It was an interest upon which the policy attached. By the loss of his life within the year, the person whose life was insured lost the means of earning any thing more, and the plaintiff was deprived of receiving his share of such earnings to an uncertain and indefinite amount." In Trenton Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 4 Zabr. 576, a policy was taken out by the plaintiff on the life of one Van Middlesworth for $1,000, one-half payable to the plaintiff and the other half to Van Middlesworth. They belonged to an association called the New Brunswick and California Mining and Trading Company, the capital stock of which consisted of forty-five shares of $600 each. The company consisted partly of shareholding members and partly of active members, the shareholders being each required to furnish a substitute to proceed to the mines of the company. The plaintiff owned one share, advanced $600 of capital and procured Van Middlesworth to go out as his substitute, which he did and acted as his agent and substitute; and the assets of the company having been divided in California, he received the plaintiff's share, and afterward died, not having paid it over. By one of the articles of the association all treasures, and all the proceeds of the labor of each member, and all profits were to go into a general fund for the benefit of the association. To the action brought on the policy it was objected that the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the life of the deceased. On this question the court said: "In the present case Johnson had a direct interest in the life of his substitute, whose earnings were to constitute a part of the joint funds, of which he was entitled to his share, an interest fully equivalent to the interest of a wife in the life of her husband, of a child in that of a parent, or a sister in that of a brother. And at Van Middlesworth's death, although prior to that time the company had been virtually dissolved, he had an interest in him as his creditor to the extent of his share of the assets in his hands." In Bevin v. Connecticut Ins. Co., 22 Conn. 244, the plaintiff had obtained a policy of insurance for $1,000 on the life of one Barstow, to whom he had advanced $350, besides articles of personal property, to enable him to go to California and there labor for one year, on an agreement that he would account to the plaintiff for onehalf of his gains. The court said that Barstow was the plaintiff's debtor and partner, giving to the plaintiff an interest in the continuance of his life, as by that meaus, through his skill and efforts, the plaintiff might expect not only to get back what he had advanced, but to acquire great gains and profits in the enterprise. "All the books," the court added, "hold this to be a sufficient interest to sustain a policy of insurance. As to the value of this interest, we think it must be held to be what the parties agreed to consider it in the policy. This was the sum asked for by the plaintiff, and which the defendants agreed to pay in case of death, and for which they were paid in the premiums given by the insured. The policy must, we think, be held to be a valued policy." And after referring to a policy of insurance obtained by a sister on her brother's life, where no question seemed to have been made as to the amount, but only whether it was an interest which the law would recognize, the court said: "So in every case, where a person on his own account insures the life of a relative, if the sum named in the policy is not to be the rule of damages, we inquire what is? The impossibility of satisfactorily going into the question in most cases, and especially where there is nothing to guide the inquiry, and everything is uncertain, would lead us to hold that a policy like this is a valued policy as most consistent with the understanding of the parties and the principles of law." Held, further, that there was no breach of warranty in the statement of the amount of interest that L. had in the life of D. The statement as to the amount of interest was necessarily conjectural. No one can affirm with absolute certainty that he has an interest to a definite sum in the life of another, where the interest depends upon the result of an existing partnership or other business transactions not yet terminated. The value of his interest in such cases will always be more or less a matter of opinion. The statement in that regard must of necessity be taken as a mere estimate. If therefore L. had an interest in the life of D. and his estimate was made in good faith, the declaration cannot be deemed untrue so as to constitute a breach of the warranty. The extent of a man's inter. est in the life of another, depending upon a continuing partnership or the results of business transactions not yet completed, is in the nature of things uncertain, and in such cases all that can be required is that he had an actual interest, and that his estimate was made in good faith, without any purpose to deceive. