88 of survivorship, were utterly inconsistent with the genius and spirit of the laws of that State. So too in Iowa it has been held that the estate by entireties was abolished, and that husband and wife taking land by the same conveyance were tenants in common. Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa, 302. In those States where it is conceded that this peculiar estate still exists, it becomes a question of considerable importance as to how far the husband can control and dispose of the estate and to what extent it is liable for his debts. It is stated in general terms that neither the husband nor wife can dispose of the estate or any portion of it, so as to affect the right of the other as survivor. But whether the husband can exercise his common-law right, and grant, lease, or mortgage the estate during his life, subject to the right of survivorship in the wife, is a question on which the decisions are by no means harmonious. Hilliard in stating what he deems to be the law on this point says: "It has been said that husband and wife holding lands by a conveyance to them must both join in a conveyance, that both are necessary to form one grantor; and the deed of either without the other is merely void. It is to be observed however in qualification of this remark that the husband, of course, has the same right in the wife's interest as husband which he has in any other estate belonging to her, and may therefore convey or mortgage it for his own life (there being children). But the land cannot be taken on execution for his debts." 1 Hilliard Real Prop. 797. And Washburn lays down the rule that a conveyance by the husband is valid in case he survives the wife, and that during the coverture he has entire control of the estate, and that it may be taken on execution. 1 Wash. Real Prop. 577; see also Williams Real Prop. 225; Needham v. Branson, 5 Ired. 426; French v. Mehan, 56 Penn. St. 286; Fairchild v. Chastelleux, 1 Barr. 179; Jackson v. McConnell, 19 Wend. 175; Rol. Abr. Tit. Recovery; Pig. Com. Rec. 72; Cases Temp. Talbot, 164. In Hall v. Stevens the court say: "Search has been in vain for any common-law authority giving color to the assertion that the husband cannot by his own conveyance alone pass a title which shall be good, at least, during his life, subject to defeat, of course, by the wife's survivorship." Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 680. A similar rule seems to prevail in New Jersey. The Supreme Court of that State held that the husband was entitled to the use and control of the estate by entireties during his life, and that during this period the wife has no control over or interest in the property, and that it was no invasion of her rights for him to dispose of it at pleasure, and he could convey or mortgage it during his life. Washburn v. Burns, 34 N. J. 18; Den v. Gardner, Spencer, L. 556. Danforth, J., in speaking of the effect of a deed to husband and wife, and of the power of the husband over the estate, says: "If as the court below held, they by virtue of the deed became tenants by entireties, then by the common law the husband had the right to alienate in fee his share, subject only to the wife's right of survivorship, and the further right to sell, lease or mortgage the entire property for the joint lives of himself and wife. He had also the right to the possession of the property during the same time and to the receipt of the profits thereof and all this he might do without his wife's consent, and even in spite of her opposition." Meeker v. Wright, 76 N. Y. 262; see also Bertles v. Nunan, 27 Alb. L. J. 357; 1 Bish. L. M. W. 447; Ames v. Norman, 4 Sneed. 696. It would seem that if the husband could thus control the estate during his life, it could be taken on execution for his debts. In McCurdy v. Canning, the trial judge made use of the following language, which was approved by the Supreme Court: "If the husband might convey or mortgage it for the period of his own life, it would seem to follow necessarily that it might be taken on execution and sold by the sheriff for the same period, and that a purchaser of such an interest would be entitled to recover possession during the life of the husband by an action of ejectment." 64 Penn. St. 39. A similar doctrine is held in Missouri. The Supreme Court of that State held that the husband had a vendible interest in an estate by entireties arising from the marriage relation, and that it was subject to be sold on execution, the purchaser being entitled to the use of the estate during the life of the husband. Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670. And it seems that if land that is held by entireties be sold and the money given to the wife, the money in her possession will be treated as a fund from which a judgment creditor of the husband will be entitled to the payment of his claim. Farmers', etc., Nat. Bank v. Gregory, 49 Barb. 155. In Ames v. Norman the court say "From the peculiarity of this tenancy, the unity and indivisibility of the seisin, there is some confusion in the cases respecting the power of the husband alone to make any conveyance or disposition of the land thus held during their joint lives, and also as to the right of creditors of the husband to subject the same to the satisfaction of the husband's debts. But upon examination of the authorities it appears to be settled that during their joint lives the husband may dispose of the estate. He may lease or mortgage it, or it may be seized and sold upon execution for his debts." 