FIRE CONTROL

The fire control system consists of a gyro lead-computing gunsight and a sight current generator. The gunner visually acquires and tracks the target with the gyro lead-computing gunsight. The antenna axis of the radar is servoed to the optical line-of-sight, and the radar supplies target range and ranges rate data to the sight current generator. These inputs are then processed to provide outputs that are used to control the gunsight.

With inputs of range, range rate, and angular tracking of the optical line-ofsight (measured by a freely gimballed gyro), the sight automatically computes the future target position and adds the required super-elevation to hit the target.

Turret fire control is a disturbed line-of-sight system. The sight case and gun bore are physically fixed in alignment but the sight reticle which defines the optical line-of-sight, is positioned by the gyro and is displaced from the gun bore as the gunner tracks the target, thereby establishing the proper lead angle. The amount of optical line-of-sight displacement is dependent on the range and range rate inputs to the sight and the required tracking time to establish the lead angle is about one second.

The range-only-radar developed by the Lockheed Electronic Company, is a coherent doppler, moving target indicator (MTI) radar. It will acquire targets up to 5,000 metres away.

A green light appears in the sight optics signalling that the radar has acquired the target and that the target is within the effective range of the turret system, so that the gunner simply acquires the target in the sight reticle tracks the target and fires after the green light appears.

ALTERNATIVE MODE

When desired the gunner may switch to a manual mode of fire control. In this model he must estimate target range and speed and set the estimates on indicator dials on the control panel. The gyro lead-computing gunsight then computes the lead angle based on these estimates.

Trained gunners can achieve good results using the manual mode of fire control as was demonstrated during the Military Potential Tests conducted by the US Army.

SYSTEM POWER

Power for the turret is supplied by 24-volt nickel-cadmium batteries within the turret. One battery furnishes power to the turret power control and fire control system, a second drives the Vulcan gun with conventional linked ammunition, but a third battery is required when the linkless feed system is used. Batteries can be charged by an on-vehicle generator or a portable auxiliary power unit. The turret can remain in standby condition over long periods of time without significant power drain.

CHARACTERISTICS (TOWED TYPE)

Type: Land-mobile, air-transportable, light antiaircraft weapon system. Control: Radar ranging optical aiming automatic lead computation.

Fire power: 6 × 20 mm guns a 3,000 span high rate of fire. 1,000 spm low rate of fire.

Radar range: 5,000 metres.

Weapon coverage: Azimuth 360 deg. Elevation 5 deg. to +80 deg.

Turret slewing rate: Azimuth 60 deg/sec. Elevation 45 deg/sec. Acceleration 160 deg deg-ec.

Height on wheels: 2.03 metres.

Height emplaced: 1.73 metres.

Wheel track: 1.77 metres.

Weight: 1.360 kg.

Standby power requirement: 500 W.

DEPLOYMENT

The U.S. Army after successful military potential tests in 1964 and 1965, selected the Vulcan Air Defence System to arm new Composite Air Defence Battalions. The Vulcan system is used in conjunction with the Chaparral missile system in the composite battalion.

The Army is using two VADS configurations; the M-163 Self-Propelled and the M-167 Towed. For the Self-propelled M-163: the turret is mounted on a modified M-113A1 armoured personnel carrier (designated M-741 for this application) and uses a linkless ammunition feed system. It maintains the swim capability of the M-113.

For the towed M-167 the system is mounted on a light weight two wheel gun carriage and uses conventional linked ammunition in a 300-round container. It is helicopter transportable and uses the M-715, 14-ton truck as its prime

mover.

STATUS

In production for U.S. and various other governments. A towed version without radar is in production for the Belgian Air Force. See also AVADS (2843.131)

MANUFACTURERS

Complete System: Aircraft Equipment Division, General Electric Company, Burlington, Vermont.

Radar: Lockheed Electronics, Plainfield, New Jersey and American Electronic Lab., Philadelphia, Pa.

Vehicle: FMC Corporation, San Jose, California, U.S.A.

ANALYSIS BY HON. BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL TO ADMINISTRATION

COMMENTS ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 552, JUNE 26, 1975

The preliminary response of the administration to the request for information stated in H. Res. 552 is incomplete, inadequate and inconsistent. It also contains statements with frightening implications with respect to stability in the Middle East and world peace.

I set forth below some of the more glaring problems posed by these preliminary answers. I thhink these will show that H. Res. 552 not only still remains necessary but has been rendered even more essential.

