Article 1 obligates both States, subject to the provisions of the treaty, to extradite to the other persons charged with or convicted of extraditable offenses. Article 2 includes as extraditable offenses those which are, under the laws of the Netherlands and the Federal law of the United States, punishable by imprisonment for a maximum period exceeding one year. Article 2 also authorizes extradition under certain conditions for an attempt to commit or a conspiracy to commit any extraditable offense. This article also permits the Government of the United States to request the extradition of a person for any extraditable offense when Federal jurisdiction is based upon the use of the mails or other means of carrying out interstate commerce. Article 2 in addition includes a jurisdictional provision which allows for extradition where the offense has been committed outside the territory of the requesting State by a national of that State. Crimes committed outside the territory of the requesting State may also provide the basis for extradition if the offenses so committed would also be punishable under the law of the requested State in similar circumstances. Like provisions are contained in United States extradition treaties with the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Norway, and Mexico. It is anticipated that such provisions will be useful in the areas of narcotics and counterfeiting violations. Article 3 defines the territorial application of the treaty. This article expands the normal context of that concept to include aircraft in flight. This provision also extends jurisdiction to acts of aircraft piracy, whether or not they occur over the territory of either of the Parties. Article 4 contains the political offense exception clause. It excludes, however, from the category of political offenses murder or other willful crimes against the life or physical integrity of a Head of State or Head of Government or their families. Military offenses are excluded as extraditable offenses. Article 4 gives the Executive Authority of each Party the responsibility of determining whether a request for extradition involves a political or military offense, unless the national laws of the requested Party grant such powers to its courts. In the United States, the laws do not grant such powers to the courts, and the authority, therefore, would rest with the Executive branch. Article 5 contains a prior jeopardy provision. It excludes extradition in cases where the person requested has been prosecuted by the requested Party for the offense for which extradition is requested. Article 6 precludes extradition where prosecution or enforcement of the penalty for the offense for which extradition is sought has become barred by lapse of time according to the law of requested Party. Article 7 permits refusal of extradition in capital cases unless satisfactory assurances are received that the death penalty will not be imposed or, if imposed, will not be executed for an offense not punishable by death in the country from which extradition is requested. A similar article has been included in most recent treaties. Article 7 also provides that the Executive Authority may refuse extradition on humanitarian grounds having regard to the age or other personal condition of the person sought. Similar provisions are found in our extradition treaties with Norway and Finland. Article 8 deals with the extradition of nationals. It contains two provisions similar to those included in some of our other recently signed extradition treaties. It grants the Executive Authority the discretionary power to extradite its own nationals. If extradition is denied on the basis of nationality, the requested Party undertakes to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense. This article thus takes into account the law of the Netherlands ordinarily prohibiting the extradition of Dutch nationals but allowing for their prosecution in the Netherlands for offenses committed abroad. Article 8 also contains an innovation. It provides that the requested Party may not refuse extradition solely on the basis of nationality where there exists a treaty between the Parties on the execution of foreign penal sanctions. Such agreements, more often referred to as prisoner transfer treaties, would, for example, allow a Dutch national tried and convicted in the United States to return to the Netherlands to serve out his ordered term of incarceration. This provision was put in Article 8 to provide for liberalization of the nationality clause should the Parties in the future conclude such an agreement. Articles 9-18 outline the procedures by which extradition shall be accomplished. Of particular note are Articles 9 and 13. Article 9, inter alia, limits extradition to cases where there is sufficient evidence, according to the laws of the requested Party, to bring the person sought to trial had the offense been committed in [the territory of] the requested Party or where the person is shown to have been convicted by the courts of the requesting Party. Article 13 contains another innovation. It allows the requested Party to temporarily surrender a person sought to the requesting Party for purposes of prosecution. The provision was designed to cover the situation where the person sought is found extraditable on foreign charges while serving a sentence in the [territory of the] requested Party for an entirely different offense. Article 19 provides, among other things, that the requested Party shall make all arrangements necessary for internal extradition procedures and employ all legal means to obtain from the judicial authorities the decisions necessary to perfect the extradition request. We expect to continue the present practice under which each country is represented in extradition proceedings by the other's Justice Department. Article 19 also provides that the requesting Party shall only pay the costs associated with the transportation of the person sought and with the translation of extradition documents. Article 20 stipulates that the treaty is retroactive in effect as to extraditable offenses which were committed before the date of its entry into force and which were punishable under the laws of both Parties when committed. Article 21 provides that the treaty will enter into force on the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification. Upon entry into force, this treaty will terminate the Treaty of Extradition between the United States and the Netherlands signed on June 2, 1887, and the Supplementary Treaty on Extradition signed on January 18, 1904. S. Treaty Doc. No. 97-7, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (1981), pp. v-vii. The United States and the Kingdom of The Netherlands later concluded a Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, with exchange of notes, at The Hague, June 12, 1981 (which does not apply to requests for assistance relating to fiscal offenses addressed to the Netherlands Antilles). TIAS 10734; entered into force, Sept. 15, 1983. In regard to extradition treaties concluded by the United States with the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Mexico, Norway, and Turkey, all replacing earlier extradition treaties and all including, as extraditable offenses, narcotics offenses and aircraft hijacking, see the 1979 Digest, pp. 460-479. §6 South Africa Protection