adds his own name as a witness, behind the back of the maker, without his knowledge and consent, the act having been done or procured to be done through honest motives and without any wrongful intent. The law shrinks from applying the severest rule in such a case, but pardons the act upon the grounds of expediency and for the public good. It is a somewhat common belief among the masses of the people, that if a person sees another sign an instrument, or if he knows his handwriting, such person may attest his knowledge of the fact by signing the instrument as a witness without the maker's knowledge or consent. This is often the case with contracts, bonds and deeds, as well as with promissory notes. It is better that a maker or promisor should occasionally and accidentally have such a slight risk or chance of injury imposed upon him, than that many important deeds and notes should become through innocent mistake invalidated and lost. The general rule was reluctantly sustained by the Massachusetts court in the case of Homer v. Wallis, 11 Mass. 309. In that case the witness did not see the maker sign the note. In Smith v. Dunham, 8 Pick. 246, the exception to the rule, or its qualification, was established. The court held, that the act being innocently done, it did not amount to a technical alteration. In Ford v. Ford, 17 Pick. 418, it was held to be a harmless act to add a witness to an instrument without the maker's consent, the instrument having been witnessed before. In that case no fraud was suggested. In Adams v. Frye, 3 Metc. 103, the obligee of an unattested bond got a person, who knew the handwriting of the obligor, but was not present when the bond was signed, to add his name as a witness to the bond; and in that case the bond was held not to be avoided, it being shown that the act was done without any wrongful intent. It is there said by the court: We think it would be too severe a rule, and one which might operate with great hardship upon an innocent party, to hold inflexibly that such alteration would, in all cases, discharge the obligor from the performance of his contract or obligation. If an alteration, like that made in the present case, can be shown to have been made honestly, if it can be reasonably accounted for, as done under some misapprehension or mistake, or with the supposed consent of the obligor, it should not operate to avoid the obligation.' Willard v. Clarke, 7 Metc. 435, affirms the doctrine of the Massachusetts cases pre

ceding that case. We regard the doctrine as fully established by our own adjudications. In Brackett v. Mountfort, 11 Me. 115, it was held that the note was avoided by such an unauthorized alteration. In that case the witness did not see the maker of the note sign his name, and he added his own name thereto more than ten years after the note was made. The court evidently regarded it as a fraudulent alteration. In Rollins v. Bartlett, 20 Me. 319, it was held that the validity of a note would not be destroyed by a subscribing witness attesting the note generally, when he saw only one of the three

promisors execute the note, the act being done without a wrongful intention. In Thornton v. Appleton, 29 Me. 298, the attesting witness saw the maker sign the note and afterward, without the knowledge and consent of the maker, at the request of the payee, witnessed the same. But this act, it was held, did not annul the note, it being done without an intention to defraud. Mr. Parsons (2 Bills and Notes, 555,) approves the doctrine unhesitatingly. Other authorities could be added. Procuring such an attestation would be prima facie evidence of fraudulent intent. But that may be rebutted and disproved." Mr. Daniels says (Neg. Inst. § 1393): "But it is treading on dangerous, and at least doubtful, ground to countenance this doctrine."

In Cheney v. Town of Ryegate, 55 Vt. 499, an action for injuries received while travelling on the the highway, caused by a collision with a runaway team whose driver had been thrown from the sled in consequence of a bad place in the road about fifty rods back of the place where the accident occurred, evidence that such team had the habit of running away was held not admissible. The court said: "We think there was no error in this. The towns are required to so construct their highways as to guard against accidents likely to occur. In Kelsey v. Glover, 15 Vt. 708, Kelsey's horse was killed by a rnnaway team, forced into the highway and against Kelsey's horse by a tree-top on the margin of the road. That horse had the historic vice of running away, 'without any occasion.' Whether the runaway horses are instigated by inherent vice, or adequate occasion, is not material; it is enough that the danger of injury to the plaintiffs was enhanced by this accident, or incident, that occurred in consequence of this bad place in the road.

Whether the owner or driver of that team could have recovered damages for his injury of this defendant is not involved in this case."

