REVIEW OF NEW PUBLICATIONS. Natural Evidence of a Future Life, derived from the properties and actions of animate and inanimate matter. By F. C. Bakewell. MR. BAKEWELL'S proposition is," that the evidences to be derived from the consideration of the properties of matter, and the functions of the corporeal organs, are sufficient to prove that the mind survives the dissolution of the body.” In accordance with this, the work is divided into three portions. 1. On the indestructibility of matter; 2. On the properties of matter. 3. On the phenomena of life. His purpose is to show that all matter is indestructible; 2dly, that all the known properties of matter are subtile agents distinct from mere extension, solidity, and divisibility, which are the sole abstract characteristics of inert matter. And having shown that all material substances contain a subtile principle, as chemical attraction, heat, light-and that annihilation is incompatible with the known laws of nature, he then proceeds to consider the connexion of the immaterial principles of vitality, with material organization, and endeavours to prove that they are not only distinct from, but that, even during the continuance of that connexion, the percipient and intellectual powers are, to a certain degree, independent of the corporeal organs. Mr. Bakewell very justly adds, lest any one might mistake the tendency of his line of reasoning, That in pursuing this course of inquiry, it is not intended to enter the province of the moral philosopher. He may arrive at the same conclusions by reasoning on the attributes of the Deity, and the moral constitution of the human mind.' He very justly infers, from the admirable manifestations of design and contrivance in the development of the living principle, that it was created for further purposes than the transient and apparently useless existence in this world; and that the attributes of benevolence, of justice, and of goodness, of the supreme Creator, would not be reconcilable with a scheme of philosophy which would limit the existence of Man to the trials, miseGENT. MAG. VOL. VI. ries, and persecutions to which he is subjected in the present life. The arguments to be derived from psychological considerations, respecting the nature and powers and actions of the human mind, are not available in his inquiry, except where mental operations are indicated by external signs. Thus, then, the first division of his book is formed into an analogical argument. If matter is proved indestructhat mind must also be the same. The tible, we may reason in like manner second is also of the same nature. The subtile properties of matter being investigated-as light, heat, gravity, &c.and it being ascertained that they are distinct from and independent of the material substances which they control, so it may reasonably be supposed that the soul is distinct from the material organization, which is subservient to its will, and independent of it. The third branch considers the phenomena of life, which require for their first evolution, a pre-existing power, distinct from the properties of matter, competent to dispose the elementary particles in their organic arrangements, and which in more advanced processes exhibit the mind, as distinct from material substance, and capable of acting independently of the organs of sensation,-leading to the conclusion that the mind is immaterial and immortal. Mr. Bakewell has re-stated his two leading propositions more than once, and with this addition. If it can be satisfactorily proved, that the elements of all visible objects are indestructible, and that the subtile properties of matter are also indestructible, may we not in fer that the sentient principle, which acts upon inert matter, must be equally durable with the inferior substance, trol.' And he adds, that this arguover which it exercises complete conment will apply with equal force, whether we consider the mind to be a material substance or an immaterial: for, if matter and its properties can be proved to be indestructible, the sentient principle, being one of those properties, must also be imperishable. But if we consider the vital principle H to be immaterial, capable of being united with matter, then the argument to be drawn from the equal duration of the superior to the inferior substance, derives additional strength. In the first division, the indestructibility of matter is shown, in solution, evaporation, rarefaction, natural decomposition, and combustion. The subject is treated of with clearness and knowledge; and the conclusion to which the natural philosopher has arrived by experiment and different modes of reasoning, that matter is changed but not destroyed, is established. Instead, however, of proceeding at once, and carrying the argument from matter to mind (because we cannot gain any positive evidence relative to the nature of the human mind, and not being able to assist our inquiries respecting its existence in a separate state from the body, by the result of experience;) he takes his second branch, and makes this intermediate argument. The numerous instances with which we are acquainted, of the continued existence of matter in a more subtile form, and therefore inappreciable by our senses, after it has been apparently annihilated, afford strong emblematical analogy to the existence of the soul after its separation from the body.' The subtile properties of matter exercising a similar influence over it, as the mind does over the body, are next considered; as light, heat, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, chemical attraction, gravitation. Mr. Bakewell here justly remarks, that to those persons who conceive objections founded on the incapacity of man to comprehend the nature of the human mind may have weight, it may advantageously be shewn, that the mind is baffled in the endeavour to comprehend the most ordinary phenomena of nature, or understand the ultimate cause of its simplest operations. He adds-'In pursuing this inquiry we shall be able to add materially to the analogical evidence in favour of a future state of existence. When, for instance, we find certain properties inherent in matter, which properties, though generally considered to be them selves material, are at the same time so subtile as to elude all attempts to ascertain their natures; when we find, as in chemical attraction and gravitation, that those pro perties are not destroyed nor affected by the decomposition of the bodies in which they are manifested, but that they continue inseparable from them in