to obtain one elsewhere. This would be a form of blackmail in which no U.S. Government should engage. Thus, since we cannot deny Jordan the right to go elsewhere, the question is not whether Jordan should have an air defense system, but who should supply it. Every U.S. interest dictates that it be the U.S. All other points aside, this is the crux of the issue. The real danger arises from a failure to recognize it.

3. One must ask again why after 26 years the AIPAC, or anyone else has chosen this issue at this time. It is either the result of a hasty, ill-timed, over-zealous tactic with secondary political objectives in which Jordanian-American relations have become an unwitting victim. Or it is a calculated effort to establish the groundwork and set in motion an alternative to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

4. In sum,

this is not the time and these are not the reasons

for the United States to change its basic traditional policy

toward Jordan.

SUMMARY OF HEARINGS ON PROPOSED SALES TO JORDAN OF THE HAWK AND VULCAN DEFENSE SYSTEMS

(NOTE. On July 22, 1975, Hon. Dante B. Fascell presented the following summary of the hearings contained herein to the full Committee on International Relations.)

Widespread interest in the proposed sales of Hawk and Vulcan air defense systems to Jordan was expressed by members of the Committee immediately following May press reports of the possible sale. To obtain further information on the sales, Congressman Rosenthal on June 18 introduced a Resolution of Inquiry which was tabled by the full Committee on June 26. In response to his concern and that of a large number of other Congressmen the Subcommittee agreed to review the proposed sales.

Official notifications of the proposed sales were submitted to the Committee on July 10, 1975 by the Defense Department as required by section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act. The notifications were immediately referred to the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs and hearings were scheduled on July 16 and 17.

On July 16 the Subcommittee heard five hours of testimony in both open and closed session on the proposed sale from Hon. Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and Lt. General Howard M. Fish, USAF, Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

On July 17, the Subcommittee heard testimony from five Members of Congress opposed to the sales. Testifying were: Hon. Jonathan Bingham; Hon. Claude Pepper; Hon. Robert Drinan; Hon. Henry Waxman; and Hon. Benjamin Gilman.

The Subcommittee has concluded its hearing on the proposed sales. The hearing record raises all of the pertinent issues which the Committee may want to review in connection with consideration of a concurrent resolution disapproving these sales. In my judgement, the record also contains all the facts necessary to reach an informed judgment on this issue.

The records of the Subcommittee hearings are available to Members of the Full Committee for their consideration.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES

Discussion at hearings on proposed arms sales to Jordan before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs, July 16 and 17, 1975. Pursuant to section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Department of Defense on July 10, 1975 submitted to Congress two separate notices of proposed sales to Jordan of elements of both the Hawk and Vulcan Air Defense Systems.

THE PROPOSAL

While actual details remain classified basically accurate press stories indicate Jordan is to be sold:

14 batteries of Hawk missiles and supporting test equipment and Improved Hawk missiles, and

100 Vulcan self-propelled antiaircraft weapons and spare parts.

The total cash sale (financed by Saudi Arabia) would be in excess of $300 million.

Testimony indicated that the bulk of Hawks would not be delivered for two and one half (21⁄2) years. The first increment would include three Hawk batteries and the Vulcan system to be delivered over the next year.

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THE WEAPONS

Vulcan is a system composed of 20 mm antiaircraft Gatling guns mounted on a M163 full-tracked vehicle.

Hawk is a road-mobile air defense missile system for use against supersonic aircraft. It is extensively used by U.S. and allied nations including Israel for air defense. Each battery is composed of six (6) launchers (with a usual supply of approximately three (3) missiles per launcher). The Hawk system can be moved by road but requires 50 trucks per battery. The Soviet equivalent, the SA-6, is off-road mobile.

There are two versions of the Hawk missile: The original or old Hawk and the improved Hawk. Currently only U.S. forces have the improved Hawk. Commitments have been made to Israel and other countries for sale of either the new Hawk or modification kits for older missiles. The missiles to be sold Jordan will be improved Hawks. Improved capability will be provided Israel prior to Jordan.

ADMINISTRATION RATIONALE FOR SALE

Jordan has made a decision to acquire an air defense system, preferably from the United States, if possible, but elsewhere if necessary. To deny sale of an air defense system to Jordan would be detrimental to U.S.-Jordanian relations and to the pattern of mutual cooperation essential to strengthening Jordan's moderate policies.

Jordan is important to regional stability and despite its geographic vulnerability has followed moderate policies and been cooperative with the United States position in support of peace in the area. Jordan's commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Middle East situation is essential to our efforts for peace and, hence, we have attempted to work with Jordan and bolster that nation's self confidence.

