Smith, and I think stands upon the fair ground of reason." This covers the case of one taking profits, as such, from the partnership property or the firm, but has no relation to a case where the profits are first to be earned and received by one person before the other can have any claim upon any part thereof. No action would lie against the firm in favor of Snyder. If the firm earned profits, Snyder could not compel a division; for in the general profits of the firm he has no interest. There is no privity between himself and the firm; and, if he sued Strang and Platt, he could recover only on showing that they had received profits. That they were earned would not be sufficient. He has no claim against the Arm, or cause of action as principal. He must make out his case through Strang and Platt, and this consideration alone would seem to be a decisive answer to the plaintiff's demand; for the plaintiff claims by virtue of the agreement, and not because Snyder has done. anything to induce the plaintiff to deposit his money with the firm, relying on his responsibility or his relation to the firm. We are of opinion that the plaintiff, on the facts found by the referee, has no cause of action against the defendant Snyder, and that the judgment should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.1 * 串 1 "Mining partnerships as distinct associations, with different rights and liabilities attaching to their members from those attaching to members of ordinary trading partnerships, exist in all mining communities. In Skillman V. Lachman, 23 Cal. 198, 83 Am. Dec. 96, the Supreme Court of California said that. 'whatever may be the rights and liabilities of tenants in common of a mine, not being worked, it is clear that, where several owners unite and co-operate in working the mine, then a new relation exists between them, and to a certain extent they are governed by the rules relating to partnerships. They form what is termed a "mining partnership," which is governed by many of the rules relating to ordinary partnerships, but also by some rules peculiar to itself, one of which is that one person may convey his interest in the mine and business without dissolving the partnership.' Associations for working mines are generally composed of a greater number of persons than ordinary partnerships; and it was early seen that the continuous working of a mine, which is essential to its successful development, would be impossible, or at least attended with great difficulties, if an association was to be dissolved by the death or bankruptcy of one of its members, or the assignment of his interest. A different rule from that which governs the relations of members of a trading partnership to each other was therefore recognized as applicable to the relations to each other of members of a mining association. The delectus personæ, which is essential to constitute an ordinary partnership, has no place in this mining association." Per Field, J., in Kahn v. Smelting Co., 102 U. S. 641, 645, 26 L. Ed. 266 (1880). SECTION 2.-COMPETENCY OF PARTIES. HOAGLIN v. C. M. HENDERSON & CO. (Supreme Court of Iowa, 1903. 119 Iowa, 720, 94 N. W. 247, 61 L. R. A. 756, 97 Am. St. Rep. 335.) MCCLAIN, J. The nature of the controversy involved in this case, and the questions of law arising therein, will be better understood from a brief narrative of the facts as shown in the evidence: H. A. Hoaglin had been engaged in business at Mt. Pleasant, and in January, 1900, sold out his business; receiving therefor a sum in cash entirely insufficient to pay the indebtedness contracted by him in conducting his business. Being without other property or resources, he proceeded to settle with his creditors, who were pressing for payment of their respective claims, by paying to each a portion of the indebtedness; taking receipts in full for the respective claims. It does not appear that these settlements were made on any uniform basis, or in pursuance of any agreement for compensation with creditors. In some instances about one-third of the claims were paid; in other instances, more. One of these creditors was the defendant firm, and through their attorney they accepted one-third of their claim, and receipted in full for the entire amount. Thereupon H. A. Hoaglin, with his wife, who had previously been conducting a millinery business in her own. name in connection with the business carried on by H. A. Hoaglin, removed to Ottumwa, and, as it is contended, entered into a contract to carry on a partnership business under the name of H. A. Hoaglin. This alleged firm was without other assets than $250 of the wife's money, and $500 borrowed by husband and wife on their joint note from the wife's sister. With this sum of money in hand, H. A. Hoaglin, without disclosing the fact that he was acting as member of the alleged firm, or that his acts were done otherwise than in his individual capacity, ordered through one Meades, the traveling agent for defendant firm, a bill of goods amounting to $1,000; paying $575 by draft delivered to said Meades, and proposing to pay the balance on time. The order contemplated the immediate shipment of the goods from defendants' place of business, in Chicago, to H. A. Hoaglin, at Ottumwa. Meades, having no authority to accept an order forwarded. the order to defendants for acceptance and approval, accompanied by the draft, whereupon defendants refused to accept the order, and notified Hoaglin that they would retain so much of the money as was necessary to satisfy the balance of their previous indebtedness against him, and would pay over to him, or furnish him goods for, the surplus. Thereupon Hoaglin and wife, suing as partners, brought this action to recover from defendants the amount of money represented by the draft delivered by Hoaglin to Meades for defendants, and ap propriated by defendants to their own use. The suit, as originally brought, was by attachment, and notice was by publication, but defendants entered an appearance and secured, the dismissal of the attachment by giving bond to pay the amount of any