Imagini ale paginilor

is Wednesday. We are going to miss that deadline by a few days. But I would like to come as close to that deadline as we can.

For that purpose, I would like to report this bill today. We have spent several days on this with the members of the subcommittee who have been able to attend, and I think that we now have pretty close to consensus among those members. I would like to proceed.

Mr. FINDLEY. May I ask one further question, Mr. Chairman? I am perfectly agreeable with your outline.

In title 3, does the language there convey any authority to the President over exports which he does not now enjoy?

Mr. BINGHAM. The answer to that is, "No."

Mr. MAJAK. This simply changes from one statute to another.
Mr. FINDLEY. No extension whatsoever?

Mr. MAJAK. The same authority as now, but put into a statute where they belong.

Mr. BINGHAM. There is one other provision which I have not discussed, which has been drafted by staff since we last met.

Mr. WHALEN. Mr. Chairman, before we go on, what is the status of the proposed amendment to page 2?

Mr. BINGHAM. It was agreeable to me and to Mr. Cavanaugh, and I hope to others who have not had as much chance to review it. It meets your problem, I think, and it largely meets the concerns of the representatives of the administration, because you don't have to declare an emergency, or continue the phony emergency, the President simply has to say that in the national interest these authorities should be continued, and do that annually.

Mr. WHALEN. Have we acted on it?

Mr. BINGHAM. No, we have not acted on it.

Mr. WHALEN. I would suggest that it be acted on before we adjourn today. I was afraid that we would hold it for the full committee.

Mr. BINGHAM. We will act on it. There is also another amendment which I would like to have read.

Mr. MAJAK. That provision is before the members. It is entitled "Savings provisions." section 208, and it is on a separate sheet. It should be in the members' folders.

Mr. BINGHAM. Would you explain this, please?

Mr. MAJAK. Mr. Chairman, the question arose, raised in part by the administration draft which had a provision roughly of this sort. What happens to frozen assets, assets of a foreign country that are frozen under a variety of circumstances, if the authorities under this act are terminated.

The provisions of the National Emergencies Act, presumably, would terminate the authority of the President to continue to freeze the assets of a foreign country even if, for example, there were American claims outstanding.

Indeed, one of the reasons why Presidents have continued states of national emergencies for long periods of time in some cases, has simply been to continue to have available the authorities to freeze the assets of foreign countries pending settlement of claims.

We, therefore, thought that the subcommittee should address the question as to whether there should not be some saving provision, some passthrough, if you will, of the authority to continue to hold frozen assets even if you terminate the national emergency, pending the settlement of claims.

So we have drafted that kind of a savings clause, keyed to our staff draft. This savings provision would allow a President to continue to freeze foreign assets that were frozen at the time the national emergency was terminated, whether it was a grandfathered national emergency, or a national emergency declared at some future date.

So this is the thrust of section 208.

Mr. BINGHAM. That applies to assets of China, Cuba, and Czechoslovakia.

Mr. MAJAK. It is identical. This would enable the assets, for example, of China to continue to be frozen as they presently are, even if whatever national emergency is the basis for that freezing of assets, were terminated.

Mr. SANTOS. Mr. Chairman, we have only one comment and it is of a technical nature. If the subcommittee wishes to adopt the amendment on page 2 which we discussed a little earlier, it may be superfluous to have the savings clause with respect to those authorities, since presumably the President could continue to exercise the authorities under existing national emergencies without continuing the national emergency itself.

The savings clause enables him to do that with respect to existing emergencies.

Mr. BINGHAM. That is true, but that also, as I understand it, would provide for a limitation of powers to freezing assets at the end of another emergency.

Mr. SANTOS. Certainly, the first clause, (a) (1), would be useful, and I don't mean to say that it is not. It is only 208 (a) (2) that is superfluous. I have only seen this for a few minutes, but it would appear to duplicate the powers contained in sections 101 (a) and 101(b) as amended.

Mr. BINGHAM. Do you want to comment further on the proposed amendment to section 101 (b), page 2?