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs. Opinion by Field, J. [Decided May 7, 1883.] MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-PROBABLE CAUSE— EVI. DENCE-OTHER ACTS.-(1) In order to enable a plaintiff to recover in a suit for malicious prosecution, he will be required, in addition to the fact that he was prosecuted and acquitted, to show that he was prosecuted at the instance of the defendant, and that such prosecution was both malicious and without probable cause on the part of the defendant. The want of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. As to the existence of the facts relied on to constitute the want of probable cause, that is a question for the jury; but what will amount to the want of probable cause in any case, is a question of law for the court. If the evidence adduced be legally insufficient to be submitted to the jury to prove each of the elements of the plaintiff's case, his action will be pronounced groundless, and the defendant not be called on for his defense. Boyd v. Cross, 35 Md. 197; Cooper v. Utterbach, 37 id. 318; Stansbury v. Fogle, id. 381; Cecil v. Clarke, 17 id. 508; and Metcalfe v. Brooklyn Life Ins. Co., 45 id. 205. All the cases referred to adopt the definition of Washington, J., in Munns v. Dupont, 3 Wash. C. C. 31, of probable cause. It is "such reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves, to warrant a cautious man in believing the party accused to be guilty." It is wholly immaterial whether the party was guilty or not, if the facts known to the defendant, and only known to him, were such as would warrant "a cautious man in believing the party was guilty. An officer of a railroad company having reasonable grounds for supposing a person had in his possession fraudulent tickets of the company, is justified in proceeding by search warrant to ascertain that fact; and the failure to find such tickets does not show that he had not sufficient ground to justify him in instituting the search. Nor would the failure to find any such tickets be necessarily sufficient to convince a reasonably prudent and cautious man, that the suspected person had not fraudulently issued a ticket. which prior to the search he was suspected of issuing; or even might not still have others in his possession, though none were found in the place which was searched. (2) In an action for malicious prosecution on a charge of selling a fraudulent railroad ticket, the *Appearing in 59 Maryland Reports. defendant may introduce evidence of his having had knowledge, anterior to the charge, of the sale of fraudulent tickets by the plaintiff on other occasions. In Bell v. State, 57 Md. 114, this court decided that the fraudulent utterance of other forged paper by the defendant anterior to the forgery for which he was being tried, was admissible evidence for the prosecution. In Bloomer v. State, 48 Md. 527, the prosecution was for the fraudulent issuance of passes on a railroad, and evidence was admitted of other like acts by same defendant. These rulings were in accordance with most approved modern decisions to which reference is made in these cases. If therefore such evidence is admissible on the trial before the jury on the question of guilt or innocence, a fortiori, such evidence as was admitted here must be receivable to show whether a layman in instituting a prosecution had reasonable ground and probable cause for his conduct in the premises. Thomas v. Russell, 9 Exch. 764, and Bacon v. Torme, 4 Cush. 240. Thelin v. Dorsey. Opinion by Irving, J. MARRIAGE WIFE IF CREDITOR OF HUSBAND HAS SAME RIGHTS AS OTHERS-ATTORNEY-PRIVILEGE.-(1) The provision of the Maryland Code that "no acquisition of property passing to the wife from the husband after coverture shall be valid, if the same has been made or granted to her in prejudice of the rights of his subsisting creditors," does not prevent the husband from treating his wife like any other creditor, if the relation of debtor and creditor, is proved to exist between them. A wife may become a creditor of the husband, and this provision of the Code was never intended to prohibit him from paying or devoting his property to the payment of a debt due to her. If she is, in fact, such creditor, the law regards her rights with as much favor as those of other creditors. He may prefer her in a deed of trust for the benefit of creditors, or he may convey property to her absolutely in consideration and discharge of such debt, in the same way he could in reference to a debt due by him to any other party. Bowie v. Stonestreet, 6 Md. 418; Stockett v. Holliday, 9 id. 480; Jones v. Jones, 18 id. 464; Mayfield