4 Sneed, 683; see also Bennett v. Child, 19 Wis. 362; 1 Bish. L. M. W. 447; 1 Wash. Real Prop. 578; Cook v. Kennerly, 12 Ala. 42; Pollard v. Merrill, 15 id. 169; Barber v. Harris, 15 Wend. 615; French v. Mehan, 56 Penn. St. 286; Freeman Co. Ten. & Par., §§ 73, 74; Stoebler v. Knerr, 5 Watts, 181. However there is some authority for the support of the doctrine that during the joint lives of the husband and wife the interest of the husband in an estate by entireties cannot be taken on execution for his debts. This question came before the Supreme Court of Indiana in the case of Chandler v. Cheney, and the court after a consideration of the authorities came to the conclusion that the husband had no vendible interest which could be taken on execution during the life of the wife. But the court seemed to think that the result of holding this estate subject to the control of the husband during his life, and to execution for his debts, would be to utterly destroy the nature, quality, essence, and incidents of an estate by entireties, and to defeat the plain and manifest intention of the Legislature in providing that an estate by entireties might continue to exist between husband and wife. However the court did not quote any authority that could justify the ground taken unless it be some decision by the same court. 37 Ind. 391. In Roanes v. Archer, it was held that the joint interest of husband and wife cannot be touched by the creditors of the husband, and that the wife was entitled to enjoy the estate during her life as well as the husband. However the creditor was allowed to take proper proceedings to appropriate the benefit of the reversionary interest of the husband, which he might acquire by survivorship. 4 Leigh, 593; see also Scott v. Gibbon, 5 Mun. 86. Some courts have held that the married woman's act protects this estate from execution for the debts of the husband, and that during the life of the wife she is entitled to enjoy the estate jointly with the husband. Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391; Kip v. Kip, 33 N. J. Eq. 213; McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Penn. St. 39. But it is not easy to understand how a statute passed for the purpose of protecting the separate estate of the wife, and allowing her to convey, mortgage, lease, or bequeath her own property in the same manner as if she were a feme sole, could apply to an estate by entireties. It is neither her separate estate, nor is it possible for her to exercise control over it in any way as she does over her separate property, and this must have been known by the legislators when the acts were passed. The better doctrine seems to be that this estate is an exception, and is in no wise affected by those statutes passed for the better protection of married women in the enjoyment of their own property. Farmers', etc., Nat. Bank v. Gregory, 49 Barb. 155; McDuff v. Beauchamp, 50 Miss. 531; Hall v. Stephens, 65 Mo. 670; Robinson v. Eagle, 29 Ark. 202; Bates v. Seely, 46 Peun. St. 248; Goelet v. Gori, 31 Barb. 314; Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402. It seems that as a general rule, personal property may be held jointly by husband and wife as tenants by entireties. Slaves may be thus owned, Cook v. Kennerly, 12 Ala. 42; Pollard v. Merrill, 15 id. 169; Roanes v. Archer, 4 Leigh, 593, and so may promissory notes, Gillan v. Dixon, 65 Penn. St. 395; Shields v. Stillman, 48 Mo. 82; Draper v. Jackson, 16 Mass. 480; Tyler Infancy and Coverture, 376; and legacies, Couper v. Scott, 3 P. Wm. 120; Hamm v. Meisenhelter, 9 Watts, 349; judgments, Schoonmaker v. Elmendorf, 10 Jobus. 48; Bond v. Simmons, 3 Atk. 21; and stocks, Craig v. Craig, 3 Barb. Ch. 76, and see cases cited in defendant's brief in Sanford v. Sanford, 45 N. Y. 123. On the other hand there are a few cases that hold that personal property cannot be held by entireties, and in regard to such property no right of survivorship is created by a conveyance to husband and wife. Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich. 425; Polk v. Allen, 19 Mo. 467; Bish. L. M. W., § 211; Reeves Dom. Rel. 62. A divorce severs an estate by the parties tenants in common. Ill. 197. entireties and makes In this case the court held that the right to holdļas tenants by entireties arose from the fact that the conveyance was made during the marriage of the parties, and that the divorce destroyed the relation which gave the joint right and with it the right itself. It seems that if the divorce be obtained after the husband has alienated the estate, it does not affect the right of the alienee, and that nothing but the death of the husband, the wife surviving, will defeat his title. Ames v. Norman, 4 Sueed, 696. It has been held that when lands are bought with the funds of the wife and deeded to husband and wife jointly, the husband will not take as survivor, because in such case the mere fact of a joint conveyance