[To clarify ratios for the various weapons systems the following information was subsequently furnished by the Defense Department:]

RATIO OF SELECTED TYPES OF WEAPONS ON HAND OR PROJECTED FOR JORDAN COMPARED WITH SIMILAR WEAPONS ALREADY ON HAND IN THE FOUR PRINCIPAL NEARBY STATES OF EGYPT, SYRIA, IRAQ, AND ISRAEL

I. Ratio of fighter aircraft in Jordanian inventories compared with fighter aircraft in neighboring inventories: Less than 1:30.

II. Ratio of shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (Redeye) provided to Jordan compared with similar systems (REDEYE, SA-7) in neighboring inventories: Approximately 1:50.

III. Ratio of short-medium range surface-to-air missile launchers (HAWK) in proposed package for Jordan compared with similar launchers (HAWK, CHAPARRAL, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6) in neighboring inventories: Approximately 1:15.*

General FISH. What I was using as a benchmark was Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Jordan.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, you made several references to the possibility of Jordan obtaining similar weapons elsewhere and looking at alternatives. How strong do you feel the possibility is that if we do not proceed with some agreement along this line that Jordan will in fact obtain such weapons elsewhere?

Mr. ATHERTON. I think it is a virtual certainty, Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. BUCHANAN. Can you say where?

Mr. ATHERTON. The Jordanians would have to make that decision obviously. A very high probability, I would think, would be that they would then turn to take up an offer which we understand the Syrians made to them which they did not take up to provide Soviet-manufactured systems through Syria so that they would then in effect have a system that was comparable to that held by those countries that are supplied from the Soviet Union.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Did you say we would be supplying substantially what they were asking for?

Mr. ATHERTON. Substantially less than the initial request we received from them.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Is there any reason to believe that should we not proceed they might not, from this alternative source, seek this higher amount they sought from us? Can you give any estimates as to whether or not they could obtain them?

Mr. ATHERTON. Judging from what they indicated they wanted from us I think it would be a fair assumption that they would seek to get more if they went to a source that was willing and able to provide more. I don't think they would have difficulty obtaining them either in terms of availability or in terms of capacity to pay.

The point I think this brings out is while all of the questions on the effect of the system on the balance and the use to which it would be put in so forth are obviously valid questions, the underlying fact remains that the Jordanians have come to the conclusion that they need

*This ratio compares what is projected for Jordan with what is already on hand in neighboring states. Since their inventories are likely to increase by the time Jordan receives any missiles the USG may provide, the real ratio is likely to be less favorable to Jordan.

an air defense system as other countries in the area have and they have the funding now to obtain it. They have made this decision. It is really just a question of whether they get this system from us or get it from other sources.

Mr. BUCHANAN. So far their exclusive relationship is with the United States. Is that correct?

Mr. ATHERTON. That is correct. I believe they still have some small supply relationship with Great Britain. But almost exclusively with

the United States.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Do we put any restraints on our military equipment as to how it shall and shall not be used?

Mr. ATHERTON. All of our supply arrangements have built into them contractually that the equipment that we provide will not be transferred to third parties without our approval.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I am trying to look at alternatives that our country faces. One more question. Is there any basis for Jordan to want these other than to use them against Israel? What other use does Jordan have for this kind of capability? Is it strictly because of the confrontations pertaining to Israel, or is there any other situation in the area that might give Jordan the desire for this kind of capability? Mr. ATHERTON. Jordan obviously wants to have a defense establishment that could defend it against attack from any source. I think historically one has to recall that in 1970 Jordan was invaded from Syria. So it cannot assume that if political relationships in the area change as they have a way of doing in this area that it will not again find itself in a confrontation situation with one of its Arab neighbors as has been the case in the past.

Quite obviously the possibility of Arab-Israeli hostilities is also a major consideration. That is one of the possibilities. But I would emphasize that it is not the only one, if you look at the area over a period

of time.

Mr. BUCHANAN. General, I don't know how far you can go in this classified area along the lines of your earlier answers to my colleague, Mr. Winn and the chairman.

Would it be accurate to say that if this deal goes through it does give Jordan a very small capability as against its neighbors individually as well as collectively?

