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PROPERTY, BRIBERY INVOLVING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS AND
CORRUPT PUBLIC OFFICIALS, AND COMPLEX CRIMINAL ANTITRUST
CONSPIRACIES, AS WELL AS OTHER FRAUD AGAINST THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE. THESE INVESTIGATIONS ARE SIMILAR TO, AND OFTEN WORKED
JOINTLY WITH, OTHER INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES SUCH AS THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), IRS, AND U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
(CUSTOMS). UNLIKE THE FBI, IRS OR CUSTOMS, THE DCIS DOES NOT HAVE
THE FULL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY NECESSARY TO DO ITS JOB.

ALTHOUGH DCIS AGENTS ARE AUTHORIZED BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE, TO CARRY WEAPONS AND APPREHEND MILITARY PERSONNEL, THEY DO NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ARREST CIVILIANS. OUR AUTHORITY WITH

REGARD TO CIVILIANS IS LIMITED TO DETAINING CIVILIANS ON MILITARY

BASES UNTIL THE ARRIVAL OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WHO HAVE ARREST

AUTHORITY.

STATUTORY ARREST AUTHORITY HAS ALREADY BEEN PROVIDED TO A

BROAD VARIETY OF FEDERAL INVESTIGATIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

INDEED,

CONGRESS HAS GIVEN THIS AUTHORITY TO INVESTIGATORS FOR THREE OF THE

STATUTORY INSPECTORS GENERAL:

AGRICULTURE, GENERAL SERVICES

ADMINISTRATION AND THE POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE.

WE BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE SOUND AND COMPELLING REASONS TO

PROVIDE ARREST AUTHORITY TO THE DCIS. THE DCIS HAS APPROXIMATELY

330 INVESTIGATORS LOCATED AT 10 FIELD OFFICES AND 30 RESIDENT

AGENCIES IN THE UNITED STATES, AS WELL AS AGENTS ASSIGNED TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REGIONAL OFFICES IN GERMANY AND HAWAII.

THE PRIMARY MISSION OF DCIS INVESTIGATORS IS PROCUREMENT

FRAUD.

THE TARGETS OF THE INVESTIGATIONS PRIMARILY ARE CIVILIANS.

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IN THE INVESTIGATIONS CONDUCTED IN FY 1989, THE DCIS SERVED 417
INSPECTOR GENERAL SUBPOENAS, 1,000 GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS, CONDUCTED
144 CONSENSUALLY MONITORED INTERCEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS, AND
PARTICIPATED IN 24 UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS. IN VIRTUALLY EVERY ONE
OF THE 319 INDICTMENTS IN FISCAL YEAR 1989 RESULTING FROM DCIS
INVESTIGATIONS, A CIVILIAN WAS THE SUBJECT OF THE INDICTMENT.
THESE INVESTIGATIONS OFTEN INCLUDED SENSITIVE UNDERCOVER
OPERATIONS, SURVEILLANCE, INTERVIEWING POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS
SUSPECTS AND WITNESSES, SERVING INSPECTOR GENERAL AND GRAND JURY
SUBPOENAS ON HOSTILE WITNESSES AND TRACKING FUGITIVES. I EMPHASIZE
THAT THOSE SITUATIONS ARE POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AND MAY INVOLVE

CONFRONTATIONS WITH ARMED SUSPECTS. THE DCIS AGENTS ARE

STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TO BE ARMED AND ARE TRAINED IN FIREARMS, AND RIGHTLY SO. THEY SHOULD NOT BE EXPOSED TO PHYSICAL DANGER WITHOUT

THE AUTHORITY TO ARREST PERSONS WHO SEEK TO ENDANGER THEM AND

OBSTRUCT INVESTIGATIONS.

IN MOST OF THE DCIS CASES IN WHICH AN ARREST WAS MADE, IT WAS .NECESSARY FOR THE DCIS INVESTIGATOR TO OBTAIN ASSISTANCE FROM A

FEDERAL OR STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY WITH THE AUTHORITY TO MAKE THE ARREST. THE DCIS AGENTS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELY ON PERSONAL

CITIZENS ARREST AUTHORITY OR STATE ARREST AUTHORITY IN PERFORMING

THEIR DUTIES. THE LACK OF ARREST AUTHORITY HAS RESULTED IN

NUMEROUS UNNECESSARY DELAYS IN MAKING ARREST.

THE LACK OF ARREST AUTHORITY IS ALSO AN IMPEDIMENT IN THE

EXECUTION OF SEARCH WARRANTS. UNDER A DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REGULATION, ALL DCIS AGENTS ARE AUTHORIZED TO APPLY FOR A SEARCH WARRANT THROUGH A LOCAL U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. BY PRESIDENTIAL

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AUTHORIZATION AND PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, DCIS AGENTS ARE ALSO AUTHORIZED TO EXECUTE SEARCH WARRANTS. IN 1989, PURSUANT TO THIS AUTHORITY, THE DCIS EXECUTED MORE THAN 60 SEARCH WARRANTS. BECAUSE OBSTRUCTION OF THE EXECUTION

OF THE SEARCH WARRANT IS A POSSIBILITY IN EACH CASE, AND BECAUSE OF OUR LACK OF AUTHORITY TO MAKE ARRESTS, IT IS FORMAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE POLICY, AND SOUND INVESTIGATIVE PRACTICE, THAT WE OBTAIN THE ASSISTANCE OF ANOTHER FEDERAL OR STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT

ORGANIZATION WITH FULL ARREST AUTHORITY WHENEVER A SEARCH WARRANT

IS EXECUTED.