will not invest him with a joint interest in the land. Moore v. Moore, 12 B. Monr. 651; Garner v. Jones, 52 Mo. 68. In such cases a court of equity will protect the wife in the enjoyment of the property and declare a trust in her favor. Garner v. Jones, supra. However if an advancement be made to a daughter and the deed made to her and her husband, unless the deed expressly states that it is for her separate use, it must bear the same construction as any deed to husband and wife. Garner v. Jones, supra. FIELD, J. This is a suit in equity to restrain the defendants from using an alleged trade-mark of the complainant, upon certain medicines prepared by them, and to compel an accounting for the profits made from its use in their sale of the medicines; also the payment of damages for their infringement of the complainant's rights. The complainant, a corporation formed under the laws of New York, manufactures in that State medicines designated as "Atwood's Vegetable Physical Jaundice Bitters;" and claims as its trade-mark this designation, with the accompanying labels. Whatever right it possesses it derives by various mesne assignments from one Moses Atwood, of Georgetown, Massachusetts. The bill alleges that the complainant is, and for a long time previous to the grievances complained of was, the manufacturer and vendor of the medicine mentioned; that it is put up and sold in glass bottles with twelve panel shaped sides, on five of which in raised words and letters "Atwood's Genuine Physical Jaundice Bitters, Georgetown, Mass." are blown in the glass, each bottle containing about a pint, with a light yellow printed label pasted on the outside designating the many virtues of the medicine, and the manner in which it is to be taken; and stating that it is manufactured by Moses Atwood, Georgetown, Mass., and sold by his agents throughout the United States. The bill also alleges that the bottles thus filled and labelled are put up in half-dozen packages with the same label on each package; that the medicine was first invented and put up for sale about twenty-five years ago by one Dr. Moses Atwood, formerly of Georgetown, Massachusetts, by whom, and his assigns and successors, it has been ever since sold "by the name, and in the manner, and with the trade-marks, label and description substantially the same as aforesaid;" that the complainant is the exclusive owner of the formula and recipe for making the medicine, and of the right of using the same name or designation, together with the trade-marks, labels, and good will of the business of making and selling the same; that large sales of the medicine uuder that name and designation are made, amounting annually to twelve thousand bottles; that the defendants are manufacturing and selling at Portland, Me., and at other places within the United States, unknown to the complainant, an imitation of the medicine, with the same designation and labels, and put up in similar bottles, with the same, or nearly the same words raised on their sides, in fraud of the rights of the complainant and to its serious injury; that this imitation article is calculated and was intended to deceive purchasers, and to mislead them to use it instead of the genuine article manufactured by the complainant, and has had, and does have, that effect. The bill therefore prays for an injunction to restrain the defendants from affixing or applying the words "Atwood's Vegetable Physical Jaundice Bitters," or either of them, or any imitation thereof, to any medicine sold by them, or to place them on any bottles in which it is put up, and also from using any labels in imitation of those of the complainant. It also prays for an accounting of profits and for damages. Among the defenses interposed are these: that Moses Atwood never claimed any trade-mark of the words used in connection with the medicine manufactured and sold by him; and assuming that he had claimed the words used as a trade-mark, and that the right to use them had been transferred to the assignors of the complainant, it was forfeited by the misrepresentation as to the manufacture of the medicine on the labels accompanying it, a misrepresentation continued by the complainant. In the view we take of the case, it will not be necessary to consider the first defense mentioned, nor the second, so far as to determine whether the right to use the words mentioned as a trade-mark was forfeited absolutely by the assignor's misrepresentations as to the manufacture of the article. It is sufficient for the disposition of the case, that the misrepresentation has been continued by the complainant. A court of equity will extend no aid to sustain a claim to a trade-mark of an article, which is put forth with a misrepresentation to the public as to the manufacturer of the article, and as to the place where it is manufactured, both of which particulars were originally circumstances to guide the purchaser of the medicine. It is admitted that whatever the value of the medicine possesses was given to it by its original manufacturer, Moses Atwood. He lived in Georgetown, Massachusetts. He manufactured the medicine there. He sold it with the designation that it was his preparation, "Atwood's Vegetable Physical Jaundice