The 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of that amount which we are committed to sell will not be delivered. This grain was not intended for human consumption but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock herds.

Although the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.

Along with other countries, we will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the north. The United States also stands ready to help other nations in the region in similar ways.

*

Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, Bk. 1 (1981), pp. 22-24; American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980 (1983), pp. 813-814.

At a press conference on February 13, 1980, President Carter was asked about Afghanistan. The questions and his answers follow:

SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN

Q. Mr. President, if the crisis in Afghanistan is real and as serious as you have said it is-if it is, does the U.S. have the military capacity to cope with it, short of using a nuclear weapon?

THE PRESIDENT. The crisis is a great one, precipitated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for several reasons. First of all, this is a crucial area of the world-to us, to our allies, and to other nations. Two-thirds of all the oil exported in the entire world comes from the Persian Gulf region. Secondly, it's a highly volatile, rapidly changing, unstable part of the world. Third, the Soviets have been indulging in a steady military buildup over a number of years, which has caused us concern and to which we have reacted since I've been in this office. Fourth, the Soviets-a major departure from anything they've done since the Second World Warhave now exhibited a willingness to use their military forces beyond their own borders, in a massive invasion of Afghanistan. The reaction[s] that I have taken to these steps are appropriate and, I believe and hope, adequate. We must convince the Soviet Union, through peaceful means, peaceful means, that they cannot invade an innocent country with impunity and they must suffer the consequences of their action.

Everything we've done has been to contribute to stability, moderation, consistency, persistence, and peace. We have taken actions on our own, and we have asked our allies and others to join in with us in the condemnation of the Soviet Union and the demand that the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan and to convince them that any further adventurism on their part would cause grave consequences

to the Soviet Union.

In my judgment our forces are adequate. We cannot afford to let the Soviets choose either the terrain or the tactics to be used by any other country-a nation that might be invaded, their neighbors, our allies, or ourselves-if they should persist in their aggressive action. Those judgments would have to be made at the time. But I believe they're adequate.

SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

Q. Mr. President, in Afghanistan again, sir, what kind of regime would be acceptable to you? The Russians have said that if they withdraw, they would leave-I think have left the indication that they would leave a puppet regime. Would you insist on a neutralist regime, or what ideas have you on it?

THE PRESIDENT. What we would like to have, first of all, is a Soviet withdrawal and a commitment, that might be verified and carried out, that the Soviets would not invade another country or use their military forces beyond their borders again to destabilize the peace. We would like to have a neutral country. If there had to be à transition phase during which a neutral and responsible government might be established acceptable to the Afghanistan people, then perhaps some peacekeeping force espoused by the United Nations, maybe comprised of Moslem military troops or otherwise, could be used during that transition phase.

But the prime consideration that I have is to make sure that the Soviets know that their invasion is not acceptable, to marshal as much support from other nations of the world as possible, and to prevent any further threat to the peace and the cause of war. I think through strength we can maintain peace. But we've got to be resolute, we've got to be consistent, and our actions have got to be in a tone of long-range, predictable action clearly understood by the Soviet Union.

Ibid., p. 849; Public Papers, ante, pp. 308-309.

On Jan. 7, 1980, a draft Security Council resolution proposed by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, the Philippines, and Zambia (U.N. Doc. S/13729, dated Jan. 6, 1980) was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The German Democratic Republic also voted against the resolution. See, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2190, Jan. 7, 1980, p. 57.

On Jan. 14, 1980, the U.N. General Assembly, by a vote of 104 (U.S.)-18-18, adopted G.A. Res. ES-6/2, regarding the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security. The principal operative paragraphs of the resolution: reaffirmed that respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every State is a fundamental principle of the U.N. Charter; deplored the armed intervention in Afghanistan; appealed to all states to respect Afghanistan's sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and non-aligned character and to refrain from any interference in its internal affairs; called for immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan; and urged all parties to bring about conditions necessary for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homes.

U.N. Gen. Ass. Off. Rec., 6th emerg. spec. sess., Supp. No. 1 (A/ES-6/7) (1980), p. 2; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 80, No. 2035, Feb. 1980, p. 73.

See, also, the 1979 Digest, pp. 32-43.

Nonfomentation of International Terrorism

On May 9, 1980, Malcolm R. Barnebey, Director of the Office of Andean Affairs in the Department of State's Bureau of InterAmerican Affairs, appeared before the Subcommittee on Government Activities and Transportation of the House Committee on Government Operations to testify about United States measures in response to the Chilean Government's failure to extradite, prosecute, or seriously investigate three ex-officials of the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA). A Federal grand jury in the District of Columbia had indicted the three in 1978, together with several other persons, in connection with the 1976 assassination of Orlando Letelier and Mrs. Ronni Karpen Moffitt.

Letelier, a former Chilean Ambassador to the United States and former Chilean Cabinet Minister, and Mrs. Moffitt had been killed when a bomb attached to the Letelier car exploded as they were riding to work in Washington. The grand jury had charged the three DINA officials with having planned and directed the killings. Knowledge of their involvement had been obtained in part from information furnished by Michael V. Townley, an American citizen employee of DINA in Chile, who had come to the United States to make the bomb used in the killing, had then returned to Chile, and had thereafter been expelled from Chile to the United States. Arrested and charged with conspiracy to murder Letelier, Townley had plea bargained in exchange for providing full information about the conspiracy (see the 1978 Digest, pp. 851-855).

