The Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association and its colleague organizations in the Law Enforcement Steering Committee (The Law Enforcement Steering Committee represent a total of 570,000 state, county and local law enforcement officers.) endorse S. 2080 and HR. 4149. These bills granting full enforcement powers to IGs should be passed immediately, or their provisions be incorporated into other legislation and passed at the earliest possible time. On behalf of the National Fraternal Order of Police, and representing approximately 211,000 professional law enforcement professionals throughout the United States, I am taking this opportunity to endorse S 2080, the "Office of Inspector General Law Enforcement Act of 1990," now pending before your Committee. Over the last decade, and as the federal inspectors generals have sought to win enhanced law enforcement powers to carry out their sworn duties, the complexity of their jobs and the dangers they face have grown dramatically. During this time, increased demand has been placed upon the inspectors general to carry out traditional law enforcement activities by Congress, federal agencies and the U.S. Department of Justice. While this increased demand for their law enforcement abilities has been taking place, it has become apparent that OIG agents sometimes lack the necessary tools to perform their sworn duties in an efficient manner, such as the uniform statutory authority to execute search and arrest warrants or to carry firearms while on the job. The failure to provide OIG agents with these tools unnecessarily threatens their safety and adversely impacts their efficiency as well as effectiveness. I am pleased that your Committee has scheduled hearings on this important issue. For too long, much disinformation has surrounded this subject. Opponents of granting this enhanced power to OIG agents routinely claim that to do otherwise would result in a proliferation of federal police powers and that OIG agents are unqualified to assume full law enforcement authority. It is the position of the NFOP that S 2080 would not significantly add to the existing federal police force and that the professional law enforcement training provided to OIG agents renders them more than fit to carry out all aspects of NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS, 2100 GARDINER LANE, LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY 40205 Honorable John Glenn July 18, 1990 Page Two traditional law enforcement duties. I believe that the testimony developed during hearings on this issue will support our conclusions and provide the basis for this Committee to approve S 2080. Enforcing the law, at the federal, state or local level, is not any easy task to perform. It is a job that requires tremendous dedication, personal integrity and, all too frequently, great personal sacrifice. It is also a job that puts one in almost daily contact with some of the worst elements of society. It is a job that is enormously difficult to carry out, even under the best of conditions. However, asking OIG agents to shoulder an increasing investigatory workload while not taking steps to provide them with the means to get the job done and to protect themselves in the process is just not sound public policy. Mr. Chairman, I commend you on holding these hearings and I trust that this legislation will receive the serious consideration it so deserves. If I may of service to you or the Committee in expediting the adoption of S 2080, please do not hesitate to contact me directly. With kind personal regards, I remain DRS/SHB/ms Sincerely, Deney Dewey R Stokes This letter is intended to memorialize the results of the recent discussions between the Department of Justice and the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) concerning the investigative authority of the Inspectors General. On March 9, 1989, the Department's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued an opinion resolving a dispute between the Solicitor of Labor and the Inspector General of the Department of Labor concerning the scope of that Inspector General's investigative authority under the Inspector General Act. In that Opinion, OLC concluded that the Inspector General of the Department of Labor did not have authority to undertake criminal investigations of private parties under regulatory statutes such as the Fair Labor Standards Act or the Occupational Safety and Health Act. In the wake of the OLC Opinion, Inspectors General expressed some confusion and concern over the scope of the Opinion and its application outside the context of the Department of Labor. In a letter dated September 11, 1989, Acting Deputy Attorney General Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr. emphasized that the OLC opinion identified the nature of the authority that is granted all Inspectors General by the general provisions of the Inspector General Act, but did not address the specific situation of any Inspector General other than the Labor Department Inspector General. The Dennis Letter recognized that "the full extent of the investigative authority of any particular Inspector General can only be determined by reviewing all of the statutory provisions from which he derives his authority." Id. at 2. The Department of Justice and the PCIE, with the assistance of the Office of Management and Budget, have been carrying on discussions in an attempt to resolve misunderstandings that have arisen from the opinion and to apply the experience that both DOJ and PCIE have gained in recent months in addressing questions relating to the scope of the authority of Inspector Generals. 07 17/1992 15:50 FROM OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL TO 92249682 F.03 Through this process DOJ and PCIE successfully have reached a more comprehensive and clear understanding of a variety of areas of IGS' authority and accordingly have drafted a set of principles that clarify the opinion in several respects. clarifying principles are as follows: These 1. Each IG may conduct criminal and other investigations of agency employees, contractors, grantees, other recipients of federal funds and guarantees, and offerors or other applicants for agency contracts, grants, guarantees, or funds, so long as these investigations are related to the IG's agency's programs and operations. 2. Each IG may also conduct criminal and other investigations of individuals and entities who are not agency employees and who do not receive federal funds (hereafter in this document referred to as "external parties") under the circumstances listed below, which are intended to be illustrative and not all inclusive. presumption of validity or invalidity should apply to a circumstance not listed. a. When an external party is suspected of having federal law, and investigation of the external party is a necessary complement to NOTE: Recent indictments or convictions involving b. When the IG is investigating an external C. party under the Program Fraud Civil Remedies When, in an application for a federal benefit - 2 No |