Mr. SANTOS. It is certainly an improvement, Mr. Chairman, over what is currently on page 2. I think that it would go a long way to alleviating the problem that we feared, which we mentioned here earlier. Mr. BINGHAM. I think we are ready to mark up this draft, unless there are additional questions.

Mr. WHALEN. I heard Roger's comments on section 208, the use of that, and the fact that 208 (a) (2) might be redundant.

Mr. MAJAK. They might, in fact, be redundant. I think the President by his own actions may terminate a national emergency. It might be said that he could continue the asset controls. I don't know. I have just been confronted with this question.

Mr. SANTOS. By the way, we are not anxious, of course, to delete powers that you want to give us, but it does seem to be redundant.

Mr. BINGHAM. Supposing that we leave this question, which is essentially a technical question, to the staff. If they decide that it is redundant, it could be easily omitted at a later stage.

Mr. CAVANAUGH. If we might approach it some other way. If we left page 2 as is, and adopted 208, would that create an acceptable situation to the administration? It certainly would be more pleasing to me. Mr. BINGHAM. As I understand it, 208 would not involve the embargoes.

Mr. MAJAK. Section 208, if the language on page 2 remained the same, would not alleviate the problem of the President having to redeclare a national emergency, which is the essential problem, I think that has been raised with respect to page 2.

It would alleviate the problem in the sense that he might no longer have reason to continue the national emergency, since he would have the authority to continue to freeze assets. But there are other authorities being exercised with regard to Cuba and Vietnam.

Mr. FINDLEY. Would you list those?

Mr. SANTOS. They are essentially transaction control regulations to the extent that the transaction involves a transfer of assets, it would involve the travel to those countries and the exchange of goods. Those are powers being exercised under 5(b), and this is considerably more extensive than the freezing of a bank account or a piece of property. Mr. FINDLEY. I strongly prefer the alternative the gentleman suggests.

Mr. BINGHAM. Let me suggest that this alone would not do what we really want to do, and leaving it in, on the other hand, would not be redundant because if it is left in, the adminstration could move from a situation where there is an embargo, to a situation where there is simply blocked assets with respect to Cuba.

It separates the two types of controls at this stage, and without a thorough consideration of it, I would be reluctant to rely solely on section 208 (a). The majority, at least, felt that it was necessary. Do you want to comment on that?


Mr. BINGHAM. I suggest that we move, then, to the first amendment, which would be on page 2, line, and I would say that this is Mr. Findley's amendment, to change the words "the date of enactment of this Act," to "June 1, 1977."

Mr. FINDLEY. I think that this is an improvement, but it does not go as far as I would have hoped.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Whalen, would you move the amendment to page 2?

Mr. WHALEN. So moved.

Mr. BINGHAM. All those in favor of the amendment

Mr. CAVANAUGH. I would like to ask a question on the amendment requiring that the President extend the exercise of the authorities for a 1-year period upon determination that it is in the national interest of the United States. Do we understand this to be a reporting requirement to the Congress, that is something short of a justification of the continuation of the national emergency?

Indeed, the national emergency would expire, but it would entail an obligation upon the President to present a justification for the continuation of the powers?

Mr. BINGHAM. That is my understanding, and that is the way it is going to be stated in the report.

Mr. CAVANAUGH. On that basis, then, I would find that amendment acceptable, assuring that some justification for the continuation of the exercise of powers would be encumbent upon the President in order to effectuate this continuation.

Mr. FINDLEY. Some new justification, would you express it that way?

Mr. CAVANAUGH. Some justification.

Mr. FINDLEY. I think I am the lone minority here. The administration, on a bipartisan basis, has been putting off the settlement of emergencies like Romania and the Eastern European countries. As long as it is easy to put it on the backburner and leave it there, it is going to stay there. Here is just such another opportunity.

If it could be required that the administration set forth a justification for the extension, some new development that justifies an extension, it would make it a lot better.

Mr. BINGHAM. I thought that we agreed on that.

Mr. FINDLEY. That is what I would like to see in there.

Mr. WHALEN. Romania, I don't think that this comes into play. You are speaking of Czechoslovakia, and that is another political issue which is different from the Trading With the Enemy Act, even though the authority contained in that act is used.