v. Kilgour, 31 id. 240; Drury v. Briscoe, 42, id. 154; Oswold v. Hoover, 43 id. 360; Sabel v. Slingluff, 52 id. 132. (2) It is a common thing in this country, for a party wishing to convey his property to seek the advice of an attorney, and for the attorney not only to give advice, but to act as conveyancer in the preparation of the deed. Communications made by a client to his attorney thus employed, relating to the subject-matter about which and for which advice was thus sought, are just as confidential and just as much privileged as if they were made in reference to a litigation existing and in progress at the time. Crane v. Barkdoll. Opinion by Miller, J. VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE-IF FAIRLY MADE EQUITY WILL NOT SET ASIDE FOR GRANTOR.-Every person, whether man or woman, of sound and disposing mind, if under no legal disability, has the absolute right of making any disposition of his or her property that he or she may think proper, provided it does not interfere with the existing rights of third persons. If the disposition of property be fairly made by a competent person, though entirely voluntary and without consideration, it is perfectly valid, and cannot be rescinded simply because the court may think it absurd or improvident that such a disposition should have been made. As declared by Lord Chancellor Nottingham, in Villers v. Beaumont, 1 Vern. 100, "If a man will improvidently bind himself up by a voluntary deed, and not reserve a liberty to himself by a power of reVocation, this court will not loose the fetters he hath put upon himself, but he must lie down under his own folly; for if you would relieve in such a case, you must consequently establish this proprosition, viz., that a man can make no voluntary disposition of his estate, but by his will only, which would be absurd." Goodwin v. White. Opinion by Alvey, J. WILL-ATTESTATION-CONSTRUCTION-MEANING OF ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY."- (1) The fact that the witnesses to a will have sigued above instead of below the words designating attestation, cannot affect the validity of the attestation, when it is clearly manifest that they signed for the purpose of attestation. White v. Trustees British Museum, 6 Bing. 310; 1 Jarman Wills, 213; Welty v. Welty, etc., 8 Md. 15; Etchison v. Etchison, 53 id. 357. (2) A will which provided for a life income to certain persons contained this: "I authorize and empower my executor to lease any part, or all of my estate, and where it is absolutely necessary, to sell the same." Held, that the necessity contemplated was an imperative necessity; and being such must refer to some pressing exigency of the estate, growing out of deficiency of revenue to meet the demands upon it, such as might be brought about by some unexpected contingency or disaster. Marshall, C. J., in M'Culloch v. State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 414, says "necessary" admits "of all degrees of compari8011. "A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary." In the case then under discussion, the word "absolutely" was prefixed to the word necessary, and he said it was impossible to escape the conviction that the prefixing the word "absolutely" was intended to materially affect the meaning of the word necessary. In this case the testator by so emphasizing the word necessary designed to indicate a superlative degree of necessity. Moale v. Cutting. Opinion by Irving, J. " MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. MAY, 1883. AGENCY-CONTRACT TO SELL REALTY-EXCESS OF AUTHORITY WHEN AVOIDS.-An agent was authorized by writing not under seal to sell lands subject to a lease. By an instrument under seal he contracted to sell the land free from all incumbrance. Held, that the seal might be rejected as a separable excess of authority, and the agreement stand as a simple contract (Dickerman v. Ashton, 21 Minn. 538; Long v. Hartwell, 34 N. J. Law, 116; Lawrence v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 107), but the agreement as to title was in excess and not separable, and was not enforceable. "Where there is a complete execution of a power, and something ex abundantia added, which is improper, then the execution is good, and only the excess is void; but where there is not a complete execution of a power, or the boundaries between the excess and the execution are not distinguishable, it will be bad." Alexander v. Alexander, 2 Ves. 640; Story, Ag., §§ 165-168; 2 Sugden, Pow., ch. 9, § 2. Thomas v. Joslyn. Opinion by Berry, J. SALE-WHEN DELIVERY OF ENTIRE QUANTITY SOLD NEED NOT BE TENDERED AT ONE TIME-REASONABLE TIME.