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(10) The details of any financing arrangements made

2 by Jordan for such sale, including sources of funds, cash, and

3 credit terms, and any other explicit or implicit conditions of

4 financing.

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(11) At what point, if any, the sale is to be referred

6 to the Congress pursuant to the provisions of the Foreign 7 Military Sales Act, as amended.

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(12) The detailed substance of the communication (and 9 its date) of the favorable disposition of the Government of 10 the United States toward the requested sale, and whether 11 any conditions were placed by the United States on the 12 making public of the fact or substance of such communica13 tion.

14 (13) The date and substance of the first announcement 15 by the United States Government of the sale, and the re16 corded conclusions, if any, of the executive branch as to the 17 effect of such announcement on United States relations with 18 Israel and Jordanian relations with the United States, the 19 Soviet Union, other Arab States, and the Palestinians.

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(14) A description of the function, purpose, mode of 21 operation, and offensive and defensive capabilities of each of 22 the principal components of the Hawk missile system.

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(15) The identities of those nations to which the United

24 States has furnished, or to which the United States has made

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a commitment to furnish, directly or indirectly, each of the

2 components referred to in paragraph (14).

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(16) The relevant portions of all agreements docu4 ments, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material 5 in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all 6 precautions being taken to insure that access to the Hawk 7 missile system, and to technical information about its com8 ponents, whether sold or given to Jordan, does not extend, 9 directly or indirectly, beyond Jordanian personnel.

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(17) The relevant portions of all agreements, docu

11 ments, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material 12 in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all 13 precautions being taken to insure that neither the Hawk 14 missile system nor any of its components falls under the com15 mand, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, of other 16 than Jordanian personnel, including any steps which are 17 being or which shall be taken to prevent the conclusion of 18 agreements for joint military command between Jordan

19 and any other country.

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(18) The relevant portions of all agreements, docu

21 ments, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material 22 in the possession of the executive branch which relate to 23 all contacts, in person or otherwise, between personnel of 24 the executive branch, including employees of the State and

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1 Defense Departments, and any representatives of private in2 dustry with respect, directly or indirectly, to the Hawk mis3 sile sale. "Representatives of private industry" includes, but 4 is not limited to, all Raytheon Company employees and 5 agents, all employees and agents of manufacturers of com6 ponents of the Hawk missile system, and all employees and 7 agents of any finance institution (including finance institu8 tions controlled or affiliated with any foreign goverment). (19) The relevant portions of all agreements, docu

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10 ments, letters, memorandums, and/or other written material 11 in the possession of the executive branch which relate to all 12 sales commissions or fees related, in whole or in part, to the 13 Hawk missile system sale, payable by any entity involved 14 in the sale to any person.

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(20) With respect to the Redeye antiaircraft missile

system, all of the information sought by this resolution with

17 respect to the Hawk missile system.

INFORMATION SUBMITTED BY MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, IN RESPONSE TO THE RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY (H. Res. 552)

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH RELATING TO RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY BY HON. BENJAMIN ROSENTHAL

THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, D.C., June 23, 1975.

Hon. THOMAS MORGAN,

House of Representatives,

Washington, D.C'.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to the request for information stated in H. Res. 552 in the House of Representatives, I am happy to provide information to the Committee to clarify the sale to Jordan of both the HAWK and REDEYE antiaircraft missile systems. Answers to the specific questions posed in House Resolution 552 are attached.

Both sales were undertaken after the most careful consideration by appropriate agencies and officials of the Government and after carefully weighing all factors bearing on U.S. interests in the area and our relationship with Jordan. This particular transaction was not taken in isolation, but was considered in the overall perspective of past, current, and projected events throughout the Middle East, and the policies of other states toward the Middle East.

Our relationship with Jordan has for many years been mutually beneficial. Jordan has supported our broader goals in the Middle East, has encouraged moderation, and the contributed significantly to the peace of the region. The length of the boundary between Jordan and Israeli-administered territory on the West Bank and at Jordan's geographic location between Israel, Syria, and Saudi Araba makes clear the importance of a moderate Jordan with close ties to the United States as a major contributing factor to regional stability and tranquillity.

