1975 Review Conference sought to rectify this discrimination against NPT parties-and to reduce the serious proliferation risks inherent in it-by urging that "in all achievable ways common export requirements relating to safeguards be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing states non-party to the Treaty." Since 1975 there has been movement toward that objective by a number of states. But the objective will not be realized until truly concerted action is taken. The United States, therefore, strongly recommends that this Conference promote the objective of fullscope IAEA safeguards in a way that can most realistically be expected to have the desired effect-by calling on members of the non-proliferation regime to enter into new nuclear supply commitments only with those states that undertake to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities.

At the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, we took another significant step in response to the call by a number of NPT parties at the 1975 Review Conference for negative security assurances. We announced the following declaration by the President of the United States, which he has instructed me to reaffirm at this Conference:

The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such a state allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a nuclearweapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.

This U.S. formulation-which gives special recognition to adherence to the NPT-was designed to benefit those countries that are the most appropriate recipients of such assurances.

Each of the parties to the NPT, in reaching a decision to join the Treaty, made its own careful calculation of national selfinterest. Each came to the conclusion that its national security interests as well as its civil nuclear energy goals were better served by membership in the NPT regime than by avoidance of its obligations and that those national objectives could be severely jeopardized by the acquisition of nuclear explosives by additional states. These conclusions are more valid today than ever. We continue, individually and collectively, to have a vital stake in the preservation and strengthening of the NPT regime.

United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Documents on Disarmament, 1980 (1983), pp, 367-370, 373.

Controversy over the implementation of the nuclear arms control and disarmament objectives of Article VI and to a lesser extent over the amount of peaceful nuclear

cooperation available to developing NPT parties prevented Conference agreement on a long, substantive Final Declaration. However, throughout the Review Conference there was little criticism of the Treaty itself, or its objectives. The parties broadly endorsed the NPT and called for universal adherence. There was widespread agreement within the Conference Committee dealing with safeguards and peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the desirability of full-scope safeguards coverage in non-nuclearweapon states not party to the NPT, and considerable support for requiring this as a condition of new nuclear supply commitments. In the final U.S. statement to the Conference on September 7, Ambassador Earle underscored the parties' support for the Treaty and pointed out that the actual mandate of the conference"--which was the review by the parties and consideration of ways in which the Treaty's implementation could be improved-was fulfilled in a manner that we consider constructive."

Doc. 100, "Summary of Accomplishments and Concerns at the Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980 (1983), p. 224.

Nuclear Exports

Safety and Environmental Issues

-S.B.

On December 18, 1979 and May 7, 1980, the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs held hearings to examine international safety and environmental issues relating to nuclear exports.

Michael A. Guhin, Director, Office of Non-Proliferation and Export Policy, appearing at the first hearing on behalf of the Department of State, set out "two key and interrelated premises" on which the Department's approach to the health, safety, and environmental issues associated with nuclear exports was based: (1) such issues were legitimate matters of concern to the United States in accomplishing its nonproliferation and other foreign policy objectives; and (2) the fundamental responsibility for the necessary arrangements was that of the sovereign government in whose territory the facility would operate.

International cooperation took place, Mr. Guhin continued, first through cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and second through technical and regulatory exchange agreements with other countries. He discussed cooperation with the IAEA, in part, as follows:

IAEA ROLE

The IAEA has authority, under the terms of its statute, to establish or adopt standards of safety for the protection of health and for minimizing any dangers which nuclear energy could pose to life and property. In carrying out this function, it has developed widely accepted guidelines for the packaging and transportation of radioactive materials, for the control of ionizing radiation, and for radiological impacts of nuclear energy on the environment. As

indicated in its Safety Series publications and the topics for its ongoing program of technical symposia for experts from member nations, the IAEA has undertaken a broad range of health, safety, and environmentally related work.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, the Department of State, and the Environmental Protection Agency participate with the IAEA in multilateral assistance programs. Over the years the United States and several other countries have also encouraged and assisted the IAEA to undertake a significant effort to provide expanded power reactor safety advice and assistance to developing countries. Key programs in this regard include:

A multiyear program to develop codes of practice and safety guides concerning regulating power reactors, siting, safety criteria for design and construction, operation, and quality assurances. Codes of practice for these areas have been essentially completed and work is progressing on over half of the approximately 50 related safety guides;

IAEA reactor safety missions, which typically involve four to five safety specialists from various countries who visit developing countries for periods of a few weeks to advise on safety matters related to siting, construction, and operation of power reactors;

Technical assistance programs which include such activities as the assignment of experts for up to 2-year tours in developing countries. For example, under these auspices, the NRC has furnished experts to Mexico, South Korea, and the Philippines. Other assignments are currently being arranged for Mexico, Brazil, South Korea, and Yugoslavia; and

Safety training courses and safety seminars.

