A father, for instance, will not be afraid of relaxing the bonds of good discipline in forgiving a child, when a mother in tears and anguish is the expression of an abhorrence of the child's offence. God has consulted the ends of public justice in the exercise of his mercy, and has set forth the death of his Son as the honorable ground on which he is just in justifying him that believes. God spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, as a clear demonstration of his great concern for his justice, and as a public expression at what a dear rate he forgives the s which his righteous soul abominates.

Such a provision for securing the ends of justice, honors the divine government. It shews that the reins of just authority are not at all relaxed. All the subjects will feel that the moral Governor thinks highly of justice. No friend of the Mediator can slight the law and the government, and no one who slights and disregards the law will ever be deemed a friend of the Mediator.

III. In the atonement the suffering of death by Jesus Christ was substituted, by the blessed God, instead of the suffering of the punishment that was due to the sinner.

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Jesus Christ suffered for us, the just for the unjust. He was made a curse for us-and a sin-offering for us. When it is said that Christ suffered for us, it is not meant that he suffered the sufferings due to law, but that his sufferings were endured as substituted instead of our sufferings. An atonement goes on the supposition that the identical sufferings threatened against man are suspended, and other sufferings substituted instead of them.

This exchange, or commutation of sufferings, in the expedient for redemption, was intimated in the first promise made to Adam. Man by transgression had become liable to the literal sufferings threatened in the penalty of the law. From these sufferings he was to be delivered by the Seed of the woman. This deliverance was to be effected, not by power, but by a price of sub

stituted sufferings, designated the "bruising of the heel," a very different kind of suffering from that which was threatened to Adam.

This view of the vicarious and substitutionary character of the sufferings of Christ will give some definiteness and force to the phrase, "Christ has paid our debts." Though this phrase is not scriptural it is not to be treated contemptuously, as it is constantly used with much sweetness and unction by many Christians, and has been sanctified by long usage in our sermons, and in our spiritual songs.

"What are the debts which Jesus Christ has paid for us?" Some answer the question by saying that Jesus Christ obeyed the law for us; gave, in our stead, and in our name, that obedience which we owed to the law, so that the law cannot now demand perfect obedience of us, because this was given to it in our stead by Jesus Christ.

Let it be duly considered-Did Jesus Christ pay our debts in this sense? Did he obey the law that we might not obey it? Did he do what the law required, that we might be discharged from our duty? Did he love God. and love his neighbor, in our stead, so that we are delivered from the obligation to do so? I am sure, I wrong my reader by supposing for a moment that he does not perceive, at once, that in this sense, Christ has paid no debts for us. Paying for us the duty which we owed to the law, would be redeeming us from God, and not to God, and would be an axe at the root of all moral government. No class of rebels would ever be restored to their allegiance by a high officer so obeying the law in their stead, as to discharge them from all fealty and homage.

It is, therefore, evident, that by Jesus Christ's paying our debts, must be meant, not the debt of duty, but the debt of penalty. The handwriting, or chirograph which he cancelled was not the bond of obligation to duty and service, but the bond of liableness to punishment and sufferings.

It will be inquired, "How did Jesus Christ pay our debt of penalty?" This question is frequently answered, by saying, that Jesus Christ suffered the identical punishment to which we were exposed in law. This sentiment is embodied in a phrase not at all uncommon, that "Jesus Christ suffered the hell of his people."

I shall refer a fuller discussion of the commutation of sufferings to the chapter on the atonement in its connection with sin. I shall, now, only remark farther, that the atonement of Christ cancelled the obligation to punishment, not by paying the idem in the duty, nor by suffering the idem in the penalty, but by substituting his own sufferings instead of the sufferings due to the sinner. IV. The sufferings of the Lord Jesus Christ answer the same ends as the punishment of the sinner.

An offender is publicly punished by a wise government, not for the sake of putting him personally to pain and torture, but for the sake of deterring others from committing crimes and offences. An English judge once remarked to a criminal before him, "You are condemned to be transported, not because you have stolen these goods, but that goods may not be stolen."