In Matthew's Appeal, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, October, 30, 1883, 13 W. N. C. 502, an interesting question of the right of counsel to comment on a master's report arose. The chief justice said: “Our attention has been directed to some objectionable and improper language in the appellant's paperbook. Objectionable words, hastily spoken in the warmth of oral argument, may often be excused. In printed arguments there is no excuse for language such as we find in this book. The motives of the master are impugned, and he himself is spoken of contemptuously. Especially is this unjustifiable where, as here, the master's report was confirmed by the court. The master is a part of the court. To say that his course of reasoning is contrary to

common sense

** * * it is kin to the utterings of a 'crank'' is not criticism on his reasons, nor relevant to the questions at issue. Farther on we find this language: 'But the master bridged it over by saying that there was so little of the balance of

purchase-money left that the game would not be worth the candle; and therefore excused the company from fault. Here again we have a ruling which more closely resembles the utterings of a 'crank' than it does the reasoning of a chancellor.' The attention of appellant's counsel was called to this objectionable language in open court a week ago, immediately after the calling of the general list, but the book now comes to us unchanged. A majority of this court has determined that this paper-book be suppressed." Counsel for appellant desired to be heard, but the chief justice said: "We have read the language and decided on its impropriety. We | cannot hear argument as to the wisdom of our decision, but if you wish to make any apology we will hear you." Counsel for appellant then stated that the argument was written in haste, and was not intended to reflect personally on the master, between whom and the counsel friendly relations exist; and that the objectionable language would be expunged. The paper-book having been purged, the case was afterward by consent of appellee's counsel heard by the court.

The Canada Law Journal publishes the report of Reg. v. Taylor, Ontario C. P. Div., February, 1882, which case holds that it is criminal for a barber to

shave for hire on Sunday. The statute prohibits "worldly labor or work of his ordinary calling," excepting works of necessity and.charity. The court said: "The defendant is, in my opinion, a workman

one of the class of persons named in the statute. The act of shaving he is charged to have performed as a barber is an act that was done by him in the ordinary course of his business as a barber, and it was done on the Lord's day, and was not a work of necessity or charity. It was that kind of worldly labor which the statute expressly forbids being done on that day. The case of Philips v. Innes, 4 Cl. &. 234, applies very closely to this case, because the House of Lords declared the business of shaving by a barber on Sunday was not 'a work of necessity or mercy,' which is the language of the Scotch law. In that case the master was attempting to compel his apprentice to serve in the shop on Sundays till about ten A. M., and to shave the customers of his master, who frequented the barber's shop on that day for the purpose of being shaved, and the decision was reversing the judgment of the Scotch court, that the apprentice could not be required to do that which was unlawful to do on such a day. It has been decided in England that a baker or cook may supply his customers with their meals prepared by such baker or cook at his usual place of business upon Sunday, because many persons have not the means of doing such work themselves, and it is of necessity that they must eat. There is a great difference between such a business as that and carrying on the work of shaving. The business of a barber, I presume, could, while it was associated with that of surgery, have been carried on on Sunday. These two very dissimilar professions

were united by the 32 Henry VIII., ch. 42, but were severed by 18 George II., ch. 15, because 'the barbers belonging to the corporation have for many years been engaged in a business foreign to and independent of the practice of surgery'- a very satisfactory reason. Since then the barber is nothing more than a workman, one who performs mere manual labor, and he cannot lawfully exercise his calling on Sunday any more than any other workman may.' ." Osler, J., moreover said he thought the cases of a baker and a barber not distinguishable. See State v. Lorry, 7 Baxt. 95; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 555.

The court said:

In Shultz v. Insurance Co., Ohio Supreme Court Commission, October 23, 1883, 4 Ohio Law Jour. 514, it was held that a life insurance policy conditioned to be void if the assured should "under any circumstances die by his own hand," was not avoided by his death by his own hand while insane. "The phrase, 'under any circumstances,' must be disregarded as too general and uncertain to serve any purpose in the construction of the proviso under consideration." Citing Jacobs v. Life Ins. Co., 1 McA. 632, where the condition was, "shall die by his own hand or act, voluntary or otherwise." The court then review the conflicting his own hand," and adopt the rule of Life Ins. Co. authorities on the meaning of the phrase, "die by v. Terry, 15 Wall. 584. Two judges dissented, observing: "It seems to us that the words 'shall, under any circumstances, die by his own hand,' do indicate that the phrase was not used in the technical judicial construction had made narrow. As that They evince a purpose to widen that which narrowing consisted in always so construing the phrase as to include the idea that the decedent was criminal, and therefore sane, it is evident that the widening intended consists in excluding that idea Hence by a reasonable construction effect can be If we are right in thus thinking, it is the duty of given to the new words 'under any circumstances.' the court to so construe in this case."

sense.

A

COMMON WORDS AND PHRASES.

