falsity of the matter, that is, of the propositions which form the premises of the syllogism; second, those which sin against the form of the syllogism; and, third, those whose falsity results not so much from the particular argumentation as from the intent of the dispute" (Logic, § 710). Rosmini devotes a section of his Logic to a consideration of the various forms of sophism, Book ii. sect. iii. pp. 281-304 His definition of Sophistic corresponds closely with that given by Aristotle: "Εστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη σοφία οὖσα δ ̓ οὔ, καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ ̓ οὐκ οὔσης” (Top., ix. 1 ; 165a, 21 sqq.).

More on perception.

Analysis of corporeal sensations.

74.

But let us return to perception, the solid basis of all knowledge in so far as it has real beings for its object.

Any felt activity is sufficient to make the intelligent mind affirm that a real being subsists. Activity (felt) and reality are the same thing. Reality is a form of being, not being itself. The latter is added in the act of perception. The first felt activities which rouse our faculty of judgment and make us affirm the subsistence of certain beings are corporeal feelings (sensioni). If we analyze these feelings, we find in each of them three activities: first, the activity which modifies us without our wills, and toward which we are passive; second, the sensation which is the effect of that activity; and, third, ourselves who are modified. At first, indeed, the attention of our intelligence, instead of dividing itself equally between these three, concentrates itself upon the first, so that our first affirmation is that there are external bodies.

When we affirm the existence of external bodies, there is in our sensation something more than the external bodies, that is, than the agent which modifies us; nevertheless we do not advert to it or become aware of it. And here we must

We

observe the law of mental attention. Intellectual Law of intellectual attention is the force which directs our understand- attention. ing. This force is characterized by having the power of applying the understanding to any object it chooses, of restricting it to a single object or to one part of a feeling, and of affirming one object at a time, to the exclusion of all the rest. must not, however, suppose that, when attention directs and applies the understanding to a sphere more or less restricted, it proceeds by mere chance. On the contrary, it follows certain fixed laws, imposed upon it, for the most part, by the nature of being. This, however, is not the place to speak of these laws. It is enough to give prominence to the fact that, in virtue of this faculty, perception limits itself to a single object, however many there may be even necessarily connected with it. The The necessary nexus of two objects does not enter the perception, or even into that concept of the does not being which is immediately derived from percep- perception. Thus, when I affirm the existence of an external body and thereby perceive it, I do not necessarily, with the same perception, affirm either myself or the act of perception. Fichte is therefore in error when he says that we perceive the Ego and the non-Ego contemporaneously and in the same act.

necessary

into nexus of

objects

enter into

tion.

Of the three activities intellectually distinguishable in feeling (sensione) Rosmini would confine the term sensation to the third. "We have reserved the word sensation," he says, "to mark simply the sentient subject in so far as it feels, using the phrase sensitive perception of bodies to designate the same sensation, in so far as it is a passion [Tálos], which, as such, has necessarily a relation to something external and different from the sentient subject. Hence, first, sensitive perception of bodies, and, second, intellective perception. Now, in the case of sensitive perception

our spirits seize and envelop the bodies themselves, which is not true of intellective perception, except in so far as it presupposes the other as matter. . . . Sensitive perception is an element (the matter) which enters into intellective perception. Intellective perception, therefore, composed of matter and form, cannot be said to resemble sensitive perception, because the latter is not co-ordinate with the former— but subordinate to it-an element, not a copy, of it" (New Essay, vol. ii. § 453, nn.).

In regard to the order of perception and the fact that, in external perception, we are not obliged to perceive ourselves, Rosmini lays down three propositions, viz., "first, experience demonstrates that every action of a limited being has a term, either external to such being, or, at least, distinct from the beginning of the action; ... second, if every fresh action of beings proceeds from within and is directed outwards, this must be true also of the action which the human intellect performs in perceiving; third, the term of perception is its object, and the object of perception means that which we perceive and cognize in perception." He then adds: "Hence follows the corollary that what is perceived in the act of perception is the object of the same, neither more nor less. If, indeed, we should perceive anything else besides the object of perception, this thing would at once be object by the very definition. Hence, man, the intellective being, does not, with his first perception, perceive himself, but only something else that is presented to him as object. This is confirmed by experience. Man perceives himself only by a reflected movement, in

which he turns back upon himself; the external world, on the contrary, he perceives with a direct perception, in which, so to speak, he leaves and forgets himself, to go out and cognize the world in which his perception terminates, and in which he becomes limited by the limitation of his object. As, therefore, the external world is not the percipient Ego, so the perception of the external world and that of the Ego are two perceptions essentially distinct; and it is impossible for a man to perceive these two objects for the first time with one and the same perception, not only because they are essentially distinct, but also because they are presented to him by two essentially different feelingsthe one by an internal feeling, the other by external sensations. Whence it is that the act of perceiving in these two perceptions has a contrary direction. The act of perceiving the world goes from within outward; that of perceiving the Ego has a direction, so to speak, from within to within. Now, since one and the same act cannot have two contrary directions, it is absurd to say that a single first perception perceives the Ego and the world in one. What may

have given occasion to this false belief is the confusion. between feeling and intellective perception" (New Essay, vol. iii. §§ 1433-1436).

We have already alluded to the distinction which Rosmini draws between term and object (under §§ 15, 18). It will be well here to make it more clear by giving his own account of it. "No other faculty," he says, "except the understanding, has for its term an object. By object we understand a term seen in such a way that the seer sees neither himself nor any relation to himself (that is, as intuiting subject), and that himself . . . remains excluded. and forgotten, while the term stands by itself and appears as existing in an absolute mode. It appears simply as being (essente), and, although it is an intuited being, nevertheless, by merely looking at it, we cannot know or say that it is intuited in order to know this, we must perform an act of reflection upon the intuition. This is the marvellous property of the understanding, that which distinguishes it from every other faculty, and especially from that of feeling.

The faculty of feeling has for its term the felt. But the felt involves an essential relation to the sentient, so that it is impossible to conceive that the felt exists without implicitly conceiving the sentient and its act. Hence the felt is not object, but simple term, and the faculty of feeling has not the essential property of the faculty of understanding" (Logic, §§ 303-305). This is one of the most original, characteristic, and important distinctions in the whole of Rosmini's philosophy, and one that saves him from many ambiguities into which other philosophers have fallen. Without it, it is impossible to state the essential quality of intelligence as distinct from sensation. To hear most philosophers talk, one would suppose that sensation was capable of distinguishing between subject and object, which, if it were true, would render intelligence a superfluity. Aristotle is guilty of this confusion. He speaks of the objects of sense as well as of the objects of intelligence (πάλιν ἄν τις απορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερα τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τὸ VONTOV TOû VONTIкou." De An. i. 1, 7; 402 b, 14 sqq.). The same confusion is the source of all the errors of Kant. This philosopher says, “The faculty (receptivity) of receiving representations in the way in which we are affected by objects is called sense (Sinnlichkeit). By means of the senses, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone. furnishes us with intuitions; by the understanding they are thought, and from it spring concepts" (Kritik der reinen Vern., pt. i. § 1). Just as if things were objects before they were thought or conceived! It is needless to say that the same confusion runs through nearly all modern philosophy.

Source of
Fichte's

error,

confusion between feeling

and perception.

75.

Whence arises Fichte's error? From not having carefully distinguished what takes place in feeling from what takes place in intellective perception. It is most true that in our sensation