"There is error every time that there is attributed to a subject a predicate which does not belong to it. Hence the point where the error lies is the nexus between the predicate and the subject" (§ 244). Much to the same effect may be found in Dr. Newman's Grammar of Assent. 6. knowing. But this lower form of mental quiet is not Popular and philonecessarily lasting. A mind possessed by strong sophical and firm convictions, of which it has never examined the ultimate grounds, may suddenly find itself confronted by an ultimate why. Will it then remain in a state of unquiet and uncertainty, until it has found the needed reply? Here we must distinguish between repose of mind and repose of spirit. The former demands demonstration, the latter only persuasion; and these are two widely different things. Demonstration has something necessary, almost fatal, about it, while persuasion has much that is voluntary. Hence it is that a man may have firm persuasions, without being able to assign the precise grounds of them. Moreover, among these unreasoned convictions there are some that are blind, and some that are rational. Blind convictions are arbitrary, groundless, and often erroneous, although, by accident, they may be true. Rational persuasions, which a man holds, without being able to assign the grounds of them, are such as rest upon really solid grounds, known indeed directly, and comprehended sufficiently to command assent, but not sufficiently analyzed by reflection to enable him to express them either to himself or others, if he is questioned about them. The mind, the persuasions of such a man lack something, namely, the development of reflection; nevertheless, he possesses truth and a persuasion of the truth, strong enough to produce repose of spirit. He may even enjoy repose of mind, if, by refusing attention to his inner questionings, he succeed in stifling them. He is then in the same condition as if the questions had not been put. Philosophy the restorer of repose of intellect. 7. But the mind of such a man, that is, his faculty of demonstration, considered with reference to itself, and not with reference to persuasion and quiet of spirit, or to the possession of truth and certitude, has not satisfied its own demands, and, hence, has not found repose. Philosophy is what restores scientific repose of intellect. Difference between demon stration and persuasion. 8. There is, therefore, a popular knowing, sufficient for the purposes of ordinary life, and there is a philosophical knowing, calculated to satisfy the demands of the faculty of demonstration. The latter is the work of reflection, carried forward to the discovery of ultimate grounds. Rosmini devotes a considerable number of pages in his New Essay to clearing up the distinction between direct, popular, and philosophical cognition. "Direct cognition," * he says, "consists of intellective perceptions and the ideas which detach themselves from perceptions. Reflection, set in motion by language, then comes forward, and its first steps are those whereby it marks the relations, immediate or almost immediate, of the things perceived and apprehended. This first operation of reflection does not yet analyze the single perceptions and ideas of things. It leaves them entire as they were when it first acquired them, merely contemplating them together. It is still a synthetic operation of which all persons are capable. Hence, it forms a large part, not to say the whole, of common or popular science. Philosophical science, on the contrary, begins with the analysis of simple objects. When things perceived submit themselves to analysis, they acquire a singular light, which is what ennobles the wisdom of the wise. This analysis may be considered the starting-point of philosophy. Setting out from it, philosophy proceeds to confirm those great relations between beings (esseri) which the great mass of mankind have already observed, and, we might almost say, intuitively noted. Hence, popular science occupies an intermediate position between direct science on the one hand, and philosophical science on the other. It springs from a first reflection, whereas philosophical science requires a second reflection. The first strong reflection of popular cognition adds no new matter to cognition, but merely discovers new immediate relations in it. The reflections which follow bring out other relations between the preceding cognitions. If direct cognition enjoys immunity from error, the case is very different with popular cognition, which is already partly the fruit of reflection, not to say also partly of imagination. Philosophical cognition, moreover, is, of all the forms of cognition, the most liable to error, being the offspring of a more remote reflection" (§§ 1264-1267). Rosmini's distinction between the three kinds of knowing is almost exactly the same as that which Aristotle draws between perception (aïo@nois), experience (μπepía), and * Zvykexvμéva, as Aristotle says: see Physica, i. 1, 184 a, 21 sq. C theory (réxvn) or science (TOTÝμN).* To Aristotle's distinction between theory and science, viz. that the former deals with production or becoming, the latter with being (“Ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ τὴν γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ETTIOTμns." Anal. Post., ii. 19, 100 a, 7, seq.), Rosmini has nothing corresponding. The distinction between special sciences and philosophy comes very near it. St. Thomas, of course, follows Aristotle, as do the Scholastics generally. Kant's distinction between experience (Erfahrung), understanding, and reason † is equivalent to the one made by Aristotle, since Kant's experience corresponds to Aristotle's perception. Even Hegel's distinction of the stages of knowing into consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason is not essentially different,‡ although under the term reason are included religion, which, according to Rosmini, is, as such, no part of philosophy at all (§ 151), and absolute knowing, which he would attribute only to God (Theosophy, i. § 11). It is needless to say that Rosmini totally rejects Hegel's process, as well as the identification of reason and spirit (Geist) which results from it § (Theosophy, vol. iv. P. 459). Rosmini has treated, at great length, of the nature of persuasion, the difference between it and certainty, truth, and conviction, and the part which the will plays in it (Logic, §§ 136 sq., 1099 sq.; New Essay, §§ 1335 sq., 1044 sq.). He treats also, at considerable length, of the nature of mental satisfaction (appagamento). "We distinguish," he says, "satisfaction from persuasion, considering persuasion as an effect or state which remains in a man every time he adheres and assents to any truth, but which does not necessarily take away his curiosity to discover a further ground, whereas satisfaction is a more universal effect or state of the mind, causing it to search no further, and * Metaph., i. 1; cf. the commentaries of Schwegler and Bonitz. Phænomenlogie des Geistes, throughout. § Phan. des Geistes, pp. 327, sqq. leaving it without the thought that there is anything further to search into. . . . Satisfaction may be absolute or relative" (Logic, § 1161). "Absolute satisfaction arises when these two extremes are realized: (1) That the mind shall have succeeded in knowing the ultimate grounds of things, so that no further research remains possible; (2) That it shall be conscious of having thus succeeded. If it did not recognize as ultimate grounds those which it has discovered, even though they really were such, it would still feel as if it ought to continue its search and therefore would not be satisfied" (§ 1162). Inasmuch as absolute ultimate grounds are inaccessible to man on account of the limitations of his nature, he must content himself with grounds that are ultimate with respect to these (see note to § 2). "For satisfaction of mind, therefore, it is necessary, First, that a man consciously, and therefore reflectively, succeed in reaching the ultimate formal ground; Second, that being unable to find the last real ground, he make allowance for his impotence and resign himself to the necessity of the limit imposed on him by nature" (Logic, § 1168). But as such satisfaction is only relative, it follows that this is the only form of mental satisfaction possible in this life. 9. "I questions Philo their con sequences. In endeavouring to discover these grounds, a The first man must set out from the intellectual condition put by in which he finds himself (§ 4). And the first sophy, and question he puts to himself takes this form: imagine I know many things, but what is my knowing itself? May I not be deceived? Why may not all that I think I know be a delusion?" These questions lead him to the discovery of Ideology and Logic, which, as having ideas for their object, are Sciences of Intuition. |