judgment rendered. The case was presented to the jury in the lower court on the theory that if the evidence showed Hoaglin and wife to have been partners, and the money paid by Hoaglin to Meades to have been partnership funds, then the attempted application by defendants of the money received through Meades to the satisfaction of the individual debt of Hoaglin was improper, and plaintiffs, as partners, were entitled to recover the entire amount so paid; and counsel for appellants present the question whether husband and wife can be partners, contending that there was no lawful partnership, and that the money paid by Hoaglin was his own money, out of which defendants had a right to recoup themselves to the extent of Hoaglin's previous indebtedness to them. We shall not stop to consider the question whether the acceptance by defendants from Hoaglin of a part of his previous indebtedness, under the agreement that the entire indebtedness should thereby be discharged, constituted an accord and satisfaction, but shall proceed at once to determine whether a legal partnership between husband and wife can exist in this state. The common-law rule that married women cannot enter into a contract of partnership seems to be based on their incapacity at common law to contract for any purpose. Collyer on Partnership (5th Am. Ed.) § 15; Parsons on Part. § 19; Weisiger v. Wood, 36 S. C. 424, 15 S. E. 597; De Graum v. Jones, 23 Fla. 83, 6 South, 925. The power of a married woman to enter into a contract of partnership, if it exists at all in any of the states in which the common-law system prevails, must depend upon statutory authority; and in several cases the question has been considered as to whether particular statutory enlargements of the powers of married women as to contracting and managing their separate property have rendered them competent to enter into partnership relations. Thus it has been held that authority to acquire, hold, and dispose of property as a separate estate will sustain a contract of partnership made by a married woman with a person other than her husband. Abbott v. Jackson, 43 Ark. 212. And undoubtedly the general power to contract which is conferred upon married women in some states would support a contract of partnership. But on the question whether the statutes extending the powers. of married women with reference to the making of contracts and the ownership and disposition of separate property confer the power to enter into the relation of a business partnership with the husband, the courts seem to be somewhat at variance, not only on account of differences in terms of the statutes in which the power is conferred, but also on account of differences of opinion as to the bearing of rules of public policy. In Massachusetts it is said that authority to buy and sell and enter into contract with reference to her personal property, to carry on trade, and to sue and be sued, does not involve power to enter into a partnership with the husband. Lord v. Parker, 3 Allen, 127. To same effect in states where the statutes give a married woman the right to control and contract with reference to her property, see Payne v. Thompson, 44 Ohio St. 192, 5 N. E. 654; Fuller v. McHenry, 83 Wis. 573, 53 N. W. 896, 18 L. R. A. 512; Haas v. Shaw, 91 Ind. 384, 46 Am. Rep. 607; Artman v. Ferguson, 73 Mich. 146, 40 N. W. 907, 2 L. R. A. 343, 16 Am. St. Rep. 572; Gwynn v. Gwynn, 27 S. C. 525, 4 S. E. 229; Gilkerson-Sloss Commission Co. v. Salinger, 56 Ark. 294, 19 S. W. 747, 16 L. R. A. 526, 35 Am. St. Rep. 105. In other states, statutes to substantially the same effect have been held to so far enlarge the legal capacity of a married woman as to authorize her not only to enter into a partnership contract in general, but specifically to enter into such contract with her husband. Toof v. Brewer (Miss.) 3 South. 571; Suau v. Caffe, 122 N. Y. 303, 25 N. E. 488, 9 L. R. A. 593. It has been held, however, that where the statutes not only confer the right to own and contract with reference to her separate property, but also the general power to contract, the wife may not only enter into business partnership relations in general, but also specifically with her own husband, and this is said not to be contrary to any dictate of public policy. Burney v. Grocery Co., 98 Ga. 711, 25 S. E. 915, 58 Am. St. Rep. 342; Lane v. Bishop, 65 Vt. 575, 27 Atl. 499. And see Bernard & Leas Mfg. Co. v. Calvin, 12 C. C. A. 123, 64 Fed. 309. The question of public policy involved in these statutory enlargements of the powers and liabilities of married women must be determined with reference to the general tenor of the statutory provisions on the subject as they have been found in the different states. In this state, under the provisions of Code, §§ 3153, 3164, which give to married women the right to acquire, own, and dispose of property in the same manner and to the same extent as their husbands may do, and to make contracts and incur liabilities which may be enforced by or against them to the same extent and in the same manner as if they were unmarried, it is not open to question that a wife may become surety for her husband, and be liable generally on such contract of suretyship, may become the general creditor of her husband, may be joint owner of property with him, and may be his agent, or may make him her agent, in the transaction of business. Citation of authorities to support these propositions would be wholly unnecessary. These unquestioned powers of a married woman in this state to deal with her husband would seem to cover all the powers and liabilities involved in entering into or continuing the relation of partner with her husband. The essential characteristics of a partnership seem to be joint ownership of property, and authority of each partner to bind the other partners by his acts with reference to the partnership property, and also to impose upon the other partnership liability. As these relations may be separately sustained between husband and wife, we see no reason why they may not be collectively created by entering |