ced there by other rational, and talking beings, and must, consequently, have acquired from them the names which, in their recluse condition, they applied to surrounding objects. If they borrowed the terms from others, then, of course, the hypothesis of a language considered as an invention of the savages, falls at once to the ground.

Somewhat different is the theory of lord Monboddo from Mr. Smith. He supposes that language was not originally natural to man, and that the political state of society was necessary for its invention. This principle forms the basis of his elaborate work on the origin, and progress of language. He asserts that man in his natural state is a wild animal, without language or arts of any kind. To prove this, he quotes Lucretius, and Horace, Diodorus Seculus, and Leo Africanus, together with many other writers.

It is impossible, from the very nature of things, that man, in a natural state, can exist without the fostering aid of improved life, nor can we conceive of man's beginning to exist, and to be supported, without the aid of his creator in a supernatural way. Contemplate for a moment the situation of Adam, just brought into being by the creating power of his maker; possessed of mind, and faculties, senses, and appetites, without knowledge, as he was without experience, and having every thing to learn; is it possible that he could in that situation distinguish between what was conducive to health, and what hurtful? Before he could pretend to discriminate at all, he must have first learnt by experience, those things which were of an injurious, and those of a beneficial tendency, and no one object before him could have had the preference to any other, without the previous experience of their properties. The sense of hunger would not have prompted to what was good for food, sooner than to what was poisonous; nor could it have directed him how to eat it.

In short, it is certain, that without the immediate interposition of God, Adam, the first man created, must have died. This is not less true from the nature, and necessity of things, than from revelation. If such must have been the situation of man in a natural state, in regard to the objects of appetite, and sense, what must have been his situation in respect to the knowledge of God, who is not an object of sense?

If we judge from self-consciousness, experience, and scripture, (observes a great man) the truest definition of man will perhaps be found, to be an animal capable_of speceh; and through that medium of reason, and religion. For there is a wide difference between a capacity of acting, and the act itself. A watch, or other machine, fitted up with admirable skill, and perfect in all its parts, cannot put itself in motion; neither can the mind. Thus the intellectual faculties have a power to work, when supplied with materials to work upon, and not before; the mind is then carried into action, its secret springs exert their proper activity, and the rational frame enabled to think, and reason. If we consider the nature of speech, something so supernatural, and divine appear to all who have duly weighed it, Heathens, Jews, Christians, and Atheists, (for even Hobbes could say God taught Adam this useful invention) that they pronounce it to surpass the invention of men. The learned Whitby was so far convinced of language being the immediate gift of God, as to think it a clear demonstration, that the original of mankind was as Moses delivered it; from the impossibility of giving any other account of the origin of language.

Indeed every article in those short memorials of the first passages after the creation, imply an instruction by this means; it being inconceivable that man should understand the words of God, before he was taught them. Whence it must be allowed that though Adam had a capacity, and organs admirably contrived for speech; yet in this case there was a necessity of his being immediately instructed by God, because it was impossible he should have invented speech, and words to be spoken, so soon as his necessities required it.

Upon subjects whose objects, and qualities are insensible, or lie beyond the reach of sense, man could not think, till he had language given; and of course could not upon those subjects be a rational creature. Upon them he can no more think than speak without words; words are as necessarily prior to both (as the stipulated signs of ideas, and the means by which they are produced,) as causes to their effects. The mind cannot think upon nothing. Things which are insensible naturally, cannot by natural sensation enter the

mind, for those which are insensible naturally cannot have natural signs. This is precisely the case in respect to the creator, &c. The signs then, or the words, and language expressive of his name, and character, &c, are supernatural, and it is those signs which enter the mind, and produce there the knowledge of the existence of the archetypes, or things signified. In subjects of this nature, words are the marks of essence by which the mind distinguishes things, one from another, according to the character attached to them by description or representation; and, till furnished with them, the mind cannot think about, or act upon, them; For the truth of these remarks, I appeal to the reader's own experience, and observation, of what passes within his own mind; and if he can think upon spiritual subjects without words, I yield the point. Indeed, it is impossible for it to be o therwise, because words are the only bodies, or vehicles, by which the existence, sense, and meaning, of all objects, and propositions of that character, are conveyed to the mind; so that till the mind is stored with them, it has nothing to think or reason upon, or judge by. Upon these subjects, all we learn is by words, all we think is in words, and without them, could neither learn, think, or teach, much less have the most distant conception of "things not seen." The demonstration is conclusive-Language on invisible, and spiritual subjects, cannot be contrived without thought, and knowledge: but the mind cannot have thought, and knowlledge, upon them without language; therefore language must be previously taught before man could become a religious creature: and none could teach him but God. The first use of words was to communicate the knowledge, and thoughts of God, which could not be done but in the words of God, and of course by himself. With the royal preacher it was "a point of wisdom to know whose gift she is." To this the necessity of nature, in order to her attainment, and the scripture in imparting it, give a plain solution. (1st.) In general "it is God that teacheth man knowledge, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding." "The entrance of thy words giveth light: it giveth understanding unto the simple." "The words that I speak, they are spirit, and they are life." "The things of God knoweth no

man but the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of GodWhich things, also, we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; explaining spiritual things in spiritual words." "All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness. (2ndly.) With regard to spiritual matter, they particularly inform us, that "faith," or an assent of the understanding, grounded solely on the attestation of God, "is the evidence," the only assurance, and proof, "of things not seen," or of whatever does not fall under the cognizance of the senses.

This shews whence the impossibility of men's any way acknowledging the true God, Jehovah, without revelation. "For how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard, or how shall they hear without a preacher," or one to instruct them in such knowledge. "No man knoweth the Son but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him."

Agreeably to these ideas, and scripture declarations, the great Parkhurst observes, "If it be asked why the second person in the Adorable Trinity is called the Word of God? the easiest, and most natural answer seems to be, because HE hath always been the great Revealer to mankind of Jehovah's attributes, and will, or because, as he himself speaketh, (as before quoted) Math. 11. 27. "No man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him; and John 1. 18. "No man hath seen God at any time: the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, HE hath declared him." The divine person who has accomplished the salvation of mankind is called The Word, and the word of God, Rev. 19. 13. not only because God at first created, and still governs all things by him, but because men discover their sentiments, and designs to one another, by the intervention of words, speech, or discourse; so God, by his son, discovers his gracious designs in the fullest, and clearest manner to men. All the various manifestations, which he makes of himself in the works of crea

tion, providence, and redemption; all the revelations he hath been pleased to give of his will are conveyed to us through him, and therefore he is, by way of eminence, fitly styled the word of God." Correspondent with this exposition are the words of Peter in his first General Epistle i. 2: "The prophets," (taken from verse 10th) "searching what, or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ, which was in them, did signify, when it testified before hand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow."

THE WORD, as above explained, was the Thoth of the Egyptians, or the God of Speech or Eloquence, from the traditional notions of whom, as the revealer of language, Plato derived his ideas of primitive, and derivative words, as formerly suggested.

An additional light may be cast on this subject, from observing the prodigious use of NAMES in acquiring, and retaining knowledge upon spiritual subjects, (and indeed natural ones too in a great degree) for they being the objects of thought, the mind can neither describe, define, or even conceive of, any being till acquainted with the name, and meaning of it; as that not only distinguishes existences from each other, but is the bond which ties together the several properties peculiar to each, and that constitutes things what they are in the view of the mind. For the qualities, and powers of substances which make up the complex idea of them, are images too subtile, and fleeting for the mind to detain, without some mark of essence whereunto it can annex them.

After God had inspired Adam with a right knowledge of the creatures over which he had given him a dòminion, and, doubtless, names correspondent with their intrinsic natures, which none but their creator knew, he brought unto Adam every beast of the field, and fowl of the air, to see what he would call them. And whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof. Nor is it reasonable to imagine that God should thus miraculously instruct him in the knowledge of his fellow creatures before that of his creator. On the contrary, we find the words God, and Lord God, used upwards of forty times in the two first chapters of Genesis, which were names, and marks, not only of existence, but of all the glorious perfections revealed of the di