-Plaintiff, a farmer, living 12 miles from defendant's mill, agreed to deliver about 3,000 bushels of wheat at the mill of defendant at a price defendant agreed to pay. The wheat had to be conveyed by team the 12 miles, which both parties knew. No time of delivery was agreed upon. Held, that plaintiff was not obliged to tender delivery of all the wheat at one time, and that what was a reasonable time in which to deliver was for the jury. The question of reasonable time is determined by a view of all the circumstances of the case, by placing the court and jury in the same situation as the contracting parties were at the time they made the contract; that is, by placing before them all the circumstances known to both parties at the time. Ellis v. Thompson, 3 Mees. & W. 445; Cocker v. Franklin H. & F. Manuf. Co., 3 Sumn. 530. And for that purpose it has been held that evidence of the conversations of the parties may be admitted to show the circumstances under which the contract was made, and what they thought was a reasonable time. Coates v. Sangston, 5 Md. 121. Roberts v. Mazeppa Mill Co. Opinion by Mitchell, J. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-SALE OF LAND-CONTRACT IN SEVERAL WRITINGS-PAROL EVIDENCE.--Where several writings are relied upon to establish a contract for the sale of land, the relation between the writings must appear on their face. The subject-matter of the contract must appear from the memorandum, and the land must be so described that it may be identified. Brown, St. Fr., § 385. Its location and identification may be by parol. Thus in Sanborn v. Nockin, 20 Minn. 178, the plaintiff, by letter, offered to buy five acres, owned by defendant, in a certain section. This offer was accepted in writing and a valid contract established. The writing contained a description, but a question might be raised as to its sufficiency. In such case however it would be competent to identify, by extrinsic evidence, the five acres owned by defendant in the section, if he owned but one five-acre tract, and to show the identity of different forms of description of the same land. Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 548. The connection and relation of several writings assumed to constitute one contract must appear on their face either from the nature of their contents or subjectmatter, or by reference, and cannot be shown by parol. Brown, St. Fr. (4th ed.), § 348; Ridgway v. Ingram, 50 Ind. 145. Parol evidence, showing the fact of the delivery and receipt of the several writings, including time, place, situation of property and parties, and other circumstances, may be received to aid in the interpretation of the contract, but the essential terms of the writing required by the statute of frauds cannot be supplied by oral testimony of what the parties intended or understood. Tice v. Freeman. Opinion by Vanderburgh, J. USAGE-WHEN NOT BINDING-PAYMENT TO COMMERCIAL TRAVELLER.-In an action for the price of merchandise, the defense was payment to plaintiff's agent. In proof defendant showed payment to a traveller for plaintiffs, and defendant's witness was asked this: "What is the usage among commercial travellers and the houses they represent as to the payment for these goods?" Plaintiffs objected to the question as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, but the objection was overruled, and the witness auswered that Payments are received by the commercial travellers." Held, that the admission of the evidence was error. The usage of commercial travellers, and of the houses which they represent, unless it was also the usage of houses for which such travellers take orders without representing them, was therefore manifestly unimportant and immaterial. A usage to be binding, simply as such, must be established, geueral, and uniform, as applicable to the particular business with reference to which it is sought to be set up. It must be the mode in which persons in that line do their business so that the law will presume knowledge of it. Porter v. Hills, 114 Mass. 106; Trott v. Wood, 1 Gall. 443; Dodge v. Favor, 15 Gray, 82; Hall v. Georgia, 48 Ga. 607; Lawson Usages, 31, 36, 40, 44, 101, 103, 104; 2 Greenl. Ev., § 251. Also that independent of controlling usage to the contrary, the sale of goods by an agent, or the fact that he is or acts as agent to take orders for goods, does not of itself authorize him to receive payment therefor. Kornemann v. Monaghan, 24 Mich. 36; Higgins v. Moore, 34 N. Y. 417; Clark v. Smith, 88 Ill. 298. Janney v. Boyd. Opinion by Berry, J. [Decided March 20, 1883.] INSURANCE LAW. FIRE POLICY-INSURABLE INTEREST.-A person who bargains for and takes into his possession an article of personal property, giving his note of hand therefor,the note containing an agreement that the title to the property shall remain in the seller until the note be paid, has an insurable interest in the property, although the note is not fully paid. Maine Supreme Judicial Court, March 12, 1883. Reed v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., (74 Me. 537). LIFE POLICY — MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOCIATIONCONDITIONS-forfeiture.—(1) A policy or certificate of life insurance contained the following provision: "It is agreed that the said N. C. R. shall pay the sum of twenty-five dollars as a membership fee; and further, the sum of two dollars and a half, quarterly, for expenses, to be paid said association, and also such sums as may be required by the conditions annexed, for mortuary assessments." The policy or certificate also contained the following clause: "The holder of this certificate further agrees and accepts said certificate upon the express condition, that if the said assessment or quarterly dues shall not be paid at the office of said association within thirty days after date of notice, the certificate shall be null and void, and of no effect." Held, that the foregoing clauses, taken and construed together, meant that while the insured (N. C. R.), after having paid his membership fee, agreed to pay the association two dollars and a half, quarterly, the association agreed not to forfeit his membership, undues and assessments for more than thirty days after less he made default in the payment of quarterly they gave him notice. Notice was a condition precedent to forfeiture. (2) A notice to the insured in a mutual endowment association, requiring him to pay ten dollars as dues for an entire year, and in advance, is bad and does not work a forfeiture of the policy, the insured having contracted to pay the sum of two dollars and a half at the end of each quarter, and the association having assumed the burden of giving him notice when such quarterly dues were payable, and a forfeiture of the policy being conditioned upon the failure of the insured to pay his quarterly dues at the office of the association within thirty days after date of notice. Maryland Ct. of Appeals, March 1, 1883. Mutual Endowment Assessment Association v. Essender. Opinion by Stone, J. (59 Md. 463). NOTES. The American Law Register for July contains the following cases: Barclay v. Smith (Ill.), on property subject to execution-certificate of membership in board of trade, with note by Marshall D. Ewell; Commonwealth v. Whips (Ky.), on constitutionality of a special legislative authority contrary to a general statute, with note by W. W. Thornton; Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Schwindling (Penn., on liability for negligence toward infant trespasser, with note by C. Berkeley Taylor; Tilton v. Wright (Me.), on liability of attorney for official fees, with note by Addison G. McKean. -It would seem that the law is already stringent enough against inn-keepers, but in White v. Smith, 15 Vroom, 105, they are held to be insurers of the persons of their guests against kidnapping! It is there said: By the common law, an inn-keeper is bound to receive a guest and the goods he brings with him in the ordinary way, and is liable for their value in case they be stolen."- -In the advance sheets of 16th Vroom we find three more cases of unanimous reversal by the Court of Errors and Appeals. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, AUGUST 4, 1883. CURRENT TOPICS. arrangements given the public reception by the New York State Bar Association, on the conclusion of the trip, which will be in the latter part of October. The most singular sentence that ever came to our knowledge was lately imposed by Judge Krekel, of the United States District Court in Missouri. The THE committee of arting meets of the Nely York St. Louis Republican gives the particulars. William Bar Association have substantially completed the arrangements for the proposed visit of Lord Chief Justice Coleridge to this country. The chief justice will be accompained by his son, who is his secretary, by Sir James Hannen, President of the Divorce, Admiralty and Probate Division of the High Court of Justice, (this gentleman will have an excellent opportunity to study our divorce "system"), and Charles Russell, Esq., M. P. The party will probably arrive August 23, and will be the guests of the chairman of the committee, Mr. Elliott F. Shepard, of the city of New York, until the 27th. Mr. Shepard has arranged the following tour for the party: Monday, August 27, to Irvington by train. W. D. Sloane's reception. Tuesday, August 28, and Wednesday, August 29, at Saratoga. Garden party, etc., at the Grand Union Hotel, fireworks in Congress park. Judge Hilton will entertain the party. Trip to Mt. McGregor. Thursday, August 30, and Friday, August 31, at Newport. Saturday, September 1, at Windsor, Vt., William M. Evarts' guests. Sunday, September 2, rest at the Profile House, White Mountains. Monday, September 3, Fabyan's Twin Mt. House, Glen House, etc. Tuesday, September 4, leave the White Mountains and arrive at