Delimitation of the Continental Shelf. He emphasized, however, that the three boundary treaties before the Committee were "negotiated agreements, rather than based on particular legal theory.”

Portions of Mr. Feldman's replies to questions from Committee members follow:

*

We are following principles relating to maritime boundaries which flow from the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, and from the World Court decision in 1969 in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, and the opinion of the Court of Arbitration in 1977 in the Anglo-French case which confirm the basic U.S. analysis.

Fundamentally, however, these three agreements are negotiated agreements, rather than based on particular legal theory. The provisions in the Law of the Sea text on the delimitation of maritime boundaries in our opinion are reflective of the existing law on maritime boundaries as it applies to the United States in its relations to Canada and other countries, and we do not foresee any change in legal concepts or applications arising out of the adoption of these texts by the Law of the Sea Conference.

I might also add that as we see the situation in the Gulf of Mexico under the formulas that are being evolved in the Law of the Sea Conference, the entire Gulf of Mexico will become part of the continental margin of one country or the other. In other words, ultimately there will be a basis for the division of the Gulf between the United States and Mexico, so that there will be no small areas left for international jurisdiction.

S. Ex. Rept. No. 96-49, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (1980), pp. 22-23.

The Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, is at TIAS 5578; 15 UST 471; entered into force, June 10, 1964.

For the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, Feb. 20, 1969, see 1.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 3; Int'l Legal Materials, Vol. VIII (1969), p. 340.

For the decisions of the Court of Arbitration in the Arbitration between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, June 30, 1977, and Mar. 14, 1978, see Cmnd. No. 7438, Mar. 1979; Int'l Legal Materials, Vol. XVIII (1979), pp. 397-494. See, also, Colson, Note, "The United Kingdom-France Continental Shelf Arbitration: Interpretive Decision of March 1978", Am. J. of Int'l. Law, Vol. 73 (1979), pp. 112-120.

Senator Edward Zorinsky, who presided over the hearing on the three maritime boundary treaties, subsequently submitted additional questions for the record. The questions and the responses of the Executive Branch to them follow:

ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY SENATOR ZORINSKY

Question 1. Briefly, could you describe the methodology employed in drawing the three sets of maritime boundaries? Has the U.S. employed this same approach in delimiting other maritime boundaries? What, in your view, are the strengths and weaknesses

of the approach adopted for the purposes of the three treaties with Mexico, Venezuela and Cuba?

Answer. It is the U.S. position that maritime boundaries are to be established by agreement in accordance with equitable principles. The equidistance method can be applied, as a matter of convenience, where it leads to a result consistent with equitable principles.

In the three pending cases, the boundaries are best characterized as negotiated boundaries reflecting the assessment of the treaty partners of their particular interests. Equidistant lines were drawn giving full effect to islands and the lines were simplified, where useful for convenience or to avoid issues as to basepoints. The same approach was applied in the maritime boundary treaty with the Cook Islands, signed June 11, 1980, which will be submitted to the Senate in due course for advice and consent to ratification. It will be relevant in other boundary areas as well.

The principal exceptions in U.S. policy are (1) the maritime boundary with the Soviet Union which is determined by a line established in the 1867 Convention between the U.S. and Russia in connection with the purchase of Alaska and (2) the boundaries with Canada in the Gulf of Maine area and with the Bahamas on the Blake Plateau where, because of the configuration of the relevant coasts and other circumstances, a boundary following an equidistant line would not accord with equitable principles.

The advantage of the approach utilized in these treaties is that it protects the resource and security interests of the United States and permits resolution of potential disputes in our relations with neighboring countries..

Question 2. For the United States, what are the advantages and the disadvantages of adopting a maritime boundary formula which relies on the use of islands for the drawing of base lines and the determination of maritime boundaries? How significant is the "island" issue in the maritime boundary agreements with Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela? How significant is it likely to be in future maritime boundary negotiations? How is this issue being treated in the Law of the Sea negotiations?

Answer. After a complete interagency review it was determined that in applying the equidistance method, islands should be utilized as basepoints in all cases. While this approach does not advantage the U.S. in the deep waters of the eastern Gulf of Mexico, it is advantageous to the U.S. in the Pacific boundary area with Mexico. It is important to us in determining the boundary with Cuba off the Florida Keys and Dry Tortugas and the boundary with Canada in the Pacific in and seaward of Dixon Entrance. In the Caribbean and the Pacific most of our boundaries utilize small islands as basepoints. It should also be noted that the United States measures the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery conservation zone from islands along our coast.

In the law of the sea negotiating texts, islands are entitled to a 200-mile zone and continental shelf of their own. This fact, of course, does not necessarily determine how that zone should be delimited when it overlaps the zone of another country.

Question 3. Is the Department aware of any objections from other countries in the region to the conclusion of these agreements? What is the likelihood of future conflict?

Answer. No objections have been made to the United States by other countries concerning these agreements, and we are not aware of any claim by a third state to any area embraced by these agreements. Care was taken to conclude the United StatesVenezuela boundary treaty only after the Netherlands and Venezuela had reached agreement on their boundaries in the Caribbean, thereby not embroiling the United States in a dispute between Venezuela and the Netherlands Antilles.

The Department does not believe that establishment of these boundaries will be a contributing factor to any future conflict. Indeed, particularly in the cases of Cuba and Mexico where fisheries are conducted in the vicinity of the boundaries, establishment of the boundaries will clarify the legal situation, facilitate law enforcement, and generally tend to reduce chances for future conflict occurring because of uncertainty as to where the boundary line actually is.

Question 4. How do the maritime boundary treaties deal with fishery resources? Will they have a positive or negative impact on current disagreements over fishery resources, such as with Mexico? Answer. The boundaries will define the limits of the U.S. fishery conservation zone. On the Pacific coast, the boundary with Mexico insures that four rich fishing banks are within the limits of U.S. jurisdiction.