Bitters," and was manufactured there by him. As the medicine was tried and proved to be useful, it was sought for under that designation, and that purchasers might not be misled, it was always accompanied with a label, showing by whom and at what place it was prepared. These statements were deemed important in promoting the use of the article and its sale, or they would not have been continued by the assignees of the original inventor. And yet they could not be used with any honest purpose when both statements had ceased to be true. It is not honest to state that a medicine is manufactured by Moses Atwood, of Georgetown, Massachusetts, when it is manufactured by the Manhattan Medicine Company in the City of New York. Any one has an unquestionable right to affix to articles manufactured him a mark or device not previously appropriated, to distinguish them from articles of the same general character manufactured or sold by others. He may thus notify the public of the origin'of the article and secure to himself the benefits of any particular excellence it may possess from the manner or materials of its manufacture. His trademark is both a sign of the quality of the article and an assurance to the public that it is the genuine product of his manufacture. It thus often becomes of great value to him, and in its exclusive use the court will protect him against attempts of others to pass off their products upon the public as his. This protection is afforded not only as a matter of justice to him, but to prevent imposition upon the public. Manufacturing Company v. Trainer, 101 U. S. 54. The object of the trade-mark being to indicate, by its meaning or association, the origin or ownership of the article, it would seem that when a right to its use is transferred to others, either by act of the original manufacturer or by operation of law, the fact of transfer should be stated in connection with its use; otherwise a deception would be practiced upon the public and the very fraud accomplished, to prevent which courts of equity interfere to protect the exclusive right of the original manufacturer. If one affix to goods of his own manufacture signs or marks which indicate that they are the manufacture of others, he is deceiving the public and attempting to pass upon them goods as possessing a quality and merit which another s skill has given to similar articles, and which his own manu facture does not possess in the estimation of purchasers. To put forth a statement, therefore, in the form of a circular or label attached to an article, that it is manufactured in a particular place, by a person whose manufacture there had acquired a great reputation, when in fact it is manufactured by a different person at a different place, is a fraud upon the public which no court of equity will countenance. This doctrine is illustrated and asserted in the case of Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co., which was elaborately considered by Lord Chancellor Westbury, and afterward in the House of Lords on appeal from his decree. 4 De Gex Jones and Smith, 147, and 11 Clark's H. of L. Cas. 523. In that case, an injunction was asked to restrain the defendant from using a trade-mark to designate leather cloth manufactured by it, which trade-mark the complainant claimed to own. The article known as leather cloth was an American invention, and was originally manufactured by J. R. and C. P. Crockett, at Newark, New Jersey. Agents of theirs sold the article in England as "Crockett's Leather Cloth." Afterward a company was formed entitled "The Crockett International Leather Cloth Company," and the business previously carried on by the Crocketts was transferred to this company, which carried on business at Newark, in America, as a chartered company, and at West Ham, in England, as a partnership. In 1856, one Dodge took out a patent in England for tanning leather cloth and transferred it to this company. In 1857 the complainant company was incorporated, and the international company sold and assigned to it the business carried on at West Ham, together with the letters-patent, and full authority to use the trademark which had been previously used by it in England. A small part of the leather cloth manufactured by the complainant company was tanned or patented. It however used a label which represented that the articles stamped with it were the goods of the Crockett International Leather Cloth Company; that they were manufactured by J. R. and C. P. Crockett; that they were tanned leather cloth; that they were patented by a patent obtained in 1856, and were made either in the United States or at West Ham, in England. Each of these statements or representations was untrue so far as they applied to the goods made and sold by the complainant. The defendant having used on goods manufactured by it a mark having some resemblance to that used by the complainant, the latter brought suit to enjoin the use. Vice-Chancellor Wood granted the injunction, but on appeal to the lord chancellor the decree was reversed and the bill dismissed. In giving his decision the lord chancellor said that the exclusive right to use a trade-mark with respect to a vendible commodity is rightly called property; that