the television program “Issues and Answers", October 5, 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown responded:

Well, again, this is very hypothetical, Mr. McWethy, but there is no doubt in my mind that we have a commitment both to keep the Straits [sic] of Hormuz open, and to keep access to the nonbelligerents in the area open, and our relations with Saudi Arabia are such, and the dependence of the industrialized world on Saudi Arabia is such that I think that commitment has to be taken very seriously.

American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980 (1983), p. 800.

In an address on October 14, 1980, Secretary of State Edmund Muskie outlined United States objectives in the Persian Gulf. He said that the Iran-Iraq conflict might spread to interfere with shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and

[W]e have pledged to do what is necessary to protect free shipping in the Strait of Hormuz from any interference. We believe that the oil-producing nations must be free from external coercion or control and free to ship their oil safely through international waters. We and our allies do not seek to dominate the oil production decisions of the oil-producing nations. But all nations-not only industrial but the world's developing nations as well-have a profound interest in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

*

All these [military defensive] steps, let me emphasize, are taken in the interest of defense and peace. They threaten no one whose purpose is peace. They are designed to buttress the independence of the region and rights of free passage in its waterways. Our actions will remain carefully calibrated to these goals, so we neither create new needless tensions with the Soviet Union nor appear to threaten the freedom of decision of our friends in the

area.

Ibid., pp. 607-608.

By letter dated Oct. 21, 1980, the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General of the Iranian Government's policy concerning the Strait of Hormuz, to-wit:

As certain rumours have been spread concerning the Strait of Hormuz, which might disturb international navigation in that area, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that Iran is committed to keeping the Strait open to navigation and will not spare any effort for the purpose of achieving this end.

The Treaty between the United States and Panama Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, with

Annexes and Protocol, was signed at Washington September 7, 1977, and entered into force October 1, 1979. The Treaty provides for the permanent neutrality of the Canal in peace and war so that" . . . it shall remain secure and open to peaceful transit by the vessels of all nations on terms of entire equality . . ." (Article II). The Protocol, which is open to accession by all States, provides that the parties thereto... acknowledge the regime of permanent neutrality for the Canal..."and" . . . associate themselves with its objectives." In October 1979, shortly after the Treaty entered into force, the United States and Panama undertook a series of parallel démarches in world capitals to encourage other States to accede to the Protocol.

In a letter dated November 24, 1980, Secretary General Alejandro Orfila of the Organization of American States (the depositary of the Protocol) informed U.S. Permanent Representative Gale W. McGee that the Organization had received to that date instruments of accession to the Protocol from the following countries: Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Republic of Korea, Malawi, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Taiwan.

Earlier, in view of the prospective accession to the Protocol by the Taiwan authorities, the People's Republic of China had indicated that it could become party to the Protocol only if it received assurances that the Taiwan authorities would not be permitted to accede. In a diplomatic note, dated May 13, 1980, the Department of State informed the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, in pertinent part, as follows:

The Department of State is gratified to learn of the intention of the Government of the People's Republic of China to accede to the Protocol to the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal. The Department believes that accession by the Government of China will emphasize the international significance of the Protocol. The Department wishes to point out, however, that while the Government of the United States of America continues to recognize the Government of the People's Republic as the sole legitimate Government of China, the Department is not able to assure the Embassy that the Taiwan authorities will not be permitted to accede to the Protocol, because the Government of the United States is not a party to the Protocol. The United States and Panama are parties to the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal. However, the Protocol to that Treaty is international in scope and is intended to permit other nations of the world to express their support for the regime of neutrality created by the Treaty. Therefore, neither the Government of the United States nor the Government of Panama is eligible to be party to the Protocol. As the Embassy is aware, international law requires that any significant question regarding the acceptability of an accession to a multilateral Treaty such as this Protocol must be forwarded by the depositary (in this case the Organization of American States) to the

parties for decision. The United States is therefore unable to provide the desired assurance, which can only come from the parties. The Department wishes to reiterate its satisfaction in learning of the interest of the Government of China in this matter, and encourages the Government to accede to the Protocol at the earliest date possible.

Files, L/T; Dept. of State File No. P86-0041-1465.

On May 22, 1980, during a visit to Panama, a representative from Taiwan presented to the Government of Panama his authorities' instrument of accession to the Protocol. The Panamanian Foreign Minister accepted it for forwarding to the Organization of American States (OAS) for deposit. The deposit was effective July 22, 1980. The People's Republic of China so far has not become party to the Protocol.

§8 Ports Deepwater Ports

-H.D.C.

By an exchange of notes at Washington, August 15 and October 10, 1980, the United States and Panama confirmed their agreement that vessels registered in or flying the flag of Panama and their personnel on board which utilize the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP, Inc.), a deepwater port facility established under the Deepwater Port Act of 1974, shall, whenever they are present within the deepwater port's safety zone, be subject to the jurisdiction of both the United States. and the flag state, Panama, on the same basis as when they are in United States coastal ports. The agreement does not apply to vessels registered in or flying the flag of Panama that merely pass through the LOOP safety zone without calling at or otherwise utilizing the port.

