States: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, Bk. I (1981), pp. 697-698.

See, further, the 1979 Digest, pp. 1767-1776.

The course of the Sept. 1979 trilateral talks was subsequently summarized in Peace in the Sinai, in part, as follows:

As the discussions got underway, it was clear that Israel would not accept the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) as a substitute for UNEF, even if the former were substantially strengthened. UNTSO's unarmed observers, it said, would be unable to carry out the enforcement role required of the UN force.

Behind Israel's objections lay memories of the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force just before the outbreak of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This impasse led to an Israeli suggestion that the United States should implement the commitment undertaken in President Carter's letter of March 26, 1979, "to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force." [See the 1979 Digest, p. 1707.]

Secretary Vance pointed out that the President's commitment to help establish an alternative multinational force applied to the final withdrawal period and not to the interim stages. . . . [The Secretary] recognized, however, that some new American initiative might be required to resolve the problems created by UNEF's withdrawal, and requested... that the U.S. Sinai Support Mission (SSM) develop a verification proposal for his possible use with the Egyptian and Israeli negotiators. ... SSM's staff prepared a plan that involved the use of helicopter-borne inspection teams to verify compliance with the armament and manpower limitations specified in the Treaty for the Egyptian units permitted in the controlled areas west of the Interim Buffer Zone, known as Zones A and B. By using helicopters for reconnaissance and the transportation of inspection teams, particularly to the more remote parts of the Sinai, SSM was confident that SFM [the Sinai Field Mission], working in conjunction with the American surveillance flights provided under the Treaty, could reliably verify compliance without exceeding its authorized personnel ceiling of 200 American civilians.

With this information in hand, Secretary Vance was able to move the discussion of the interim security arrangements forward by offering, subject to Congressional approval, to have the United States assume responsibility for verifying that the armament and force limitations specified in Article II of Annex I of the Peace Treaty were carried out in Zones A and B, including at the Israeli technical sites in the Interim Buffer Zone. By using personnel of the Sinai Field Mission, the United States could fulfill the requirement in Article VI of the Annex, originally to have been requested of the UN, for periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of the Annex to be carried out not less than twice a month, with additional verifications within 48 hours after receipt of a request from either Party. But it would do so only in Zones A and B, and the Interim Buffer Zone, and only during the period preceding Israel's final withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982. In addition, the frequency of U.S. aerial surveillance flights over the Sinai would be increased to once a week.

Initially at... [the Secretary's] request, the two Parties themselves accepted responsibility for ensuring that the provisions of the Treaty would be carried out in the Interim Buffer Zone. Later, in October, the United States was to agree to the Parties' request that it serve as the "third party" which would conduct monthly inspections of the four technical installations Israel would be permitted to operate in the Interim Buffer Zone under Article V of the Appendix to Annex I of the Treaty. With U.S. and Egyptian encouragement, Israel agreed to a small continued UNTSO presence in the Sinai, but did so on the understanding that the United States alone would be responsible for the verification inspections.

It was also agreed that the United States would meet with the Parties one year before Israel's final withdrawal to arrange for a UN or a multinational force to be stationed in Zone C following that withdrawal. From the outset of the trilateral meeting, it was clear that Israel was primarily concerned with the security arrangements to be implemented at the time of its final withdrawal from the Sinai. By pledging to address these concerns well before that withdrawal, the United States made it easier for Israel to accept the interim arrangements.

With the Parties' acceptance of the U.S. offer came a significant new role for the Sinai Field Mission, a role that would broaden its area of responsibility from the 240 square miles covered by the early warning system to more than 15,000 square miles

of western and central Sinai and require different operational personnel and equipment.

Dept. of State, Peace in the Sinai (March 1983), pp. 1-3.

In addition to the semiannual reports on U.S. monitoring operations in the Sinai, required by P.L. 94-110, see, for a narrative account of the first phase of the operations of the Sinai Field Mission/Sinai Support Mission, Dept. of State, Watch in the Sinai (May 1980).