PPARATUS; APPENDAGES. A mathematical chart may come within the description of "school apparatus and appendages." School District v. Swayze, 29 Kans. 211. The court said: "Now it is certain that all kinds of school apparatus are not included among the articles properly denomi nated 'appendages;' but we think it is equally certain that some kinds of school apparatus may be denominated 'appendages;' for instance, we would think that blackboards, outline maps and mathematical charts, to be hung upon the walls of the school-house and to remain there permanently for the purpose of illustrating such lessons in science, history or geography as might be taught in the schools, might properly be denominated both 'school apparatus and appendages.' A mathematical

chart might be hung upon the walls of the schoolhouse and become an appendage; and it might also be used for the purpose of illustrating the science of mathematics, and thereby become a part of the apparatus used by the school."

Union

BUCKET-SHOP.-In Bryant v. Western Telegraph Co., 7 Fed. Rep. 825, it is said: "If bucket-shop means a place where wagers are made upon the fluctuation of the market price of grain and other commodities, then I think the evidence shows the complainants keep such a 'shop,' and are of the class which defendants are prohibited from furnishing the market quotations of the Chicago Board of Trade. This is gambling, and a very pernicious and demoralizing species of gambling, which a court of equity should not protect even if the board of trade had not taken the action it has." PACKET.In United States v. Blackman, 17 Fed. Rep. 837, the defendant, a railway postal clerk, was indicted for detaining and opening a packet of tea. The statute spoke only of opening "any letter packet, bag, or mail of letters." It was held that the packet need not necessarily be one of letters. The court said: "If the statute had provided for mailing only letters, then we should have understood that the packet referred to was a packet of letters; but since the statute authorized the mailing of packets of merchandise, I hold that such packets were likewise included in the criminal provision under consideration. To hold otherwise would be to assume that Congress intended to provide for mailing packets both of letters and of merchandise, but did not intend to punish employees for tampering with the latter. The more reasonable construction is that the word 'packet' in the statute in question means any packet which is mailable." DEVICE. -In Re Lee Tong, United States District Court, Oregon, November 3, 1883, Chic. Leg. News, November 17, 1883, it is held that the Chinese game of "tantam" is gaming by means of a device. The court said: "It is a simple game of chance; something like odd or even.' The device by which it is played are little brass disks, called 'cheen,' about the size of a twenty cent piece, with a square hole in the center, in which the conductor of the game inserts a pointed stick for the purpose of conveniently and publicly moving them on the table as he draws them from the pile. He has probably two or three hundred of these near him. On the table when the game is played a small square is described, with its sides marked 1, 2, 3, 4. The player takes up, at random, a handful of the brasses and puts them on the table before him, and as he does so, covers them more or less with a hollow vessel, so that no one can tell what number is in the pile or whether it is an odd or even one. The players then put down their money on the sides of the square, as they may fancy. When this is done the conductor uncovers the brasses and picks them out of the pile, four at a time, until only four or a less number are left. If the number left is an even one-either two or four, the player who put his

money on this figure wins a like amount from the table, less a rebate of seven per centum to the conductor, and the table wins what is laid on the other even number, while those who put their money on the odd numbers withdraw it. If the number of brasses left is an odd one either one or three, that number wins and the process is reversed. The device mentioned in the statute is not cards, dice or other 'like' device, but simply 'other 'device. And if it were a 'like' device, the question would arise — like in what respect? like which of them? Cards and dice are in most respects very unlike—indeed, they have no resemblance, except that they may both be used for gaming. But then any thing which may be used for that purpose is so far a like device The coin of the realm, when used to play the game of 'match,' 'heads or tails,' 'odd or even,' for money or any thing of value-a long and short straw when used to play the game of 'draw straws' for the same purposea 'wheel of fortune' or a grab-bag,' when used at church fairs or festivals or elsewhere, to dispose of articles of value upon the chance of getting something for comparatively nothing, are each and all of them, so far, just as much gambling devices as cards or dice can be. In short, any thing which is used as a means of playing for money or other things of value, so that the result depends more largely on chance than skill, is so far a gambling device."

