that behalf. The court thereby decreed that the bankrupt "be forever discharged from all his debts and claims which by said act were made. provable against his estate, and which existed on the 4th day of August, 1898, on which day. the petition for adjudication was filed by him, excepting such debts, if any, as are by said act excepted from the operation of a discharge in bankruptcy." There is no claim that the discharge was invalid by reason of any of the things mentioned in chapter 3, §§ 14 and 15, of the bankruptcy act of 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3427, 3428]). The discharge did not purport to forever release the bankrupt from all his debts and liabilities, but only from all such "debts and claims" as were by said bankruptcy act "made provable against his estate." That the debt was one which might have been proved in bankruptcy proceedings against the estate of the individual partner is evident from. the whole tenor of the law, and especially from chapters 1, 3, §§ 1, 4, 30 Stat. 544, 547 (U. S. Comp. 1901, pp. 3418, 3423), chapter 3, §§ 4, 5, of that law, 30 Stat. 547 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, pp. 3423, 3424). See, also, section 16, 30 Stat. 550 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428). Indeed, subdivision "g" of said section 5 expressly provides that the court may "permit the proof of the claim against the individual estates and vice versa and may marshal the assets of the partnership estate and the individual estates so as to prevent preferences and secure the equitable distribution of the property of the several estates." The history and present status of this case differentiate it from any authority to which our attention has been called, or which a careful search has enabled us to find. Collier on Bankruptcy (5th Ed.) p. 74, § 5a. The partnership ceased to do business, and had been dissolved so far as the parties could dissolve it, in 1893. Moreover, in that year, by general assignment under the state insolvency law, the partners conveyed all their unexempt individual and firm assets to an assignee. The plaintiff has not made it appear that any such firm assets now exist. This court will not presume that they do. This case therefore does not involve any question of marshaling assets, nor of the right of the plaintiff against the firm assets or the other partner. Respondent alone appears to have been served with summons in this action. The question here presented to this court affects the judgment against him alone. It is also to be borne in mind that this is not an objection to the entry of a decree of discharge, but only to the right of the appellant to renew or extend this judgment. The entry of the judgment materially affected the nature of the claim on which it was based, so far as these proceedings are concerned. It might be that in certain contingencies this court would examine that judgment for the purpose of ascertaining what the original contract was. Such a proposition is, however, academical in this case. When the judgment was entered it became a lien on any unexempt. real estate within the county where the judgment was docketed which belonged to the defendant and respondent Wallblom, and the creditor became entitled to appropriate new rights and remedies against him in consequence. So far as this case involves that judgment, the original cause of action was merged therein. In McKittrick v. Cahoon, 89 Minn. 383, 95 N. W. 223, 62 L. R. A. 757, 99 Am. St. Rep. 606, this court held that where, by an order in bastardy proceedings, the putative father of a natural child was required to pay a monthly stipend for its support, and upon refusal a final money judgment was obtained for the total amount due, the rights of the person entitled to recover under the order of filiation were merged in the judgment, and the debt evidenced thereby was not excepted from the operation of the bankruptcy act of 1898 (section 17), although the claim on which the judgment was based, standing by itself, would not have been discharged. Such a judgment as the one here sought to be extended, filed in the bankruptcy proceedings, might, under appropriate conditions, have been paid in full or in part by the application thereto of the whole or a proper part of the funds in the hands of the respondent's trustee in separate bankruptcy proceedings. Its full discharge as an individual liability on a firm debt may accordingly be had in bankruptcy proceedings. Jarecki Mfg. Co. v. McElwaine, 5 Am. Bankr. R. 751, 107 Fed. 249; Curtis v. Woodward, 58 Wis. 499, 17 N. W. 328, 46 Am. Rep. 647. Collier in his note to In re Freund, 1 Am. Bankr. R. p. 31, says: "Both on principle and by the weight of authority it would seem to be law that a discharge granted to one member of the firm releases him from all his provable debts and liabilities, both from those incurred individually and from those incurred as a member of the partnership. The few cases which held to the contrary under the former act seem to have been based upon a misconception of the extent of the rights of an assignee in the bankrupt's property, and as to the effect upon the firm of the bankruptcy of one member." In Re Meyers (D. C.) 96 Fed. 408, relied upon by appellant, upon an objection to discharge on the ground of fraud, there were independent and merely individual proceedings by the two partners. The petition asked for discharge of both individual and partnership debts. Brown, J., said (page 411): "No adjudication of the firm as a bankrupt is asked, nor could such an adjudication be made without formal application therefor, and the presence of both partners in the same proceedings. Where there are absolutely no firm assets, separate proceedings may be valid, and a discharge of each partner separately may possibly be had, because the firm debts are several as well as joint." Appellant also relies largely upon In re Mercur, 122 Fed. 389, 58 C. C. A. 472. That case involves an obviously different state of