convenience. A pony, drawing a carriage in which the plaintiff's wife was riding, shied at the roller, upset the carriage, and the plaintiff's wife was killed. Held, that the roller was an obstruction to the highway; that it was an unreasonable user of the highway by the defendant, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages for the death of his wife under Lord Campbell's Act. The court, Grove, J., said: "Upon the cases cited I think the law seems clear, and that is, that although a person is entitled to use the highway for necessary purposes, it is essential and expedient that he should not be allowed to use it in an unreasonable manner. It does not follow that because a person may use the highway for his horses and carriages he may obstruct it. If the defendant had been merely taking the roller from one field to another and the pony had shied at it, the defendant would not have been liable, because that would not have been an unreasonable user of the highway. The roller was not left there for use, but simply for the convenience of the farmer. In other words, he made the highway a standing ground for his roller until it suited his convenience to take it away. There was some evidence given to show that several horses had shied at it the same day, and therefore it must have been there some little time before the accident happened. The roller was on the highway, and it was an obstruction in the sense that it impeded the proper use of the highway. It was in consequence of the improper use of the highway by the defendant that the pony shied and the accident happened. There is no misdirection. Therefore the verdict being legally sustained by the evidence, can we say that it was an unreasonable verdict? I think not. The defendant might have left the roller on the field, or taken it into the opposite field, and I am of opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment." Counsel cited Harris v. Mobbs, 3 Ex. Div. 268, the case of a house van attached to a steam plough. See Bennett v. Fifield, 13 R. I. 139; S. C., 43 Am. Rep. 17; Turner v. Buchanan, 82 Ind. 147; S. C., 42 Am. Rep. 485; Foshay v. Glen Haven, 25 Wis. 288; S. C., 3 Am. Rep. 73; Ayer v. City of Norwich, 39 Conn. 376; S. C., 12 Am. Rep. 396; Macomber v. Nichols, 34 Mich. 212; S. C., 22 Am. Rep. 522, and note, 522; Card v. City of Ellsworth, 65 Me. 547; S. C., 20 Am. Rep. 722. 55 In St. Johnsbury, etc., Railroad Co. v. Hunt, Vt. 570, it was held that a railroad company may maintain an action against one who maliciously causes the arrest of its engineer while running a train, with intent to delay the train and injure the company. The court said, Veazey, J.: "The defendant's counsel contends that the 'gravamen of the court is the arrest of Collins,' and that his arrest was no infringement of the rights of the plaintiff; that this was illegal, if at all, only as against him, and that the plaintiff cannot recover damages for an act not illegal as to itself; that the damages resulting to the plaintiff from this arrest of its servant upon due process are damnum absque injuria. We think the assumption that the gist of the count is the arrest of Collins is unsound. The gist is the delay of the train for the purpose of injury to the plaintiff. To accomplish the injury the defendant resorted to the contrivance of a legal proceeding against the servant. The process was correct in form, and was a legal warrant for the act of the officer. But back of that, the act of resorting to legal proceedings against Collins was, under the averment, wrongful, and this wrongful act was adopted as a means and for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff. The preliminary or concurrent wrong to Collins did not alter the character of the wrong to this plaintiff. The wrong to Collins was the instrumentality adopted to accomplish this injury. A suit for malicious prosecution by Collins would not be affected by the fact that the officer was warranted in serving the original process, or that his act of arresting was legal as to him, but it would reach back to the question of motive and probability of cause. No more should the intervening act of the officer affect the plaintiff's remedy here. The same injury to the plaintiff might have been accomplished by placing an obstruction upon the track. Probably if the defendant had had a lawful claim against Collins, and the enforcement of it by legal process had produced the same injury to the plaintiff company, it would have been remediless even if the real motive of the process had been such injury; because it is immaterial with what motive a person does a legal act. But this suit is not brought by the plaintiff for interference