The ends of government in the punishment of offenders are to shew the goodness and benevolence of the law-to demonstrate the impartial justice of the governor-to exhibit the evil consequences of breaking the law, and to impress offenders with the hopelessness of escaping the punishment due to crime.

You may be doubting the benevolence of a law that takes away a man's life. But suppose your house robbed, or your child murdered, you would account that law really benevolent that would kindly throw around you the shield of her sympathy, and would rid the country of such robbers and murderers. It is true, that the murderers themselves would not regard such a law as good and benevolent, but every honest man would admire and welcome it. Sinners generally judge of the laws of God, as criminals judge of the laws of their country. Public punishments tend to shew that the law

is good and that it watches kindly over the interests of the poorest subject.

By public punishment the magistrate shews that his justice is impartial and fair. He is above private motives; his concern is for the public good. The insulted rights of the lowest subject shall be vindicated by him: and the rank or power of an illustrious offender shall not thwart the measures of righteousness. The effect will be, that all will stand in awe of the majesty of unsullied justice.

The spectators of a public punishment are likely to be impressed with the evil of the crime. They perceive that they who know the interest of the nation best, regard the deed of the culprit as injurious and wrong. They feel that if every one did as the culprit did, there would be no living in any community. They will know that by the conduct of the culprit some families have suffered severely, and that, if he had been spared, many more would have suffered. They would see that such a mode of life, however easy and pleasant for the moment, is sure, eventually, to end in sorrow, infamy, and ruin; and that such an ignominious end of such a character, will be approved and praised by all honest men every where.

The other end of government, in executing punishment, is to convince all offenders, of the hopelessness of escaping the law. The criminal may long hide himself, but eventually he will be apprehended, and caught in the firm grasp of the law. Neither his obscurity nor his rank, neither his entreaties nor his bribes, can shelter him from the execration of the law and the constitution. The impressions of this, every spectator, and every hearer of the execution, will carry with him to his home, and to his retirement.

If a man transgress a law, he must, in a just and firm government be punished. Why? Lest others have a bad opinion of the law, and transgress it too. But suppose that this end of the law can be secured without punishing the transgressor; suppose that a measure shall

be devised by the governor, which shall save the criminal, and yet keep men from having a bad opinion of the law. Why, in such a case, all would approve of it both on the score of justice, and on the score of benevolence. For public justice only requires that men should be kept from having such a bad opinion of the law, as to break it. If this can be done without inflicting what, in distributive justice, is due to the criminal, public justice is satisfied, because its ends are fully answered.

In the moral government of God, the death of the Lord Jesus Christ does this. It secures all the ends of the law, as if the sinner himself had been punished. This view of the atonement is, I think, what Paul meant when he said, that "Christ was the end of the law for righteousness;" that is, that the very end which would have been secured by the punishment of the sinner himself, has been amply and fully secured by the death of Christ. It is on this account that the death of Christ is represented in scripture as an atonement, a satisfaction, or an equivalent, for suspending the literal execution of the penalty on the transgressor.

There are two sorts of equivalents, one belonging to commercial transactions, and the other to moral and civil affairs. A commercial equivalent is an exchange of one kind of property for another, as between a buyer and seller, and which particularly defines the kind and the quantity to be thus exchanged. A moral or civil equivalent does not regard kind or quantity, but secures the same ends, and produces the same effects, as theother moral or civil measure instead of which it is substituted. Why in the social circle do you accept of an expression of sorrow for a fault, instead of inflicting the pain of your displeasure? It is because you think such sorrow will answer the same ends as the infliction of your displeasure. Why was the death of Zimri and Cozbi, by the zeal of Phinehas, accepted by God as an atonement, instead of inflicting the threatened death on all the Israelites who had joined Baalpeor? It was because it answered the same ends for preventing idol