morally-good action, whatever be the results, we say, 'How good he is!'

The Utilitarian does not recognise this twofold distinction. He He says the morally-good is an emanation of the pragmatically-good, and the ultimate test of the morally-good cannot be left to a personal, vacillating feeling, but lies in the results of the action.

The difference between the two may be summed up epigrammatically :—

The Utilitarian, the Hedonist, etc., says: The Good is the good for (me, humanity, the majority, etc.)

The other says: The Good is the good conviction which is in harmony with the supreme ethical law.

Ethics, therefore, in defining the nature of the good, becomes a guide to conduct.

Esthetics.

Esthetics deals with things inasmuch as they call forth in us the feelings of beauty. If we regard things in the light of our desires, of our interest, we should not be likely to discover their beauty; we should not be likely to find in them those attributes of beauty which would be accorded to them by all people. There would be no uniformity of opinion whatever, and we could never approach a science of the laws governing beauty. Opinions would be as different as human interests are, which latter, luckily for us, do not converge upon the same point. In judging a chair according to comfort, one would disapprove of its straight back, another would dislike its long legs, still another

would find that the seat was not sufficiently slanting, and so on. But when viewed æsthetically, i.e. disinterestedly, merely in regard to the beauty and harmony of its form, every one with normally human senses would admire the roundness of the curved arms, the fine lines of the carving, the delicate design of the embroidered coverings. And this uniformity of admiration is the more guaranteed the less our individual desires and interests come into play.

The science which attempts to lay down the general laws of beauty in every form is called Esthetics. It has to deal with all the manifestations of beauty up to the present day, the whole history of art, and must also attempt to show what ought to be done in the future. Like Logic, it is to be a guide as well as a test; or rather, a guide by being a test.

Metaphysics.

Finally we come to Metaphysics. This word has suffered the most singular usage not only by the unphilosophical, but also by philosophers. It has been twisted and cramped and stretched in all directions and into all dimensions. It was first affixed to those treatises of Aristotle which came after Physics, i.e. (according to some) which goes beyond Physics, which treats of the transcendent, the supranatural. Aristotle meant it to be the science of First Principles, of the Essence of Things, and probably called it Пpóтn Φιλοσοφία, or Μέθοδος περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς πρώτης (Zeller, Philosophie der Griechen, ii. 2. 58, note). By essence

was meant that which remains of a thing after one subtracts all its physical accidents,—the pure existence. So, later, especially in the Middle Ages, Metaphysics became the Science of Being, and was called Ontology. Another view is, that certain books were called 'those following the Physics' (Tà peтà тà pνσin), because they actually did follow the treatises on Physics. This sounds like a very superficial interpretation of a fact which has been dug for far below the ground.

With us Metaphysics now means the science of the highest generalisations. It sums up all knowledge; shows us the field of the Knowable, and points to the dim regions of the Unknowable (as Mr. Spencer would term it); or (using the language of Mr. Lewes) it shows us the region of possible experience, the Empirical, and warns us against that which surpasses experience, the Metempirical. It deals with the postulates which precede all Psychology, Logic, etc. Only by force of its assumptions can we go on laying down laws of Logic. It is the groundwork of Philosophy, and treats all the other philosophical studies as special data for its supreme generalisations. Knowledge has here fulfilled its circle; for it has come to the final stage in the generalisation of experience, which exhibits at the same. time the necessary elements of all experience. When human thought has passed through all these stages of Philosophy, it is prepared to return to special investigation with far greater success. Let us represent this curriculum in the following scheme, in which a, b, c, etc., designate common thought and the special sciences

before they have passed through Philosophy, and A, B, C, etc., the same sciences after they have added their special tribute to universal knowledge, and have become philosophised, more scientific.

COMMON THOUGHT AND SPECIAL SCIENCES, before.

a b c d e f g

hi

ETC.

SECTION IV.-WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY ?

The word Philosophy is composed of two Greek words meaning 'love' and 'wisdom.'1

An object which evokes love draws us toward it, we feel the want of it and we strive towards it.

We call a man wise when he suits the proper means to the proper ends. But, in order thus to adapt means to ends, we must know the end and the means and the relation subsisting between them. And we must not be

1 An eminent contemporary philosopher, Professor Kuno Fischer of Heidelberg, is wont to begin his lectures on the History of Philosophy with this literal definition.

mistaken about the relation between things, but they must be the true representation of things and their relation, i.e. Truth. Philosophy then in its widest signification would be the Striving for Truth; though it is commonly used to signify the body of truth itself.

If

But, one may say, the essential nature of truth is, that it is one, excluding change. How then can there be a history of truth? If you have truth, then be done with it; if you cannot find it, then cease from seeking!' This conception of truth may be quite adequate for him who still believes that the earth is a plate-like body resting firmly in noble repose on something else, which again lies in noble repose, and so on; but not for him who knows that the earth revolves. there were no change, no progress, no development, no life, in fact no existence, then would this be a conceivable representation of truth. But, happily for us, there is this change, this life, this development. Nature is continually changing, new forms are continually being evolved; so the relation between things is in continual transmutation, as also the relation between things and the conceiving mind. Mind itself is also subject to evolution. I have said before, that we call him a wise man who adapts himself to his surroundings. Now, if the surroundings of man change, if he himself, by means of his reason, changes his surroundings, must not he, then, adapt himself to his environment in its new form, i.e. must he not become conscious of this changed relation? It is true, we do not know all. Nor would it be desirable. There would be no striving for truth,