force, October 14, 1966) are not general submissions to United States jurisdiction. The District of Columbia Circuit subsequently ruled that the agreement to arbitrate before ICSID had not implicitly waived Guinea's sovereign immunity before United States courts because the agreement did not envisage a role for United States courts in compelling "stalled" arbitration.

In United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 601 F.2d 1195, cert. granted, 444 U.S. 1070 (1980), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), the defendant's naturalization had been revoked because he had misrepresented material facts as to his whereabouts during World War II, both in his 1949 application for an immigrant visa under the Displaced Persons Act and in his 1969 application for citizenship. (Fedorenko, a Ukrainian prisoner-of-war of the Germans, had been assigned to serve as a guard in the Nazi death camp at Treblinka. After failing to overturn the revocation of his naturalization, he was deported in December 1984, pursuant to an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals, to the Soviet Union, where he was tried and convicted of, among other things, having participated in mass executions, and reportedly sentenced to death in June 1986.)

The district court had ruled in 1978 that Fedorenko's admitted deception as to his whereabouts during World War II did not constitute a material misrepresentation and concealment within the meaning of section 340(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1451(a) (see the 1978 Digest, pp. 337-340). Reversing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held in 1979 that the United States did not need to prove ultimate facts warranting denial of citizenship but need only prove that full disclosure would have led to further inquiry-possibly uncovering such facts. (The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit on other grounds, considering that the mere fact of Fedorenko's service as a guard at Treblinka excluded him from the definition of a "displaced person" and made him ineligible to receive a visa under the Displaced Persons Act. The Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit's ruling, moreover, that district courts lack discretionary authority in denaturalization proceedings, once the Government has proved that the naturalized citizen has obtained citizenship illegally or by willful misrepresentation.)

Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), presented a successful challenge to the constitutionality of a "legislative veto" provision in section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(2). The Attorney General had suspended Chadha's deportation pursuant to section 244(a)(1), in part because of a finding of "extreme hardship" to Chadha. The House of Representatives had

passed a resolution, nevertheless, that disapproved the suspension of deportation. Judicial invalidation of the "legislative veto" provision in question, which the Immigration and Naturalization Service conceded before the Ninth Circuit to be unconstitutional, cast doubt upon a number of legislative veto provisions in other statutes.

In Muskie v. Agee, No. 80-83, the Department of State successfully petitioned in 1980 for certiorari to issue to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A divided three-judge panel of that court had affirmed a district judge's ruling against the Secretary of State's revocation of Agee's passport upon national security or foreign policy grounds, made under a 1966 regulation. Revocation had followed a determination in December 1979 that Agee's activities abroad were causing or were likely to cause serious damage to the national security or the foreign policy of the United States.

Agee's activities included his practice-through publications, press conferences, and personal appearances of charging specific United States employees in specific countries with having been, or being, engaged in intelligence work in those countries. Even in the absence of confirmation or denial, the mere existence of such allegations had endangered the lives of those individuals. In addition, Agee had also reportedly contacted the Iranian captors of the American Embassy hostages in Tehran, who had allegedly invited him to participate in a "tribunal" for "trying" the hostages.

The district court had considered that there was no statutory authorization, express or implied, for the 1966 regulation. In affirming, two members of the three-judge appellate panel rejected the series of statutes, regulations, proclamations, orders and advisory opinions dating back to 1856, upon which the Secretary of State had relied. (Following the grant of certiorari in 1981, the Supreme Court by a majority of seven to two upheld the Department of State's legal position and the Secretary's authority to deny or revoke a passport under the challenged regulation.)

In three cases, among others, the United States joined to support the right of aliens to equal protection under United States law. The United States intervened in Shabani v. Simmons, No. EC80-160-LS-P (N.D. Miss. 1981), involving a tuition increase under a Mississippi appropriations act provision, that by its terms could apply only to Iranian students at Mississippi public institutions of higher education. The United States appeared amicus in Doe v. Plyler, 628 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 457 U.S. 202, reh'g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982), and appeared as intervenor in In Re Alien Children Education Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 544 (S.D. Tex. 1980). Both of these cases involved a Texas statute requiring either United States citizenship or legal admission as an alien as a condition for attending the free

public schools. In all three instances, the challenged statutory provisions were struck down.

Other aspects of the individual in international law commanded official United States attention during 1980, in the areas of refugees and asylum, extradition, and human rights.

The Refugee Act of 1980, approved March 17, 1980, 94 Stat. 102, effected substantial changes in entitlement to refugee status within the framework of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including a statutory requirement for establishment of an asylum procedure. Coincidentally, the State of Florida found itself within a matter of days inundated by arrivals from Cuba via the Mariel "boatlift" and at about the same time by waves of illegal migrants from Haiti. The 1980 Digest outlines some of the legal and other problems that had to be dealt with in regard to each group.