with its servant and to recover damages resulting from loss of his services; it is brought for stopping and delaying the train to the plaintiff's injury. The declaration sets up the unwarrantable interference with the servant simply as a method by which the designed result was accomplished. It is further contended in behalf of the defendant that Collins being the injured party has his action for the injury done, and that the defendant ought not to be subjected to two actions for the same act. It is admitted under the demurrer that this plaintiff was injured by the act of the defendant which we hold was wrongful. It is no answer to a claim for this injury to say that this act also injured another party. Each party suffering directly from a wrongful act is entitled to a remedy against the wrong-doer. A single act of trespass destroying one man's arm and another man's leg would create a right of action in each separately." In Van Steenwyck v. Washburn, Wisconsin Supreme Court, November 20, 1883, 17 N. W. Rep. 289, it is held that the right and duty of election by a widow in case of a provision by will in lieu of dower is personal, and must be exercised by her alone, and she is not excused although insane. The court, Cole, C. J., said: "Does the statute apply to an insane person? On this point it is vigorously insisted that it does not; that the statute provides only for cases where an election is possible; that an insane widow is incapable of making any election, of exercising any intelligent judgment or choice, therefore she cannot come within its terms. The statute manifestly implies choice or election on the part of the widow, or by some instrumentality in her behalf. At the same time it is apparent that the statute contains no exception of persons who are insane or otherwise under disability. Where the widow is sane, is sui juris, capable of making contracts, competent to bind herself by a legal obligation, the way is plain. She can elect whether she will take the devise or other provision made for her in the will of her husband, or whether she will claim that interest in his estate which the law gives her. But when we come to apply the statute to an insane widow, non compos mentis, one who can exercise no intelligent judgment or choice, one who is not responsible for her acts, then it goes against our notions of right and justice. Still, the law is well settled that in the construction of statutes general words are to have a general operation, unless something is found in the statute itself which affords grounds for qualifying or restraining them. No exceptions can be claimed in favor of particular persons or classes unless they are expressly mentioned.' Dixon, C. J., in Woodbury v. Shackleford, 19 Wis. 60. The same principle was recognized and enforced in Lindsay v. Fay, 28 Wis. 177, and is doubtless in accord with the great weight of judicial opinion on this subject. As the Legislature has made no exception in the statute, the courts have no right to make one, because to do so would be legislation. Were we to hold that the statute does not include a widow of unsound mind, we should certainly be making an addition to it which the Legislature has not seen fit to enact. The ill effects of holding that the statute did not include an insane widow were most ably presented in the argument of respondents' counsel. These evil consequences, however proper for the consideration of the Legislature, can really have no weight in giving construction to a statute which is plain and unambiguous in its language. The doctrine of an inherent equity, creating an exception as to any disability where the legislature has made none, must be abandoned, particularly in a country where the legislative power is distinct from the judicial. The result therefore on this point is that we must hold that the general words in the statute have a general application, and since there is no exception as to an insane widow, the court can create none. Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 138; Lewis v. Lewis, 7 Ired. (Law,) 73; Thompson v. Egbert, 2 Har. (N. J.) 462; Bank v. Dalton, 9 How. 522." The like was held in Crenshaw v. Carpenter, 69 Ala. 572; S. C., 44 Am. Rep. 539; Crozier's Appeal, 90 Penn. St. 384; S. C., 39 Am. Rep. 666. a But the court held in the principal case that court of equity might elect for her, if petitioned within a proper time. In Wright v. West, 2 Lea, 78, a widow having been prevented by insanity from dissenting within the statutory time, it was held that she might afterward in equity claim her rights as if she had duly dissented. Lyon, J., dissented in the principal case. In Woodling v. Knickerbocker, Minnesota Supreme