the jurisdiction of the court in the protection of trade-marks rests upon property, and that the court interferes by injunction because that is the only mode by which property of that description can be effectually protected. But he added: "When the owner of the trade-mark applies for an injunction to restrain the defendant from injuring his property by making false representations to the public, it is essential that the plaintiff should not in his trade-mark, or in the business connected with it, be himself guilty of any false or misleading representation; for if the plaintiff makes any material false statement in connection with the property he seeks to protect, he loses, and very justly, his right to claim the assistance of a court of equity." And again: "Where a symbol or label, claimed as a trade-mark is so constructed or worded as to make or contain a distinct assertion which is false, 1 think no property can be claimed in it, or in other words, the right to the exclusive use of it cannot be maintained." When the case reached the House of Lords the correctness of this doctrine was recognized by Lord Cran worth, who said that of the justice of the principle no one could doubt; that it is founded in honesty and good sense, and rests on authority as well as on principle, although the decision of the House was placed on another ground. The soundness of the doctrine declared by the lord chancellor has been recognized in numerous cases. Indeed, it is but an application of the common maxim that he who seeks equity must present himself in court with clean hands. If his case discloses fraud or deception or misrepresentation on his part, relief there will be denied. Long before the case cited was before the courts, this doctrine was applied when protection was sought in the use of trade-marks. In Pidding v. How, 8 Sim. 477, which was before Vice-Chancellor Shadwell in 1837, it appeared that the complainant was engaged in selling a mixed tea, composed of different kinds of black tea, under the name of "Howqua's Mixture," in packages having on three of their sides a printed label with those words. The defendant having sold tea under the same name, and in packages with similar labels, the complainant applied for an injunction to restrain him from so doing. An ex parte injunction, granted in the first instance, was dissolved, it appearing that the complainant had made false statements to the public as to the teas of which his mixture was composed, and as to the mode in which they were prooured. "It is a clear rule," said the vice-chancellor, "laid down by courts of equity, not to extend their protection to persons whose case is not founded in truth." In Perry v. Truefitt, 6 Beav. 66, which was before Lord Langdale, Master of the Rolls, in 1842, a similar ruling was had. There it appeared that one Leathart had invented a mixture for the hair, the secret and recipe for mixing which he had conveyed to the plaintiff, a hair-dresser and perfumer, who gave to the composition the name of "Medicated Mexican Balm," and sold it as "Perry's Medicated Mexican Balm." The defendant, one Truefitt, a rival hair-dresser and perfumer, commenced selling a composition similar to that of plaintiff, in bottles with labels closely resembling those used by him. He designated his composition and sold it as "Truefitt's Medicated Mexican Balm." The plaintiff thereupon filed his bill, alleging no representation could be more material than that of the ingredients of a compound recommended and sold as a medicine; that there was none so likely to induce confidence in its use, and none, when false, that would more probably be attended with injurious consequences. And it also said: "Those who come into a court of equity, seeking equity, must come with pure hands and a pure conscience. If they claim relief against the frauds of others, they must themselves be free from the imputation. If the sales made by the plaintiff and his firm are effected, or sought to be, by misrepresentation and falsehood, they cannot be listened to when they complain that by the fraudulent rivalry of others, their own fraudulent profits are diminished. An exclusive privilege for deceiving the pub. lic is assuredly not one that a court of equity can be required to aid or sanction. To do so would be to forfeit its name and character." See also Seabury v. Grosvenor, 14 Blatch. 262; Hobbs v. Francais, 19 How. Pr. 567; Connell v. Reed, 128 Mass. 477; Palmer v. Harris, 60 Penn. St. 156. The doctrine enunciated in all these cases is founded in honesty and good sense; it rebukes fraud and encourages fair dealing with the public. In conformity with it, this case has no standing before a court of equity. The decree of the court below dismissing the bill must therefore be affirmed; and it is so ordered. CONTRACT TO COMPENSATE ATTORNEY that the name or designation of "Medicated Mexican A Balm " had become of great value to him as his trademark, and seeking to restrain the defendant from its use. It appeared however that the plaintiff, in his advertisements to the public, had falsely set forth that the composition was "a highly concentrated extract from vegetable balsamic productions" of Mexico, and was prepared from “an original recipe