เ

-

RAISE. In regard to money to be got by subscription, this means "collect." Prest., etc., of Bates College v. Bates, Massachusetts Supreme Court, September, 1883.

in

GOOD FAITH. - In Wilder v. Gilman, 55 Vt. 503, Redfield, J., says: "Good faith, or the want of it, is not a visible, tangible fact, that can be seen and touched, but rather a state or condition of mind which can only be judged of by actual or fancied tokens and signs; and the greatest errors have been committed, and the bloodiest and blackest pages history written by men who arrogate to themselves good faith, and deny it to others. The richest ingredient of our inheritance is that there is woven into the texture of our organic law that crime cannot be predicated upon the fancied state of mind; nor fundamental rights lost or denied, except for overt acts. Sin, whether original or imputed, doubtless exists, and sometimes in the most subtle form, but it has been found wiser and safer to leave that to free discussion and the harmless exercise of opinion; that the 'subtle disputants on creeds' may have 'free course,' without power to inflict penalties for error of opinion or a bad state of mind. It is not probable that this justice had a very accurate conception of what 'good faith' meant, whether it had reference to the Nicene Creed' or to some abstruse process of the law which he did not fully comprehend. This statute to work beneficial results must have a practical administration. The petitioner was denied a valuable right, because, as the record is made to say, he did not present his claim in good faith, though he swore to the claim and there was no

evidence to the contrary. It was somewhere in the woods of this same county, when the pettifogger had free course, and petty justices rendered final judgments in actions for slander and other matters without jurisdiction, that an honest suitor sued in trespass for taking personal property, read a case to the very point in the Vermont Reports, wherein the case was stated as trespass de bonis asportatis, showing what he had done was lawful and right. The pettifogger, with a show of offended dignity at such outrages upon justice, informed the magistrate that the defendant did not read that case to the court in good faith. He knew better; it had nothing to do with the case in hand; it showed on the face of the opinion of the court that it was a miserable quarrel between two men about a lot of potatoes.' It hardly need be added that the defendant was cast in his suit for the want of 'good faith.' And we remember as one of the well authenticated incidents of the Orleans county bar that the late Samuel Sumner, having graduated with honor from college and regularly admitted to the bar, began practice at Coventry. He was soon called to defend a suit at Derby. Sumner felt scandalized and exhibited some passion at the unprofessional treatment he received, whereupon objection was made to Sumner that his pretense of being an attorney was not in good faith; that he does not look nor appear like an attorney; ' and neither a defense nor appeal was allowed to Sumner's client. Whether such a miscarriage of justice may be technically and strictly termed fraud, accident, or mistake, or not, it is a mishap, when final judgment has come upon a man, and legal rights denied him, without fault on his part. It is more common that justices are so acted upon that they get in the wrong, than they, of their own volition, act corruptly. And from what is stated in this, it would seem more probable that the mind of the justice, especially all judicial qualities of his mind, by the charges and counter-charges of good and bad faith, was in a state of catalepsy, so that he denied the appeal without much considering on what legal ground it could be put. It was a mishap, and for all practical purposes may be called 'accident or mistake.'

OPERATION OF RAILWAY. A section-hand, engaged in loading timber upon cars, is not engaged in the "operation of the railway." Smith v. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 59 Iowa, 73.

"The

TOOLS. In Green v. Raymond, 58 Tex. 80, it was held that a printing press, types and cases are exempt from forced sales as "tools and apparatus of trade or profession." The court said: terms used, and especially the word 'apparatus,' is strikingly apt, a generic term of the most comprehensive signification. The trade or profession of Raymond was that of editor and publisher of a weekly newspaper. What tools and apparatus belonged to that trade or profession? It is the printing press, type, cases, etc., and not alone the pair of scissors, bottle of ink and goose-quill pen of the editorial department. The apparatus belonging to

the trade of a publisher must of necessity include the press, type, cases, etc., which are essential to the conducting of that business. The blacksmith could as well dispense with his anvil and hammer, the shoemaker with his awl and last, the farmer with his plow and hoe, as could the publisher dispense with his press, type and cases; and yet all of these are exempt as belonging to these respective trades. So in our opinion are the press, type, cases, etc., of the publisher exempt as belonging to his trade."

Box. A barrel is a "box" within the purpose and requirement of the statute regulating the drawing of juries. Commonwealth v. Bacon, Massachusetts Supreme Court, September, 1883.

DEVISE IN TRUST FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES.

OHIO SUPREME COURT, JANUARY TERM, 1883.*

SOWERS V. CYRENIUS.

A residuary clause in a will in these words, "At the decease of my wife Esther, I give and bequeath all my estate, real and personal, for the preaching of the Gospel of the blessed Son of God, as taught by the people known now as Disciples of Christ. The preaching to be well and faithfully done in Lorain county in Birmingham, and at Berlin in Erie county, Ohio, and I nominate and appoint John Cyrenius, Silas Wood and Samuel Steadman executors of this item of my last will and testament, and I request them to do the business without remuneration, "-creates a valid trust which will be enforced in a court of equity. Whether the legal title to the real estate devised is in the trustees, or descended to the heir at law, it is subject to the trust.