Court, November 28, 1883, 17 N. W. Rep. 387, two interesting questions of libel arose. The court said: "The libels alleged in the complaint were placards placed upon a table belonging to and standing upon the sidewalk in front of the place of business of the Knickerbocker Furniture Company,' a firm engaged in dealing at wholesale and retail in furniture and draperies, in Minneapolis. The defendants are alleged to be partners in that firm, and the complaint charges that they, and each of them, put the placards on the table. The first placard read: 'Taken back from Dr. Woodling, who could not pay for it; to be sold at a bargain.' This was removed by plaintiff, and soon after another was placed on the table, which read: 'This was taken from Dr. Woodling, as he would not pay for it; for sale at a bargain;' and near this, at the same time was placed another: 'Moral: Beware of deadbeats.' These two, read together, as they were undoubtedly intended to be, constitute a gross libel. They are clearly defamatory on their face. The first one, that removed by plaintiff, comes within the second class of words classified in Pratt v. Pioneer Press Co., 30 Minn. 41, i. e., those that are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning as well as an innocent one, according to the occasion and circumstances of using them. What meaning, whether injurious or not injurious to plaintiff, they would convey to ordinary men, who read them without a knowledge of the transaction to which they referred, was for the jury to determine, in view of the circumstances under which they were exposed to the public perusal, and whether they were libellous or not ought to have been left to the jury to say. It appeared on the trial that the defendants Layman and S. E. Knickerbocker were members of the firm. How George Knickerbocker was connected with it did not appear. And it did not appear that S. E. Knickerbocker had any thing to do with, or knew any thing of, the placing of the placards on the table. She cannot be held liable unless by reason of it having been done by her partner, or by some one in the service of the firm. One can be held liable for a libel published by another only because he has authorized him to make the publication. There is nothing in the nature of the business of this firm that of dealing in furniture and draperies — from which authority to one partner or to a servant to gratuitously publish a libel can be implied. The case is different from that of a partnership whose business is publishing or selling either books or newspapers, where each partner is supposed to have authority to publish or sell, and to determine what shall be published or sold, and also from that of the necessary correspondence of a firm, where each partner is presumed authorized to conduct it, and to determine on its substance and terms.” The same court, in Olson v. Crossman, November 17, 1883, 17 N. W. Rep. 375, an action against an innkeeper, held that it is not imputable as negligence in the guest that he consented to be placed to sleep in a room with another guest with whom he did not come to the inn, and who was a stranger to him, by whom his goods were stolen. In Mc Cullough v. Hemingway and Shoneman, Pennsylvania Common Pleas, June 2, 1883, 14 W. N. Cas. 14, the plaintiff, passing along a sidewalk, was struck and injured by a bag of waste paper thrown from a window of the defendant Shoneman's which makes the person doing it, or his employer, building by the servants of the defendant Heming- "In defendants were merchants in the city of Troy, New York. They sold to Messrs. E. & D. B. Plum a box which was in the upper loft of the defendants' store. The Messrs. Plum sent their porter for it. He went up into the loft to get the box, and hallooed to some one to hoist the fall, which was on the outside and in front of the store, which being done, the porter hooked the box by the ends and swung it out, and while it was descending, it struck against the middle roller, which knocked it out of the hooks, and it fell, striking the plaintiff violently on the head and injuring him. At the trial the judge charged the jury, that if they should find that the porter went into the store with the knowledge or permission of the defendants, he so far became their agent and servant, while engaged in that business, as to render them liable for the consequences of his carelessness, and the question on appeal was whether the judge did not err in so charging. The Court of Appeals held that 'the defendants could not be rendered liable for the negligent acts of the porter, by virtue of the principle applicable to the relation of master and servant, unless that relation in fact subsisted. Knowing