This letter is in response to your letter of August 15, 1990, in which you posed several questions concerning Inspector General operations and needs. Because some of your questions related to all of the presidentially-appointed Inspectors General, I asked my AIG/I to consult with Lorraine Lewis, of your staff, to decide how to best collect the required information. As a result of their discussion, I contacted the other Inspectors General and obtained their responses on questions 1, 4 and 5, which are reflected below. The responses to questions 2, 3 and 6 relate specifically to my own organization. 1. If your office's criminal investigators were given "blanket" deputation, similar to that given the Department of Justice OIG, and to be reviewed periodically by the Attorney General or Deputy Attorney General, would that authority satisfy your law enforcement requirements? 2. Yes, "blanket" deputation would fulfill our law enforcement requirements. The vast majority of the other Inspectors General also responded positively. Implicit in this strong support for blanket deputation is the assumption that no undue administrative burdens would be imposed. How many full-time equivalent (FTE) criminal investigators are assigned to your office? 32 3. During FY 89 and the first half of FY 90, what percent of your total workload was devoted to conducting: a. audits/security activities/administration 87% c. criminal investigations 13% d. other (please specify) (Note: This breakdown reflects the ratio of Inspector 4. During FY 1989 and FY 1990 (to date), in how many criminal cases did you seek assistance from a fully empowered law enforcement agency? Please summarize the type of assistance rendered and identify the agencies providing the assistance. 5. During FY 1989 and FY 1990 (to date), this office sought the assistance of a fully empowered law enforcement agency in thirteen (13) instances. The assistance was required to provide protection during the execution of search warrants, during consensual monitoring and during interviews of dangerous individuals. The agencies assisting us were the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, U.S. Customs, Internal Revenue Service and the FBI. The other Inspector General offices requested similar Of the presidentially-appointed Inspectors General (25), b. How many of these do not have any statutory law C. How many have arrest authority (with or without a d. How many have search warrant authority? 776*. e. How many have firearms authority? 776*. * of the 776 investigators who have arrest, search - 2 6. In response to your request concerning proposed legislation to amend the Grand Jury Secrecy rules to permit the release of certain material for use in civil and administrative proceedings, our experience does not support a need for such action. In general, evidence gathered during an investigation that indicates a future civil or administrative prosecution is segregated and a record made that such records existed prior to and independent of any grand jury proceedings. In the one case where grand jury material was required for other proceedings, we worked successfully with the prosecuting attorney to obtain a Court Order permitting its use. I appreciate the opportunity to provide my views as well as those of my colleagues on a matter of such great importance to the entire IG community. Please let me know if I or my staff can be of further assistance to you or the Committee. TESTIMONY OF SENATOR RUDY BOSCHWITZ ON S. 2080 LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE FULL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS JULY 16, 1990 MR. CHAIRMAN, THANK YOU FOR HOLDING THIS HEARING TODAY ON ISSUES OF IMPORTANCE TO THE OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (OIG). I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE TESTIMONY ON S. 2080, MY BILL TO PROVIDE FULL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY TO ALL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS OF THE OIG. FULL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY INCLUDES MAKING ARRESTS, ISSUING SEARCH WARRANTS AND CARRYING FIREARMS. I HAVE HAD THE PRIVILEGE, MR. CHAIRMAN, TO SERVE AS A NACLE WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE ANTI-DRUG ABUSE ACT OF 1988 TO STUDY PAY, BENEFITS, AND OTHER ISSUES RELATED TO THE RECRUITMENT, RETENTION, AND MORALE OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. THE COMMISSION FOUND THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO RECRUIT AND RETAIN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS FOR THE OIG'S BECAUSE THEY LACK FULL LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY. BY LAW, THE STATUTORY OIG'S ARE ALL CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS OF PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS IN THEIR -2 AGENCIES. ALTHOUGH THE STATUTORY LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL OIG'S ARE IDENTICAL, THEY DO NOT HAVE AGENTS EXERCISE SOME LIMITED FORM OF ENFORCEMENT POWERS THROUGH EXISTING OR DELEGATED AUTHORITY. - LIKE "TRADITIONAL" LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (FBI, DEA, IRS, CUSTOMS, SECRET SERVICE WHOSE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS ARE ALSO GS-1811'S), SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE STATUTORY OIG'S INVESTIGATE FRAUD, PUBLIC CORRUPTION AND RELATED OFFENSES. LIKE THE TRADITIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, THEY CONDUCT THEIR INVESTIGATIONS THROUGH REVIEW OF RECORDS, USE OF INFORMANTS, SURVEILLANCE, UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS, APPROVED ELECTRONIC MONITORING AND INTERVIEWS WITH HOSTILE WITNESSES AND SUBJECTS. THESE INVESTIGATIVE SUBJECTS AND WITNESSES ARE OFTEN INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS SALES, ILLEGAL WEAPONS TRANSACTIONS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES COMMONLY ASSOCIATED WITH VIOLENT CRIMES SUCH AS ASSAULT AND BATTERY, UNLAWFUL USE OF A WEAPON, RAPE, MURDER, RESISTING ARREST AND EXTORTION. UNLIKE EMPLOYEES OF TRADITIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, OIG SPECIAL AGENTS MUST FREQUENTLY ENTER HIGH-CRIME AREAS TO GATHER INFORMATION OR SERVE SUBPOENAS WITHOUT THE PROTECTION OF FIREARMS. FREQUENTLY, INFORMANTS OR WITNESSES WHO COOPERATE WITH |