In connection with the 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel the two Parties had requested that the Sinai Field Mission continue its monitoring operations in accordance with previous agreements until completion of Israeli withdrawal from the western two-thirds of the Sinai, in specified subphases, behind an interim withdrawal line, whereupon the Mission was to be terminated (see Art. VII, par. 2 of the Appendix (Organization of Movements in the Sinai) to Annex I (Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Arrangements) to the Peace Treaty). In accordance with Art. I, par. 3, of Annex I to the Treaty, completion of the interim withdrawal was to be effected by nine months from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty (i.e., Jan. 25, 1980). (In Art. VII, par. 1, of the Appendix to Annex I, the Parties had, however, also requested the United States to continue airborne surveillance activities in accordance with previous agreements until completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai (behind the international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine), the date for which was, also, set in Art. I, par. 3, of the Annex at not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty (i.e., Apr. 25, 1982).) See, the 1979 Digest, pp. 1690, 1692, 1699.

For the text of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, signed at Washington, Mar. 26, 1979, Annexes I-III, with Agreed Minutes, and the Appendix to Annex I, see ibid., pp. 1689-1706; American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980 (1983), pp. 669-681 (with Maps 1, 2, and 3, and Annex II interleaved between pp. 682 and 683); Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 79, No. 2026, May 1979, pp. 3-14.

President Gerald R. Ford established the U.S. Sinai Support Mission by Exec. Order 11896, Jan. 13, 1976, to carry out U.S. duties and responsibilities in implementing the Agreement Concerning the Establishing and Operation of an Early Warning System in the Sinai, between the United States and Egypt, signed at Alexandria, Sept. 1, 1975 (TIAS 8156; 26 UST 2278; entered into force, Oct. 13, 1975), and the Agreement Concerning the Establishing and Operation of an Early Warning System in the Sinai, between the United States and Israel, signed at Jerusalem, Sept. 1, 1975 (TIAS 8155; 26 UST 2271; entered into force, Oct. 13, 1975). For Exec. Order 11896, see 3 CFR, 1976 Comp. (Jan. 1, 1977), pp. 82-84.

See, further, the 1978 Digest, p. 1588; the 1976 Digest, pp. 241-242, 716, and 721; and the 1975 Digest, pp. 316-319, 759-761, and 827-829.

On July 23, 1979, President Jimmy Carter issued Exec. Order 12150, amending Exec. Order 11896, to expand the description of the Mission's duties and responsibilities (in section 1(b) of Exec. Order 11896) to include those in implementation of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, with a specific reference to Article VII (Surveillance Activities) of the Appendix to Annex I to the Peace Treaty. 3 CFR, 1979 Comp. (1980), pp. 422-423.

On July 22, 1980, President Carter issued Exec. Order 12227, further amending Exec. Order 12150, as amended, to include the addition of the verification function to the Mission's responsibilities. Exec. Order 12227 read:

United States Sinai Support Mission

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including Chapter 6 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2348, 2348a.-2348c.), Sections 1(b) and 1(c) of Executive Order No. 11896 of January 13, 1976, as amended, are hereby further amended to read as follows:

"(b) The Mission shall, in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, including Part II, Chapter 6 thereof, the Joint Resolution of October 13, 1975 (Public Law 94-110, 89 Stat. 572, 22 U.S.C. 2441 note), and the provisions of this Order, assist in the implementation of the provisions of Annex I and the Appendix to Annex I of the Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, signed March 26, 1979. The Mission shall assist by (i) verifying Zones A and B and the provisions of Annex I of the Treaty relating to force levels, fortifications, and installations by on the ground inspections and reconnaissance flights, (ii) verifying the technical installations within the Interim Buffer Zone as provided in Article V(3)(c) of the Appendix to Annex I of the Treaty, and (iii) conducting other assigned tasks in order to further the implementation of the Treaty of Peace. Such assistance shall be subject to broad policy guidance received through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2382).

"(c) It shall be the duty and responsibility of the Mission to ensure that the United States role enhances the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement and thereby promotes the cause of peace."

3 CFR, 1980 Comp. (1981), pp. 270-271.

On Sept. 29, 1980, President Carter transmitted a (tenth) report to the Congress on the Sinai Support Mission, that covered a further six-month period of operations. For his letter of transmittal, see Public Papers of the Presidents: Jimmy Carter, 1980-81, Bk. III (1982), p. 1957. The report may be found at Dept. of State File 83D268, Box 2728.

On Apr. 15, 1981, President Reagan transmitted an (eleventh) report to the Congress on the Sinai Support Mission, which covered the last three months of 1980 and the first three months of his Administration. The report may be found at Dept. of State File No. P81 0075-1227. The President's letter of transmittal may be found at Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1981 (1982), p. 355.

In order to provide maximum security for both Parties, the Peace Treaty called, inter alia, for permanent stationing of U.N. forces and observers in designated areas, to be deployed prior to the final Israeli withdrawal. When it became apparent in 1981 that no agreement could be reached in the U.N. Security Council upon the establishment of a U.N. peacekeeping force and observers, Israel and Egypt, with the full participation of the United States, entered into discussions on an agreement to create a multinational force and observers as an alternative. Preliminary agreement on the necessary texts was reached in negotiations at Cairo, concluding on June 25, 1981. See, Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 81, No. 2053, p. 82; American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981 (1984), p. 690.

On July 17, 1981, representatives of Egypt and Israel, together with Ambassador Michael Sterner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, representing the United States, initialed-at London-a Protocol and related documents constituting the international agreement establishing the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and determining its functions. Ibid., p. 691.

Formal signature of the Protocol by Egyptian Ambassador to the United States Ashraf A. Gorbal and Israeli Ambassador to the United States Ephraim Evron took place at a ceremony at the Department of State on Aug. 3, 1981, witnessed by Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., for the U.S. Government.

Par. 2 of the Protocol states that the Treaty provisions relating to the establishment, functions, and responsibilities of the U.N. Forces and Observers shall apply mutatis

mutandis to the establishment, functions, and responsibilities of the MFO “or as provided in this Protocol." Par. 3 of the Protocol confirms that the provisions of Art. IV of the Treaty and the Agreed Minute shall apply to the MFO, but eliminates Security Council authority over removal of the Force and Observers. Par. 4 requires the parties to agree on the nations from which the MFO will be drawn. Par. 5 states that the mission of the MFO shall be to undertake the functions and responsibilities stipulated in the Treaty for the U.N. Forces and Observers, and that the details about its international nature, size, structure, and operation will be set out in an attached annex, which is an integral part of the Protocol.

Par. 6 of the Protocol states that the parties shall appoint a Director-General who shall be responsible for the MFO's direction and who shall, subject to the parties' approval, appoint a Commander to be responsible for the daily command of the MFO, with details again to be set out in the attached annex. Under par. 7, MFO expenses not covered by other sources are to be borne equally by the parties. Par. 8 provides for resolution of disputes arising from the interpretation and application of the Protocol in accordance with Art. VII of the Treaty.

In identical letters to Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali of Egypt and Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel, also dated Aug. 3, 1981, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. confirmed understandings in regard to the United States' role, reached in the negotiations on establishment and maintenance of the Multinational Force and Observers. First, the post of Director-General would be held by United States nationals suggested by the United States. Second, the parties would accept U.S. proposals concerning appointment of the Director-General, the appointment of the Commander, and financial issues specified in the Annex to the Protocol, if the parties themselves could not reach agreement upon any of these issues; the United States would participate in deliberations concerning financial matters; and the parties would invite the United States to join them in resolving any differences about the composition of the Multinational Force and Observers. The third understanding covered a U.S. commitment, subject to Congressional authorization and appropriations, to contribute armed forces personnel and civilian observers to the Multinational Force and Observers, as well as a specified portion of the MFO's annual operating expenses (one-third) and for an initial period of establishment, three-fifths of the costs. The United States committed itself, further, to use its best efforts to find acceptable replacements for contingents withdrawing from the MFO, as well as to take the necessary steps to ensure the maintenance of an acceptable MFO.