TIAS 9885; 32 UST 2906; entered into force, Oct. 10, 1980.

Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources

On December 2, 1980, President Carter forwarded to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, adopted at the conclusion of a diplomatic conference held at Canberra, May 7-20, 1980, which was opened for signature on August 1, 1980, and signed on behalf of the United States by the American Ambassador to Australia, Philip H. Alston, on September 11. 1980.

The Convention provides for an ecosystem approach to the management of marine living resources in the waters surrounding Antarctica and establishes legal obligations and international machinery to protect and conserve those resources.

Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie recommended transmittal of the Convention to the Senate in a letter to the President dated October 29, 1980. The Secretary's report on the negotiations included discussion of the following points: (1) the conservation standard adopted; (2) the area of the Convention's application; (3) the accommodation in the Convention between creation of an effective Antarctic marine resources management system and claims to territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction in Antarctica; (4) decisionmaking by consensus on matters of substance; (5) the relationship between the Convention and the Antarctic Treaty; (6) participation in the Convention by the European Community; and (7) steps which the participants agreed to take for conservation of Antarctic marine living resources in the interim period after signature of the Convention but prior to its entry into force. A portion of the Secretary's letter follows:

THE NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiation of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources grew out of an initiative taken by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties and reflected in agreed recommendations under the Antarctic Treaty. Specifically, Recommendation IX-2 of the Ninth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, held in London in 1977, called for establishment of a regime for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources and outlined a two-stage procedure for development of such a regime. The first stage involved preparation of a draft regime by the Consultative Parties, and the second stage involved conclusion of the regime at a formal conference of the Consultative Parties and other interested states and organizations. During the first stage there were special meetings of Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties in Canberra and Buenos Aires in 1978 and informal discussions held in Washington and Bern in late 1978 and during 1979. These meetings resulted in the development of a draft convention which became the basic working document for the second stage-the diplomatic conference held in Canberra, May 7-20, 1980. (The diplomatic conference was preceded by a final two-day Special Consultative Meeting which formally transmitted the working documents to the conference.)

During the course of the negotiations seven major issues arose regarding the nature of, or relating to, the Convention. These involved:

-the conservation standard of the Convention;

-the area of application of the Convention;

-territorial sovereignty and maritime jurisdiction in the Convention area;

-decisionmaking;

-the Convention's links to the Antarctic Treaty;

-participation in the Convention by the European Community; and

-interim measures.

The Conservation Standard.-The waters surrounding Antarctica constitute a rich and distinctive marine ecosystem. This system is characterized by short, simple food chains and the dependence of a large number of species upon a single food source-krill. Antarctic krill ( a small shrimp-like crustacean) is food in enormous quantities in Antarctic waters and has become the object of considerable interest because of its potential for commercial harvesting. Concern over the possible effects of large-scale harvesting of krill was a major impetus to the negotiation of the Convention. The U.S., supported by a number of the participants in the negotiations, strongly advocated an ecosystem approach to the management of krill and the other species found in Antarctic waters. Such an approach would address not only the effects of harvesting upon target species, but also upon dependent species and the ecosystem as a whole. The states with the most immediate interests in harvesting expressed concern that such an approach could be formulated so as to prevent even carefully regulated fishing activities. The conservation standard which emerged from the negotiations fully satisfies U.S. interest in an ecosystem approach. It recognizes that rational utilization of the resources covered is included in the concept of conservation, but provides a commitment to ensuring the health of target and dependent species and the ecosystem as a whole, including prevention of irreversible changes in that ecosystem.

The Area of Application. The Antarctic Treaty applies to the area south of 60 degrees South Latitude. Early in discussion of the new Convention on Antarctic Marine Living Resources, it became clear that the Convention should cover a large area, because the range of the species involved extends well north of the area of the Antarctic Treaty-up to the Antarctic Convergence, or polar front, which is an oceanographic boundary between Antarctic waters to the south and warmer sub-Antarctic waters to the north. Therefore, it was agreed that it was important for the Convention to apply to all waters south of the Convergence.

Definition of the Convergence for the purposes of the Convention, however, represented an intricate scientific and, in fact, political issue. The Convergence is a complex transition zone which, in response to environmental conditions, fluctuates both in time and space. In addition, there are islands south of the Convergence over which state sovereignty is not disputed in contrast to the areas of Antarctica proper (south of 60 degrees South Latitude).

The participants in the negotiations agreed to delineate the area of the Convention by a set of coordinates understood as a rough approximation of the Convergence. As noted, this area includes islands clearly under the national jurisdiction of participating governments. One of these governments-France-expressed serious reservation over including these islands in the area of application of the Convention on the grounds that the implication might be created that its sovereignty was disputed. After prolonged discussion a solution was found which permitted France