(2) expanded trade with the republics in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia or their successor entities should be encouraged.

SEC. 362.68 POLICY TOWARD THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS BY SOUTH AFRICA.

It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the President and the Secretary of State should pursue, through diplomatic actions with the South African Government, the release of all political prisoners and the resolution of controversy about who is eligible for release as a political prisoner;

(2) not less than 90 days after enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report documenting the progress which has been made concerning the release of all political prisoners in South Africa; and

(3) satisfactory resolution between the South African government and the African National Congress of the issue of the release of political prisoners is essential to the continued progress toward the establishment of a nonracial democracy in South Africa.

SEC. 363. UNITED STATES TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGNED FOR DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE.

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that

(1) the Warsaw Pact military alliance no longer exists;

(2) the Soviet Union's capability to pose a military threat to European security has retreated radically; and

(3) in light of the retreating Soviet threat, West European electorates are unlikely to approve the deployment of new United States tactical nuclear weapons on European soil.

(b) POLICY.-It is the sense of the Congress that the United States Government should not proceed with the research or development of any tactical nuclear system designed solely for deployment in Europe unless and until the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has officially announced how, when, and where such tactical nuclear systems will be deployed.

SEC. 364. UNITED STATES SUPPORT FOR UNCED.

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that—

(1) the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (hereinafter in this section referred to as "UNCED") is scheduled to meet in June 1992 in Rio de Janiero, Brazil; and

(2) UNCED affords a major opportunity to shape international environmental policy as an underpinning of sustainable development for well into the next century.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of the Congress that

• Functions vested in the Secretary of State in this section were further delegated to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs by Delegation of Authority No. 193, January 7, 1992 (Public Notice 1555; 57 F.R. 2298; January 21, 1992).

(1) the United States should seek to integrate environmental principles and considerations into all spheres of international economic activity;

(2) the President should accord the UNCED process highlevel attention and priority within the executive branch;

(3) the United States should exercise a leadership role in preparations for the June 1992 meeting of the UNCED;

(4) the United States should carefully consider what it hopes to achieve through the UNCED and how United States national security interests may best be advanced in deliberations in that conference;

(5) the United States should seek ways to forge a global partnership and international cooperation among developing and industrialized nations on behalf of environmentally sound economic development;

(6) the United States should actively pursue creative approaches to the spectrum of UNCED issues which the conference will address, and in particular seek innovative solutions to the key cross-sectorial issues of technology transfer and financial resources;

(7) the United States should consider how best to strengthen international legal and institutional mechanisms to effectively address the range of UNCED issues beyond the 1992 Conference and into the next century;

(8) the United States should promote broad international participation in the UNCED process at all levels, from grass roots to national;

(9) the Agency for International Development should assume an appropriate role in the preparations for the June 1992 meeting of the UNCED, in view of the mandate and expertise of that agency regarding the twin conference themes of international environment and development; and

(10) the executive branch should consider funding for appropriate activities related to the UNCED in amounts which are commensurate with United States responsibilities in the world, as such funds can engender good will and further our national interests and objectives in the UNCED process.

TITLE IV-ARMS TRANSFERS RESTRAINT POLICY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERSIAN GULF REGION 69

SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds that

(1) nations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, which accounted for over 40 percent of the international trade in weapons and related equipment and services during the decade of the 1980's, are the principal market for the worldwide arms trade;

(2) regional instability, large financial resources, and the desire of arms-supplying governments to gain influence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region, contribute to a regional

arms race;

69 22 U.S.C. 2778 note.

(3) the continued proliferation of weapons and related equipment and services contribute further to a regional arms race in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region that is politically, economically, and militarily destabilizing;

(4) the continued proliferation of unconventional weapons, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as delivery systems associated with those weapons, poses an urgent threat to security and stability in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region;

(5) the continued proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and ballistic missile systems that are capable of delivering conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads undermines security and stability in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region;

(6) future security and stability in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region would be enhanced by establishing a stable military balance among regional powers by restraining and reducing both conventional and unconventional weapons;

(7) security, stability, peace, and prosperity in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region are important to the welfare of the international economy and to the national security interests of the United States;

(8) future security and stability in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region would be enhanced through the development of a multilateral arms transfer and control regime similar to those of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Australia Chemical Weapons Suppliers Group;

(9) such a regime should be developed, implemented, and agreed to through multilateral negotiations, including under the auspices of the 5 permanent members of the United Nations Security Council;