and permitting the porter to go into the loft to get the box, being in fact, at the time, the servant of Plum, and actually acting in his employment, did not constitute the porter in any degree the agent or servant of the defendants while engaged in removing the box. The relation of master and servant cannot be created but by contract, express or implied, between the master and servant.' It was therefore held that the defendants were not liable, and that the judge had erred in his charge to the jury. See also Blattenberger v. Little Schuylkill Nav. Co., 2 Miles, 309, where the subject is fully considered in its application to personal property. * * * It is not unlawful in itself to take merchandise out of the upper stories of a warehouse, by lowering it on a rope, or even by dropping it, in a careful manner, down the outside of the warehouse; it is only a negligent or careless manner of doing such work, THE PRESUMPTIVE VALIDITY OF JUDI CIAL ACTS. RULE I. Where a court having general jurisdiction acts in a case its jurisdiction to so act will be presumed.(1) ILLUSTRATION. 1. In a suit in a court of chancery, a grant of adinvalid. The order of this court granting letters of ministration by a probate court was objected to as administration did not show that the decedent died intestate or that his last residence was in the county in which the grant was made. Held, that these requisites to the jurisdiction of the court would be presumed.(2) In case 1 it was said: "Our courts of probate are not inferior in the technical sense of that term, as used upon the subject at common law, nor is this jurisdiction special and limited; on the contrary it is general, original and exclusive. In the exercise of such a jurisdiction, these courts are entitled to the presumption that what they do is rightly done and on just grounds." RULE II. But when the proceedings are taken by an inferior court, (a) or are under a special authority granted to any tribunal in a special case or for special purposes, (b) or are not according to the course of the common law, (c) the jurisdiction is not presumed but must be shown.(3) Nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a superior court, but that which specially appears to be so, and nothing will be presumed to be within the jurisdiction of inferior courts, but that which is expressly alleged. (4) It is a general rule, said Wightman, J., "that all judicial acts exercised by persons whose judicial authority is limited as to locality (1) Markel v. Evans, 47 Ind. 326 (1874); Butcher v. Bank of Brownesville, 2 Kas. 80 (1863); State v. Lewis, 22 N. J. (L.) 564 (1849), Railway Co. v. Ramsey, 22 Wall. 3:22 (1874). (2) Brien v. Hart, 6 Hump. 131 (1845); and see Kilcrease v. Blythe, 6 id. 379 (1845). (3) Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 127; Kempe v. Kennedy, 5 Cranch, 173; Jackson v. New Milford Bridge Co., 34 Conn. 266 (1867); Pelton v. Palmer, 13 Ohio, 209 (1844); Goulding v. Clark, 34 N. H. 148 (1856). (4) Peacock v. Bell, 1 Saund. 74. must appear to be done within the locality to which the authority is limited."(5) where the examination was taken. An examination of a soldier taken before two magistrates was offered in evidence, but it did not show where the soldier was quartered at the time. There was no presumption that he was quartered at the place where the examination was taken, and it was inadmissible. (15). "The rule," said Holroyd, J., in case 1, "that in in maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta does not apply to give jurisdiction has never been questioned. Here then the jurisdiction should at all events have appeared on the face of the examination, supposing proof of it aliunde not to have been necessary." "It is undoubtedly true," say the Supreme Court of the United States in Galpin v. Page, (6) "that a superior court of general jurisdiction, proceeding within the general scope of its powers, is presumed to act rightly, all intendments of law in such cases are in favor of its acts. It is presumed to have jurisdic-ferior courts and proceedings by magistrates, the tion to give the judgments it renders until the contrary appears; and this presumption embraces jurisdiction not only of the cause or subject-matter of the action in which the judgment is given, but of the parties also. The former will generally appear from the character of the judgment, and will be determined by the law creating the court or prescribing its general powers. The latter should regularly appear by evidence in the record of service of process upon the defendant or his appearance in the action. But when the former exists the latter will be presumed. This is familiar law and is asserted