have been occasional pressures by neighbors, if you will, not by the authorities. We believe when that happens, when some neighbors rise up and protest about a Jew because he has been conducting a Hebrew session in his apartment, that it probably was initiated by the authorities, but you can't document it. Very few things happen in the Soviet Union without official encouragement. But, basically Jews can live where they want. They can travel where they want, even if they can't always work in the fields that they want to work in. Mr. ROSENTHAL. One last question: To what do you attribute the remarkable decline in emigration in the last 2 years? Mr. GOODMAN. Ted. Mr. MANN. I would attribute it primarily to the deplorable state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Mr. ROSENTHAL. You mean our inability to exercise any influence? Mr. MANN. Yes. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think there are any other domestic concerns they have that the Soviets would allege as reasons? Mr. MANN. There are some they would allege, but I tried to answer your question as to what I really think the bottom line reason is. I think it is simply that. Yes, they may very well have been surprised at the enormous surge of applicants, Jewish applicants with visas from Israel who wanted to leave once they were allowed to leave. When the numbers got as high as over 50,000 a year in 1979, that may have taken them somewhat by surprise. So there have been a series of discouraging movements since that time. Mr. ROSENTHAL. When you say deterioration in relations between the Soviets and the United States, we have continued the grain shipments. We are working the other way on the pipeline. What other areas of deterioration are there that would have impacted on emigration? Mr. GOODMAN. If I might comment on the points the Congressman raised, I think the issue of grain is a good example to show how leverage from this country might have been helpful, but it was never employed. The grain sales last year were extended for 1 year without any extraction of either human or other economic or even political concessions. I think the same thing will happen probably in the next few days when again the grain agreement is extended for another year without any quid pro quo. Part of it has to do with the way it was negotiated. Part of it has to do with the way it is being extended by this Government. With so many people in this country saying that we must sell grainand indeed we must. There is a surplus piling up and the farmers need to sell it. We accept that, but the more we talk about that publicly, the less likely it is that the United States has a good bargaining position. Then we come to the Soviets on the other side who know how vulnerable we are, and if we wanted to extract something, we have given the whole package away before we can negotiate. This is not a smart negotiating tactic when dealing with the Soviet Union or any other tough adversary. They are tough bargainers. I think we have to learn; unfortu nately we didn't in 1972 and I see we are not in 1982 either. That might be an opportunity if we exploited it properly. Mr. ROSENTHAL. How about the Madrid Conference? Did that impact positively or negatively in this area? Mr. MANN. So far not at all. I must say in terms of the Madrid Conference, to which I was a delegate, the United States, in terms of this issue and other human rights issues, handled itself admirably, beautifully, but it has been extremely confrontational. It promises to continue to be extremely confrontational when it resumes in November and has produced no movement in human rights terms that I have been able to observe. I think we ought to recall on this subject that unlike most other current human rights issues, most especially Poland and Afghanistan, we are dealing, when we deal with Soviet Jews, with something that is really not important to the Soviet Union. There is no primary interest of the Soviets involved in its treatment of its Jews or else they would not have let a quarter of a million out in the last decade. I think, therefore, that when and if U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations become somewhat warmer than they are now and continue, that it is likely to have a beneficial effect upon that issue at least if no others. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Are there any other nationality groups that have improved their emigration status within the Soviet Union? Mr. MANN. Yes, both ethnic Germans and Armenians are two nationality groups other than Jews which have had some rate of emigration just as the Jews did but whose emigration did not stop when Jewish emigration stopped. Though smaller numbers than the Jews, their figures tend to go up and down pretty closely according to what was happening to the Jewish community in the Soviet Union, except that I believe in the case of ethnic Germans there has been some recent improvement probably as a result of the pipeline. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Has there been any pressure from Arab States or the Soviet Union to restrict emigration on the theory that some or many of those emigrating go to Israel? Mr. GOODMAN. There has been pressure from Arab States that goes back to the early seventies when emigration first began, but the Soviet Union was never one to respond to that kind of pressure as far as we can tell. In fact, one of the high peaks of Jewish emigration took place during the 1973 Yom Kippur war. There were Russians in Syria at that time and planes were landing from Europe with Russian emigrants. So I don't think it was a serious issue. The Soviet Union does what it does because of what it considers to be its own self-interest. It may respond to that kind of pressure; it might not, but only if it suits whatever its larger objectives are. So I don't think it is a major factor. I might add one thing about the Madrid Review Conference that you asked about. While it is true we have not seen emigration in crease since the meeting began, I think that was the proper role of the U.S. delegation to take under Max Kampelman. A few individuals thought their lot would have been worse, including people who were sentenced and in prison during that time, but without the ventilation of their individual cases, both here in Washington, in Madrid, and elsewhere, it was their belief that it might have been far worse. So that is some saving grace. Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. BONKER. What you just said dramatizes a dilemma that we in the Congress face with respect to this and other human rights issues. I understand your contention that the rate of emigration might be linked to the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States. If relations are good, there might be more emigration; if relations deteriorate, maybe there will be a tightening of emigration. The other day we heard testimony from Christian groups that took very hard line position. They said we ought to continue with the denial of export licenses on the construction of the pipeline and reinstitute the grain ban and so forth. When we attempt to institutionalize a human rights policy, we must invariably back it with sanctions-trade sanctions. By that method we can punish those countries that are not fulfilling our expectations of human rights. We have done that in various places, notably Latin America, and the Soviet Union. Some people say that if the Soviet Union persists in their institutionalized persecution and does not allow freedom of movement and freedom of faith for certain minorities, ethnic groups, or religious groups, then we ought to respond by harsher actions, punitive actions. Other groups maintain that confrontational policies will lead to greater restrictions and removes our leverage in dealing more diplomatically with the Soviet Union. This is a terrible dilemma for us. Mr. MANN. It is, indeed. Let me just say a couple of things about that. In the first place, there is a difference between confrontational tactics and confrontational tone. I always feel that confrontational tone is unnecessary in international relations. It is what you do and how you act that counts and just verbal abuse coming from one nation to another has never added anything to anybody whether in human rights or in any other relations between two countries. I think we have seen a little of that recently that hasn't helped. Beyond that, I would say that I don't disagree-except on the grain issue-I don't disagree with the Christian witnesses that you have had here, as you have described what they have recommended. On the grain issue, it is very difficult. You are a Congressman. I am a citizen of the United States. I have to be concerned about Soviet Jews. I also have to be concerned, it seems to me, about the American farmer and the U.S. economy and- Mr. BONKER. And whether or not that policy is effective. One just can't ignore it. So it is much too easy to say let's be confrontational. One has to analyze each issue on its merits. I am not sure what the answer is on grain, but I am not convinced that grain provides us with some enormous leverage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union under current economic and farm conditions. However, I think that if the two nations were talking and dealing with one another on an issue that the Soviets regard as important, I think Jews are a primary subject of easy negotiations if there were any negotiations. I have the feeling in the past year and a half, that there just aren't any. So the opportunities for using whatever limited leverage there might be have not been picked up. I must add that the administration, from the President on down, have said—and I am certain feel-very, very deeply about the issue on which I have testified. Mr. GOODMAN. Mr. Congressman, if I might add an observation on that question, I think there is very often a conclusion. Certainly in dealing with the Soviets, one has to be firm. There should be made, I believe, a distinction between being firm and being abusive. Firmness is something which we should encourage. Second, the measure has to be effectiveness. If something is tried once and it is not effective, then perhaps it should not be tried a second time. Third, in dealing with the Soviet Union or any other government, if we want to be effective, I don't believe we should be punitive for its own sake. Too many people assume that punishment at all times works whether it is with a child or with another nation. That may not always be the case. Fourth, we are not dealing with absolutes. I think we have to learn from the experiences of the past which means that not every tactic is useful at every time in history. What we might have done in 1972, we might not want to do in 1982. The world has changed. The Soviet Union, for example, is not the same state that it was a decade ago. In many ways it is much more self-sufficient and much less vulnerable to certain kinds of pressures and leverage. We may regret that; we might not, but that I think is the reality. Therefore, it means looking at each instance and each tactic within a context at a particular moment in history in making those judgments. Mr. BONKER. I want to thank both of you for your excellent testimony. You have contributed immensely to our understanding of the problem and how to deal with it. Thank you for being here. Mr. GOODMAN. Thank you. Mr. MANN. Thank you. Mr. BONKER. I shall now call the remaining witnesses and we will have them constitute a panel of Paul Meek, the Washington director, Union of Councils for Soviet Jews; William Korey, director of international policy, B'nai B'rith, and Aleksandr Goldfarb, refusenik. Mr. Meek, with this voluminous text, you are scaring the chairman. Mr. MEEK. It is not that long. STATEMENT OF PAUL MEEK, WASHINGTON DIRECTOR, UNION OF COUNCILS FOR SOVIET JEWS First, I want to apologize and send greetings along from Lynn Singer, my president, who is ill today. I am speaking here on behalf of the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, which is the oldest national grassroots Soviet Jewry organization, with affiliates in 33 States, and national headquarters here in Washington. In addition, the UCSJ has five international affiliates in England, France, Switzerland, Canada, and Israel. Our members are volunteers dedicated to the cause of freedom and dignity for Soviet Jews through bettering their opportunities for emigration from the U.S.S.R. and providing them with the moral and material support necessary to them in their struggle to live as Jews. Since the previous witness I think covered fairly extensively the general situation as it exists at the moment, I thought I would just go right away into a discussion of some of our recommendations for things to do. I think we are all pretty much aware that there is a problem. I think it is very useful to have these kinds of hearings to discuss the nuts and bolts of the problem; but I think it would also be useful to have some movement in the direction of trying to find solutions to the problem. The current state of Soviet Jewry, Mr. Chairman, is approaching a critical point. Unfortunately there are no quick fix solutions to this problem. What is apparent from the last 22 years of Soviet human rights performance is that there may not be an emigration movement at all unless policymakers find a way to reward and punish Soviet behavior. Soviet Jewish emigration has always been dependent upon the general environment of United States-Soviet relations. Emigration performance is a primary indicator for determining the status of superpower relationship. Soviet Jews are usually the first to suffer when things begin to deteriorate. Equally, they are the last to benefit when détente appears to be an increasing possibility. For policymakers and Soviet Jewry activists alike, United StatesSoviet interaction leads to a view that human rights gains must be evaluated in a long-term perspective. Today's disheartening statistics will probably continue until such time as there is some movement toward a renewed United StatesSoviet rapproachement. In many ways the activities the Union of Councils recommends today are aimed at preserving what we can in a deteriorating situation, while attempting to find a beneficial means for improving emigration in the years ahead. At present the opportunities for real leverage with the Soviets are very small. Because of the frostiness which characterizes United States-Soviet relations now, the United States has very few options for influencing Soviet behavior with regard to Soviet Jewish emigration. The two areas most often mentioned in terms of leverage, grain sales, and technology transfer, are the subject of significant, often |