all changes of form-we shall surely be justified in considering this union of subtile active properties with inert matter, as strongly analogous to the union of the sentient principle with a material body; and the continued existence of those subtile properties of matter, after the forms with which they were combined are dissipated, present a close symbolical analogy to the continued existence of the soul after the dissolution of the material system of organization with which it was united.' In this part of the work, relating to the subtle essences acting on matter, it was necessary to avoid all strained and fanciful analogies. This being guarded against, the argument is by Mr. Bakewell very ingeniously and elegantly stated; whether quite satisfactorily to the philosopher, we will not say: and this, Mr. Bakewell, at p. 131, himself seems to acknowledge, and places the argument in a proper point of view. son,' he says, 'of the combinations of the forms and properties of matter, with the wonderful combination of man governed by the sentient principle, must necessarily be extremely rude and imperfect but in our endeavours to comprehend the connexion between matter and mind, such comparisons may serve as tangible points whereon to fix our ideas; and by showing, in the combinations of matter with subtile properties, that the active powers of material substances are distinct from matter itself, and exist independently of the forms in which they are manifested, we may aid our feeble conceptions of the distinct and separate existence of the soul from the body; and the possibility of such separate existences may be confirmed.' : 'Any compari It would be as well also to read the fifteenth chapter, where the summary of this second branch of the subject is fairly and forcibly drawn. The origin of these subtle principles, coeval with the creation of matter, their independence of it, and their indestructibility, are all brought to bear with very pleasing effect. The third and last division is called "The Phenomena of Life.' "Having hitherto considered matter in its inorganic state, the author now views it when in combination it differs from its elementary forms, and by which the functions of life are performed: and then he inquires whether the organization of matter that manifests the existence of an intelligent Creator, do not also afford evidence to prove that the living principle, which directs those organizations, is distinct from organic matter, and exists in a separate and imperishable state;-or in other words, it will be our province to show that the living principle in plants, and the sentient and thinking principles in man, are distinct from the organised structures in which they are developed; and that they are not inherent in any portion of the matter which composes those organizations. We shall also endeavour to prove from facts and illustrations, de. rived from an examination of the exercise of the perceptive and mental faculties, and the corporeal functions, that the sentient principle is not only distinct from, but may and does exist independently of the material organization of the body." This argument includes the consideration of vegetation, animal organization, animal life, organs of sensation, animal mutations, personal identity, suspended animation, dreams, and spectral illusions. The deficiency in Mr. Bakewell's analogical argument (see p. 215), from vegetation, would ists, which supposes the percipient soul to be the result of animal organization, does not remove any of the difficulties supposed to attend the belief in the immateriality of the vital principle, whilst it is obliged to have recourse to the transposition of cause and effect; (i. e. the soul the result of organization), and it further involves the absurdity of supposing that all beings are self-created." The 24th chapter, which treats of dreams and spectral illusions, is one in which, as was probable, Mr. Bakewell finds much to support his argument; and the facts are well and forcibly given. In the dreams which accompany sleep, the mind seems to act, as far as possible, independently of the body, and requiring no aid from it, nor asking the senses to look out for her in the external world, to bring her supplies of information. Nor can it be said that memory alone is re-arranging or re-sorting her stores, which had been previously collected for her by the senses, since other powers of mind besides memory are busily employed, and for ever on the wing. Besides, we combine, we arrange, we create scenes, facts, conversations, circumstances, which can have no kindred to the working mind, and with which mere memory has no concern. Mr. have been supplied, had he adopted Coleridge assures us that he composed that eminent botanist M. de Candolle's opinion, that trees carry in their formation the principle of indestructibility, except by accidents or force; and that their existence is constantly renewed.* Mr. Bakewell's 19th and 20th chapters are very interesting ones, in which the brain is considered, and the arguments of the materialists upon it, brought forward. The general conclusion is thus given "Though the vital principle is unknown to us in any state distinct from animal organization, yet every point of view in which we can bring our mental powers to bear upon the subject, the sentient and thinking principles seem so entirely different from any known material substances, that we cannot form any conception of mind or sensation otherwise than as distinct from every possible combination of matter: and the preceding consideration of this subject has, it is hoped, been sufficient to show that the hypothesis of the material See M. de Candolle's memoir, in our last number. a very fine poem of some hundred lines during sleep, part of which has been given us a wonderful instance of the activity of the mind during the torpor and temporary death of the body, and worthy to be noted by the philosopher, because it is a mental energy that stands out in bolder relief, and with more absolute reality, than the common dream, which is very often so shadowy in its outline, so faint and fugitive, as to vanish and disappear the moment the opening eye awakes to the brighter realities of life. Like a ghost, it vanishes at cock-crow: but here is an instance of active power working to the full as finely and as forcibly, without the assistance of the corporeal powers, as it could with them, and leaving its product permanently to be seen. "Could we (says Mr. Bakewell), establish the fact of the mind operating entirely apart from matter, we should be able at once to dispose of the whole question; but our very limited faculties will not permit us to penetrate into the sub tile properties of abstract etherial essences. Though the phenomena of dreams and of spectral illusions do not represent the perceptive faculties to be capable of acting when separated altogether from the corporeal machine, yet we conceive that the moofs which they exhibit of the agency of the perceptive powers, not only without the aid of the organs of sensation, but in direct opposition to the impressions which those organs convey to the brain, are sufficient to establish the abstract independence of the mind." We are thus arrived at the conclusion of the argument; the leading positions of which, the author observes, which he had to establish, were 1. That the living principle exists prior to, and is therefore not conse. quent on, animal organization. 