General FISH. Yes, sir, I think that would be an accurate statement. But the degree is so very modest that it is marginal in the gross and marginal individually.

Mr. GILMAN. Would the individual yield?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Certainly.

Mr. GILMAN. Isn't this weapon that is intended to be sold not only defensive but could be used offensively?

General FISH. The Hawk missiles really cannot be used except defensively. The Redeye is strictly a defensive weapon. The Vulcan can be used against ground targets in an offensive mode, say, with an advancing force.

Mr. GILMAN. Would the sale of this weaponry, General, change the whole complexion of the Jordanian defense system?

General FISH. Sir, it would increase their capability, particularly in the way they plan it to be used, to give them a capability around fixed installations that are now uncovered as far as any air defense. It

would give the troops in the field a very-I emphasize the "very"modest capability which they now feel completely lacking.

It is important to their morale to the extent that morale is important and to the extent that fixed installations make it more important for an attacking force to get rid of fixed installations. It is an improvement in their capability. But it does not in our view unbalance the relationships individually or collectively.

Mr. GILMAN. But as compared to the present defensive system this is a substantial change, is it not?

General FISH. Oh, yes, because they have got zero now. Almost anything you would add would

Mr. BUCHANAN. In order to keep things in perspective would it be possible for them to obtain qualitatively-I think we have established. quantitatively that they want more than we would give them and they could apparently obtain that more through Syria with Soviet equipment-qualitatively is it possible? Qualitatively is it possible for them to obtain comparable capability or greater capability from the Soviet side?

General FISH. Yes, indeed, because of the mobility of the SA-6, the off-road mobility feature, it would be a big plus in that regard. Redeye and SA-7 are roughly comparable. On the Vulcan side the Soviet comparable weapon is the ZSU-23. The Soviet system has greater capability because it is an all-weather system. It has greater capability than the Vulcan. So unquestionably, same quality or better.

Mr. BUCHANAN. I would like to ask one more question, but Mr. Chairman, I know my time has expired, so I will wait for my next turn.

Mr. FASCELL. Go ahead and ask your question, Mr. Buchanan.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Secretary, you have indicated that the absence of air defense may have contributed to Jordan's nonparticipation in the 1973 conflict. On the other hand you have related in your remarks and so has the General in several instances their policies of moderation. In your political judgment-and this may be speculative-is there greater safety in a situation of exclusive military relationship to the United States than in a situation where the Jordanians have a dual relationship, with the United States to the extent they have now and have built up this capability from the Russians via Syria? As part B to that question I know it is our policy to try to exercise restraint and avoid conflict and avoid the use of this capability in any aggressive fashion against Israel. Do you feel the chances will be equally good if this capability were supplied via Syria by Russia, that they too would urge the same restraint and the same abstinence from using this in any way against the Nation of Israel?

Mr. ATHERTON. I think there is no question that the maintenance of an exclusive military supply relationship between ourselves and Jordan permits us to help keep Jordan on its moderate course in pursuit of peace policies and moderate policies in the area. If it were to have a source of supply of Soviet-manufactured equipment it is almost certain it wouldn't stop there, that this would bring the dependence for replacement of parts. for spare parts, for training, either by Soviets directly or by the Arab from which they got that equipment, which in turn would begin to have its effect, it seems to me, inevitably on the policy of Jordan.

In other words to us the denial of the services that have been proposed to Jordan and the almost certain consequence that Jordan would obtain it from another source would begin to fundamentally affect the United States-Jordanian relationship and would begin to have a fundamental effect upon the policies that Jordan pursues.

I don't want by that to imply that Jordan would turn around overnight or that it would suddenly become an aggressive state rather than one that has rejected trying to solve this problem by force. What I am saying is that the chain of events that would be set in motion would objectively begin to have this kind of an effect, whether or not this was the intent at the time.

Mr. BUCHANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. The Chair would like to yield now to members of the full committee who are here and first yield to the gentleman from New York who is the principal sponsor of the resolution of disapproval, Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I take it from your argument that you are not relying very much on the economic argument here; that is that we want this deal to go through as a business proposition so we get these exports?

