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of the nature of true virtue. But if any think, that natural
affectičn is more properly to be referred to a particular in-
stinct of nature, than to self love, as its cause, I shall not think
it a point worthy of any controversy or dispute. In my opin-
ion, both are true, viz. that natural affection is owing to nat-
üral instinct, and also that it arises from self love. It may be
said to arise from instinct, as it depends on a law of nature.
But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from
self lóve, because, though it arises from a law of nature, yet
that is such a law as according to the order and harmony ev-
ery where observed among the laws of nature, is connected
with, and follows from self love, as was shëwn before. How
ever, it is not necessary to my present purpose, to insist on
this. For if it be so, that natural affection to a man's chil-
dren or family, or near relations, is not properly to be ascribed
to selflové, ás its cause, in any respect, but is to be esteemed
an affection arising from a particular independent instinct of
nature, which the Creator ini his wisdom has implanted in
men fot the preservation and well being of the world of man-
kind, yet it canńot be of the nature of trúe virtue. For it has
been observed, and I humbly' conceive, proved before (Chap.
II.) that if any Being or Beings have by natural instinct, or
any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence, ex-
tending only to some particular persons, or private system,
however large that system may be, or however great a num.
ber of individuals it may contain, so long as it contains but an
infinitely small part of universal existence, and so bears no
proportion to this great and universal system.....such limited
private benevolence, not arising from, nor being subordinate
to benevolence to Being in general, cannot have the nature of
true virtue.
However, it


not be amiss briefly to observe now, that it is evident to a demonstration, those affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue, from these two things.

First, That they do not arise from a principle of virtue...... A principle of virtue, I think, is owned by the most considerable of late writers on morality to be general benevolence or VOL. II.

3 I

public affection : And I think it has been proved to be unioni of heart to Being simply considered ; whịch implies a dispod sition to benevolence to Being in general. Now by the supposition, the affections we are speaking of do not arise from this principle; and that, whether we suppose they arise from self love, or from particular instincts; because either of those sources is diverse from a principle of general benevqlence. And,

Secondly, These private affections, if they do not arise from general benevolence, and they are not connected with it in their first existence, have no tendency to produce it. This appears from what has been observed : For being pot de pendent on it, their detached and unsubordinate operation rather tends to, and implies opposition to Being in general, than general benevolence; as every one sees and owns with respect to self love. And there are the very same reasons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely short of yniyersal existence, should have that inflyence, as well as love that is confined to a single person, New upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections which do not arise from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to trụe virtụes as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

For the reasons which haye been given, it is undeniably true, that if persons by any means come to have a benevolent affection limited to a party that is very large, or to the coun. try or nation in general, of which they are a part, or the pub lic community they belong to, though it be as large as the Roman empire was of old, yea, if there could be an instiņct or other cause determining a person to benevolence towards the whole world of mankind, or even all created sensible natures throughout the universe, exclusive of union of heart to general existence and of love to God, nor derived from that temper of mind which disposes to a supreme regard to him, nor subordinate to such divine love, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

If what is called natural affection, arises from a particular natural instinct, so, much more indisputably, does that mutual


Affection which naturally arises between the sexes. I agree with Hutcheson and Hume in this, that there is a foundation Taid in nature for kind affections between the sexes, that are truly diverse from all inclinations to sensitive pleasure, and do not properly arise from any such inclination. There is doubtþess a disposition both to a mutual benevolence and mutua! cómplacence, that are not naturally and necessarily connected with any sensitive desires. But yet it is manifest such affections as are limited to opposite sexes, are from a particular instinct, thus directing and limiting them; and not arising from a principle of general benevolence ; for this has no tendenty to any suchi limitation. And though these affections do not properly arise from the sensitive desires which are between the sexes, yet they are implanted by the Author of natürė chiefly for the same purpose, viz. the preservation or continuation of the world of mankind, to make persons willing to forsake father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and brought up, for the sake of a stated union with a companion of the other sex, and to dispose to that union in bearing and going through with that series of labors, anxieties, and pains requisite to the Being, support and education of a family of children. Though not only for these ends, but partly also for the comfort of mankiña as united in a marriage relation. But I suppose, few (if any) will deny, that the peculiar natural dispositions there are tö mutual affection bëtween thie'sexes, arise from an instinct or particular law of nature. And therefore it is manifest fïòím what has been said already, that those natural dispositionis cannot be of the nature of true' virtue.