Proceeding to the increasing importance assigned by the International Atomic Energy Agency to nuclear health, safety, and environmental matters, both before and after the Three Mile Island accident in the United States in 1979, Mr. Guhin described the development of internationally accepted standards in these areas and improved technical knowledge of environmental and safety problems through United States cooperation with the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

At present, the bulk of NEA activities are organized into committees covering four priority areas: radioactive waste management; nuclear safety; radiation protection and public health; and nuclear power development, and fuel cycle production and demand. The first three of these clearly deal with safety and environment-related matters. At the same time, cooperative work is underway between the NEA and the environment committee of the OECD. These efforts are moving from basic information sharing in the direction of joint work programs on environmentally acceptable use and development of nuclear power.

Such cooperation through the IAEA and the NEA is of key importance, among other reasons, because nations are much more willing to accept internationally recognized recommendations,

findings, or guidelines than those offered directly by individual supplier states. This is particularly so as the issues involved concern essentially the sovereign responsibility of each country. In the first instance, the relationship is among equals and can more easily be separated from politically sensitive questions. In the second instance, the relationship may imply an attempt to impose the supplier's standards or additional nuclear export conditions.

Our consultations in the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation and elsewhere suggest that unilateral attempts to impose additional export controls related to environmental requirements would be resented by other countries, would have a low probability of success, and could drive states to purchase nuclear equipment and materials from other countries which did not have such export requirements. Furthermore, most nations regard safety and environmental controls applicable to their respective territories as sovereign prerogatives which they are careful about limiting in formal international agreements. On the other hand, it is an area of keen interest and concern to all states, and one in which they are ready to cooperate, exchange information, and put into practice internationally accepted standards.

Nuclear Exports: International Safety and Environmental Issues: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on For. Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st & 2nd sess. (1979, 1980), pp. 10-12.

Congressman Howard E. Wolpe asked Mr. Guhin in the course of the questioning about the advisability of a statutory mandate requiring the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to specify ways in which a proposed nuclear powerplant for a foreign country, or the site for such a powerplant, did not conform with American standards. The Department of State subsequently furnished the following response:

JUDGING FOREIGN NUCLEAR PROJECTS BY U.S. STANDARDS

The Administration would not favor such an approach, for the reasons outlined below.

As noted in our testimony, the procedures established under Executive Order 12114 call for concise environmental reviews of reactor exports. These reviews will include consideration of nuclear safety aspects of proposed projects and the extent to which a country's standards are comparable to internationally-recognized standards. This would include any available safety reviews undertaken for the project by the IAEA which assess a project's conformity with the Agency's standards. We believe that this approach will provide an adequate basis for consideration by U.S. officials charged with responsibility for nuclear reactor export licensing decisions; will assure that significant nuclear safety aspects, including a recipient country's standards, are taken into account; and will assist in identifying areas of mutual concern, if any exist, where upgrading of programs or cooperation might be appropriate. Thus, we do not believe there is a need for such legislation as suggested.

We also believe that such legislation could have a net adverse effect on U.S. non-proliferation interests as well as U.S. interests in upgrading international nuclear safety, health and environmental standards. It could be seen by other countries as an attempt by the United States unilaterally to impose yet another new condition upon its nuclear cooperation, on top of the already heavy and stringent requirements of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the environmental procedures referred to above. Since nuclear safety controls applicable in countries' territories are regarded by most countries, including the United States, as sovereign prerogatives and responsibilities, other countries' resistance to the perceived infringement on their sovereignty would likely be increased. This would not be productive in achieving our practical objective of effective nuclear safety. Rather, it could actually impair our ability to remain a major international nuclear supplier, a role that is closely connected with our ability to achieve our non-proliferation and other foreign policy objectives, including our objective of enhancing nuclear health, safety and environmental standards worldwide.

We consider that appropriately structured multilateral and bilateral cooperative programs will continue to serve as the best means for constructively influencing countries to this end. Bilaterally, we will continue to make available our considerable experience and expertise, primarily from the NRC, through provision of assistance and voluntary arrangements for mutual interchange of nuclear regulatory and safety information. In multilateral programs, as noted in the testimony, the IAEA has long provided advice and assistance for establishment or improvement of member nations' national nuclear safety programs, and we will continue strongly to support and participate in the Agency's nuclear safety programs (which bear a visible imprint reflecting the results of our domestic nuclear experience and expertise). In this context, a relatively small U.S. effort can be effective in helping to train the manpower of safety organizations in countries newly undertaking nuclear power programs.

We believe that these efforts, combined with the reviews called for by the procedures recently promulgated pursuant to the President's Order, should provide the practical results that such legislation would seek while avoiding the serious drawbacks entailed in a new legislative approach at this time.

Ibid., pp. 30-31.

The hearing resumed on May 7, 1980, after the Nuclear Regulatory Commission had voted to issue two export licenses involving the Philippines (see the 1979 Digest, pp. 1596-1610), and construed its jurisdiction in the international health and safety area to exclude consideration of potential impacts on citizens of the recipient nation. Commissioner John F. Ahearne, Chairman of the Commission, summarized the reasons for the Commission's actions, in part as follows: