by the universal experience of all men, in the kingdom of nature, than that something cannot proceed from nothing. Human ingenuity has been as unable to annihilate a particle of matter, as to create one; all that can be effected is to produce new arrangements in the principles, and substances already existing, by mixtures, by decompositions, or new combinations.

If, then, it be asked, whether matter has existed forever? The evidences of nature compels the mind to answer in the affirmative; for matter which is neither augmented, nor diminished essentially; and which can neither be created, nor annihilated, is stern in the assertion.

There being nothing intrinsically in the elementary properties, compound forms, nor laws of matter, which can suggest any thing relative to their beginning, no information can be drawn from them which of itself points to an existence of an anterior date, and whose nature is entirely dissimilar to them. The mere existence of things, can give no intimation of their beginning, so far from justifying a conclusion that they originated from nothing.

Should the order and harmony of nature in its different aspects be urged as a reason for their beginning, or creation by an intelligent first cause, the same reason will apply with equal or superior force in favour of the beginning or creation of the creator of nature himself, and of the creation of his creator, and so on without end; for order and harmony must exist, in as high a degree at least in the nature and attributes of the creator of the natural order, and harmony, as are discoverable in that order, and harmony, and of consequence must as strongly indicate his creation. A more correct conclusion seems to me would be, from the mere order, and harmony of nature, that nature has ever existed; for this state of things more justly warrants the belief of a perpetual state of natural existence, (including the principles of self-preservation within its own economy) than any other; indeed I cannot see how any other can possibly be drawn from the premises; and we are not to forget that according to the 4th rule in page 20, we are to draw no conclusion but what is obvious, and fairly contained in the premises. But should a beginning, or a creator be still inquired af

ter, and contended for; I ask whence this inquiry about a beginning, about the origin of nature in her diversified powers from nothing? Nature herself in none of her possible operations suggests either a beginning, or a radically different order of things from that which appears, and consequently affords no suggestion for the inquiry about a beginning or creator. To be a little more particular-What facts of sensation transpire in the view of the mind which intimate either the beginning, or creation of matter, or the existence of a creator who is not an object of sense, whose being is independent of matter, whose power and wisdom created it from nothing, and controul the sensible universe? No person has ever seen a creation, the beginning of something from nothing; there is an entire want of fact, and analogy upon the subject. But according to the third rule, viz. "to permit the use of no name, or noun substantive, nor terms expressive of qualities which are not sensibly attributed to sensible objects," I ought to have objected to the words creator, and creation, as not belonging to the language of nature, and which the mind on that account could not have originated. The same may be said of "spiritual existence independent of matter, and the governor of nature; for no such existence or relation of things are discernible by the mind in the regular operations of nature, and of course it could not have formed language expressive of such ideas; as the facts which are the archetypes of them, whence they are taken, have no natural existence.

I may be told, (for this is a leading argument with natural religionists) that the operations of the human mind, consisting in its influence over matter, its intelligence, and design in the works of art, and skill direct to the conclusion of an invisible intelligence, who controuls the natural economy. We will attend to these things.-We see a man building an house, or constructing a watch, adjusting all the parts to the completion of the whole. In the former case, the result is, a place suited for the habitation of man, comfortably sheltering him from the inclemencies of the seasons, and protecting him against the encroachments of his enemies; in the latter, a time piece is produced which with considerable accuracy ascertains to the mind the succession

of time. But is there in either of those cases a creation the origination of something from nothing? Is there more of a creation here than the beaver evinces in erecting his dam, the bee in forming her comb, the spider in spinning its web, or the sparrow in constructing her nest? I ask, farther, by what means have we learnt that men build houses, construct watches, &c.? Is there any instinctive knowledge upon these subjects; or is not our information derived from experience, and observation? Would a person, supported in a dungeon from infancy to manhood, without having seen, heard or felt the operations of mechanism, upon first being ushered into open day, and perceiving, for the first time, a house or a watch, infer that man or any other animal had built or constructed them? I think no person who will examine the powers of his own mind, and the rise, and progress of his own acquirements of knowledge, will answer in the affirmative.

The powers of the human mind, however penetrating and improved, can produce no effect upon matter, but through its laws and properties; any effect produced in this way is as dissimilar to a creation as the existence is dissimilar to the non-existence of matter.

Again, does the mind in a single act or operation indicate a separate existence from matter? But, on the other hand, is it not naturally self-evident, and proven by daily experience, and observation that the mind is not only dependent upon matter for its operations, but is also necessarily dependent upon, and connected with, animal life for its very being, as well as exercise? Who has ever thought without a brain animated, and has not ceased to think upon the destruction of the brain, or the extinguishment of life? How easy is the philosopher degraded into an idiot by a stroke on the head, or a wonud in the brain; and how suddenly is the most intelligent, penetrating mind thrown into a delirium or phrensy by a fever? This is not all.-There is nothing in the natural order of things appertaining to mind, which proves that it is any thing more than a quality of organized matter, under the influence of animal life. The above facts and observations prove it.

E

It can be of no weight in the inquiry to say that the desire of life is a proof of the contrary; for every animal, and insect desire life, and avoid danger, and pain, which are destructive of it;—and will any person say that these are proofs that they have minds or spirits independent of their bodies, and that life, which they are desirous of preserving? Indeed if the desire of life in man, and his endeavours to preserve it, are evidences of a separate existence from his body, the superior manifestations of those principles in other animals give them higher claims to separate mental existence from their bodies.-The voluntary sacrifices men make of their own lives by intemperance, in duels, and by various other methods of self-destruction, none of which are practised by other animals, evince stronger marks of a supernatural existence in them, or one independent of the natural constitution of their bodies, than can possibly be attached to man. Conclusions drawn from such premises as the above in favour of a creation or a superintendent insensible existence are not less absurd than to infer the distance of Philadelphia from Lexington from the fact that one dollar has been, by a law of Congress, rated at one hundred cents-they are conclusions without premises. Nature suggests no other than natural existence, regulated by her laws. Nor is it possible for the human mind, armed with all the acquisitions of which it is capable, from nature, and by attention to its own operations, to exceed the limits of time, and sense, and natural existence. As the senses can never exceed their natural limits, (the eye perceiving no sounds, the ear perceiving no figures nor colour, &c.) so the mind which is furnished with its ideas through the senses from the properties, and qualities of sensible objects, can never exceed the limits of those ideas, however variously it may arrange, and combine them..

Such is the humble situation of man by nature, both in respect to his mind, and body; without a knowledge of God in the world, ignorant of his own origin, and the origin of all things, and of his own destiny; a creature of time, flesh, and sense; a mere animal-an Atheist! The universal language of nature, in respect to all animal beings, is death; the experience, and observation of every day utter the same:

voice-from its cold offensive embraces there is no escape in all the resources of nature; nor is there a solitary ray from the light of nature which breaks through the deep, impenetrable gloom of the grave, and points to an hereafter! No light of life irradiates the horrid mansions of the dead, nor redeems humanity from its insatiable devourings! Her lesson is "Let us eat, and drink, for to-morrow we die." The last, and best hope of man, derived from the lessons, and illuminations of nature, has its final termination here! There is none "to deliver them who, through the fear of death, were all their life-time subject to bondage"-in all the domains of nature! The king of terrors, and the terror of kings, has an absolute sway over men, and beasts, and all creeping things; over the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea, and there is none to arraign him, or to say, why or what doest thou? O death, thy sting is fearful! O grave, thouart victorious! There is no balm in nature, no physician's there, that can more than allay for a moment, the pangs of dissolution, or protract but for a short period, declining life. The iron sceptre of death has unrestrained sovereignty.

Such is the voice of nature, uttered from her thousand mouths, and by her thousand tongues!

Section 3.

The same subject continued:

The incapacity of the mind for spiritual discernment, or the perception of a God, by the light of nature without revelation, being so important for establishing the necessity of revelation in order to a knowledge of the existence of a God, I will vary a little the investigation, lest the argument, and reasoning should appear incomplete. We will suppose a person, born without eyes and ears.-I ask whether such a person by the greatest possible exertion of his mind upon the objects of the remaining three senses, (viz.) the objects of taste, feeling, and smelling, could acquire the knowledge of light and sound? The answer of natural experience is in the negative. Iask why? Because the mind is inaccessible to light,