discoveries of revelation. It is not, indeed, contended that these truths were, in the first instance, reasoned out by the human mind, left altogether to its own resources. The history of our race suggests a different conclusion; and surely, assuming the existence of an intelligent Author of nature and Ruler of mankind, there is no antecedent improbability in His revealing Himself to men, but very much to suggest that He would do so. Bishop Butler, in the first Part of his invaluable work, which treats of the Analogy of Natural Religion to the constitution and course of Nature, expressly guards against the supposition that the truths which it embraces were originally discovered by human reasoning. As there is no hint or intimation in history,' he says, 'that this system was first reasoned out; so there is express historical or traditional evidence, as ancient as history, that it was taught first by revelation.' '* In the second Part of his work he reverts to the subject: There does not appear the least intimation in history or tradition, that religion was first reasoned out; but the whole of history and tradition makes for the other side, that it came into the world by revelation.'†

6

Again, it is not assumed that every man may now reason out for himself the great fundamental truths which lie at the basis of religion; but only that the nature of man and the constitution of the world around us really afford sufficient ground for the acceptance and firm belief of these truths, even independently of revelation. We may again quote the words of Bishop Butler: It is impossible to say who would have been able to have reasoned out that whole system which we call natural religion, in its genuine simplicity, clear of superstition; but there is certainly no ground to affirm that the generality could: if they could, there is no sort of probability that they would.'‡

What, then, are the fundamental truths of natural religion? They are the existence of God, the spiritual nature of man, * 'Analogy,' Part I., ch. vi. † 'Analogy,' Part II., ch. ii. 'Analogy,' Part II., ch. i.

the fact that we are placed under a moral administration, and a future state of rewards and punishments. These are the subjects which we propose first to consider, regarding them in the light shed on them by our own consciousness and by the world around us; and then we may advance to the clearer and ampler discoveries of the Christian revelation.

CHAPTER II.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD-THE ARGUMENT FROM THE GENERAL CONSENT OF MANKIND, AND FROM THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNIVERSE.

THE primary truth of religion is the existence of God, the

living Personal God, who stands in most intimate relations to us, and, indeed, to the whole universe of being. What is the evidence, we have to ask, apart from revelation, on which this truth reposes ?

In replying to this, we would put aside that which has been termed the à priori argument, as wholly inconclusive and unsatisfactory. It is surely not for us to attempt to demonstrate by antecedent considerations the necessity of the Divine existence. We must rest on other proofs suggested by our experience and observation.

One of these is the common consent of mankind. The fact of this consent has sometimes been called in question; and it must be admitted that there have been some, in almost every age, who have denied the existence of an intelligent and almighty Author of nature. But the instances are comparatively rare; and even when there has not been a distinct apprehension of God in His essential perfections, there has been an impression of a Power above us on which we are dependent. Bishop Ellicott, in his valuable little work entitled 'Six Addresses on the Being of God,' has quoted the following passage from a distinguished man of science, M. de Quatrefages:- Obliged, in my course of instruction, to review all human races, I have sought atheism in the lowest

as well as the highest; I have nowhere met with it, except in individuals, or in more or less limited schools, such as those which existed in Europe in the last century, or which may still be seen at the present day.'

*

Assuming, then, as we are authorised to do, that the human mind is so constituted that it readily embraces, and even turns to, the idea of God, let us reflect on the evidential value of this fact. We do not put it forward as of itself conclusive; but we contend that it possesses great weight, and should not be lightly passed over by any serious inquirer into this great subject. Canon Liddon properly remarks, 'The idea or presentiment of God, everywhere rooted in the mind of man, is a fact sufficiently important to be treated as something better than a superstition by those who put forward any serious doctrine about human nature. A mental fact is as worthy of attention as any fact which can be appraised in a chemical laboratory or on the roof of an observatory. Cicero's statement that there is no nation so barbarous and wild as not to have believed in some divinity, is still, notwithstanding certain apparent exceptions, true. A nation of pure atheists is yet to be discovered. Unworthy and degraded as are many of the beliefs on the subject of a Higher Power that are to be found in the heathen world, some groping after the great Unseen, some tentative intuition, some shadowy belief there is to be found always and everywhere. Man thinks of a Higher Power as naturally as he thinks of the world around him, or of himself. . . . The spontaneous activity of his consciousness brings with it, contains in itself, the thought of ONE who is greater, if not also stronger, wiser, better than all else; and that man should thus think of Him is of itself a presumption that He really exists.'†

From this consideration we pass to the argument founded on the existence and general constitution of the universe around us, and of which we form a part. Three questions, as Bishop * Address II., p. 45.

†Some Elements of Religion,' Lecture II., pp. 49–51.

Ellicott has pointed out, force themselves on our attention. The first is, What was the beginning of the material world? In the case of this earth,' he remarks, science is now ever more and more distinctly presenting to us the idea of a beginning of its existence, and that, too, at a time by no means so boundlessly remote as it was once the habit of philosophy to assume. And this consideration, in the present position of the general argument, and especially in connection with the subject of Efficient Causation, will be found to be of the most serious moment. If there be a real beginning, the question at once arises, How, by whom, or by what, did that beginning take place? It must have been by an agency external to what was begun. There must have been something that gave the first start; for of all truths this is the most certain and indisputable, that in the realm of the inorganic world there is no such thing as self-originated force, any more than there is self-originated motion. . . . . The more distinctly that science demonstrates that, however far we may go backward, we must still come to a definite movement which must be called a beginning, the more distinctly does the question press itself home upon the mindWhat was the true and efficient cause of that beginning? How did it originate? The difficulty of the question is not in the slightest degree removed, nay, it is not even attenuated, by tracing back the history of matter to its earliest and most primordial condition. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, the general truth of the nebular hypothesis; let us suppose that we have gone backward into the depths of the eternity a parte ante, and are contemplating the primordial state, not of our solar system only, but of the whole material universe; and let us suppose that we find it to be that which science frequently assumes it to have been,―highly diffused yet homogeneous nebulosity. Of this we are told there are decided scientific indications. . . . Well, and what then? Why this, that if there is to be any connection between that past and this present, some action must have taken place, however rudimental, which initiated change, and gave the first impulse to that primary

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