facts, and is in its reasoning not of necessity entirely inconsistent with the rule here applied. In the early history of partnership law, the courts fell into the habit of speaking of a partnership as "a separate entity." The inaccuracy and impropriety of such nomenclature was so clearly and re peatedly demonstrated as to lead to its substantial abandonment. Recent decisions on the marshaling of assets under the present bankruptcy law have led to the undesirable resurrection of the phrase. Its misleading and ambiguous character is well illustrated by the subtleties of appellant's brief, and by his use of it as a justification for a fallacious conclusion derived by unwarranted deductions from a fiction of law. His argument commands admiration for its ingenuity and industry, but compels the conviction that its result would be a plain perversion of the letter and purposes of the bankruptcy law. The learned trial court properly held that the discharge in bankruptcy operated as a full defense. Order affirmed.1 * 1 Corey v. Perry, 67 Me. 140, 24 Am. Rep. 15 (1877), contra. CHAPTER IX. TERMINATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP. SECTION 1.-BY ACT OF THE PARTIES. HENN v. WALSH. (Vice Chancellor's Court of New York, 1833. 2 Ed. Ch. 129.) Bill to dissolve the copartnership and for an account. An injunction had been granted. The defendant put in his answer. Crossmotions now came before the court-one, on the part of the complainant, for a receiver, and the other, by the defendant, to dissolve the injunction. The copartnership had commenced on the 1st day of May, 1833, and was to continue for five years. By the agreement between the copartners an inventory was to be made at the end of two years, and if either was then dissatisfied he was to have liberty to dissolve the firm. The complainant had put into the concern the sum of $1,000 in cash, as his part of the capital, and the goods of the defendant, with fixtures belonging to him, were taken at a like sum, after allowing for debts which he owed. The charges of misconduct in the bill were met and denied by the answer. McCOUN, V. C. A partnership agreement, like any other, is binding upon the parties, and they must adhere to its terms. Neither partner is at liberty to recede from it against the will of the other without sufficient cause. Mere dissatisfaction by one partner will not justify him in filing a bill for a dissolution, where by their express agreement it is to continue for a definite term; and this court will not interfere to dissolve the contract upon such ground. Here there was a fiveyear partnership, with the privilege of dissolving it at the end of two years. The complainant has become dissatisfied; and he makes various charges in his bill, showing prima facie cause enough for a dissolution before the stipulated time. But his allegations are positively and fully denied in the answer. As the matter now stands the complainant's case fails, and he would not be entitled on the hearing to a decree for a dissolution-consequently not to an injunction or receiver in the meantime. If there be any breach of covenants by one partner, which in its consequences would be so important as to authorize the party complaining to call for a dissolution before the copartnership could be dissolved by efflux of time, the complainant may then have an injunction. Gow, 135. There must be some actual abuse of the partnership property or of the rights of a copartner, and not a mere temptation to such abuse, which will induce this court to interfere. Glassington v. Thwaites, 1 S. & S. 124. * * * The injunction must be dissolved, and the motion for a receiver denied. SOLOMON v. KIRKWOOD et al. (Supreme Court of Michigan, 1884. 55 Mich. 256, 21 N. W. 336.) COOLEY, C. J. The plaintiffs, who are in the city of Chicago dealers in jewelry, seek to charge the defendants as partners upon a promissory note for $791.92, bearing date of November 9, 1882, and signed "Hollander & Kirkwood." The note was given by the defendant Hollander, but Kirkwood denies that any partnership existed between the defendants at the date of the note. The evidence given on the trial tends to show that on July 6, 1882, Hollander & Kirkwood entered into a written agreement for a partnership for one year from the 1st day of the next ensuing month in the business of buying and selling jewelry, clocks, watches, etc., and in repairing clocks, watches, and jewelry, at Ishpeming, Mich. Business was begun under this agreement, and continued until the latter part of October, 1882, when Kirkwood, becoming dissatisfied, locked up the goods and excluded Hollander altogether from the business. He also caused notice to be given to all persons with whom the firm had had dealings that the partnership was dissolved, and had the following inserted in the local column of the paper published at Ishpeming: "The copartnership heretofore existing between Mr. C. H. Kirkwood and one Hollander, as jewelers, has ceased to exist; Mr. Kirkwood having purchased the interest of the latter." This was not signed by any one. A few days later Hollander went to Chicago, and there, on November 9, 1882, he bought, in the name of Hollander & Kirkwood, of the plaintiffs goods in their line amounting to $791.92, and gave to the plaintiffs therefor the promissory note now in the suit. The note was made payable December 15, 1882, at a bank in Ishpeming. When the purchase was completed, Hollander took away the goods in his satchel. The plaintiffs had before had no dealings with Hollander & Kirkwood, but they had heard there was such a firm, and were not aware of its dissolution. They claim to have made the sale in good faith and in the belief that the firm was still in existence. On the other hand, Kirkwood claimed that Hollander and the plaintiffs had conspired together to defraud him by a pretended sale to the firm of goods which the plaintiffs knew Hollander intended to appropriate exclusively to himself; and he was allowed to prove declarations of Hol |