deductions), we may say that indeterminate being is the union of being and nothing, because it contains at once ideal being and the zero of reality. Let it further be admitted, by another figure of speech, that becoming is the union of being and nothing, because, in the act of becoming, we conceive the cessation of one being and the beginning of another. After all this is admitted, it will not follow, in the least, that indeterminate being is becoming, although both may be defined as the union of being and nothing. This definition would not signify the same thing in the two cases. What it would signify when applied to indeterminate being would be something different from its signification as applied to becoming. The union of being and nothing, in the case of indeterminate being, would be a mode of union different from the union of being and nothing in the case of becoming. In indeterminate being there are entirely wanting the concepts of annulment and production there is nothing but (ideal) being and (real) non-being. In becoming, on the contrary, there are not simply being and non-being, but annulment and production. Nothing and annulment are two different things. Nothing presupposes nothing, whereas annulment presupposes an agent that annuls and an entity that is annulled. So likewise, being and the production of being are two different things. Being expresses a completed, quiet act; production expresses an uncompleted, unquiet act. We must, therefore, at all events, reform these definitions, figurative though they be, and say that indeterminate being is the union of (ideal) being and (real) nothing, whereas becoming is the union, not the identification, of annulment and production. When the definitions are thus reduced, they have lost their identity. The Hegelian sophism, therefore, comes from having abandoned the ancient logic, which, if our philosopher had studied it, would have taught him to begin his discussions with rigorous definitions and with acute analyses. If he had made such definitions and analyses, the whole enchantment, under which the mind of the Berlin professor lies, would have vanished as if at the sign of the cross.

"(13) And, in fact, all this large number of errors in this

small number of words arises not only from the omission of definitions, but, above all, from the omission of analysis. Hegel, who is so contemptuous of the learning of the ages, which fine spirits have now declared too vulgar, has introduced into philosophy his concept of becoming, borrowing it bodily from the vulgar. He has not taken the least trouble to rectify or purify it, but has placed it, in all its roughness, bulk, and confusion, as the corner-stone of his edifice. Had he applied a little philosophical analysis to it, he would have seen that becoming, as the vulgar conceive it, does not exist in nature save phenomenally. But our philosopher, while he imagines that he is soaring aloft as an eagle, is deceived by the most ordinary prejudices, and contents himself with wrapping them up in obscure verbiage. Becoming, therefore, as we have said, does not exist in the sense of being a point in which one being annuls itself and another begins; but whatever instant we choose to assign, in that instant being either is or is not, and of that which is, we cannot say that it is not yet. Thus, in creation, which Hegel professes to admit,* between the existence and non-existence of the world there was no middle step. Nor is creation a beginning: it is a positing of being in all its completeness. In creation, therefore, there is not a something which becomes, and, even in the created world, becoming belongs to the changing modes of real being, not to being itself; and even of these modes, every one at every instant either is or is not. At all events, it is another mistake thus to apply to substantial being that which may only, in a certain sense, be predicated of its modes and determinations; and Hegel applies becoming to being, in such a way that, not content with making being itself become [i.e. enter into the process of its own determination], and become whatever he chooses, he tries to make it becoming itself. But even with respect to the modes and determinations of being, it cannot. . . be asserted that

* "Die tiefere Anschauung ist dagegen diese, dass Gott die Welt aus Nichts erschaffen habe" (Enclyclop., pt. i. § 128. Cf. Siebeck, Die Lehre des Aristoteles von der Ewigkeit der Welt, in Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der Griechen, pp. 137-189; Bernays, Die unter Philon's Werken stehende Schrift über die Unzerstörbarkeit des Weltalls).

