and even-handedness that must eventually characterize successful diplomacy.

But proudest of all should be the people of Zimbabwe for they have demonstrated to a skeptical world that it is possible to resolve longstanding racial and political grievances and to establish a society based on the principles of democracy and racial equality. The United States welcomes the determined efforts of Prime Minister Mugabe and his Government to create in Zimbabwe a nation where those ideals will be translated into an everyday reality. We will do everything we can to encourage and support those efforts. We encourage all Members of the United Nations, and the United Nations itself, to contribute to those efforts, especially those directed at Zimbabwe's economic and social development.

For its part, Zimbabwe can make an important contribution to the world community through its participation in the United Nations. Zimbabwe has already begun to play an important role in the affairs of southern Africa. It has joined with other States in the region to promote economic development. And it is participating, together with the other Front-Line States [see, post] and the five Western nations and others, in efforts to find a peaceful solution to the vexing problem of Namibia.

Equally important to the cause of world peace is the contribution that Zimbabwe has already made and continues to make by its example. As the Members of the United Nations seek solutions to the pressing political and economic problems that confront the nations of the world, we should see Zimbabwe as a beacon light. Its unique experience signals to us all that swords can be turned into ploughshares, and enemies can join as brothers to work towards a common good.

U.N. Doc. 2/PV. 2244, July 20, 1980, pp. 47-48.

S/RES/477 (1980) may be found at Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council,] 1980, Security Council Off. Rec., 35th year, S/INF/36 (1981), p. 25.

The "Front-Line" States, in addition to Zambia and Mozambique, ante, were Angola, Botswana, and Tanzania.

On Sept. 25, 1980, the Governments of the United States and Zimbabwe concluded at Salisbury (Harare) a memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the field of agricultural science and technology (TIAS 10054; entered into force, Sept. 25, 1980) and an agreement for scientific and technical cooperation (TIAS 9967; 32 UST 4543; entered into force, Sept. 25, 1980).

Self-Rule and Autonomy

West Bank and Gaza

On March 20, 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance appeared at a hearing by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to examine the current status of United States policy regarding Israeli settlements in Arab territories occupied since 1967, and regarding Jerusalem. The hearing had been prompted: (1) by questions about United Nations Security Council Resolution 465 dated March 1, 1980, for which the United States had voted in its entirety, after having obtained deletion of certain references to Jerusalem; and (2) by a subsequent statement of President Carter regarding the United

States vote-it had been approved in the belief that all references to Jerusalem would be removed in a resolution concerning settlements. The Secretary reiterated the United States position that a comprehensive peace must include a resolution of the Palestinian problem, that the Israeli settlements were contrary to international law and an impediment to the Middle East peace process, and that full autonomy for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza "within the context of assured Israeli security" was a necessary step toward achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement. Portions of his statement follow:

The current negotiations provide the context for concrete discussion of individual issues. It is important to define what the current negotiations are and what they are not.

They are not, for example, designed to define the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. All issues relating to permanent institutions in these areas are to be resolved in a later negotiation where the Palestinians can participate in the determination of their own future through the process set forth in the Camp David accords. Our concern is that unilateral acts tend to prejudice the outcome of those negotiations and therefore undercut the avenue to a peaceful and honorable resolution of these complex issues.

The current negotiations are an effort to establish a selfgoverning authority in the West Bank and Gaza for a transitional period while fully protecting Israel's security. In order for that effort to succeed, some important issues will have to be resolved.

The current negotiations must also define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. These arrangements should assure full autonomy for the inhabitants of these territories while providing for the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

There is, also, the question of how the elections will be conducted which will produce the freely elected body called for by the Camp David framework. Those elections should assure that during the transition period the body has the popular support necessary to carry out its responsibilities as agreed among the parties.

On the question of security, let me affirm the statement in the Camp David accords that, "all necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond."

I will turn now to the peace process.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, there has been no change in U.S. policy as we continue our dedicated efforts toward a comprehensive settlement. Before turning to your questions, I would like to say a few final words about the Middle East peace process as a whole.

Over the past 3 years, there is no foreign policy goal on which the President and I have worked harder than a genuine peace in the Middle East. The achievement at Camp David, the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the launching of negotiations to establish full autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza are historic accom

plishments, particularly when viewed against the past history of this tragic conflict.

It is critically important that we concentrate our full and undivided attention on the autonomy negotiations and do all we can to give these talks the best possible prospect for success. The autonomy negotiations offer the first real opportunity for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza to achieve full autonomy within the context of assured Israeli security, as the next step toward achieving a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace settlement.

As reflected in the agreement reached at Camp David, such a peace is deeply in the interests of the United States, of Israel, of Israel's neighbors, and of the world. Every decision we have made and will make is designed to move us toward that goal.

With this in mind, the President has invited President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin each to come to Washington in early April to discuss with him how best we can accelerate the movement toward our mutual objective.

U.S. Middle East Policy: Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on For. Rel., 96th Cong., 2d sess. (1980), pp. 5, 6-8; American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980 (1983), pp. 706-708; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 80, No. 2038, May 1980, pp. 61-62.

