and * Imm. Kant's Logik, Vorrede, pp. 7, 8, edit. Kirchmann. † Logische Untersuchungen, vol. i. p. 17. Logische Studien, p. 1, note. § Ueber Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnisstheorie. Vortrag (Heidelberg, 1862), p. 8. An admirable discourse! Ein akademischer |