An essential element in the maintenance of such a relationship has been the ability of Jordan to protect itself from attack and the willinguess of the United States to provide reasonable assistance in enabling it to maintain such an ability. For this reason we have collaborated closely in helping Jordan meet its legitimate defense needs since 1970, in the wake of Jordanian actions to repel outside attack, suppress Palestinian Fedayeen activity internally and generally establish security. Since that time, the U.S. Government has undertaken to replace combat losses and assist in the modernization of the Jordanian armed forces. There have been regular meetings at least once a year since 1970 between top level representatives of the U.S. and Jordanian military establishments. Congress has supported this policy by appropriating the following security assistance funds.

Jordan's need for an air defense capability and its supply by the United States have been the subject of discussion between the two countries since that time. The October 1973 war in the Middle East gave particular urgency to this question.

Jordan, alone among its neighbors, has no viable air defense system and its interest in improving its air defense capabilities grew as a result of increasing quantities of sophisticated aircraft in the inventories of neighboring states and the offers to Jordan of air defense weaponry manufactured in the USSR and Western Europe. The U.S. supply of some type of air defense system for Jordan thus became a gauge of our relationship to that country and our support for its moderate policies during a period when it was increasingly under pressure and isolated from other Arab countries precisely because of its moderate stand.

Within this framework, in principle in February 1975, the Jordanian request was reviewed comprehensively within the U.S. Government during 1974, and in early 1975 the Defense Department conducted a study based on in-country review of Jordanian air defense requirements. The findings of the study team, together with comments by the Departments of State and Defense, and further specific requests by the Jordanians were reviewed by the President prior to reaching a decision in principle in February 1975, which was communicated to King Hussein of Jordan on April 29. Agreement was reached on a modest air defense system and training package, to be phased over a period of several years. The details of the agreement, including the Letter of Offer, are now being worked out.

In providing the Committee with information on these two arms sales we have done our best to be responsive to the requests contained in H.R. 552. As I am sure the Committee will recognize and appreciate, many of the questions seek information which is related to the security posture of a friendly country with which we have had a long and extensive military supply relationship. Unauthorized exposure of certain details might jeopardize the security of Jordan, as well as our close relationship with that country. Other questions seek information about a contracting process which is not yet complete. Still other questions touch on the nature of advice and recommendations provided to the President and are directly related to Executive Branch internal decision processes. Nevertheless, we have made every effort within these constraints to provide the Committee with the information we believe adequate to an understanding of the purposes and policies underlying the President's decision to provide Hawk and Redeye missiles to Jordan. Therefore, we believe H.R. 552 is unnecessary. Sincerely,

MAX L. FRIEDERSDORF, Assistant to the President.

ATTACHMENT

(1) How and when the sale to Jordan of the Hawk and Redeye missile systems were initiated, including the date, nature, and substance of the first approach of the Government of Jordan to any agency of the United States? and

(2) What military equipment, if any, in addition to the Hawk and Redeye missile systems were sought by Jordan at or about the time of this approach?

ANSWER

The armed forces of Jordan have felt a need for an air defense system since the 1967 war. The need was clearly stated in 1970, at the time of the Syrian incursion into Jordan and was confirmed in the findings of the U.S. officials who conducted an analysis of Jordanian military needs at that time. However, at that point the degree of severity of the air threat, and the defensive capabilities of air defense missile systems were not fully recognized. A higher priority and urgency was placed on ground equipment, such as tanks, and Jordan had tight budgetary restraints. For these reasons, Jordan did not press its request, although it had communicated to the USG its desire for air defense weapons, including Hawks and Redeyes.

Subsequently, in March 1973, the United States was asked to reevaluate the military requirements for Jordan. Again the need for an air defense system was stated by the Jordanian military, understood by the U.S. analysis, but relegated to a lesser priority. Air defense was not included in subsequent arms transfers stemming from the early 1973 analysis.

The October 1973 Mideast war clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of Jordanian ground forces to air attack. As a result. Jordanian pressures to obtain air defense became intense. These concerns were clearly stated to the United States on many occasions by many representatives of the Jordanian Government. The extensive arms request list which Jordan submitted in December 1973 included a mix of anti-tank weapons, armor, artillery, and aircraft and three