by all the adjudged cases. The rule is different with respect to courts of special and limited authority; as to them there is no presumption of law in favor of their jurisdiction; that must affirmatively appear by sufficient evidence or proper averment in the record, or their judgments will be deemed void on their face." The meaning of "inferior court" in the above rule, is not, as will have been observed from the language just quoted, the broad meaning which this phrase sometimes bears. By an "inferior court," is meant one with only limited jurisdiction; a court with general jurisdiction is not an "inferior court" within the rule, because au appeal may lie from its decision to a higher tribunal. In the appellate court the presumption always is that the court from which the appeal is taken has not erred, and this presumption must be removed by proof before the court will reverse the proceedings below. (7) "A revisory court never presumes that an inferior tribunal has erred. The presumption is that it has not. Until the contrary is shown by record every court is presumed to have acted and decided correctly."(8) As superior courts within rule 1 are included all courts of the common law and created by statute having general common-law jurisdiction; also a court Palatine of a county,(9) a court of chancery, (10) and a court of probate. (11) On the other hand there are inferior courts within the rule, viz., a justice of the peace:(12) a magistrate whose authority is restricted by locality;(13) a County Court in Iowa.(14) ILLUSTRATIONS. A statute gave justices of the peace power to take the examination of a soldier quartered in the place (5) R. v. Totness, 11 Q. B. 80 (1849); Dempster v. Parnell, 4 Scott, N. R. 30 (1841); King v. Fell, 1 Bold. 386 (1830); Swain v. Chase, 12 Cal. 283 (1859); Bosworth v. Vandewalker, 53 N. Y. 597 (1873). In R. v. Gouche, 2 Salk. 441, the Court of King's Bench ruled that jurisdiction of magistrates would be presumed until the contrary was shown. Different conclusion was reached in R. v. Helling, 1 Strange, 7, decided in 1780. The later ruling was affirmed by Lord Kenyon in King v. Inhabitants of Hulcott, 6 T. R. 585, in the year 1796, after a review of all the earlier authorities. (6) 18 Wall. 364 (1873). (7) State v. Farish, 23 Miss. 483 (1852). (8) Wagers v. Dickey, 17 Ohio, 439 (1848); Coil v. Willis, 18 id. 28 (1849). (9) Peacock v. Bell, 1 Saund. 74. (10) Hopper v. Fisher, 2 Head, 258 (1858); Kilcrease v. Blythe, 6 Humph. 379 (1845). (11) Brien v. Hart, 6 Humph. 131 (1845); Redmond v. Anderson, 18 Ark. 449 (1857). (12) Swain v. Chase, 12 Cal 283 (1859); Van Eltten v. Jilson, 6 id. 19; Whitwell v. Barbour, 7 id. 64. (13) R. v. Totness, 11 Q. B. 80 (1849); R. v. Bloomsbury, 4 El. & B. 520 (1854). (14) County of Mills v. Hamaker, 11 Iowa, 206 (1860). (B.) 1. A statute gave to County Courts power to order the sale or partition of real estate of an intestate where the heirs could not agree upon a division or one of them was a minor. Under this law a County Court partitioned certain land. In a proceeding in which its act was attacked. Held, that there was no presumption that every thing necessary to the validity of the judicial act had been done. (16) 2. A statute provided that a magistrate should have power to call a meeting of a corporation upon the petition of three or more proprietors owning onetwentieth of a property. There is no presumption that such a meeting called by a magistrate was doue on the petition of such proprietors.(17) 3. By the law of New Jersey the acknowledgment of a deed of lands lying in the State can be taken in another State, only where the grantor whose acknowl edgment is taken resides in such State. A deed of lands in New Jersey was acknowledged before a commissioner in New York. There was no presumption that the grantor resided at the time in New York. (18) 4. The board of aldermen of a city were constituted by statute, a court for the purpose of trying a city officer on charges preferred. The statute required the aldermen to be duly sworn as such court. In a proceeding to set aside their finding, there is no presumption that they were sworn.