COVER LETTER

The letter covering the administration's response sets the tone for, and outlines the substance of, the answers. Basically, it alleges that the sale of the Hawk missile was and is intended to give Jordan an air defense system to enable it to maintain its moderate stand despite increasing pressure from other Arab countries.

None of these basic propositions stands close scrutiny. The Hawk is not a strictly defensive weapon. It is a surface-to-air missile which may be speedily mounted and fired from movable carriers. Equipped with semiactive radar homing, it is designed to provide supplementary air cover in support of mobile offensive operations. Moreover, with a range of 22 miles, even a stationary Hawk system can be used to harrass and attack routine Israeli commercial and military air traffic. But most importantly, by protecting Jordanian targets against retaliation, the Hawk system gives Jordan the ability to participate fully in any future Arab offensive against Israel.

The Hawk system does not help Jordan maintain its moderate stand. Indeed, the promise of the Hawk to Jordan has had just the opposite effect. Syria learned a painful lesson from its one-prong attack through Golan in 1973 and desired the option of a multiprong attack through Lebanon's Arquoub region ("Fatahland") and from Jordan's Ajlun Heights against Haifa. This plan required Jordan's involvement to be credible, and Syria used threats and blandishments to enlist Jordanian participation. As the New York Times reported on April 25, Jordan's lack of a sophisticated air defense system was a primary obstacle. The Hawk, which the United States tentatively offered to Jordan on April 29, was just such a sophisticated air defense system and thus removed this obstacle, eliminating any excuse King Hussein could offer. On June 12, Hussein and Syria's al-Assad announced the creation of a Joint High Commission to coordinate Jordanian and Syrian military policies. (New York Times, June 13, p. 3.) The Commission will include military officers and will meet every 2 months.

Jordan could hardly be considered either under pressure or isolated from other Arab countries. Two weeks ago, Hussein hosted a triumphal three-day state visit to Amman by Syria's President Hafez al-Assad, who is the closest friend and most immediate supporter of the Palestinians. The joint military agreement concluded entitles Hussein to $350 million in subsidies set by the Arab leadership conference at Rabat in November 1974. About half of this has reportedly been paid with as much as $100 million set aside for purchase of the Hawk. Hussein has good relations with all the Arabs except for Libya and the Palestinians. There are unconfirmed rumors reported in the New York Times on June 22 that King Hussein is to visit Moscow as full confirmation of role as a leader of a "confrontation state."

Hence, the basic themes underlying all of the Administration's answers are highly suspect. I now turn to the specific answers to address their inadequacies. Answers 1 and 2. It is ironic that the October 1973 war allegedly first impressed upon the United States the need by Jordan for an air defense system. The 1967 war demonstrated the value of air supremacy in the Middle East. Jordan was not even a participant in the 1973 war. If the 1973 war so clearly

revealed the need of Jordan for the Hawk system, why was it not provided for in fiscal year 1975 appropriations?

A more compelling scenario, which only a fuller examination of the facts can prove or disprove, is that what led to the Hawk sale agreement in April 1975 was the combination of substantial petrodollars and pressure on Jordan to play a stronger role in Arab threats against Israel. The Rabat conference in November 1974 dangled the carrot of $350 million in front of Hussein and raised the stick of greater Palestinian insurgency. Jordan took the bait and found a willing accomplice in a United States eager to recover some of the dollars extorted through the oil boycott. The exact timing of the agreement to sell the Hawk, several weeks into the Administration's so-called reassessment of Mideast policy, followed upon the Administration's need to punish Israel for what the administration saw as Israel's unreasonable stance in the Secretary of State's shuttle diplomacy.

Answer 3. This answer is wholly unresponsive. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is charged with making critical evaluations of the potential mi itary impact, feasibility and significance of sales under the Foreign Military Sales Act. A variety of air defense weapons was available for sale to Jordan including the Chaparral missile and the Vulcan antiaircraft gun. Any of these would have sufficed for routine air defense .The Hawk is unlike these in its great sophistication. Like the vaunted Soviet SA-6, the Hawk is exceptionally effective at low altitudes as well as at maximum tactical heights. It is the basic air defense missile used by the U.S. Army and Marines, and by seven NATO countries. A full understanding of the Hawk sale requires an appreciation of the conclusions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense as to the requirement of Jordan for such a potentially destructive combination defensive-offensive weapon. These conclusions are not supplied.