of the learned J. F Von Blumenbach, and was recently presented to the proprietor by a very near relation of that illustrious physiologist;" and the court therefore refused the injunction, the Master of the Rolls holding that in the face of such a misrepresentation, the court would not interpose in the first instance, citing with approval the decision in the case of Pidding v. How. In a case in the Superior Court in the city of New York, Fetridge v. Wells, 4 Abb. Pr. 144, this subject was very elaborately and ably treated by Chief Justice Duer. The plaintiff there had purchased a recipe for making a certain cosmetic, which he sold under the name of "The Balm of a Thousand Flowers." The defendants commenced the manufacture and sale of a similar article, which they called "The Balm of Ten Thousand Flowers." The complainant, claiming the name used by him as a trade-mark, brought suit to enjoin the defendants in the alleged infringement upon his rights. A temporary injunction was granted, but afterward, upon the coming in of the proofs, it was dissolved. It appeared that the main ingredients of the compound were oil, ashes and alcohol, and not an extract or distillation from flowers. Instead of being a balm, the compound was a soap. The court said it was evident that the name was given to it and used to deceive the public, to attract and impose upon purchasers; that PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT, OCT. 2, 1882. ORMEROD V. DEARMAN. The court will not enforce a contract by which an attorneyat-law undertakes for a contingent fee to procure a settlement of a charge of fornication with a married woman. CTION upon a promissory note. Defendant, an attorney-at-law, set up that the note had been setsled. The settlement claimed was an agreement on the part of the intestate of plaintiff below to allow the amount of the note for services in settling a charge of fornication against the intestate. Judgment below was for plaintiff, aud defendant took a writ of error. PARSON, J. The learned judge of the court below in affirming the plaintiff's fifth point withdrew the case from the jury. The said point is as follows: "That the charge against J. Dearman, proposed to be settled by the alleged contract, constituted a criminal offense against the law, and therefore not susceptible of settlement. The most that could be accomplished in such a case would be to induce the prosecutor not to appear and prosecute, and the alleged agreement in this case to pay for such services is void, as being against the policy of the law, and cannot be enforced, and the plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover." was The offense with which the plaintiff below charged was that of fornication. The woman with whom it was alleged he committed said offense was married, and the settlement was made with her husband. The defendant, who is an attorney, alleges that the plaintiff agreed to give him a contingent fee of $2,000, provided he could succeed in settling the matter so as to avoid a prosecution. We need not discuss so much of the ruling of the learned judge as holds that an offense of this character is not susceptible of settlement. That is not the question here. Conceding the right of settlement, the important question arises whether a court of law will enforce a contract by which an attorney-at-law undertakes, for a contingent fee, to procure a settlement of such a criminal charge, and thus prevent its coming into court. The stifling of a prosecution for a criminal offense, even where it is a mere misdemeanor and of such a character as to be within the control of the parties, is not a proper subject of a bargain for a fee. This is especially the case where the crime is one which concerns public morals. It would lower the standard of the profession and impair its dignity and usefulness were the principle contended for by the defendant to receive judicial sanction. Its mere statement implies an understanding that some means are to be used that are not professional. Such contracts, if sustained, cannot fail in many instances to interfere seriously with the administration of public justice. There is a line of authorities which do not differ in this case from principle. Thus, it was held in Hatzfield v. Gulder, 7 Watts, 152, that "a contract founded upon a promise or engagement to procure signatures and obtain a pardon from the governor for one convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced to punishment is unlawful, and cannot be enforced by an action." It was said by Huston, J., in delivering the opinion of the court: "It is not necessary to say whether, after the whole transaction is closed, a person who incidentally paid some postage, or who, under special circumstances, carried a petition, the signatures to which were spontaneously made, may not receive his actual expense and daily pay. I would say it must be a very special case however to justify this. this is not such a case, and we do not wish to see advertisements that pardons will be obtained at the lowest price, nor any thing which approaches to it; and generally all contracts to change the course of trials, or the effects of trials, whether to obtain a liberation of a prisoner by money to