of Human Rights On May 13, 1980, Patricia M. Derian, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, discussed the status of human rights in South Africa at a hearing held jointly by the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade, on Africa, and on International Organizations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Miss Derian's testimony was directed toward several specific Subcommittee questions, the last of which inquired about United States actions to protest human rights violations in South Africa. Her prepared statement read: The U.S. Government has continued to underscore our opposition to the apartheid system in South Africa. Private and Public Diplomacy At the diplomatic level, the United States has repeatedly protested human rights violations to the South African Government at the highest levels. In these exchanges, we have raised the practice of banning, arbitrary detention, torture, the pass laws, the forcible removal of black communities, the systematic denial of South African citizenship to blacks, the denial of meaningful participation by all South Africans in the political process, and the lack of justice in the judicial system. The United States also has publicly protested the egregious abuses in South Africa. Our Ambassadors at the United Nations have delivered forceful public statements on apartheid's abhorrent nature. On October 4, 1979, speaking before Ambassadors and Ministers of the Organization of African Unity [OAU], former Secretary Vance reaffirmed that unless a system of government evolved in which all South Africans could participate equitably, our relations with South Africa would inevitably deteriorate. Vice President Mondale has affirmed this same point publicly. Arms Embargo In addition to private and public diplomacy, the United States imposed a voluntary arms embargo against South Africa, beginning in 1962. In 1977, the Carter Administration supported the U.N. mandatory arms embargo on South Africa. In 1978, we imposed a ban on all exports to the South African military and police and have made sometimes effective representations to other governments to do likewise. We shall continue to do so. There have been no sales to South Africa under the U.S. foreign military sales program since 1973. We, further, have tightened procedures on the commercial sale of civilian aircraft to South Africa to help assure that they will not be used for military, police, or paramilitary purposes. There also have been no exports of nuclear supplies or materials to South Africa since 1975. We have made it clear that resumption of peaceful nuclear cooperation would depend on South Africa's agreement on the Non-proliferation Treaty and safeguards issues. Economic Endeavors In the economic sphere, legislation was passed in 1978 to confine Export-Import Bank support to those private firms implementing fair employment practices. In consequence of this restriction, there have been no new authorizations for Exim financing for exports to South Africa since September 1978. Prior to these restrictions, the United States had halted Eximbank financing to the South African Government. In 1979 and 1980, CCC [Commodity Credit Corporation, U.S.A.] credits have not been made available to South Africa. In the area of private investment, we have urged U.S. firms operating in South Africa to follow fair employment practices for black employees in accordance with the Sullivan code. The Sullivan principles set reasonable standards for corporate conduct in South Africa. They have sought to involve the business community in promoting economic opportunities for blacks. The Sullivan principles call for improvements in wages, working conditions, fringe benefits, and advancement opportunities for black workers. They also support recognition of representative black trade unions. To date, more than 130 companies have subscribed to the Sullivan principles, representing 75% of the work force on the payrolls of U.S. corporations doing business in South Africa. Certainly, those American firms which have not implemented the Sullivan code are not acting in accordance with the thrust of U.S. policy. It is noteworthy that as a result of the Sullivan initiative, similar codes of conduct have emerged from other nations and some South African corporations, too, have agreed to implement these principles. SUMMARY Politically and legally, the United States has refused to recognize the independent homelands, proclaimed by the South African Government. At the United Nations, we have supported resolutions condemning the establishment of these independent homelands. We also have supported resolutions on South Africa's ill-treatment of political prisoners and have endorsed continuation of U.N. trust funds for South Africans. I would note that we have been unable to support resolutions that encourage violence or call for economic sanctions against South Africa. We have sought to maintain ties with many elements of the black South African community, including human rights organizations and banned individuals. We have dispatched embassy observers to political trials. We have contributed generously to U.N. funds providing educational assistance and training to black South Africans. We also have contributed funds for legal aid to prisoners, relief for their families, and assistance to black South African refugees in neighboring states. Through the visitors program of the International Communications Agency (USICA), we have brought approximately 50 South Africans annually to the United States. Twenty-five Americans, in turn, have visited South Africa. By means of this program, we have demonstrated our support for black South Africans seeking change; we have encouraged white South Africans to recognize the need for change. The program's effectiveness is perhaps evidenced by the South African Government's refusal on occasion to grant passports to some of the black grantees. We have vigorously protested these actions. In sum, the United States has undertaken a variety of measures to influence and persuade South Africa to change its policies. There is still a great deal to do. For example, many private groups in the United States today are calling for stronger measures to combat apartheid in South Africa. They have urged broadening of the Sullivan principles and strengthening their implementation. . . . Private groups also have called upon the U.S. Government to disassociate itself more clearly from the South African Government through our trade and investment policies. Specifically, they have urged the U.S. Government to curtail or halt private trade and investment to South Africa. They have called upon corporations to withdraw from South Africa. In at least two cases, corporations have done so. Private groups also have urged the United States to consider if there are any circumstances whereby it could support economic sanctions against South Africa in the United Nations. To date, the United States has limited its support of sanctions to our expanded arms embargo. .. [O]ur policies must encourage rapid, peaceful, and significant change in South Africa. It is incumbent upon the United States, consistent with its obligations under the U.N. Charter, to continue to seek respect for the rights of all South Africans to participate in the political process of South Africa without distinc |