Answer 4. Improving morale among Jordanian Armed Forces is hardly a strong reason for compromising the balance of power in the Mideast. Moreover, the suggestion that the sale of the Hawk was necessary if Hussein was not to go e'sewhere for his air defense system has been refuted by Hussein himself who is reported as saying on his visit to the United States in late April that he never seriously considered purchasing surface-to-air missiles manufactured by any country other than the United States. Apart from these two items, this answer adds little to the understanding of the motivations behind the sale. It reiterates the highly questionable conclusions of the cover letter that the sale would reinforce Jordan's policies of moderation. It also recites that the sale of the Hawk would not alter the balance of power between Jordan and Israel. Of course, this latter is hardly really an issue. Rather, the concern is the impact of the sale on the balance of power in the whole Middle East, which wou'd include the role the Hawk sale played in encouraging Jordanian belligerency and facilitating Jordanian/Syrian military cooperation. The reported conclusions of the State Department or anyone else in the Executive Department as to the vital point are lacking.

Answer 5. This answer evades the aspects of the question relating to delivery date and private industry production needs with respect to the Hawk sale. State Department leaks to the press have placed the price of the system hardware at about $100 million. This figure probably does not include the cost of training and maintenance. But the actual magnitude of the sale is not given. Nor is the delivery date supplied. The cover letter speaks of a modest air defense system and training package, to be phased over a period of several years. This is hard to reconcile with press reports that Jordan has already allocated $100 million for the prompt purchase of the system. This $100 million compares to the $80 million which Congress appropriated in fiscal year 1975 for grants and credits with respect to all military supplies to Jordan.

Answer 6. This answer only recites that a price and availability statement has been prepared as required by law. It does not supply the contents of the statement nor the date of preparation, both requested in the question. The contents of such statement would alone give Congress an idea of the magnitude of the proposed sale.

Answers 7 and 8. These answers have common failings of vagueness and inadequacy. No mention is made of the price and advisability statement to which question No. 7 addresses itself. None of the persons who evaluated the sale is identified nor are any of the specific conclusions of such persons supplied, as question No. 8 requires.

Answers 9 and 10. No details are given of any of the terms of the letter of offer or of the financing arrangements. It is hard to believe that with the letter of offer scheduled for finalization in another month none of these is known.

Answer 11. Congress may well be in recess at the time of presentation of the notice of sale. This would hamper any effective consideration and review of the sale. Full consideration now is made even more urgent.

Answer 12. This answer recites that the President approved the sale in principle on April 15, 1975, in the midst of the so-called Mideast reassessment. This statement is inconsistent with the recital in the cover letter that the President approved the sale in principle on November 15, 1975. The detailed substance of the communication, as called for by the question, is not supplied.

Answer 13. This answer evades the issue of the impact the announcement of the sale might be expected to have on Israel which had earlier been told that deliveries of the Lance missile and discussions of the sale of F-15's would be suspended in an even-handed reassessment of Mideast policy.

Answer 14. The answer to this should be requested to enable Congress to evaluate the full potential impact of placing these sophisticated weapons into Jordan's hands.

Answer 15. This answer does not distinguish between sales of the original Hawk, a missile of early 1960's vintage, and the improved Hawk being sold to Jordan, nor does the answer break down the countries by the components furnished.

Answer 16. This answer is wholly unresponsive or frightening in its implications. Section 3(a) of the Foreign Military Sales Act (22 U.S.C. sec. 2753) requires the President only to conclude that Jordan has agreed not to transfer "title to, or possession of," the Hawk missile system to other than Jordanian personnel. It does not require him to take any precautions to see that Jordan does not put the Hawk at the disposal of a Joint Military Command or even another entity such as the Palestinians.

Answer 17. Answering this question is evaded only by the use of sophistry or an apparent falsehood. Accounts in the New York Times, Washington Post and Batimore Sun, dated on or about June 13, 1975, all describe a communique issued by Hussein and al-Assad announcing the creation of a joint high commission to coordinate military policies between Jordan and Syria. It seems to be bad faith not to call such a commission a joint military command and to supply the information requested.

Answer 18. None of the documents called for are supplied despite the admission that at least proposals, presumably written, furnished by the Hawk contractors have been filed.

Answer 19. Raytheon's proposal of June 9, 1975, is cited but not supplied as the question requires. Even the description of the proposal raises serious issues. If in fact all negotiations in the sale were carried on between the governments of Jordan and the United States, how would any representative of Jordanian nationality have earned a commission?