Secretary Haig's letters and the Protocol between Egypt and Israel, with Annex and Appendix to the Annex, as well as the replies, also dated Aug. 3, 1981, of Foreign Minister Ali (through Ambassador Ghorbal) and Foreign Minister Shamir (through Ambassador Evron) may be found at TIAS 10556; entered into force, Aug. 3, 1981. Secretary Haig's letters and the Protocol with Annex and Appendix are also at American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981 (1984), pp. 693-703; and Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 81, No. 2054, Sept. 1981, pp. 44-50. The Appendix constitutes, in effect, a status of forces agreement for the Multinational Force and Observers and covers: duties of MFO members in the Receiving State; arrangements respecting criminal and civil jurisdiction; arrests by MFO military police and by Receiving State civilian police, with arrangements for transfer of custody and mutual assistance; MFO premises, flag, uniform, vehicle, boat and aircraft markings and registration, and operating permits; MFO privileges and immunities, including provisions regarding taxation, customs, and fiscal laws and regulations of the Receiving State; communications and postal service; motor vehicle insurance; use of roads, waterways, port facilities, airfields, and railways; water, electricity, and other public utilities; currency exchange; local procurement of provisions, supplies, and services; recruitment of local personnel; and settlement of disputes or claims.

Among countries that, in response to U.S. urging, indicated a willingness to participate in the Multinational Force and Observers were four European Community members-the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. The Israeli Government refused to agree, however, to participation by any country that publicly referred to any basis therefor other than the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of Peace and the Protocol of Aug. 3, 1981. The four countries then sent separate, but identical, statements regarding their participation in the Multinational Force and Observers to Egypt, Israel, and the United States under date of Nov. 23, 1981; for the text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981 (1984), pp. 720-721.

On Dec. 3, 1981, the United States and Israel issued a joint statement that emphasized the exclusivity of the Treaty and the Protocol as the (sole) bases for the Multinational Force and Observers, as well as the obligation of a participating state to carry out its functions and responsibilities in the Multinational Force and Observers without "derogation or reservation" from the terms of the Treaty and the Protocol. Ibid., pp. 721-722; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. 82, No. 2058, Jan. 1982, pp. 46-47; International Legal Materials, Vol. 21 (1982), p. 202.

On Dec. 29, 1981, President Reagan signed into law P.L. 97-132, 95 Stat. 1693, 22 U.S.C. 3401 nt., 3421 et seq., a Joint Resolution authorizing United States participation in the Multinational Force and Observers.

In identical letters dated Mar. 19, 1982, to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House, and Senator Strom Thurmond, President pro tempore of the Senate, the President reported deployment to the Sinai of U.S. military personnel and equipment as part of the Multinational Force and Observers. See, Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald Reagan, 1982, Bk. I (1983), pp. 337-338; Cong. Rec., Vol. 128, No. 29 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1982), pp. S2512-S2513.

In an exchange of letters with Secretary of State Haig, dated Mar. 26, 1982, Leamon R. Hunt, Director General, Multinational Force and Observers, accepted a U.S. offer to provide to the Multinational Force and Observers an infantry battalion task force of approximately 800 personnel, a logistics support element of approximately 350 personnel, staff personnel, and civilian observers. Details regarding the U.S. contribution were set out in three Annexes to Director General Hunt's letter: Annex I, United States Military Contribution; Annex II, Financial Arrangements for United States Military Contribution (with an Agreed Minute); and Annex III, Civilian Observers. The Director General's letter was also accompanied by a text of the Protocol (of Aug. 3, 1981) and Annex, with Appendix, and by an Aide-Mémoire, Guidelines for the Government of the United States Planning for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO).

A second exchange of letters between Director General Hunt and Secretary Haig, also dated Mar. 26, 1982, confirmed understandings with respect to various aspects of participation in the MFO, most of them referring to specific provisions of the Appendix. One understanding, related to paragraph 6 of the Annex, confirmed that national contingents provided to the MFO were to be placed under the operational control of the Force Commander, who would issue them orders through the appropriate national contingent commander in accordance with the chain of command established by him pursuant to the Protocol. The understandings also provided for consultation between the Director General and representatives of participating states, including their representatives accredited to the country in which his headquarters were located and so designated for briefing and discussion of issues of general concern. Provision was also made for raising at the diplomatic level any disputes not resolved through normal administrative channels. TIAS 10557; entered into force, Mar. 26, 1982.

The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) assumed its responsibilities on Apr. 25, 1982, upon completion of Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.