there is any true continuity of transition other than phenomenal, or that one state succeeds another immediately. To be sure, there is continuity; but this means no more than that the successive states of a being which develops itself -for example, a plant-are so little different from each other that our powers of observation are not equal to distinguishing them, and that, therefore, we imagine there is continuity. As we have elsewhere demonstrated, the concept of continuity in motion is a confused concept, concealing an absurdity.* Hegel, therefore, adopts, as the basis of his system and of his new logic, a most vulgar concept, phenomenal in its origin, confused and carrying within it an absurdity. One can easily conceive that a philosopher, who sets out with propositions so equivocal, arbitrary, confused, erroneous, and absurd, may very easily, especially if he is gifted with great power of abstraction, such as we find generally in Germans, draw from them the strangest consequences and create a species of fantastic universe, calculated to surprise untrained and confident young minds, and thus to form a kind of school, as we find the philosopher of Stuttgard has done; but any man, whose sense has been educated in a manly way, and who does not allow himself to be hoodwinked by a blind (though, it may be, sometimes generous) enthusiasm, weighs the grounds, and penetrates to the bottom, of every new doctrine, and thus does not fall into such nets. The celebrity of this man is explicable. It is one of those numerous celebrities which blossom in university halls, one of those crowns woven by the hands of unsophisticated youth" (Logic, §§ 40-52).

We have quoted this long passage for three reasons: first, because it shows the wide gulf which separates the philosophy of Rosmini from the romantic idealism of Germany; second, because it affords an excellent example of his method of dealing with subtle questions; and, third,

*See New Essay, vol. ii. §§ 814, 815; Psychology, vol. ii. §§ 1210-1223. Rosmini denies all continuity in any transient act, that is, any act involving movement. His arguments, some of which are identical with those of Zeno, if not altogether convincing, are, at least, very acute and deserving of careful consideration.

because it shows how serviceable his first principle is in clearing up the entanglements of subjectivism. A very instructive parallel might be drawn between the above criticism of Hegel's system and that pronounced by Trendelenburg, which is also very able.

Aim of reasoning

and nature of convic

tion.

54.

The aim of reasoning is certainty, and certainty is a firm persuasion in accordance with known truth.

Elsewhere Rosmini defines certainty as "a firm and reasonable persuasion conformable to truth," and then proceeds: "I may have present to my spirit a true opinion, and yet doubt of its truth: in that case, I have no certainty. It is not, therefore, enough that a thing should be true, in order that it should be true for me. In order that it may be true for me, I must have a motive which produces in me a firm persuasion, and produces it reasonably; that is, by means of a reason which convinces me that my opinion and belief are true and indubitable. Although it is a fact that logical truth has no existence in itself, outside of all subsistence, nevertheless, it exists in itself outside of the human intellect, and this justifies the distinction between true in itself and true for man. A thing becomes true for man by means of the certainty which he has of its truth. . . . Certainty, therefore, results from three elements: first, truth in the object; second, firm persuasion in the subject; and, third, a motive or ground producing such persuasion " (New Essay, vol. iii. § 1044, 1045). St. Thomas distinguishes two kinds of certainty. "Certitudo," he says, "potest considerari dupliciter, uno modo ex causa certitudinis, et sic dicitur esse certius id quod habet certiorem causam. . . . Alio modo potest considerari certitudo ex parte subjecti; et sic dicitur esse certius quod plenius consequitur intellectus hominis" (Sum. Th., ii. q. 4, art. 8, cor.; cf. q. 1, art. I, m.). "Certainty," says Sir W. Hamilton, "expresses

either the firm conviction which we have of the truth of a thing, or the character of the proof on which it rests" (Lect. on Metaph., vol. i. p. 161). It will be seen that Rosmini's definition of certainty includes both objective and subjective certainty.

55.

office of

Logic, therefore, has two offices: (1) to defend Twofold the existence of truth in general and the validity Logic. of reason in particular; (2) to teach men to use their power of reasoning so as to arrive at complete possession and conviction of truth—to attain certainty. Logic, therefore, may be divided into two parts: (1) defence of truth, and (2) means of arriving at truth and certitude.

56.

truth?

the form

telligence.

Truth is a quality of knowledge. Knowledge What is is true when that which is known is. Let us reflect closely upon this definition of truth. If the thing which is known is, it is true; therefore the truth of a thing is, in the last analysis, its being. Known being, therefore, is the truth of knowledge. Truth is But the form of intelligence is being, as ideology of our inshows us. Hence the form of intelligence is truth. The first truth, therefore, is possessed by the human spirit through its very nature. This very simple deduction disposes of those sceptics who deny all truth, as well as of those who, without expressly denying the existence of certain truths, nevertheless declare that all truth is unattainable by man.