As other nations offensive and defensive air capabilities have increased Jordanian anxiety has increased. By early 1975 Jordan felt it had to obtain an air defense system which has become increasingly important to the morale of the armed forces. Our willingness to sell such a system has thus become symbolic of our willingness to support moderate policies.

The issue perceived by the Executive is primarily from whom Jordan should get its air defense system. In February 1975 President Ford decided it should be the U.S. and agreed in principle to sell Jordan an air defense system.

ISSUES

1. The Sales Upset the Regional Balance of Power and Would be Detrimental to Israel.

Critics of the sale charge that provisions of the improved Hawk missile to Jordan:

a. Represents a massive increase of aid to Jordan and more than doubles the dollar amount of arms provided Jordan, 1962–74;

b. Introduces the new sophisticated improved Hawk missile into the Middle East; and

c. Would upset the regional balance since Jordan stayed out of the 1973 war because of a lack of air defense system and, hence, a Jordanian air defense would encourage participation in another Middle East war.

The Administration argues, however, that such is not the case:

a. United States remains committed to survival of Israel and it is in that context that decisions were made to sell Jordan Hawk and Vulcan. The maintenance of balance was major concern of U.S.

b. Sales will have stabilizing effect on Jordanian armed forces and permits us to keep Jordan on a moderate course while use of missiles from an alternative supplier might set in motion events undermining Jordan's moderate stance.

c. The air defense weapons will give Jordan only a modest system with very marginal effectiveness against Israeli air attack.

d. The weapons represent no new technology and only a modest increase in the number of weapons in the area. Jordan's share would be less than 1/50 of Redeyetype systems and 1/15 of Hawk-type systems in the area.

2. The Sales are Contrary to the Middle East Reappraisal and Designed to Pressure Israel.

Critics charge that these sales are designed to pressure Israel into a Middle East peace agreement and are inconsistent with the suspension of arms deliveries announced by the Secretary of State March 23 pending a reappraisal of U.S. policy toward the Middle East.

The Executive branch denies both charges arguing that:

a. Agreement in principle to sell Jordan an air defense system came much earlier than announcement of the reappraisal. This was decided by the President in February, 1975 and resulted from discussions going back as far as December, 1973. Details were worked out later following a March 22 report to the President on Jordanian defense needs by the Defense Department. There is no connection between this sale and reassessment.

b. Reassessment was never meant to interfere with deliveries of defense articles the U.S. agreed to supply. Deliveries have continued to be made to Israel and will continue.

c. As part of the reassessment there has been a delay in consideration of an Israeli request for F-15 aircraft and Lance missiles. These requests had not been approved prior to March 23 as had Hawk and Vulcan and would represent new technology for the area unlike Hawk and Vulcan.

d. Under the agreement to sell, Jordan will be getting much less equipment than originally requested.

3. Jordan and Alternative Air Defense Systems.

Critics of the sales charge that the basic premise of the Executive is incorrect, i.e., Jordan will purchase an air defense system elsewhere if not from the United States. They argue:

a. Jordan, a long time U.S. ally will not lightly modify its relationship with us; and that Jordan

b. Does not want to buy Soviet missiles either directly or through Syria since this would involve an undesirable influence in Jordanian affairs.

c. King Hussien merely is attempting to curry favor with his Arab neighbors to improve his internal political situation vis-a-vis the PLO and may not be unhappy if we reject these sales.

d. Jordan really needs air defense only if contemplating war against Israel. The Executive states that:

a. It is certain Jordan will buy these weapons elsewhere if necessary.

b. Alternative systems purchased from Soviets or Syria would undermine Jordan's moderation and ultimately adversely affect Israel.

c. The SA-6, being off-road mobile, would constitute a greater threat to Israel than the Hawk.

d. Jordan needs its air defense system against neighbors other than Israel. e. Jordanian planned deployment of Hawks and terrain make it difficult to envision their offensive use against Israel.

ALTERNATIVES TO PROPOSED SALES

Most opponents of the proposed sale recognized Jordan's relatively moderate policies in the Middle East and appeared willing to continue a military supply relationship with Jordan to the extent no harm was done to Israel.

Three alternative suggestions to outright rejection of the sale emerged:

a. Reject the total sales as presently proposed but authorize the sales on an incremental basis thus keeping Congress intimately involved in approval of Jordanian arms shipments.

b. Approve the entire package but at the same time approve what Israel has requested.

c. Hold up the Jordan arms sale until we have benefit of the Executive's policy reassessment.

о

BD -127