Mr. Barnebey summarized measures that the United States Government had announced on November 30, 1979 (see the 1979 Digest, pp. 50-52 and 1457-1458) and thereafter taken. His prepared statement follows, in part:

Subsequent to the 1978 indictments by a U.S. Federal grand jury in Washington of three officers of the Chilean intelligence service, the U.S. Government requested that the Government of Chile order the extradition of the three officers. This request was reviewed by the President of the Chilean Supreme Court but was denied in May 1979. The U.S. Government appealed this decision to a special review panel made up of five Justices of the Chilean Supreme Court. In elaborating U.S. arguments for extradition before the courts, a strong case was made, as is well known both to those Americans who have followed the case closely as well as to large numbers of Chileans who followed the extensive coverage of the trial in the Chilean press. On October 1, 1979, the review panel of the Chilean Supreme Court issued its findings, denying our appeal and upholding the initial denial of extradition.

Concurrent with our request for extradition, a Chilean investigation was underway of the possible fraudulent use of Chilean passports and other matters related to the assassination. By October 1979, this investigation had proceeded for over 20 months without any indication that it would be pursued vigorously. The decision of the review panel gave no indication that this situation would change.

U.S. Measures

As a result of the failure of the Government of Chile to investigate seriously or to prosecute these crimes, the President decided on a series of actions which were announced on November 30, 1979. These measures were taken to make clear both to the Government of Chile and to others throughout the world that any such act of terrorism as that committed against Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt on the streets of Washington, D.C., cannot be tolerated.

• We reduced the number of U.S. Government personnel in Chile. This reduction is complete except for a few individuals, and they will depart from Santiago before mid-July. The reduction involves 25% of mission personnel and has significantly lowered the profile of U.S. Government activities in Chile.

• On January 1, 1980, the foreign military sales pipeline to Chile was terminated, and thus all deliveries of military equipment and spare parts to the Government of Chile by the United States has been ended.

• Concerning the military group stationed at our Embassy in Santiago, the measures announced November 30 prescribed that the military group would be phased down as the foreign military sales pipeline was reduced and that in 1980 an assessment would be made as to whether the military group should be eliminated. This assessment has been made, and the decision was to eliminate the military group.

• Pursuant to the Export-Import Bank Act and to authority delegated by the President, the Secretary of State determined that suspension of Export-Import Bank financing in Chile would "clearly and importantly advance United States policy" in combatting international terrorism. The Export-Import Bank has, therefore, suspended its limited remaining financing operations in Chile. In addition, the Federal Credit Insurance Agency, a private organization closely associated with the Export-Import Bank, is no longer providing export insurance.

We have continued to make clear to the Government of Chile our grave concern over its failure to investigate seriously the Letelier/Moffitt assassinations. For example, we recently voted in the World Bank against a proposed water supply project loan in Chile. In our contacts with the Government of Chile, we have continued to stress the adverse impact of this case on our bilateral relations.

We believe that the measures which have been taken constitute clear and strong indications of the U.S. Government's abhorrence of terrorist killings and our determination to take signifi

cant and appropriate steps against those who, by their actions or failure to act, condone such crimes.

*

Alleged Violations of U.S. Aviation Laws and Regulations by LAN Chile Airlines: Hearing before a Subcomm. [on Government Operations and Transportation] of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (1980), pp. 37-40; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 80, No. 2042, Sept. 1980, pp. 73-74.

The Subcommittee was investigating alleged violations of United States aviation laws and regulations by Linea Aerea Nacional de Chile (LAN Chile), the Chilean state-owned airline, some of whose personnel had been involved with one of the co-conspirators, allegedly without any knowledge of the conspiracy. See, further, this Digest, Ch. 8, §2, post.

§2 Continuity and Succession of States

Succession of States in Respect of Treaties

United States-Tuvalu

On October 1, 1979, Tuvalu, formerly the Ellice Islands, achieved independence from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (see the 1978 Digest, p. 87).

In a note dated December 17, 1978, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu notified the Secretary General of the United Nations that the Government of Tuvalu considered itself bound, until further notification, by treaties and agreements applicable to Tuvalu before its independence. For the text, see, Treaties in Force (1986), under "Tuvalu", p. 184.

In an effort to clarify which of the many treaties and agreements entered into between the United States and the United Kingdom remained in effect in respect of Tuvalu, the United States, by a note from the American Embassy at Suva to the Tuvalu Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at Funafuti, dated January 29, 1980, submitted for review as to continuing application a list that included a consular convention, an extradition treaty, and agreements on air services, the Peace Corps, amateur radio licensing, and visas. In addition, the United States proposed that the 1979 Treaty of Friendship between the two nations be included when it entered into force. By a reply dated April 25, 1980, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu confirmed his Government's concurrence in the continuation in force of the treaties and agreements set out in the Embassy's note.

TIAS 9770; 32 UST 1310; entered into force, Apr. 25, 1980.

The Treaty of Friendship between the United States and Tuvalu, signed at Funafuti, on February 7, 1979, may be found at TIAS 10776; entered into force, Sept. 23, 1983.

See, also, the 1979 Digest, pp. 781-782.