Responding to a question from the Committee Chairman, Senator Frank Church, Secretary Vance stated that the United States view remained one of opposition to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Senator Church then asked if it would not have been more consistent with the United States role as mediator in the negotiations between Israel, Egypt, the Palestinians, and "hopefully other Arab countries relating to the unresolved issues, including the West Bank", for the United States to have abstained from voting on S/RES 465, parts of which, the Chairman said, “related to the very issues which were the subject of negotiation between the parties." Pointing out that S/RES 465 was recommendatory, Secretary Vance replied:

First let me say that I believe the United States, as a full partner in the negotiations, has played and can play a very important role in helping the parties reach agreement, as was the case not only at Camp David but also in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and in the commencement of the negotiations, the so-called West BankGaza autonomy negotiations which are ongoing now. So, we do clearly have an important role to play.

We want to create an atmosphere in which the parties can have the best chance of succeeding,

One of the reasons that we abstained at an earlier date, in March of last year, when the resolution was first raised to set up a committee to look into the question of settlements, is that we felt at that time that by abstaining we would help to move the negotiations forward which soon would be taking place for the West Bank and Gaza.

Also, we hoped that by abstaining it would help lead to restraint on the part of Israel with respect to the establishment of new settlements.

The same thing was true when, subsequently, in July as I recall it, there was a second vote on which we abstained. Unfortunately,

our hopes with respect to restraint in the area regarding the establishment of new settlements did not bear fruit.

Therefore, when this resolution came forward at this time, particularly in light of what had not been happening in terms of restraint, and the dangers which we saw that the failure to exercise restraint presaged for the successful continuation of the autonomy talks, we felt it was appropriate that in this case we would vote affirmatively on the settlements question.

U.S. Middle East Policy: Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on For. Rel., 96th Cong., 2d sess. (1980), pp. 10-11.

On Nov. 21, 1980, Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, Personal Representative of the President to the West Bank and Gaza Autonomy Negotiations, gave an assessment of the negotiations over the preceding 18 months before the Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs. During that time, he said, the United States had sought to "play an active and essential part as a 'full partner' . . . [and had] undertaken to act as a catalyst and a constructive spur to progress [trying] to help both parties find common ground and narrow the differences between them." See, An Assessment of the West Bank and Gaza Autonomy Talks, November 1980: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Europe and the Middle East of the House Comm. on For. Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d sess. (1980), pp. 7, 14; American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980 (1983), pp. 718-719.

For a statement by President Ronald Reagan regarding the West Bank, made at a press interview on Feb. 2, 1981, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981 (1984), pp. 681-682.

Rights and Duties of States Nonintervention in Internal Affairs

On January 4, 1980, President Carter addressed the Nation about the "extremely serious threat" to the peace in Southwest Asia caused by the massive Soviet invasion of the "small, nonaligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan" on December 25 and 26, 1979.

The world, the President said, simply could not stand by and "permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with impunity", and neither the United States nor any other nation committed to world peace and stability could continue to "do business as usual with the Soviet Union." The President outlined the steps that the United States Government would take in response to the Soviet "attempt to crush Afghanistan". Excerpts from his address follow:

The Soviets claim, falsely, that they were invited into Afghanistan to help protect that country from some unnamed outside threat. But the President, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated-along with several members of his family-after the Soviets gained control of the capital city of Kabul. Only several days later was the new puppet leader even brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets.

This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia and also because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples throughout the world.

This is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter. It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people.

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan to stability and peace. A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a steppingstone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies.

The United States wants all nations in the region to be free and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend their control to adjacent countries, the stable, strategic, and peaceful balance of the entire world will be changed. This would threaten the security of all nations including, of course, the United States, our allies, and our friends.

Therefore, the world simply cannot stand by and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with impunity. Fifty nations have petitioned the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan. We realize that under the United Nations Charter the Soviet Union and other permanent members may veto action of the Security Council. If the will of the Security Council should be thwarted in this manner, then immediate action would be appropriate in the General Assembly of the United Nations [under G.A. Res. 377A(V), Nov. 3, 1950], where no Soviet veto exists.

In the meantime, neither the United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union.

The successful negotiation of the SALT II treaty has been a major goal and a major achievement of this administration, and we Americans, the people of the Soviet Union, and indeed the entire world will benefit from the successful control of strategic nuclear weapons through the implementation of this carefully negotiated treaty.

However, because of the Soviet aggression, I have asked the United States Senate to defer further consideration of the SALT II treaty so that the Congress and I can assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

The Soviets must understand our deep concern. We will delay opening of any new American or Soviet consular facilities, and most of the cultural and economic exchanges currently under consideration will be deferred. Trade with the Soviet Union will be severely restricted.

I have decided to halt or to reduce exports to the Soviet Union in three areas that are particularly important to them. These new policies are being and will be coordinated with those of our allies. I've directed that no high technology or other strategic items will be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further notice, while we revise our licensing policy.

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States waters will be severely curtailed.