Mr. ATHERTON. No, sir, I am not making the economic argument at all. This was not a factor in the decision.

Mr. BINGHAM. That is what I understood from your presentation. It is a combination of political and military factors that is behind this decision. I assume it is an objective of the Department to keep Jordan out of the next war if there is one in the Middle East?

Mr. ATHERTON. The objective is to see that there isn't another war obviously and if there is, then that it does not spread any more widely than necessary. So the answer to your question is that obviously we would like to keep as many countries out of it as possible.

Mr. BINGHAM. What effect do you think having Jordan armed with an air defense capability would have on a decision of whether to stay out of another war?

Mr. ATHERTON. I think it would be one of many factors, Mr. Bingham, which they would consider. I do not think it would be the only or even the decision factor. Jordan entered the 1967 war without either an adequate air force or adequate air defense. It is true that they stayed out of the 1973 war and have cited the absence of an air defense system as one of the reasons for not going into the war.

I don't think that that necessarily leads to the conclusion that in the absence of an air defense system it would find it possible to stay out of another war. It would depend upon a whole complex of circumtances, political forces, in the area.

Mr. BINGHAM. I would like to call your attention to your statement on page 2 where you say that "Jordan has consistently followed policies of restraint and moderation in the Middle East. It has consistently cooperated with the United States in our efforts to move toward the goals of peace and security in the area. It has been a force for peace and for moderation."

Those statements wouldn't apply, certainly, to 1967, would they?

Mr. ATHERTON. No, sir. Well, I would say even in 1967 the Jordanians in the context of the area were certainly relatively more moderate

than any of its Arab neighbors. This did not prevent Jordan from joining the war in 1967. It has always been in relative terms more moderate. But certainly I think since 1967, which was obviously a very severe blow to Jordan, when it lost a great deal of its territory in that war and has drawn certain lessons from it, I think since 1967 there has been no ambiguity at all in Jordan's position in this regard. It has expressed it publicly and privately, saying that it rejects the idea of using force or military attack to try to solve the problem, that it can only see a solution to the problem with Israel coming through negotiations.

Mr. BINGHAM. I think it might be useful to review for a moment the history of 1967. It is true, is it not, that Israel publicly indicated that Jordan was in no danger from Israel if they stayed out of the 1967 conflict and Jordan nevertheless joined in? That is correct, is it not? Mr. ATHERTON. That is my recollection; yes.

Mr. BINGHAM. Wouldn't you say and in fact you almost said it, that Jordan is in no danger from an Israel attack unless Jordan joins in another war?

Mr. ATHERTON. I do not see any indication that Israel contemplates an attack on Jordan. What Jordan's concern is-and this is what has led King Hussein to feel he needs to acquire the air defense system which he doesn't have-if there is another outbreak of hostilities that the Israeli forces might go to Syria across Jordanian territory and that they would therefore be involved in the war even though they had not been involved in starting it and that he would therefore need the means to defend himself.

Mr. GILMAN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. BINGHAM. Just a moment.

That would seem to be consistent with a statement that Hussein was quoted as making by an Arab paper, which was quoted in the New York Times and that I put in the record the other day, the statement was to the effect that he needed the air defense to protect Syria from an attack by Israeli forces across Jordanian territory.

Mr. ATHERTON. I would have read that as meaning that he needed to protect his own territory from attack, which would obviously have the effect, if the attack were directed against Syria, of also providing some protection against Syria.

But of course these are precisely the reasons why he decided he needed to get an air defense system. I think this is a point that needs to be constantly restressed, that he has made this decision. How it would be used or what its effect would be has no bearing on the basic reality that Jordan has made the decision to acquire an air defense. system.

Mr. BINGHAM. Let us stay with the other point for a moment. Isn't it true that Hussein has been trying in recent months since the decision. that was made at Rabat which was very much against his interest to reestablish a position of acceptance by the Arab League and the other Arab States?

Mr. ATHERTON. Yes, I think Jordanian policies since Rabat have been to try to improve its relations, which had been quite strained, with Syria and with Egypt, and particularly in the case of Syria the improvement has been considerable.