shall be credited to the appropriation account against which the expense was initially charged.".

PART C-DIPLOMATIC RECIPROCITY AND SECURITY SEC. 151.37 UNITED STATES-SOVIET EMBASSY AGREEMENT; PROHIBITION ON USE OF MT. ALTO SITE.

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that

(1) the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has intentionally and substantially violated international agreements with the United States concerning the establishment and operation of the new United States Embassy complex in Moscow by significantly delaying progress and by constructing the premises of that Embassy so as to compromise the security of United States operations, thus rendering the premises unusable for the primary purpose intended under those agreements;

(2) the Soviet Government's actions constitute a material violation of international law and a substantial default in performance under the contract for construction of the new United States Embassy complex, and the United States is entitled to claim appropriate compensation;

(3) due to actions of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States Government personnel cannot pursue their official duties in confidence, as the national security and diplomatic relations of the United States requires, within the new United States Embassy being constructed in Moscow:

(4) the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has similarly taken steps to impair the full and proper use of the present United States Embassy in Moscow, to the detriment of the national security of the United States and its ability to conduct diplomatic relations;

(5) as a result of the substantial violations by the Soviet Union of these international agreements with the United States and other Soviet violations of international law, the United States is entitled to terminate, in whole or in part, those agreements;

(6) termination of such agreements may include withdrawal of rights and privileges otherwise granted to the Soviet Union concerning the establishment of a new Soviet Embassy complex in Washington, District of Columbia;

(7) the location of the new Soviet Embassy on Mount Alto creates serious concerns with respect to electronic surveillance and potential damage to the national security of the United States; and

(8) to protect the national security of the United States, therefore, the United States should exercise its right to terminate the Embassy agreements in view of the substantial and

37 Sec. 151 was waived during fiscal years 1988 and 1989 by sec. 305 of the Department of State Appropriation Act, 1988 (sec. 101(a), title III, of the Continuing Appropriations for 1988; Public Law 100-202).

intentional Soviet breaches thereof, unless the threat to the national security posed by adherence to those agreements can be overcome.

(b) 38 38 WITHDRAWAL FROM EMBASSY AGREEMENT.-The United States shall withdraw from the Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reciprocal Allocation for Use Free of Charge of Plots of Land in Moscow and Washington (signed at Moscow, May 16, 1969) and related agreements, notes, and understandings unless the President makes the determinations and waiver under subsection (c).

(c) WAIVER.

(1) 38 PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATIONS REQUIRED.-The President may waive subsection (b) if he determines that

(A) it is vital to the national security of the United States that the United States not withdraw from the agreement (and related agreements, notes, and understandings) referred to in subsection (b);

(B) steps have been or will be taken that will ensure that the new chancery building to be occupied by the United States Embassy in Moscow can be safely and securely used for its intended purposes; and

(C) steps have been or will be taken to eliminate, no later than 2 years after the date of enactment of this Act, the damage to the national security of the United States due to electronic surveillance from Soviet facilities on Mount Alto.

(2) WHEN DETERMINATIONS MAY BE MADE.-The President may not make the determination and waiver permitted by paragraph (1) before the end of the 6-month period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act.

(3) REPORT TO CONGRESS.-The waiver permitted by paragraph (1) shall not be effective until 30 days after the determinations and waiver are reported to the Congress. Any such report shall include

(A) a detailed justification for each of the determinations;

(B) an assessment of the impact on national security of the removal of the Soviet Embassy from Mt. Alto; and

(C) specify the steps that have been or will be taken to achieve the requirements of paragraphs (1) (B) and (C). (4) NONDELEGATABILITY.-The President may not delegate the responsibility for making the determination and waiver permitted by paragraph (1).

(d) NOTIFICATION OF UNAVAILABILITY OF MOUNT ALTO.-If the President does not waive subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall notify the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the Mount Alto site will cease to be available to that Government for any purpose as of the date which is 1 year and 10 days

36 In Presidential Determination No. 91-2 of October 10, 1990 (55 F.R. 46933), the President determined that the conditions detailed in subparagraphs (A) through (c) were met, and accordingly determined "that the United States will not withdraw from the Agreement (and related agreements, notes, and understandings) referred to above," and waived section 151(b).

after the earliest date on which the President could make the waiver under subsection (c).

(e) PROHIBITION ON FUTURE USE OF MOUNT ALTO SITE BY FOREIGN MISSIONS.-If subsection (b) takes effect, the Mount Alto site may not be made available for use thereafter by a foreign mission for any purpose.

SEC. 152. RECOVERY OF DAMAGES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT THE NEW UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

It is the sense of the Congress that the arbitration process between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is currently under way with respect to damages arising from delays in the construction of the new United States Embassy in Moscow, should include Soviet reimbursement of the full costs incurred by the United States as a result of the intelligence activities of the Soviet Union directed at the new United States Embassy in Moscow.