When one of the trustees named in the will died, and another removed to a place unknown, the probate court had power to fill such vacancies, although there was a surviving trustee capable of executing the trust. S. & C., 1630, §§ 66, 67.

Samuel G. Gable, a resident of Lorain county, by his will gave to his wife all of his estate during her life, and appointed her sole executrix of the will. The will then provided as follows:

"Item 3: At the decease of my wife Esther, I give and bequeath all my estate, real and personal, for the preaching of the gospel of the blessed Son of God, as taught by the people known now as Disciples of Christ. The preaching to be well and faithfully done in Lorain county in Birmingham, and at Berlin in Erie county, Ohio, and I nominate and appoint John Cyrenius, Silas Wood and Samuel Steadman, executors of this item of my last will and testament, and I request them to do the business without remuneration."

The testator died without issue, and the will was admitted to probate in Lorain county. The testator's widow afterward married Samuel Sowers, the plaintiff in error, and died intestate, leaving said Sowers her heir-at-law. Silas Wood having died, and Samuel Steadman having removed from the State of Ohio to some place unknown, the Probate Court of Lorain county appointed in their places as trustees under the will, Stanley M. Parmley and James T. Robinson. Cyrenius, Parmley and Robinson duly qualified as trustees and filed a petition in the Common Pleas Court of Lorain county against Sowers, asking for a construction of the will and for authority to sell the real estate of which the testator died seised, and to carry out the trust created by the will.

*To appear in 39 Ohio State Reports.

Sowers demurred to the petition and his demurrer was overruled. He then answers denying the due appointment of Parmley and Robinson as trustees, and the legal power of Cyrenius, Parmley and Robinson, to act as trustees, and averring that the provisions of the third item of the will are vague, uncertain and void, and that no power or authority is by the terms of said item vested in the executors therein named to sell or dispose of the property. The Court of Common Pleas held that the trust was valid and rendered judgment for the trustees in accordance with the prayer of the petition, which judgment was affirmed by the District Court, on error.

This proceeding is prosecuted to reverse the judgment of the District Court.

N. L. Johnson, for plaintiff in error.

Pennewell & Lamson, and Geo. P. Metcalf, for defendants in error.

UPSON, J. The decisions in the courts of this country and of England, in cases involving the power of courts of equity to enforce charitable trusts, and the validity of such trusts, are numerous and somewhat conflicting. But they have been fully considered in several cases heretofore decided by this court, and need not now be reviewed. It is only necessary to state the conclusions at which we have arrived.

Gifts for charitable purposes have always been favored, and trusts created for such purposes are carried into effect by courts of equity upon general principles of equity jurisdiction.

In the case of Urmey's Executor v. Wooden, 10. St. 164, it was decided that the courts of chancery in this State, independently of the statute of charitable uses, (43 Elizabeth), have jurisdiction to enforce such trusts, and the existence of that jurisdiction has not since then been questioned.

Among the charitable trusts which have been most liberally construed and most uniformly sustained have been those created for the promotion of religion and education. It is clear from the language used by the testator in the third item of his will, that he intended his property to be used, after the death of his wife, for the promotion of religion by the preaching of the gospel of Christ as taught by the denomination known as the Disciples of Christ. The object thus stated is claimed to be vague, indefinite, and uncertain, but the authorities decisively show that this claim cannot be sustained. We need only refer to the decisions of this court in the cases of Urmey's Executor v. Wooden, supra; and Miller v. Teachout, 24 Ohio St. 525. In the former case the residue of the estate was devised to "the poor and needy, fatherless, etc., of Jefferson aud Madison townships," of Montgomery county. In the latter case, the residue of the estate, after the death of the testator's wife, was to be appropriated and used "for the advancement and benefit of the Christian religion." In neither of those cases was the object of the trust defined with greater certainty than in this.

It is no objection to the validity of the trust that the individuals to be benefited by it are not designated in the will, for this indefiniteness is a necessary characteristic of charitable trusts. It is only required that discretionary power to use the property for the purposes intended by the testator should be given to trustees appointed by him, or by the court. In this instance that power has been plainly given by the testator to the persons named as executors of the third item of the will. Although the language of the will might have been more definite, the intention is clear and the trust valid.