2. That the sentient and thinking principles are distinct from the material substances with which they are united. 3. That the intellectual powers of man exist independently of the system of material organization by which they are developed. We have, we trust, shown the interest and pleasure we have felt in accompanying Mr. Bakewell, and the attention we have paid to his volume; in which philosophical trains of thought are accompanied by a close and logical method of argumentation. In one respect, however, we think he has gone a step beyond what was necessary for him to do, in order to complete his position. That mind is different from matter, that the soul is not the result of the organization of the body,-that was his position which it was necessary to prove, as far as the limits of our knowledge would permit: but that, therefore, the mind hereafter will act without being united to a material substance, we see no reason for granting. It surely is making a difficult and mysterious subject, more difficult without sufficient cause. We may venture to imagine, how, in another state of existence, the mind may exist with a body of a different organization,-other senses perhaps; or the same senses enlarged, heightened, rarefied-or that a sort of intuitive power may supersede reasoning and the slow formation of judgments; and that a body of superior powers may also be a more enlarged and fit dwelling for an enno bled mind, that we can conceive: but neously after its earthly separation: but in this latter case, would not this be an anticipation of the final judgment; or in other words, would not judgment be already passed? We shall only add, also, as to this part of Mr. Bakewell's argument, that there is no reason to suppose any disembodied spirit existing in the universe, except the Deity, that the angelic beings, the highest in order of glory we know, are described always as with glorified bodies of great power and capacity of action; bodies adapted to their capacious intellects, and their extensive knowledge, their high employments, and their illustrious being; and therefore it is most logical and most reasonable to suppose, and under the shadow of Scripture most reverential and right, to presume, not that the mind hereafter will act without the body, like a bird flying from its cage, but that the body in another state will not be a clog and hindrance to the energies of the mind, as it is here, but will be the goodly palace, where it may dwell in its supreme sovereignty; by its enlarged powers of action, through the senses and otherwise, enabling the mind to receive constant accessions of knowledge, goodness, and happiness. Can we, either by reason or revelation, go further than this? A Treatise on the Law of Adulterine Bastardy; with a report of the Banbury case, and of all other cases bearing upon the subject. By Sir Harris Nicolas, K. C.M.G. Lond. 8vo. 1836. pp. 588. WE are always pleased to meet Sir Harris Nicolas, in any part of the wide field over which he extends his labours; how wide that field is may be learnt from the list of his works, appended to the present volume. We often differ from him in opinion; his premises often lead us to conclusions very wide from those at which he himself arrives; but we never rise from any of his works without something like admiration for the hearty manner in which he plunges headlong into his subject, the diligence he uses in placing it fully before his reader, and the honesty with which he states his own inferences, be they right or wrong. If he sometimes encumbers us with unnecessary details, he at least makes amends by presenting us with handsome-looking volumes; and, in the present instance, we may add, with a good index. There are few periods of our history upon which he has not thrown some additional light, and few indeed of our historical students whom he has not benefited by his labours. Upon the present occasion, he has devoted himself to a subject of very high importance; being connected with that bond which is the element of society, the source of all the domestic charities, the mother of the world, which preserves kingdoms and fills cities, and churches, and heaven itself.' (Jeremy Taylor, Sermon on the Marriage Ring). Much of his work is professional, and into that the nature of our Miscellany forbids us to enter, further than to direct the attention of the profession to his remarks upon Foxcroft's case. His antiquarian knowledge has there been brought to bear upon a legal question with great ingenuity and success. But his work takes a far higher range than that which belongs to a mere point of professional learning. It affects interests which are interwoven with the very existence of society, and equally touches upon the rights of property and of marriage, those two great institutions, out of which arise all the duties we owe to our neighbour. According to the ancient law of England, the paternity of a husband was presumed, except in certain impossible cases. 'Pater est quem nuptie demonstrant,' was the unbending rule of law, except in the cases alluded to. Shakspeare, who has already been made an authority upon almost every subject, presents the law so clearly, that we cannot forbear to quote him. "Sirrah, your brother is legitimate; Your father's wife did after wedlock bear him: And, if she did play false, the fault was hers; King John, act I. sc. 1. The first limitation of this hard rule seems to have been that the exceptions were extended to all impossible cases. Recently they have been extended still further by judicial decisions, and the law may now be stated to stand thus. That marriage affords a |