(19) In case 1 it was said: "It is an important question in this cause whether the proceedings of this court upon a petition to divide the real estate of an intes. tate under the act be proceedings under a special au thority delegated to this court in a particular case or whether they be proceedings under its general and or dinary jurisdiction, as a court of law or a court of equity. If the latter be the case, many things may be presumed which do not appear on the record nor in the evidence produced; nor will evidence be permit ted to contradict the presumption arising from the acts of the court as they appear upon the record. Thus after a court has ordered a sale in the exercise of its general and ordinary jurisdiction, it would be presumed that the court had satisfactory evidence of every prerequisite to justify the court in making the order, and such presumption would continue so long as the order of the court should remain unreversed. On the contrary if the proceedings be under a special authority delegated to this court in a particular case and not under its general jurisdiction as a court of common law or of equity, nothing material can be presumed. The person claiming title under such proceedings must show them to be regular, and in which the court had jurisdiction and was authorized to do what was done. By the Maryland Act of Descents, the chancellor has original jurisdiction only in the case where the lands to be divided lie in different (15) Kink v. Inhabitants of All Saints, 7 B. & C. 785 (1823). counties. If the land lie entirely in one county, the County Court alone has jurisdiction of the case. This court therefore can exercise jurisdiction in the present case only as being substituted for the County Court. It is a special jurisdiction given to a court of law in a particular case." "There is no presumption," it was said in case 2," in favor of the jurisdiction of inferior courts or magistrates, or persons vested with special powers; but their authority must be shown." In case 3 it was said: "It is insisted however that the presumption of law is that the officer acted correctly, and within the scope of his authority. This principle undoubtedly prevails as applied to judicial proceedings in courts of general jurisdiction; but the maxim, omnia præsumuntur rite esse acta, does not apply so as to give jurisdiction to magistrates, and to persons exercising a special, limited, or mere statutory authority." In case 4 it was said: "The board of aldermen could only become a court to try charges preferred against a city officer upon being duly sworn; and being a court of the most limited jurisdiction— indeed having jurisdiction.as a court only for the purpose of the trial and removal of officers-every thing essential to make it such a court must appear affirmatively, and no intendment or presumption in its favor can be indulged." (C.) By a State statute service of process by publication is substituted in place of personal citation in proceeding against persons without the State. That the statute has been strictly followed must be proved, and no presumption of jurisdiction will be indulged in.(20) When the special powers conferred," it is said in case 1, "are brought into action according to the course of the common law, i. e., in the usual form of common law and chancery proceedings, by regular process and personal service, where a personal judg ment or decree is asked, or by seizure or attachment of the property where a judgment in rem is sought, the same presumption of jurisdiction will usually attend the judgments of the court as in cases falling within its general powers (21) But where the special powers conferred are exercised in a special manner, not according to the course of the common law, or where the general powers of the court are exercised over a class not within its ordinary jurisdiction, upon the performance of prescribed conditions no such presumption of jurisdiction will attend the judgment of the court. The facts essential to the exercise of the special jurisdiction must appear in such cases upon the record. The extent of the special jurisdiction, and the conditions of its exercise over subjects or persons necessarily depend upon the terms in which the jurisdiction is grauted, and not upon the rank of the court upon which it is conferred. Such jurisdiction is not therefore the less to be strictly pursued, because the same court may possess over other subjects or other persons a more extended and general jurisdiction. RULE III. The regularity of the proceedings of courts of general powers is presumed, (a) and so of the proceedings of inferior courts, jurisdiction being once shown to exist. (b) (22) The maxim omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta finds perhaps its best application in sustaining the validity of judicial proceedings. They are presumed to be (20) Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 364 (1873); Jordan v. Goblin, 12 Cal. 100; Ricketson v. Richardson, 26 id 149; McMinn v. Whelan, 27 id. 300; Morse v. Presby, 25 N. H. 302. (21) Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. 