Much of this kind of reasoning, if it be reasoning rather than loose talk, comes through strong feeling, and an overshooting of truth (hyperbole) very rife and some times harmful and unfair to men.

9. Many-headed or chain-headed rede-ship (sorites), is one with several step-heads, every following one from the latter step-end of the former, as—

'A. is akin to B.'

'B. is akin to C.'

'C. is akin to D.'
'D. is akin to John.'

'John is akin to A.'

So-put rede-ships (syllogismi hypothetici). A so-put rede-ship is one of which the first step is a twin-step, or one of a hinge-step and a hank-step, of which the truth. hangs on that of the hinge-step, as—

'If John is man-he is breathesome.'

'If John is speaksome—he is man'; so
'If John is speaksome—he is breathesome.'

The hinge untrowed and the hank trowed—

'If ye ask' (I trow not whether ye will or no) then
'Ye shall receive' (I trow).

The hinge put as true though trowedly untrue, and

the hank one trowed

'If ye asked' (as I trow you do not), then

'Ye would receive' (I trow).

'If a dog is a huntsome beast, he has holding teeth';

But 'the dog is a huntsome beast,' therefore

'He has holding-teeth.'

'It is day or it is night';

'It is not day'; therefore

'It is night.'

10. Law-tracking (inductio), a tracking of the laws of nature, or of an all-common truth from the cases that happen under it.

As if man should have seen that this and that thrush with many thrushes, onward, one after another, plastered the inside of her nest, and thence should take it as a law of bird-life that the thrush plasters its nest.

11. Understanding (conditiones) of thought-puttings, or the understanding with which they are put. Of every one, as

'Man (is breathesome),'

which is true of all men of all time.

'A triangle (is a figure of three sides).'

Here the speech-matter is a formarking of the speechthing.

'Man is laughsome.'

Here neither end is a formarking of the other.

'Man is,'

where the speech-matter is not as to what man is, but of his being only, that he is.

When the cause is told of its outcome

'He died stabbed,'

and other cases.

12. Questions and proofs. Questions are

Whether a thing be, and

Why it may be.

What it may be, and

Wherefrom it may be.

Demonstrations, proofs (demonstrationes), may be :

Unstraitened or unbounded, as

'Every man is breathesome.'

Straitened, as

'Some man is learned.'

Ayesome or naysome, and others.

In-wit rede-steps.

(Syllogismi topici.) In-wit rede-ships are such as are grounded on thought-puttings which are holden or allowed as by the common faith, or in-wit (conscience), or main opinion of men, or mankind, as that—

or that

'Honesty is the best policy,'

'Lying is shameful,'

or on the commonly holden laws of civility, or calls of generosity, or common maxims.

Two-horned rede-ship.

(Dilemma, from di, dis, two, lemma, a catching) is a case of rede-ship in which a man must allow one of two thought-puttings, both of which are evenly harmful to him, as the claimant to the Tichborne lands swore that he was Sir Roger Tichborne, but that he had never written a letter to Lady Doughty, to whom it has now been shown that the true Sir Roger wrote a great many letters.

D

He must either be Sir Roger Tichborne or not.

If he is, he is guilty of perjury in that he swore he never wrote the letters. If he is not, he is guilty of perjury in that he swore that he was Sir Roger.

A dilemma:

'24 And Jesus answered and said unto them, I also

will ask you one thing, which if ye tell me, I in like wise

will tell you by what authority I do these things.

'25 The baptism of John, whence was it? from heaven, or of men? And they reasoned with themselves, saying, If we shall say, From heaven; he will say unto us, Why did ye not then believe him?

'26 But if we shall say, Of men; we fear the people; for all hold John as a prophet.

'27 And they answered Jesus and said, We cannot tell.'-Matt. xx.

The steads or stand-points.

(Loci) of rede-ship are those on which the first step of a rede-ship is taken, as on things already known, and are of sundry kinds.

On these steads or stand-points reason has drawn truths or beliefs (maxima) of truths, which become standpoints of rede-ship for yonder truths or beliefs: as in Euclid's Elements every proposition that is proved becomes a main step of rede-ship for the proving of a yonder one.

These truths and beliefs are from many sources, and have come to our minds in many ways; as from the happenings and behaviour of things in the world of matter and mind, and from the word of God: from the

gathered knowledge of our fore-elders, and the laws of nature, so far found as lore-seekers have found them, and from our own knowledge and from many other sources.

Of these beliefs proverbs make a great body; many of them are unshakesomely true, while some, and mainly in a back-turned shape may have flaws.

Cause and its outcome.

1. Or the outcoming of the outcome (causa et effectus) as the sun and heat, or heat and the melting of metals, or a maker and the thing made by him.

Beliefs. 1. To put the cause is to put the outcome, or the outcoming of it: to put the sun is to put heat.

2. To take away the cause is to take away the outcome or its outcoming: without heat the metal would not have melted.

This, however, ought to be given and taken warily, since to take away the melting of the metal might not be to take away all heat, of which there might have been some, but too little to melt the metal; so that the heat, as a cause, must here mean the heat that would melt the metal.

Again put the builder of a house and you put the house, the outcome from him, as his work, but to take away the builder of a finished house may not be to take away the house, though to take him away from an unfinished house would be to take away the further outcoming of the house.

3. Such as is the cause such is the outcome, and so backwardly.

'Such as is the tree such is the fruit';

not always so, though mainly true.