(10) confidence-building arms control measures such as the establishment of a centralized arms trade registry at the United Nations, greater multinational transparency on the transfer of defense articles and services prior to agreement or transfer, cooperative verification measures, advanced notification of military exercises, information exchanges, on-site inspections, and creation of a Middle East and Persian Gulf Conflict Prevention Center, are important to implement an effective multilateral arms transfer and control regime;

(11) as an interim step, the United States should consider introducing, during the ongoing negotiations on confidence security-building measures at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a proposal regarding the international exchange of information, on an annual basis, on the sale and transfer of major military equipment, particularly to the Middle East and Persian Gulf region; and

(12) such a regime should be applied to other regions with the ultimate objective of achieving an effective global arms transfer and control regime, implemented and enforced through the United Nations Security Council, that—

(A) includes a linkage of humanitarian and developmental objectives with security objectives in Third World countries, particularly the poorest of the poor countries; and

(B) encourages countries selling military equipment and services to consider the following factors before making conventional arms sales: the security needs of the purchasing countries, the level of defense expenditures by the purchasing countries, and the level of indigenous production of the purchasing countries.

SEC. 402. MULTILATERAL ARMS TRANSFER AND CONTROL REGIME. (a) IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGIME.—

(1) CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS.-The President shall continue negotiations among the 5 permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and commit the United States to a multilateral arms transfer and control regime for the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.

(2) PROPOSING A TEMPORARY MORATORIUM DURING NEGOTIATIONS. In the context of these negotiations, the President should propose to the 5 permanent members of the United Nations Security Council a temporary moratorium on the sale and transfer of major military equipment to nations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region until such time as the 5 permanent members agree to a multilateral arms transfer and control regime.

(b) PURPOSE OF THE REGIME.-The purpose of the multilateral arms transfer and control regime should be

(1) to slow and limit the proliferation of conventional weapons in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region with the aim of preventing destabilizing transfers by

(A) controlling the transfer of conventional major military equipment;

(B) achieving transparency among arms suppliers nations through advanced notification of agreement to, or transfer of, conventional major military equipment; and

(C) developing and adopting common and comprehensive control guidelines on the sale and transfer of conventional major military equipment to the region;

(2) to halt the proliferation of unconventional weapons, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as delivery systems associated with those weapons and the technologies necessary to produce or assemble such weapons;

(3) to limit and halt the proliferation of ballistic missile technologies and ballistic missile systems that are capable of delivering conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads;

(4) to maintain the military balance in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region through reductions of conventional weapons and the elimination of unconventional weapons; and

(5) to promote regional arms control in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.

(c) ACHIEVING THE PURPOSES OF THE REGIME.

(1) CONTROLLING PROLIFERATION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.-In order to achieve the purposes described in subsection (b)(1), the United States should pursue the development of a

multilateral arms transfer and control regime which includes

(A) greater information-sharing practices among supplier nations regarding potential arms sales to all nations of the Middle East and Persian Gulf region;

(B) applying, for the control of conventional major military equipment, procedures already developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Multilateral Coordinating Committee on Export Controls (COCOM), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); and

(C) other strict controls on the proliferation of conventional major military equipment to the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.

(2) HALTING PROLIFERATION OF UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.— In order to achieve the purposes described in subsections (b) (2) and (3), the United States should build on existing and future agreements among supplier nations by pursuing the development of a multilateral arms transfer and control regime which includes

(A) limitations and controls contained in the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative;

(B) limitations and controls contained in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR);

(C) guidelines followed by the Australia Group on chemical and biological arms proliferation;

(D) guidelines adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (the London Group); and

(E) other appropriate controls that serve to halt the flow of unconditional weapons to the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.

(3) PROMOTION OF REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.—In order to achieve the purposes described in subsections (b) (4) and (5), the United States should pursue with nations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region

(A) the maintenance of the military balance within the region, while eliminating nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and associated delivery systems, and ballistic missiles;

(B) the implementation of confidence-building and security-building measures, including advance notification of certain ground and aerial military exercises in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf; and

(C) other useful arms control measures.

(d) MAJOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT.-As used in this title, the term "major military equipment" means

(1) air-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-surface missiles and rockets;

(2) turbine-powered military aircraft;

(3) attack helicopters;

(4) main battle tanks;

(5) submarines and major naval surface combatants;

(6) nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and