In Matter of McMullen, 17 I&N Dec. 542 (BIA 1980), rev'd, McMullen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1981), the Board of Immigration Appeals overruled an earlier 1980 decision by an Immigration Judge that McMullen, the defendant in a deportation proceeding, was eligible for asylum in the United States and for withholding of deportation to the Republic of Ireland because of the likelihood of his persecution by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, from which he had defected. McMullen had also been the subject in 1978 of an extradition request from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for attempted murder, based upon his alleged commission of a crime while still a member of the Provisional Irish Republican Army. An extradition magistrate had denied the extradition request in 1979 on the grounds that McMullen came within the political offense exclusion under Article V(1)(c)(i) of the 1972 Extradition Treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom, whereupon pending deportation proceedings against him were resumed. (Following the Ninth Circuit's reversal of the Board of Immigration Appeals on the grounds of the evidentiary standard to be applied, the Board again in 1984 sustained the appeal of the Immigration and Naturalization Service against the grant of asylum to McMullen. McMullen's further petition for review to the Ninth Circuit was unsuccessful. Peter John Gabriel McMullen v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 788 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1986).)

Subsequent to the 1979 McMullen extradition case, several extradition magistrates denied other United Kingdom requests for extradition of PIRA members for alleged crimes, the denials being based upon the political offense exception in the 1972 United States-United Kingdom extradition treaty. The United States Government had consistently represented to extradition magistrates that the political offense exception did not apply to common crimes, such as murder,

the most notable case prior to the PIRA cases having been In the Matter of the Extradition of Ziyad Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (see the 1979 Digest, pp. 442-453); see, further, Eain v. Adams, 529 F.Supp. 685 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).

The effect of McMullen and its PIRA successors stretched far into the future. As a result of them, the United States began to negotiate supplementary extradition treaties to provide that the political offense exception to extradition would not apply to a number of specified crimes of violence (typically committed by terrorists). These included, among others, murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping, various bombing or bomb-type offenses, and offenses for which both parties have the obligation under a multilateral international agreement to extradite or to submit the case to their own authorities for decision as to prosecution. The 1970 Hague Aircraft Hijacking Convention, the 1971 Montreal Aircraft Sabotage Convention, the 1973 New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, and the 1979 Hostages Convention are examples of such multilateral agreements. The first supplementary extradition treaty was signed with the United Kingdom on June 25, 1985.

In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), the United States appeared amicus curiae to urge that the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 1350, encompassed an action for damages for wrongful death by torture, which a former Paraguayan official had allegedly committed in Paraguay against the plaintiffs' decedent. (The plaintiffs and the former official were all within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York at the time suit was filed.) The Department of State argued successfully, among other points, that: official torture is a violation of the law of nations; the Alien Tort Statute encompasses the law of nations as that body of law may evolve; and international law now embraces the obligation of a state to respect the fundamental human rights of its citizens.

In addition to United States Government litigation activities in the international law area, much time and effort were expended in the legal aspects of day-to-day business between Governments, such as negotiating agreements. Many of these were of a routine nature, but others represented new initiatives.

Still searching for more effective responses to the problem of maritime drug trafficking, the United States laid the foundation in 1980 for concluding with the United Kingdom (in 1981) an agreement to facilitate interdiction by the United States of United King

dom vessels suspected of drug trafficking. The agreement was directed primarily against such activities by private vessels, registered in the United Kingdom but having home ports in British Caribbean dependencies. (In the meantime, United States courts continued during 1980 to uphold against challenge in criminal prosecutions the constitutionality of United States Coast Guard boardings and seizures on the high seas of vessels suspected of engaging in drug trafficking.)

During 1980 the United States cooperated with other nations in other types of judicial assistance; e.g., in facilitating reciprocal enforcement of child support judgments between individual states and foreign nations; in agreements covering investigations (with Algeria, Colombia, and Turkey), and in the taking of evidence (with the Federal Republic of Germany). The United States played a major role in the preparation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which twenty-nine Member States of the Hague Conference on Private International Law had unanimously adopted and which was opened for signature on October 25, 1980.

Finally, mention must be made of additional responsibilities which the United States Sinai Field Mission assumed in surveillance and verification in the Sinai for the period between completion of interim Israeli withdrawal (January 25, 1980) and completion of final Israeli withdrawal (April 25, 1982). These activities had originally been envisaged for United Nations forces in the 1979 Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. Due to Soviet opposition to conclusion of that Treaty and to use of the United Nations Emergency Force to implement it, substitution of the Sinai Field Mission was agreed upon in trilateral talks between Secretary of State Vance, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, and Egyptian Defense Minister Kamal Hassan Ali, held at Washington, September 18-19, 1979. (Afterwards, when it became apparent in 1981 that no agreement could be reached in the United Nations Security Council upon establishing a United Nations peacekeeping force and observers, Israel and Egypt, with full United States participation, entered into discussions on an agreement to create as an alternative a Multinational Force and Observers.)

In addition to the many attorneys whose work is reflected, anonymously, in various Department of State documents, a number of persons were specially assigned to assist in the final production phase of the 1980 Digest manuscript. These included Nicholas Rostow, Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser, who served as principal coordinator of assignments, and the following attorneys: Jose E. Alvarez, John R. Byerly, Haley D. Collums, David A. Colson, James D. Earl, Mary W. Ennis, Julie Fay, Peter H. Flournoy, Dennis I.