332. (22) Merritt v. Baldwin, 6 Wis. 439 (1858); Outlaw v. Davis, 27 Ill. 467 (1861); Tharp v. Com., 3 Metc. (Ky.) 411 (1861); Com. v. Bolkom, 3 Pick. 281 (1825); Davis v. State, 17 Ala. 354 (1850); State v. Farish, 23 Miss. 483 (1852); McGrews v. McGrews, 1 St. & P. 30 (1831). regular. (23) So too after a verdict, a court of review (23) Brown y. Connelly, 21 Ark. 140 (1840); Seegee v. Thomas, 3 Blatchf 111 (1853); Sanford v. Sanford, 28 Conn. 6 (1859); Sidwell v. Worthington, 8 Dana, 74 (1839); Brown v. Gill, 49 Ga. 549 (1873); Hudson v. Messick, 1 Houst. 275 (1855); Tibbs v. Allen, 27 Ill. 119 (1862); Moore v. Neil, 39 Ill. 256 (1866); Rosenthal v. Renick, 44 id. 202 (1887); Owen v. State, 25 Ind. 371 (1865); Keely v. Garner, 13 id. 400 (1859); Morgan v. State, 12 id. 449 (1859); McNorton v. Akers, 24 Ia. 369 (1868); Sumner v. Cook, 12 Kas. 162 (1873); Letcher v. Kennedy, 3 J. J. Marsh. 701 (1830); Sprague v. Litherberry, 4 McLean, 442 (1848); Reynolds v. Nelson, 41 Miss. 83 (1866), Apthorp v. North, 14 Mass. 167 (1817); Com. v. Balkom, 3 Pick. 281 (1825); McGrews v. McGrews, 1 St. & P. 30 (1831); Callison v. Autry, 4 Tex. 871 (1849); Smith v. Sprague, 4 Vt. 43 (1867); Reedy v. Scott, 23 Wall. 352 (1874); Florentine v. Barton, 2 id. 210 (1864); Cofield v. McClel land, 16 id. 331 (1872); Addington v. Allen, 11 Wend. 374 (1883); Foot v. Stevens, 17 id 486; Erwin v Lowry, 7 How. 181; Voorhees v. Bank of United States, 10 Pet. 449; King v. Lyme Regis, 1 Dougl. 159 (1779); Caunce v. Rigby, 3 M. & W 68 (1837); James v. Heward,2 G.& Dav.264 (1842); Parsons v. Lloyd, 3 Wils. 341 (1772). Supreme Court will not presume that District Court received documents in evidence not properly stamped as required by the United States law. Towne v. Bossier, 19 La. Ann 162 (1867). From delivery of letters of administration it is presumed that oath required of administrator was taken. Brooks v. Walker, 3 La. Ann. 150 (1848). Proof that certain lost writs were issued by the proper officer raises presumption that they were sufficient as to form and seal. McNorton v. Akers, 24 Ia. 369 (1868). Where a cause is on trial at twelve o'clock on the night of the last day of the term, it will be assumed that the term did not close until that time. Morgan v. State, 12 Ind. 449 (1859). A modification of judgment made by the co urt after verdict will be presumed to have been made on the statutory grounds. Sumner v. Cook, 12 Kas. 162 (1873). It will be presumed that an order directing a sheriff to sell property of a succession was regularly issued. Re Wadsworth, 2 La. Ann. 966 (1874). Where the law requires that the bond given by an administrator before the sale of the real estate of his intestate shall be approved in writing by the judge of probate, the presumption is that this was done. Austin v. Austin, 50 Me. 74 (1862). So as to duties of register of court before sale. Vincent v. Eaves, 1 Metc. 247 (1858). It will be presumed that the court below did "strict justice" to the parties as required by statute. Grinstead v. Foute, 26 Miss. 476 (1853). In a collateral proceeding it will not be presumed that service was made by an officer of the court outside of the county. State v. Williamson, 57 Mo. 192 (1874). A letter of guardianship in due form will be presumed to have been regularly issued. Vanderveere v. Gaston, 25 N. J. L. 615 (1856). The presumption is that evidence admitted by a justice of the peace is legal evidence; the party alleging error must prove it. Smith v. Williamson, 11 N. J. L. 313 (1830). A docket entry showing that the jury were "sworn according to law," the presumption is that they were regularly sworn. Williamson v. Fox, 38 Penn. St. 214 (1861). Where after an order for a change of venue, the parties appear and litigate the case in the same court to final judgment, the presumption is that the change of venue is waived. Frosh v. Holmes, 8 Tex. 29 (1852); Doty v. State, 6 Blackf. 529 (1843). A judgment by default entered on the first day of a term is presumed to be entered while the court is in session and on due proof of the non-appearance of the defendant. Bunker v. Rand, 19 Wis. 254 (1865). Where a writ is duly returned it will be presumed that it was duly served. Drake v. Duvenich, 45 Cal. 455 (1873). The law presumes that proper care is taken of official records and files. Rice v. Cunningham, 29 Cal. 492 (1866); that copies of papers used in the court below were proper copies. Morris v. Ogle, 56 Ga. 592 (1876). "Upon the common presumptions in favor of every judicial tribunal, acting within its jurisdiction, we must suppose that all persons concerned had due notice." Brown v. Wood, 17 Mass. 68 (1820). Where judgment is shown the presumption is that the summons was served on the defendant as required by law. Ray v. Rowley, 4 Thomp. & C. 43; 1 Hun, 614 (1874). |