It is next insisted that the estate was not devised, or intended to be devised, to the trustees. It is true that the estate is not devised in express terms, but the

weight of authority is in favor of the proposition that courts will by construction imply an estate in trustees, although none is given them in words, in cases where they are required to do something which cannot be done without a legal estate, and that the estate thus implied will be an estate sufficient for the purposes of the trust. In this case, the purposes of the trust obviously require an estate in fee, and that estate would under that rule be implied by construction in the trustees. It is unnecessary however to decide whether an estate in fee was taken by the trustees, or not, for even if the legal estate descended to the plaintiff in error, it descended subject to the trust, which could still be enforced against it. This was decided in the case of Trustees of McIntyre Poor School v. Zanesville Canal Co., 9 Ohio, 287, and also in the case of Williams v. First Presbyterian Society, 1 id. 478.

It is next insisted that the appointment of Parmley and Robinson, as trustees, was invalid. If this were true, the plaintiff in error would not be prejudiced thereby, for the trust might still be executed by Cyrenius, the surviving trustee; but we are of opinion that under the provisions of the act relating to wills, (S. & C. 1630, §§ 66, 67), the Probate Court was authorized, in a proper case, to appoint suitable persons to aid in executing the trust according to the will, although there might be a surviving trustee capable of executing it, and that this power was properly exercised in this case. There is nothing in the language of the will to indicate that the power given to the first trustees is a personal trust and confidence, that cannot be exercised by others, and there is nothing in the nature of the trust to prevent its execution, in accordance with the intention of the testator, as well by trustees appointed by the court as by those named in the will. Judgment affirmed.

NOTE. The following are the principal cases involving the doctrine of charitable trusts: McGill v. Brown, Bright. (Pa.) 346; Burr v. Smith, 7 Vt. 241; Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. 127; Trustees v. Zanesville, 9 Ohio, 287; Zanesville, etc., Canal Co. v. Zanesville, 20 id. 483; McIntyre's Adm'rs v. Zanesville, 17 Ohio St. 352; Urmey's Executors v. Wooden, 1 id. 164; Miller v. Teachout, 24 id. 425; Board of Education v. Ladd, 26 id. 210; Tract Society v. Atwater. 30 id. 77; Perrin v. Carey, 24 How. 465; McIntyre v. Zanesville, 9 Ohio, 203; 30 Ohio St. 77; Lockwood v. Wood, 2 Conn. 287; Brewster v. McCall, 15 id. 274; White v. Task, 22 id. 31; Treat's Appeal, 30 id. 113; Newson v. Starke, 46 Ga. 88; State v. Griffith, 2 Del. Ch. 392; Heme v. Allen, 42 Ill. 425; Sweeney v. Sampson, 5 Ind. 465; McCod v. Ochiltree, 8 Blackf. 15; Richmond v. State, 5 Ind. 334; Ex parte Lindley, 32 id. 367; Craig v. Secumb, 54 id. 420; De Bruler v. Ferguson, id. 549; 55 id. 297; Moore v. Moore, 4 Dana, 354; Chambers v. Baptist Society, 1 B. Mon. 219; Shopleigh v. Pittsburgh, 1 Greenl. 271; Kimbell v. Universalist Society, 34 Me. 424; Tappan v. Dubois, 45 id. 288; Drew v. Wakefield, 54 id. 297; Swasey v. Am. Bible Soc., 57 id. 526; Attorney-General v. Garrison, 101 Mass. 227: Robert v. Emerson, 105 id. 433; Gooch v. Association, 109 id. 558; Fellows v. Minn, 119 id. 541; Webb v. Neal, 5 Allen, 575; Odell v. Odell, 10 id. 1; Saltonstall v. Sanders, 11 id. 446; Attorney-General v. Old South Church, 13 id. 474; Brown v. Kelsy, 2 Cush. 243; North Adams v. Fitch, 8 Gray, 421; Washburn v. Sewal, 9 Metc. 280; Young v. Emery, 16 Rich. 107: Wade v. American Colonization Society, 7 Sm. & M. 695; Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Union Baptist Society v. Candia, 2 N. H. 20; Baptist Society v. Welton, id. 508; Second Cong. Society v. First Society, 14 id. 315; Brown v. Concord, 33 id. 296; Dublin Case, 38 id. 459; Methodist Trustees v. Peaseley, 15 id. 317; Mason v. M. E. Church, 12 C. E. Green, 47; Baldwin v. Baldwin, 3 Halst. Ch. 211; Williams v. Williams, 8 N. Y. 525; Matter of New York Schools, 31