or can get. The original idea of the census was for the very purpose of basing the representation of the country on its results. The purpose, and the only purpose, for which a census was authorized by the Constitution, was to apportion representatives and direct taxes among the people.

Now we have the results as ascertained under the Constitution and laws, and, however imperfect they may be in the judgment of any gentleman, they form our only basis of apportionment. In my judgment, we are bound to do one of two things either to refuse to obey the Fourteenth Amendment according to the results obtained, or take the results as they come and make them the basis of apportioning representation. Now, in a table which I have received from the Census Bureau, the reductions have been made from the total populations of each State, according to the proportion of their disfranchised persons. This table gives the following information for each of the States: Total population; Male citizens of the United States, twenty-one years of age and upwards; Male citizens twenty-one years of age and upwards whose right to vote is abridged for other causes than rebellion or other crime; Representative population, etc. These are the totals under the above heads, following the same order: 38,113,253; 8,314,805; 40,380; 37,928,329.

I do not see that we have any choice. This is an official report, the report of the only tribunal that the Constitution knows in connection with this subject. If that tribunal is wrong, I will not say that we may not in any way revise it; for we could order the census of any State taken over again. But if we apportion the representatives this winter, and obey the Constitution, we cannot go outside this report upon any unofficial statistics that any individual may present, however correct such statistics may be. It seems to me that we are bound to take this report into account; and I hope this work will compel future Congresses to provide some more efficient mode for taking those statistics.

APPENDIX.

I.

LETTER TO MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANS.

[The copy here followed is the original, found in the files of the War Department.]

THROUGH the winter and spring of 1863, the Army of the Cumberland, Major-General W. S. Rosecrans commanding, had its headquarters at Murfreesborough, Tennessee. The President and the war authorities early in the spring became very anxious that the General should move against the enemy. General Garfield, who was Rosecrans's Chief of Staff, added his urgency to the urgency of the authorities at Washington. Rosecrans said he was not ready, and insisted that a forward movement would be hazardous. Finally, June 8, he sent a circular letter to the leading generals of the army calling for their views. When the replies were in, General Garfield summarized them, and stated his own views in the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
Murfreesborough, June 12, 1863.

GENERAL, In your confidential letter of the 8th instant to the corps and division commanders and generals of cavalry of this army, there were substantially five questions propounded for their consideration and answer, viz. :

1. Has the enemy in our front been materially weakened by detachments to Johnston or elsewhere?

2. Can this army advance on him at this time with strong reasonable chances of fighting a great and successful battle?

3. Do you think an advance of our army at present likely to prevent additional reinforcements being sent against General Grant by the enemy in our front?

4. Do you think an immediate advance of this army advisable? 5. Do you think an early advance advisable?

Many of the answers to these questions are not categorical, and cannot be clearly set down either as affirmative or negative. Especially in answer to the first question there is much indefiniteness, resulting

from the difference of judgment as to how great a detachment could be considered a "material reduction" of Bragg's strength. For example, one officer thinks it has been reduced ten thousand, but not "materially weakened." The answers to the second question are modified in some instances by the opinion that the Rebels will fall back behind the Tennessee River, and thus no battle can be fought, either successful or unsuccessful. So far as these opinions can be stated in tabular form, they will stand thus:

On the fifth question, three gave it as their opinion that this army ought to advance as soon as Vicksburg falls, should that event happen. The following is a summary of the reasons assigned why we should not at this time advance upon the enemy:

1. With Hooker's army defeated, and Grant's bending all its energies in a yet undecided struggle, it is bad policy to risk our only reserve army to the chances of a general engagement. A failure here would have most disastrous effects on our lines of communication, and on politics in the loyal States.

2. We should be compelled to fight the enemy on his own ground, or follow him in a fruitless stern chase; or if we attempted to outflank him or turn his position, we should expose our line of communication and run the risk of being pushed back into a rough country, well known to the enemy and little known to ourselves.

3. In case the enemy should fall back without accepting battle, he could make our advance very slow, and with a comparatively small force posted in the gaps of the mountains could hold us back while he crossed the Tennessee River, where he would be measurably secure and free to send reinforcements to Johnston. His forces in East Tennessee could seriously harass our left flank, and constantly disturb our communications. 4. The withdrawal of Burnside's Ninth Army Corps deprives us of an important reserve and flank protection, thus increasing the difficulty of an advance.

5. General Hurlburt has sent the most of his forces away to General Grant, thus leaving West Tennessee uncovered, and laying our right flank and rear open to raids of the enemy.

The following incidental opinions are expressed :

1. One officer thinks it probable that the enemy has been strengthened rather than weakened, and that he (the enemy) would have a reasonable prospect of victory in a general battle.

2. One officer believes the result of a general battle would be doubtful, a victory barren, and a defeat most disastrous.

3. Three officers believe that an advance would bring on a general engagement. Three others believe it would not.

4. Two officers express the opinion that the chances of success in a general battle are nearly equal.

5. One officer expresses the belief that our army has reached its maximum strength and efficiency, and that inactivity would seriously impair its effectiveness.

6. Two officers say that an increase of our cavalry by about six thousand men would materially change the aspect of our affairs and give us a decided advantage.

In addition to the above summary, I have the honor to submit an estimate of the strength of Bragg's army, gathered from all the data I have been able to obtain, including the estimate of the General Commanding in his official report of the battle of Stone River, and facts gathered from prisoners, deserters, scouts, and refugees, and from Rebel newspapers. After the battle he (Bragg) consolidated many of his decimated regiments and irregular organizations, and at the time of his sending reinforcements to Johnston his army had reached its greatest effective strength. It consisted of five divisions of infantry, composed of ninety-four regiments and two independent battalions of sharp-shooters; say ninety-five regiments. By a law of the Confederate Congress, regiments are consolidated when their effective strength falls below two hundred and fifty men. Even the regiments formed by such consolidation (which may reasonably be regarded as the fullest) must fall below five hundred men. I am satisfied that four hundred is a large estimate of the average strength.

This force has been reduced by detachments to Johnston. It is as well known as we can ever expect to ascertain such facts, that three brigades have gone from McCown's division, and two or three from Breckinridge's, say two. It is clear that there are now but four infantry divisions in Bragg's army, the fourth being composed of fragments of McCown's and Breckinridge's divisions, and must be much smaller than the average. Deducting the five brigades, and supposing them composed of only four regiments each, which is below the general average, it gives an infantry reduction of twenty regiments, four hundred each, or 8,000, leaving a remainder of 30,000.