Mr. FINDLEY. On the face it looks offensive to me, considering that we have a state of emergency with Czechoslovakia.

Mr. WHALEN. We had that almost resolved, but for one attorney who had a friend in the Senate.

Mr. CAVANAUGH. My understanding is, Mr. Findley, that the acceptance of this amendment would create a circumstance that at the expiration of the 2-year period, these absurd or hypocritical national emergencies would expire, would terminate. We would, then, move into a situation where powers sought to be continued, that is embargo of Vietnam or Cuba, the President would have to present a justification for that to the Congress in terms of why the national interest required this continuation of exercise of these powers, in the absence of the national emergency that had expired.

I understand it in terms of the fact that the President would have to present his understanding of why the national interest requires the continued exercise of powers previously exercised under 5(b).

Mr. BINGHAM. I suggest that such an expectation would be included in the report, that it would be explanation for the act the President is taking. It is not my understanding that it would require the statement of some new development.

With those commentaries, could we have a vote on the amendment? Mr. CAVANAUGH. I have one more comment, to ease my own understanding. My understanding is that this is an improvement because today we have no justification for the continuation. We have no articulation of it. This would, at least at some point, require a restatement.

Mr. FINDLEY. It is.

Mr. BINGHAM. As I commented the other day, the administration has inherited a situation, or a set of situations which stem greatly from this Trading With the Enemy Act. I think that to pull the rug from under them at this time would not be in our best interest.

I think also we would be in a difficult situation to say that there is a national emergency situation. This, it seems to me, represents an acceptable compromise.

Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Chairman, I would say that this sounds a lot like the arguments about water projects. When is a good time? I associate myself with Mr. Cavanaugh.

Mr. BINGHAM. All those in favor of the amendment, signify by saying, "aye"; opposed, "no."

The ayes have it. The amendment is agreed to.

The next amendment is the addition of section 208. Would somebody care to move that amendment?

Mr. WHALEN. I will move it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CAVANAUGH. I have one question, Mr. Chairman. Would it be the understanding, and I have not discussed it privately with the chairman, that section 204, the reporting requirements, would apply to the requirements of section 208, that is to say, either at the expiration of the national emergency, or the ending of the national emergency, the President would continue to exercise freezing asset powers conferred by 208 in the absence of a national emergency?

Would the reporting requirements that he present his reasons and justifications, as required under 204, be applicable to this section?

Mr. MAJAK. We feel that it is unclear, and that it probably would not be unless it were so stipulated. But if it were so stipulated that provisions of section 204 were relevant, some of the specifics of section 204 do not particularly make sense with respect to section 208, which raises, perhaps, a minor problem.

So there would be two alternatives, I think. We could either make reference to section 204 being applicable, even though the terms of 204 are emphasized with respect to 208; or we can write a simple reporting requirement in section 208 itself.

Mr. CAVANAUGH. I would move an amendment to the amendment, to require a simple reporting requirement.

Mr. MAJAK. This is some language we drafted.

Mr. CAVANAUGH. This language would be acceptable. I would propose this amendment to the Whalen amendment. Add to section (2) (e) :

If the President uses the authority of this section to continue prohibitions on transfers involving funds and property interests, he shall report to the Congress every six months on the use of such authority.

Mr. BINGHAM. Would someone care to move the Cavanaugh amendment to the Whalen amendment?

Mr. FOWLER. Would that be the same requirement we are putting under 204?

Mr. BINGHAM. It is less elaborate.

Mr. MAJAK. It is less specific.

Mr. BINGHAM. Is there further discussion?

All those in favor of the Cavanaugh amendment signify by saying, "aye"; opposed, "no."

The ayes have it. The amendment is adopted.

The vote occurs now on the Whalen amendment.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question, please? In the event that this amendment should not become law, what recourse would our Government and private interests in this country have to protect their claims? Would they not be able to go to court and impound properties or accounts until such a settlement occurs?

In other words, how essential is this amendment?

Mr. MAJAK. In the absence of this amendment, it would intrude upon the legal basis for their claims as a practical and political matter. How

« ÎnapoiContinuă »