representations of the blessed God as if revelling in the agonies of the cross, and in the blood of his own Son. When "it pleased the Lord to bruise him," it was not for the undivine gratification of inflicting pangs and tortures of intense pain; but "it pleased the Lord” to deliver him up a sacrifice for our offences, to substitute his sufferings instead of ours, an expedient for honoring the law and saving man. God still held his Son in undiminished love, and had infinite pleasure in his vicarious undertaking, and had, in all the mysterious sufferings of the cross, sincere good-will towards the salvation of man. If we suppose the compensative scheme of atonement to consist not in a substitution of person only, but also in a substitution of sufferings, the atonement ceases to be a satisfaction to vindictive justice, but it will appear to be what it really is, an atonement to satisfy the ends of public justice.

Upon the principle of distributive justice, it is impossible to account for the atonement of Christ and for the salvation of man. Some divines constantly affirm, that divine justice required the death of Jesus Christ as a substitute, and that the death of Christ satisfied divine justice.

Is this, indeed, true? To ascertain this, think, What is justice? Justice is giving to every one his due, or treating every one according to his character. Now, let us ponder it; "Was this justice satisfied in the death of Christ?" Justice is satisfied when it gives to every one his due, or treats every one according to his character. But, were the sufferings of an ignominious death really DUE to Christ? Did he DESERVE the treatment which he received? Is the salvation which sinners receive through his death really DUE to them? In short, is either Christ, or the sinner, treated in this transaction according to character?

I conceive that any man looking at this stupendous scheme, not through the colored medium of a theological system, will see that Christ received sufferings which he never deserved, and that the sinner receives

blessings which were never due to his character. Divine justice treats neither party according to character: "the Just" who "did this," and deserved to "live," dies; and "the soul that sinned," and deserved to die, lives; both cases being contrary to the principle of distributive justice.

The remark is probably ready, that, "this is a peculiar exercise of justice, as 'the just' is substituted for 'the unjust,' that the unjust might be saved for his sake." Very well. Such a measure will be deemed and admired by all as an expedient of transcendent benevolence and clemency: but the original question still presses on us; "How is justice satisfied in it, when neither party has what is due to his character?" In this critical difficulty, reason and revelation meet us with the assurance, that though this expedient of substitution is not distributive justice, either to Christ or to the sinner, yet it is a measure of entire justice towards the interests of the community under divine moral government, because the ends of justice are as fully secured by the substitution, as if the offender himself had suffered. It is therefore evident that the justice which admitted of substitution is not what is called distributive justice. It is public justice.

The exercise of public justice is suitable to the relations existing between God and man, because it is free, benevolent, and honorable. Public justice is voluntary and optional. The standing order of the divine government is not that God must be just in executing punishment, but that he might be just in shewing clemency. It makes the infliction of the penalty not indispensable, but admissible, and it makes the suspension of the penalty admissible too, if the ends of its infliction can be otherwise honorably secured.

It is benevolent. It shews that God is on the side of good; that he has good-will to each subject, and to all his empire. "Therefore will the Lord wait, that he may be gracious; and therefore will he be exalted, that he may have mercy upon you; For the Lord is a God

of judgment." Public justice is honorable. By its exercise God humbles himself without being dishonored: and man is condemned without being injured, and he is saved without reproach. God himself regards its exercise for a pleasure, a joy, and a glory. It is as a just God and a Savior, that he rests in his love, and joys over the universe with singing.

The hypothesis of a limited atonement is founded upon commercial views of the justice of God. It supposes that justice was administered to Christ as a substitute, upon commutative principles. The hypothesis stands thus: A certain number of souls was given to Christ to be saved- -a certain amount of punishment was due to them for so many sins-Christ suffered that amount for them, and for them only; the benefits resulting from that suffering is limited to them, and to them only.