The boundaries also define the area in which the United States recognizes that the other party has fisheries jurisdiction to the extent recognized by the United States under international law. Each treaty contains an appropriate disclaimer to this effect. The boundary treaties, therefore, only clarify the limits of jurisdiction and do not deal with other fishery issues. The U.S. does not recognize coastal state jurisdiction over tuna and the boundary treaties do not prejudice that position. The boundary treaties themselves are not directly related to the current impasse with Mexico over tuna fishing in waters off the coast of Mexico.

Question 5. How do oil and mineral interests view these agreements? Do they see them as adequately protecting U.S. access to real or potential seabed resources? In the Department's view, will ratification of these agreements stimulate U.S. oil exploration in the area? Is the Department aware of any oil or mineral interests opposed to ratification of these three treaties?

Answer. The Departments of Energy and Interior (including the U.S. Geological Survey) and scientists at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute were consulted and approved the establishment of the U.S. maritime boundary position in all three of the present boundary cases. They agree that the treaties adequately protect the U.S. interest in mineral resources in these boundary regions. In the Department's view ratification of these agreements will assist in the development of the hydrocarbon resources of the boundary regions. Establishment of the boundary line will provide the certainty necessary for planning purposes and allow the U.S. Government to hold out a clear title to the resources of the continental shelf on its side of the line. Oil companies are not normally

inclined to make substantial investments to develop continental shelf areas which may be in dispute between two governments. The Department of State is not aware of any objection to these treaties from oil or mineral interests.

Bilateral Agreements

United States-United Kingdom

On June 2, 1980, President Carter transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, with its Agreed Minute, done at London, March 27, 1979. The Agreement pertains to reciprocal fishing activities in the waters off the United States Virgin Islands and the British Virgin Islands, and replaces the Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom, with its Agreed Minute, which was signed on June 24, 1977, entered into force, November 7, 1978, and expired on December 31, 1978.

When submitting the Agreement to the President on May 20, 1980, Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie summarized its purpose and provisions in part as follows:

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Traditionally, fishermen from the B.V.I. and the U.S.V.I. have fished throughout the Virgin Islands area. A small number of fishermen from Puerto Rico also fish off the B.V.I. The result of the entry into force of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 and of similar British legislation establishing 200-nauticalmile fishery zones in the Virgin Islands, however, was to forbid such traditional fishing. In order to enable traditional small-scale fishing in the waters off the U.S.V.I. and the B.V.I. to continue in accordance with existing patterns and levels, the Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement of 1977 was concluded. The Agreement of 1979, whose provisions are virtually identical to those of its predecessor, was concluded in order to permit these traditional fishing practices to continue following the expiration of the 1977 Agreement.

The provisions of the two Agreements differ only with respect to the termination clause. While the 1977 Agreement included a fixed expiration date, the 1979 Agreement provides that the Agreement: "shall continue in force until the expiry of a period of ninety days from the date on which either Party gives written notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Agreement."

In essence, the Agreement of 1979 will serve to avoid any disruption in the small-scale fisheries which have historically occurred around the Virgin Islands, and which have been a positive element in the close economic, social and cultural relations between the people of the U.S.V.I. and the B.V.I.

The Agreement provides that commercial fishing by vessels of the United States may continue in the exclusive fishery zone of the B.V.I. in accordance with existing levels and patterns, as may commercial fishing by vessels of the B.V.I. in the waters of the Fishery Conservation Zone (F.C.Z.) of the United States. The Agreed Minute defines the existing patterns and levels of fishing activity as a maximum of twelve United States vessels no more than 55 feet in length permitted to operate in the exclusive fishery zone of the B.V.I., and a maximum of two B.V.I. vessels no more than 40 feet in length permitted to operate in the United States F.C.Z. It also describes specifically the areas and seasons in which such fishing operations are authorized.

The Agreement stipulates that the United States has exclusive authority to enforce the provisions of the Agreement and applicable national fishery regulations within the F.C.Z. with respect to fishing by vessels of the B.V.I., and that the United Kingdom has similar exclusive authority within its exclusive fishery zone with respect to fishing by vessels of the United States.

S. Ex. L. 96th Cong., 2d sess. (1980), pp. v-vi.

See, also, S. Ex. Rept. 97-37, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (1981).

See, further, the 1977 Digest, pp. 567-569.

On Dec. 16, 1981, the Senate voted its advice and consent to the ratification of the Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. Cong. Rec., Vol. 127, No. 188 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1981), p. S15533.

TIAS 10545; entered into force, Mar. 10, 1983.

Governing International Fishery Agreements

Under Title II of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, approved April 13, 1976 (P.L. 94-265, 90 Stat. 337, 16 U.S.C. 1821-1825), any nation wishing to fish within 200 miles of United States coasts must sign a governing international fishery agreement, that acknowledges United States jurisdiction in the 200-mile fisheries zone established by the Act. The foreign nation can then apply for permits for its fishing vessels to enter specified fisheries where surpluses have been determined to exist by Regional Fishery Management Councils. See, the 1976 Digest, p. 365.

Section 203 of the Act, 16 U.S.C. 1823, establishes procedures for Congressional oversight of such agreements, and provides that no governing international fishery agreement shall become effective with respect to the United States before the close of the first 60 calendar days of continuous session of the Congress after the date on which the President transmits to the House of Representatives and to the Senate a document setting forth the text of such governing international fishery agreement.

The Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Portugal Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States, with Agreed Minutes, signed at Washington on October 16, 1980, was approved by the Congress by Public Law 96-561, §145, approved by the President, December 22,