Boston. Wednesday, September 5, guests of Gov. Butler and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; take part in the exercise of the "Manufacturers' and Mechanics' Institute for the purpose of the General Improvement of Manufacturing and Mechanical Interests and the holding of Industrial Exhibitions Annually." Thursday, September 6, in Boston, attending receptions and dinners. Friday, September 7, to Portland and Bangor. Saturday, September 8, at Fredericton, N. B., where Lord Coleridge will visit his old friend, Lord John Fredericton, the Bishop of Fredericton, N. B. From Fredericton the party go to St. John and Quebec. At the latter place there will be a reception and dinner. At Montreal there will be a reception. Also at Ottawa. At Toronto a reception by the bar of the Province. Thence the party will proceed to Niagara Falls, the Thousand Islands, Watkins Glen, Rochester, Buffalo (reception), Cleveland, Sandusky, Toledo, Detroit, Chicago (reception by State bar), Milwaukee, St. Paul, Minneapolis, Sioux City, Omaha, Council Bluffs, St. Joseph. Kansas City, St. Louis, Decatur, Logansport, Indianapolis, Dayton, Cincinnati, Springfield, Columbus, Wheeling, Chattanooga, Pittsburgh, Cumberland, Harper's Ferry, Parkersburgh, Washington. Baltimore, Philadelphia, Mansfield, Salamanca, Rochester, Syracuse, Albany and New York, The date for the Albany visit has not been settled as yet. In New York the Lord Chief Justice will be VOL. 28-No. 5. Hannah was arraigned in that court on the charge of selling liquor to Indians. He pleaded guilty and gave as an excuse his ignorance of the law, and stated he could neither read nor write. He was a young fellow and the judge not desiring to be too severe on an ignorant man, whose first offense was perhaps an accidental violation of a United States law, gave him some good advice, and proposed to him that he should learn to write, and in order to insure success sentenced him to the Cole county jail until he should be able to write a letter. Hannah expressed a doubt as to his being able to learn the art of writing, but the judge assured him it could be done, if he applied himself, within a reasonable time, and in order to help him he would assign him a teacher. This teacher was one Martin, who having been convicted of cutting timber off government lands, was awaiting sentence. The judge calling up Martin sentenced him to the Cole county jail for a term to expire when he should have taught the man Hannah to write. Martin willingly consented and the two men went to jail. The success of this experiment in compulsory education was evidenced by the appearance before the clerk of the court of Hannah, who presented a specimen of very fair penmanship as a result of a little over three weeks' application. As a further test the clerk requested him to write a letter. This test was rather too much for Hannah, who lacked readiness in composition and was at a loss, he explained, for ideas. The clerk then dictated a letter to him, which he wrote very well, and having complied with the order of the court by learning to write was discharged. Martin was also discharged, having completed his part of the undertaking in teaching his fellow prisoner to write. We commend this instance to Mr. Gaskell, the "Compendium" advertiser in The Century magazine. Mr. James Payn is a clever story-teller, and "Kit, a Memory," is one of his brightest stories. We have been solacing our vacation with that and other novels, for which waste of time we have the warrant of Chief Justice Marshall's great example. Mr. Payn has his fling at the lawyers. He says: "There is something in the jargon of the law, independent of its subtleties and pretenses, which is peculiarly offensive to the man of culture. Its prolixities and repetitions, the purpose of which he knows, whatever excuses may be made for them, is at bottom greed, disgust him. Its rank undergrowth of verbiage excites his scorn, but also exhales a certain unwholesomeness, like the matted mangroves of the tropics. His walk of life is apart from such things, and he shuns them, with contempt, indeed, but also with a certain sense of shot a willful murder, and the second a suicide while in a state of temporary insanity. This doctrine will be very unwelcome to life insurance companies. The verdict reminds one of that in the Cole-Hiscock case in this city where the jury found the prisoner sane the instant before and the instant after the killing, but insane at the instant of the killing, and so acquitted him. The only recent remittance outside of the law that has come to us, and that seems to demand notice, is Dr. Dio Lewis' new monthly magazine, with an accompanying circular. The magazine is In a very interesting paper, by Dr. J. Savage devoted to "Sanitary and Social Science." The Delavan, of this city, State Commissioner