IT IS TIME CONSUMING AND INEFFICIENT TO REQUEST THE ASSISTANCE OF ANOTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY. BECAUSE OF THE ATTENDANT DELAY,

SUBJECTS MAY FLEE OR EVIDENCE MAY BE DESTROYED.

ASSISTANT U.S.

ATTORNEYS HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR FRUSTRATION AND CONCERN WITH USING

AGENTS FROM AN AGENCY NOT INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION IN

EXECUTING A SEARCH WARRANT SINCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DETAILS OF A CASE

IS FREQUENTLY ESSENTIAL TO THE PROPER EXECUTION OF THE WARRANT. SEARCHES OF CONTRACTOR PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND WAREHOUSES MUST BE CAREFULLY PLANNED AND OFTEN TAKE DAYS TO COMPLETE. THE DCIS AGENTS ARE AVAILABLE AND TRAINED FOR SUCH SEARCHES. OTHER FEDERAL AND

STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ARE UNDERSTANDABLY HESITANT TO

PROVIDE PERSONNEL FOR LENGTHY SEARCHES WHEN THE ONLY REASON FOR

THEIR PRESENCE IS TO PROVIDE ARREST AUTHORITY. SINCE EMPLOYEES OF

THESE AGENCIES ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH DOD OPERATIONS OR ARE

UNAVAILABLE, THE NARROW WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IN WHICH TO CONDUCT A SEARCH OR MAKE AN ARREST MAY BE LOST.

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WE HAVE SOUGHT TO REDUCE THE PROBLEM CAUSED BY OUR LACK OF

ARREST AUTHORITY BY HAVING SOME OF OUR AGENTS APPOINTED SPECIAL

DEPUTY U.S. MARSHALS. WE HAVE FOUND THAT THIS PROCESS IS NOT

RESPONSIVE TO OUR NEEDS. FEWER THAN 15 OF OUR 340 DCIS AGENTS ARE

SO DEPUTIZED. OUR EXPERIENCE IS THAT THE DEPUTATION PROCESS MAY TAKE MORE THAN FOUR MONTHS. EVEN WHEN DEPUTATION OCCURS, IT IS FOR ONE AGENT AT A TIME, ONE CASE AT A TIME. WE HAVE HAD INSTANCES WHERE AN AGENT, DEPUTIZED ON ONE CASE, WAS NEEDED TO ASSIST OTHER AGENTS IN THE SAME OFFICE ON THE EXECUTION OF A SEARCH WARRANT ON A

DIFFERENT CASE. BECAUSE THE AGENT WAS LACKING SPECIAL DEPUTY

MARSHAL STATUS ON THE SECOND CASE, WE WERE FORCED TO OBTAIN THE ASSISTANCE OF ANOTHER FEDERAL AGENCY WITH FULL ARREST AUTHORITY.

IN A RECENT CASE, CONDUCTED JOINTLY WITH THE FBI AND ONE OF THE MILITARY CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE ORGANIZATIONS, ONE OF OUR AGENTS WAS GRANTED DEPUTY MARSHAL STATUS. NUMEROUS ARRESTS WERE MADE, INCLUDING SOME INVOLVING ARMED SUSPECTS. BASED UPON THE FACT THAT ADDITIONAL AGENTS WERE NEEDED ON THE CASE, WE OBTAINED THE SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL U.S. ATTORNEY AND U.S. MARSHAL TO HAVE AN

ADDITIONAL AGENT GIVEN DEPUTY MARSHAL STATUS. AFTER A THREE MONTH

DELAY, THE REQUEST WAS DENIED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT ALL OF THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR

GENERAL INVESTIGATORS AT THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR ARE DEPUTIZED, AS WELL AS 20 OR MORE INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATORS AT THE

DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AND
TRANSPORTATION. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE HAS RECENTLY PROVIDED BLANKET DEPUTY U.S. MARSHAL STATUS TO

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ALL THE INVESTIGATORS ASSIGNED TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL.

WE HAVE RECENTLY COMMENCED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR REGARDING THE ENFORCEMENT OF CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL

LAWS RELATING TO DOD PROPERTY. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR HAS

IF

PROPOSED DELEGATING ITS ARREST AUTHORITY TO DOD PERSONNEL REGARDING
THE ENFORCEMENT OF FISH AND WILDLIFE LAWS ON DOD INSTALLATIONS.
THIS TAKES PLACE, AND THERE IS AUTHORITY TO DO SO, DOD OFFICIALS
WILL HAVE FULL STATUTORY ARREST AUTHORITY OVER POACHERS, BUT WILL
BE UNABLE TO ARREST INDIVIDUALS WHO ENDANGER NATIONAL SECURITY AND

ENGAGE IN FRAUD BY PROVIDING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WITH

DEFECTIVE WEAPONS.

FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, WE REQUEST THAT LEGISLATION BE ENACTED TO PROVIDE OUR INVESTIGATORS WITH FULL ARREST AUTHORITY WHICH IS

NEEDED TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY

USE OF GRAND JURY MATERIAL

BECAUSE MANY IMPORTANT DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INVESTIGATIONS

MUST BE CONDUCTED BY THE USE OF THE GRAND JURY, EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH THE GRAND JURY MAY HAVE AN IMMEDIATE IMPACT ON SAFETY OR

CRITICAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSIONS. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF RULE 6(E), FEDERAL PROSECUTORS ARE PROHIBITED FROM SHARING THIS INFORMATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

WHILE THERE ARE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS FOR SECRECY IN GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS, THE CURRENT SECRECY RULES CAN HAVE A SIGNIFICANT ADVERSE IMPACT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OPERATIONS. IN ONE

PROCUREMENT FRAUD CASE, INVOLVING CONTRACTS FOR SURGICAL EQUIPMENT, A GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION DEMONSTRATED THAT DEFECTIVE SURGICAL