reality of 'Ideas,'—nay, which recognises only them as real, and a system of philosophical theology which wishes thus to prove the existence of the Most High from the idea of God. And furthermore, Prof. Fischer has well pointed out how the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, hereditary sin and vicarious suffering, can only be held if 'humanity' have existence, i.e. if the general concept 'humanity' be real. And is not the Church an Idea? Must we not believe in its objective existence? All this tends to the proposition: general concepts, Ideas, have objective existence, are real (universalia sunt realia). This is what is called Realism as regards scholastic philosophy. But as yet it is Realism in the sense of Plato; it is Platonic Realism. Already at this early period Realism thus pronounced evoked its contrary. Roscellinus opposed Anselmus, maintaining that Ideas and General Concepts were mere names, mere common terms without objective existence (universalia sunt nomina). Here is the beginning of Nominalism. This contest between Realism and Nominalism runs through the whole of Christian philosophy, determines its different directions, and is efficient in its dissolution.

b. Aristotelian Realistic Period.

The transition from the Platonic to the Aristotelian period takes place in the monk Abelard (born 1079). Plato conceived Ideas as realities above and before individual things. Aristotle gave Ideas form, existence, only in things. The general concepts, with the second group of schoolmen, are considered as objec

tively existent, not before things, but in the thing (universalia sunt realia, non ante rem, sed in re). Before this, Aristotle had been known merely in a Latin translation of Boethius, and of his writings merely the Logic. The schoolmen and the Church had repudiated the teachings of this heathen philosopher; now he becomes legitimate, and his views of nature are adopted as totally consistent with religion. Strange to say, the writings of this great mind, which had been carefully preserved at Alexandria, came to the Christian world through the Arabian philosophers, who, in the course of historical events, had settled in Spain, and brought their learning with them from the East. Among these philosophers, well worthy of notice, the most prominent names are Avicenna and Averroes.

In spite of these suspicious antecedents Aristotle is now made the precursor of Christ' in regard to the cognition of natural subjects, as John the Baptist was with respect to divine subjects (præcursor Christi in rebus naturalibus, ut Johannes Baptista in rebus divinis). As we have seen, the world of Aristotle consisted in a vast gradation, culminating in the final aim and first cause, God. The affinity between this view of nature and Christian dogmas is evident. The great names of this period are Albertus Magnus, Thomas of Aquino, a Dominican, and Duns Scotus, a Franciscan. Scotus leads over to the last period. Thomas of Aquino, adopting the Aristotelian view of the world, considers this to be the best world possible, the result of the divine insight, i.e. necessary and determined by that insight. This is the determinalist view. Scotus shows

that this view would lead to hateful pantheism, and takes the indeterminalist view; maintaining that God's action was one totally free and arbitrary. Thus the question of Free-will again presses itself before the notice of thinkers. As Prof. Fischer has pointed out: 'If the manifestation of the Divine Will is not a necessary and rational one, then it cannot be an object of cognition, but of faith.' This is the incipient dissolution of scholastic philosophy, and leads us to the last period.

c. The Nominalistic Period.

The representative of this period is William of Occam (died 1347). The 'universalia' are in several things at the same time; nothing real can be in several things at the same time; therefore the universalia are not real. Only the individual things are real. But inasmuch as cognition depends upon names which are general, there is no cognition of the real.'1 There is but faith, and that is given in the Church. The dogmas, the existence of God, etc., cannot be proven-they must be accepted.

This we must receive.

Nothing more can be said to bring scholastic philosophy to a close, whose existence, we have before seen, depended upon the amalgamation of philosophy with theology. It has undergone a process of dissolution; but we shall presently notice other factors which essentially contributed to its extinction, and to the birth of a new era.

1 See Fischer.

CHAPTER X.

C. THE RENASCENCE.

THERE are historians who think that all historical events, all thoughts and acquirements of humanity, are amply accounted for by the merely physical, or physical and political, preceding circumstances. They forget of what influence upon politics-nay, upon the physical environments of man-are and have been the inventions of obscurely-living men, secluded monks, and ardent youths who study the laws of nature and of thought, invent the printing-press and gunpowder; who discover the hidden properties of steam and electricity, or lay down sanitary regulations, which can convert the sickly and will-less inhabitants of a district into steady, vigorous, enterprising citizens. On the other hand there are historians who consider all events as the immediate results of preconceived ideal and logical constructions. In the middle, between these two extremes, lies the true path. Of no period in history is it so difficult to ascertain the 'prior and posterior' in the vast interaction between Thought and Events, as of the Renaissance or Renascence. matter for different opinions.

H

Even its exact date is a
Some let it extend from

the thirteenth to the sixteenth century; but according to the better view its full vigour and influence extend from the second half of the fifteenth century to the middle of the sixteenth.

The Renascence is an age with a distinct and marked character of human thought in general, namely, width, universal sympathy, universal interest, universal toleration. So long as the Church maintains rigorous sway over man (to use a modern colloquial term, its prestige), it will have power to enforce its laws, to prescribe to mind the limits within which it may roam, and to exclude all other thought, at least the open pursuit of other thought. But in the period of which we are now treating, and especially in Italy, the Church had lost its claim to reverence, was standing before the eyes of the people as the hot-bed of vice, of voracity, and even frivolity. Men arose who waged open warfare against the Church, and pointed to the moral simplicity of the fathers of Christianity as opposed to the luxurious dissipation of the clergy of their own days. In Florence, Savonarola thrilled his audiences with his powerful invectives against degraded priests. Thus the negative groundwork was prepared for width and tolerance. Positively, too, all contributed to heighten the feeling of freedom and individuality. The petty republics and principalities, with their strong feeling of independence, nurtured and continually kept alive through the menacing proximity of jealous states, cultivated this feeling of individuality in the single citizen. The Church, which, like old Greek states, did not recognise individuals as such, but as members of the great Kingdom