of whole matter is a surprise to us for we had the im- Health, on "Vital Registration," the writer says: pression that Dr. Lewis, "author and gymnast,' "The registration of the marriage tie is the bête was an extremely athletic person who some years noir of the opposers of the system, if opposers they ago had lifted himself into another and a brighter are. What good is accomplished by such a method? world. But it seems we are mistaken. On reflec- Why should an event like marriage be made pubtion we guess that apostle was Dr. Winship. The lic property? We grant that it is all well enough doctor has gone out of the athletic into the literary to know about births, but why such pertinacity in line — the dumb-bell lettres line, so to speak. The knowing the age of the groom, the age of the circular is sent to us for publication as an unpre-bride, whether maid or widow, etc.? I suspect, tending" sketch, "as all the extended sketches of him have been inaccurate and filled with unreasonable and extravagant praise." To emphasize this modest aspiration the circular gives impressions of two portrait cuts of the doctor, with the suggestion that if we wish to use one it will be forwarded by mail. The doctor is a very good looking man, strongly resembling that great statesman, Mr. Jim Blaine, of Maine, but we really have no "use" for his portrait, unless he wishes to adorn our advertising columns with it at the usual rates. We wish him success however in his "labor in the interest of better bodies for American men and women." Our own efforts are in the interest of a better body of law. The bad effects of that bar-dinner to Mr. Benjamin are already beginning to appear. A solicitor writes to the London Law Times complaining that "solicitors were forgotten in the festal tribute," and that "the bench and bar were trumpet-tonged in their own praise," but that "solicitors, whose patronage made both bench and bar, received no attention." But have not clients, whose patronage makes bench, bar and solicitors, a still greater right to complain of being left out? This thing could not have occurred in this country, where it is impossible to toast a solicitor or attorney without toasting a barrister. But it does seem gratuitously cruel in the Law Times to say that "solicitors cannot secure to counsel that eminence which is the prize alone of learning and ability to which solicitors contribute nothing," although it is strictly true. The unpopularity of the common-law pains and penalties against suicides is illustrated by a recent coroner's jury verdict in England. One of the deceased persons shot the other, and as a witness deposed, within two seconds shot himself. Within that brief space there was, however, time for a complete mental change from perfect sanity to criminal irresponsibility, for the jury pronounced the first perhaps wrongfully, that we are indebted to the fairer portion of the community for the opposition to this part of vital registration. Ladies usually have no age- that is to speak of. But let us see of what utility such a register really is-I mean to the public health, and that is my only plea in this paper. The certificate of marriage is a link in the chain of exact information, which united forms a perfect whole. As the end in view to be gained by the statistician cannot be perfected without a full record of the passage of the generation through life, so the omission of the recording of the marriage tie would mar the perfectness of the complete record. Another great point to be gained is the establishment of legitimacy, and while really from the ordinary standpoint of public health no such arguments can be advanced for this registration that are for the former, viz.: the birth record, still to the statistician such a record is most valuable, as a means of arriving at a correct understanding of the vital movement of the people, whose health and prosperity are to be benefited by such records. As this paper is not intended to be other than strictly what its title implies, I will not allude to the advantage to the individuals who are married by such a record being preserved as a certificate of such a contract, an advantage that may be of incalculable value to those who come after them. Nothing can be said against the propriety of marriage registration, and certainly no objection should be made, when its object is understood, viz.: the completing of the life history of the individual.” NOTES OF CASES. 'N Murphy v. Manning, Massachusetts Supreme March, (Mass. L. it was that in a suit on a Massachusetts judgment on a debt due to a citizen of New Jersey, an insolvent discharge under the Massachusetts statute, after the rendition of the judgment, was no defense. Holmes, J., said: "It is not denied that the original debt would not have been discharged. Ilsley v. Merriam, |