The supposition of God acting on the principle of commutative or commercial justice, taking and receiving a quid pro quo, completely perverts and destroys the moral dignity of the atonement, and its influence as a medium of saving man with honor to the divine government. It makes God to exact punctually from Christ the identical punishment threatened to the sinner, as none other could have been due, to be inflicted. It makes God to proportion the sufferings of his Son to the number of sins imputed to him, as it would have been unjust to have inflicted more or less than the proportion really due. It represents the Father of mercies as doling out favors in proportion to the number and degree of his Son's sufferings, giving neither more nor less to any man than the purchased quantum. It represents the elect as claiming salvation as what is justly due to them from God, for value which he has received from their substitute, as it would be unjust to exact the same debt twice. It represents the salvation of some men as utterly impossible, because their debt has never been paid. It exhibits the great and blessed God as mercenary in his gifts, unwilling to yield a single boon

but for value received in the sufferings of his Son-sufferings which are represented as inducing (not to say bribing) Him to be propitious and merciful. All these limitations of the atonement are to be traced to commercial views of divine justice; and surely, such troubled and unwholesome streams should make us seriously doubt the purity of their source.

I will now introduce a few citations from two of our most masterly divines, partly to supply specimens of what I mean by commercial views of the divine administrations; partly to shew that such commercial views naturally produce the doctrine of limited atonement; and partly to indicate how much these commercial views have colored a great portion of systematic theology. The number of citations of this character, either from these two authors themselves, or from other theological writers might be indefinitely increased-but these are sufficient.

The first author is Dr. THOMAS GOODWIN, a great master in the Israel of his day, whose works are marked by deep research, independent thinking, and evangelical suavity. The extracts will be from his "DISCOURSE OF CHRIST THE MEDIATOR," found in the third volume of his works in folio. ed. 1692. In b. i. chap. 5, Dr. Goodwin introduces the sinner as proposing to God for his pardon, "rivers of oil, the first-born of his body, &c." but all being too low, the Doctor remarks, "There is no proportion. God would never have turned away so fair a chapman, if his justice could afford so cheap a commutation." In b. i. chap. 7, he says of Christ, "He must pay God in the same coin we should, and therefore, must make his soul an offering for sin-and if he be made sin, he must be made a curse; and which is more than all this, God himself must be the Executioner, and his own Son the person who suffers, as no creature could stroke hard enough to make it satisfactory." In b. i. chap. 8, he says, "As his Father recommended the business to him [Christ] so also he gave special recommendation of the persons for whom he

would have all this done"-viz., those who were given to Christ. Then he observes-"a strange gift it was, which he must yet pay for, and must cost more than they were worth; and yet he takes them as a gift and favor from his Father." "So as Mediator (and though a Mediator) he saves not a man, but whom his Father gave him, nor puts a name in more than was in his Father's BILL. You may observe how careful he was in his account, and how punctual in it. John xvii, 12. He is exact in his account as appears, in that he gives a reason for him that was lost, that he was a son of perdition, and so excuseth it." In b. i. chap. 9, he represents Isa. xlix, as "the draught of the covenant, or deed of gift betwixt Christ and his Father for us"—and then says, "His Father offers (as it were) low at first, and mentioneth but Israel only as his portion. Then as he [Christ] is thinking them too small an inheritance, too small a purchase for such a price."-"God therefore answers him again, and enlargeth and stretcheth his covenant further with him." In the next chapter he says, that "Christ laid down a price worth all the grace and glory we shall have."

The next author is Dr. JOHN OWEN, the Lebanon of English theology. The great extent of his learning, his accurate sagacity in searching the workings of the heart, and the prominence which he has given to the person of Christ, have recommended his works to such acceptance and circulation, as to give their own hue and character to much of the theology of his country. But the principle of a commercial atonement, of paying quid pro quo, is interwoven with his whole system of divinity, as Phidias's name in the shield. Take a specimen, or two, from his 'Death of Death,' &c.* "God spared not his own Son, but gave him up to death for us all-that he made him to be sin for us-that he put all the sins of all the elect into that сир which he was to drink of; that the wrath and flood which they feared

OWEN'S 'Death of Death,' b. iii, chap. 9, or WORKS, vol. v. p. 384, 385. See also p. 339, 340.