SEC. 153.39 UNITED STATES-SOVIET RECIPROCITY IN MATTERS RELATING TO EMBASSIES.

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR RECIPROCITY IN CERTAIN MATTERS.-The Secretary of State shall exercise the authority granted in title II of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (relating to foreign missions) to obtain the full cooperation of the Soviet Government in achieving the following objectives by October 1, 1989:

(1) FINANCE.-United States diplomatic and consular posts in the Soviet Union not pay more than fair value for goods or services as a result of the Soviet Government's control over Soviet currency valuation and over the pricing of goods and services.

(2) ACCESS TO GOODS AND SERVICES.-United States diplomatic and consular posts in the Soviet Union have full access to goods and services, including utilities.

(3) REAL PROPERTY.-The real property used for office purposes, the real property used for residential purposes, and the real property used for all other purposes by United States diplomatic and consular posts in the Soviet Union is comparable in terms of quantity and quality to the real property used for each of those purposes by diplomatic and consular posts of the Soviet mission to the United States.

(b) 40 SOVIET CONSULATES IN THE UNITED STATES.-The Secretary of State shall not allow the Soviet mission to the United States to occupy any new consulate in the United States until the United States mission in Kiev is able to occupy secure permanent facilities.

(c) SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.-The Secretary of the Treasury shall provide to the Secretary of State such assistance with respect to the implementation of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) as the Secretary of State may request.

39 22 U.S.C. 4301 note.

40 See also sec. 134 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 Public Law 101-246; 104 Stat. 33), page 147; and sec. 132 of the Foreign Relations Authorization rt, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-138; 105 Stat. 662), page 96.

(d) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.-Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Congress a report setting forth the actions taken and planned to be taken in carrying out subsection (a).

SEC. 154. REPORT ON PERSONNEL OF SOVIET STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES.

Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Congress a report discussing whether the number of personnel of Soviet state trading enterprises in the United States should be reduced.

SEC. 155.41 PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR EMBASSIES IN HIGH INTELLIGENCE THREAT COUNTRIES.

(a) SPECIAL SECURITY PROGRAM.-The Secretary of State shall develop and implement, within three months after the date of enactment of this Act, a special personnel security program for personnel of the Department of State assigned to United States diplomatic and consular posts in high intelligence threat countries who are responsible for security at those posts and for any individuals performing guard functions at those posts. Such program shall include_

(1) selection criteria and screening to ensure suitability for assignment to high intelligence threat countries;

(2) counterintelligence awareness and related training;

(3) security reporting and command arrangements designed to counter intelligence threats; and

(4) length of duty criteria and policies regarding rest and recuperative absences.

(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.-Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress on the special personnel security program required by subsection (a).

(c) DEFINITION.-As used in subsection (a), the term "high intelligence threat country" means

(1) a country listed as a Communist country in section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; and

(2) any other country designated as a high intelligence threat country for purposes of this section by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

SEC. 157.42 PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT AT UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES.

(a) PROHIBITION.-After September 30, 1990, no national of a Communist country may be employed as a foreign national employ

41 22 U.S.C. 4802 note. 42 22 U.S.C. 3943 note.

ee in any area of a United States diplomatic or consular facility in any Communist country where classified materials are maintained. (b) DEFINITION.-As used in this section, the term "Communist country" means a country listed in section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(c) ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR HIRING UNITED STATES CITIZENS.—The Congress expresses its willingness to provide additional funds to the Department of State for the expenses of employing United States nationals to replace the individuals dismissed by reason of subsection (a).

(d) REPORT AND REQUEST FOR FUNDS.-As a part of the Department of State's authorization request for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of all relevant agencies, shall submit

(1) a report, which shall include

(A) a feasibility study of the implementation of this section; and

(B) an analysis of the impact of the implementation of this section on the budget of the Department of State; and (2) a request for funds necessary for the implementation of this section pursuant to the findings and conclusions specified in the report under paragraph (1).

(e) WAIVER.-The President may waive this section

(1) if funds are not specifically authorized and appropriated to carry out this section; or

(2) the President determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States to continue to employ foreign service nationals.

The President shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress each time he makes the waiver conferred on him by this section. SEC. 158.43 TERMINATION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FOREIGN NATIONAL EMPLOYEES ENGAGING IN HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

(a) TERMINATION.-The Secretary of State shall exercise the authorities available to him to ensure that the United States does not provide, directly or indirectly, any retirement benefits of any kind to any present or former foreign national employee of a United States diplomatic or consular post against whom the Secretary has convincing evidence that such employee has engaged in intelligence activities directed against the United States. To the extent practicable, the Secretary shall provide due process in implementing this section.

(b) WAIVER.-The Secretary of State may waive the applicability of subsection (a) on a case-by-case basis with respect to an employee if he determines that it is vital to the national security of the United States to do sc and he reports such waiver to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

SEC. 159. REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS AT FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS ABROAD.

Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Com

43 22 U.S.C. 4041 note.