the jailor, or to obtain a pardon by the use of money directly or indirectly, must be void." Yet it is admittedly lawful for a governor to pardon and for a citizen to solicit a pardon in a proper way. But For a similar reason this court held, in Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 315, that a contract with an attorney to procure, or endeavor to procure, the passage of an act of the Legislature is void, as being inconsistent with public policy and the integrity of our political institutions. Bowman v. Coffroth, 9 P. F. Smith, 19, was an action by an attorney to recover compensation for his services before the department in procuring the discharge of a drafted man. It was held that the contract was against public policy and void, whether the compensation for the services was fixed or contingent. Other cases might be cited were it necessary. Those referred to establish the principle that contracts which have for their subject-matter any interference with the creation of laws, or their due enforcement, are against public policy, and therefore void. The law guards with jealousy every avenue to its courts of justice, and strikes down everything in the shape of a contract which may afford a temptation to interfere with its due admininistration. That the case in hand comes within the principle referred to is too plain for argument. The defendant may have rendered some professional services to the plaintiff for which he would be entitled to compensation. But the contract which he sets up by way of defense to the note being void, as against public policy, the learned judge committed no error in directing a verdict for the plaintiff. This view of the case renders a discussion of the remaining assiguments of error unnecessary. Judgment affirmed. PLEA OF GUILTY INDUCED BY FEAR OF INDIANA SUPREME COURT, 1883. SANDERS V. STATE OF INDIANA. A person accused of murder had when arraigned pleaded not guilty. There were threats and danger of lynching which terrified him and his counsel, by reason of which and at the urgent solicitation of his counsel he withdrew his first plea and pleaded guilty and was sentenced. Held, that he was entitled to a new trial. NDICTMENT for murder. The facts appear in the INDICTMENT for mut below appealed. N. G. Buff, J. T. Pierce and D. T. Morgan, for appellant. F. T. Hord, C. E. Matson, W. W. Carter, G. A. Knight, C. H. Knight and W. W. Thornton, for the State. The ELLIOTT, J. This is an extraordinary case. facts proved, the procedure adopted and the relief sought are strange and unusual. The facts stated and proved are these: In April, 1878, Josephine Sanders, the wife of the appellant, was slain by a pistol shot; at the time she was in a room alone with her husband, and did not and could not give any account of her death; he was then and had been for many years addicted to the use of alcoholic liquor and opium to such an extent that he had probably become insane; he was arrested shortly after the death of his wife; his case came on for trial; his counsel and many witnesses of unquestioned veracity testify that at the time of his trial he was insane; the homicide had aroused an intense feeling in the vicinity of the county-seat, where the killing was done, and the case put to trial; threats were made of lynching by the mob; counsel prepared an affidavit for delay, but feared to present it lest the mob should seize and hang the accused; the sheriff of the adjoining county came to the county-seat of Clay county and warned the sheriff of that county of imminent danger from an armed mob; a jury had been impanelled and a plea of not guilty entered, but so great was the threatened danger that counsel, to save, as they believed, their client's life, withdrew the plea of not guilty, entered a plea of guilty, on which without evidence the jury returned a verdict of guilty,and a life sentence was immediately pronounced upon the verdict by the court; the accused was at once hurried to the train and conveyed to the State's prison. For the purpose of clearly exhibiting the situation at the time the plea of guilty was entered, we quote from the testimony of the gentlemen who were then appellant's counsel, and who are men of high character and undoubted integrity. One of them says: "As one of counsel, I urged and demanded of him a plea of guilty, with which I pledged myself to save his life; his counsel all concurred; Sanders always denying any knowledge of the homicide; that they were responsible for the act of pleading guilty, believing at the time that it was the only course by which his life might be saved." Another one of the counsel says that "the accused was bewildered and refused, but finally seemed to consent, and at last appeared to acquiesce in letting counsel take their own course, that the court was agitated and alarmed, and recommended and advised the plea of guilty." The turnkey of the jail, the sheriff of Clay and the sheriff of the adjoining county concur in stating that there was great and imminent danger of mob violence; one of the jurors says that there was intense excitement among the large crowd of people present at the trial; that he was himself stationed at the door of the court house to signal to the jail any movement |