Another affection which is owing to a particular instinct, implanted in men for like purposes with other instincts, is that pity which is natural to mankind, when they see others in great distress. It is acknowledged, that such ati affection is natural to mankind. But I think it evident, that the pity which is general'anid natural; is owing to a particular instinct, and' is not of the nature of true vịrtue. I am far from saying, that there is no such thing as a' trúly virtuous pity among maħkitid. For I'ai far from thinking, that all the pity of

mercy which is any where to be found among them, arises merely from natural instinct, or, that none is to be found, which arises from that truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to sensitive Beings. Yet at the same time I think, this is not the case with all pity, or with that disposią. tion to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think I may be bold to say, this does not arise from general beneva olence, nor is truly of the nature of benevolence, or properly, called by thạt name.

If all that uneasiness on the sight of others extreme distréss, which we call pity, were properly of the nature of benévolence, then they who are the subjects of this passion, must needs be in a degree of uneasiness in being sensible of the total want of happiness, of all such as they would be dis; posed to pity in extreme distress. For thąt certainly is the most direct tendency and operation of benevolence or good will, to desire the happiness of its object. But now this is not the case universally, where men are disposed to exercise pity. There are many men, with whom that is the case in respect to some others in the world, that it would not be the occasion of their being sensibly affected with any uneasiness, to know they were dead (yea men who are not influenced by the consideration of a future state, bụt view death as only a cessation of all sensibility, and consequently an end of all happiness) who yet would have been moved with pity towards the same persons, if they hạd seen them under some very extreme an. guish. Some men would be moved with pity by seeing a brutė creature under extreme and long torments, who yet suffer no uneasiness in knowing that many thousands of them every day cease to live, and so have an end put to all their pleasure, at butchers shambles in great cities. It is the nature of true benevolence to desite and rejoice in the prosper, ity and pleasure of the object of it'; and that, in some proportion to its degree of prevalence. But persons may greatly pity those that are in extreme pain, whose positive pleasure they may still be very indifferent about. In this case a man may be much moved and affected with uneasiness, who yet would be affected with no sensible joy in seeing signs of the

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same person's or Being's enjoyment of very high degrees of pleasure.

Yea, pity may not only be without benevolence, but may consist with true malevolence, or with such ill will as shall cause men not only not to desire the positive happiness of an other, but even to desire his calamity. They may pity such an one when his calamity goes beyond their hatred. A man. may have true malevolence towards another, desiring no pose' itive good for him, but evil; and yet his hatred not be infinite, but only to a certain degree. And when he sees the person whom he thus hates, in misery far beyond his ill will, he may then pity him ; because then the natural instinct begins to operate. For malevolence will not overcome the natural instinct, inclining to pity others in extreme calamity, any fur.. ther than it goes, or to the limits of the degree of misery it wishes to its object. Men may pity others under exquisite torment, when yet they would have been grieved if they had seen their prosperity. And some men have such a grudge against one or another, that they would be far from being uneasy at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it. And when this is the case with them, it is manifest that their heart is void of benevolence towards such persons, and under the power of malevolence. Yet at the same time they are capable of pitying even these very persons, if they should see them under a degree of misery very much disproportioned to their ill will.

These things may convince us that natural pity is of a nature very different from true virtue, and not arising from a disposition of heart to general benevolence; but is owing to a particular instinct, which the Creator has implanted in mankind, for the same purposes as most other instincts, viz.chiefly for the preservation of mankind, though not exclusive of their well being. The giving of this instinct is the fruit of God's mercy, and an instance of his love of the world of mapkind, and an evidence that though the world be so sinful, it is not God's design to make it a world of punishment; and therefore has many ways made a merciful provision for men's relief in extreme calamities : And among others has given

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