was once made a question whether the reservation in a lease of the annual crops until the accruing rents had been paid, while the lessee remained in possession, as the ostensible owner, could avail as against an attachment by the creditor of the lessee. But the courts, at an early day, sanctioned such contracts, as in the interest of poor tenants, and would not allow the crops to be suatched the moment the sickle had severed the corn, or the potato had become loosened from its bed, and the owner of the soil left unrequited. And it has been uniformly held by this court, that such contracts, if bona fide, should be upheld and made available, according to the true intent of the parties. Paris v. Vail, 18 Vt. 277; Smith v. Atkins, id. 461; Briggs v. Oaks, 26 id. 138; Edson v. Colburn, 28 id. 631; Bellows v. Wells, 36 id. 599; Cooper v. Cole, 38 id. 191. Dickerman v. Ray. Opinion by Redfield, J. PAYMENT-BY CHECK-APPLICATION OF CHECK.B. having a contract with the government to furnish headstones for soldiers' graves, and being indebted to both the plaintiff and defendant, ordered all checks due for his work to be made payable to the defendant, and directed the defendant to first pay a $1,000 note which it held against him, and then to pay the plaintiff. The check came payable to B. He carried it to the bank, and by his agreement it was applied on what he owed the bank and C. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover; as the defendant never had control of the check, or its proceeds. Page v. Baxter National Bank. Opinion by Taft, J.

EVIDENCE-OF WAGES-WHEN TOO REMOTE.-In an action for wages of a carpenter per day, plaintiff offered evidence as to what carpenters' wages were in other towns in the State. Held, that this evidence was too remote. It stands on no stronger ground than the rule that distant markets cannot be consulted in proof of values unless the markets are in some way inter-dependent or sympathetic. 2 Whart. Ev., § 1290; Rice v. Manly, 66 N. Y. 82. Prices in the same vicinity may be shown. Vilas v. Downer, 21 Vt. 419; followed in Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 557. In Benham v. Dunbar, 103 Mass. 369, it is said that if the value of a town lot was in question, evidence as to the value of other lots should be confined to sales of comparatively recent date and of lots in the near vicinity. Noyes v. Fitzgerald. Opinion by Rowell, J.

MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. JULY, 1882.

CORPORATION-INVALID TRANSFER BY WHO CAN QUESTION. A railway company appropriated under the statute, for its purposes, land of plaintiff and paid for it. It afterward transferred the land to another company. Held, that plaintiff whose interests were not affected could not question the validity of the transfer. In respect to conveyances to or by a corporation, no one whose interests are not affected, except the State, can call in question the capacity of the corporation either to convey or to receive and hold property. As to persons whose interests are not so affected, if the State acquiesces in the exercise by the corporation of power to purchase and convey beyond what the State has conferred on it, they have no right to complain. Morawetz Corp., § 117; Natoma Water Co. v. Clarkin, 14 Cal. 544; Union Water Co. v. Murphy's Flat Co., 22 id. 621; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Lewis, 53 Iowa, 101; Chambers v. City of St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Martindale v. Kansas City & St. Jo. R. Co., 60 id. 508; Goundie v. Northampton Water-works Co.. 7 Penn. St. 233; Grant v. Henry Clay Coal Co., 80 id. 208; Smith v. Sheeley, 12 Wall. 358; Nat. Bank v. Mathews, 98 U. S. 621. The act of the corporation

NEGLIGENCE-MASTER AND SERVANT-CONFLICT OF LAW-STATUTE OF ANOTHER STATE RAILROAD. -A statute of Iowa providing that a railroad company shall be liable to an employee injured by the negligence of another employee, held to give a right of action enforceable in Minnesota, although there was no similar statute in Minnesota. Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11; Leonard v. Steam Nav. Co., 84 N. Y. 48; Chicago, St. L., etc., R. Co. v. Doyle, 8 Ry. Cas. 171; Nashville & C R. Co. v. Sprayberry, 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 341. See also Selma, etc., R. Co. v. Lacy, 43 Ga. 461, and S. C., 49 id. 106. Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co. Opinion by Mitchell, J.

LEASE VOID BY STATUTE OF FRAUDS. An oral lease for three years terminable upon four months' notice by the lessor is void under the statute of frauds. But though void as a lease, the rule is that if the lessee goes into possession under it, it regulates the terms of the tenancy as respects rent. Laughran v. Smith, 75 N. Y. 205; Thurber v. Dwyer, 10 R. I. 355; Larkins v. A very, 23 Conn. 304; Morrill v. Mackman, 24 Mich. 279; Tayl. Landl. & Ten., § 80; Wood Landl. & Ten., § 25. Evans v. Winona Lumber Co. Opinion by Berry, J.

INSURANCE LAW.

LIFE POLICY-PARTIES TO ACTION ON-DECLARATION -WAIVER OF PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS WHEN DUE.-(1) The engagement of the company was: "And the said company do hereby promise to, and agree with the insured, his executors, administrators, or assigns, well and truly to pay to the insured, etc. Held, that the action to recover the amount of the policy could be maintained in the name of the intestate's administra tors. Davenport v. Mutual Life Association, 47 Vt. 528, distinguished. (2) It is not necessary to set out in hæc verba in the declaration the several conditions in the policy, and then allege performance; or to prove that the insured did not die in a duel, or while employed on the railroad, etc. (3) The defendant by its dealings with the intestate in accepting payment on the premiums long after they were due, and by other acts, waived the condition in the policy, by which a failure to pay the premiums as soon as due should work a forfeiture. No tender of the last premium was necessary. Vermont Supreme Court, October Term, 1882. Tripp v. Vermont Life Ins. Co. Opinion by Powers, J. (55 Vt. 100.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

SECTIONS 444 AND 445, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

Section 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "Upon an indictment for a crime consisting

of different degrees, the jury may find the defendant not guilty of the degree charged in the indictment, and guilty of any degree inferior thereto, or of an attempt to commit the crime."

The next section provides, that "in all other cases the defendant may be found guilty of any crime the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment."

The latter section expresses the rule generally in force before the adoption of the Code in any case. The question now admitting of discussion is whether on an indictment for a crime, consisting of different degrees, a conviction can be had "of any crime, the commission of which is necessarily included in that with which he is charged in the indictment. Do the words, “in all other cases," exclude the application of the principle contained in section 445 from crimes which consist of different degrees?

Had section 445 been introduced by the words "in all cases," omitting the word "other," it would have been clear that in any case a conviction might be had for any offense necessarily included in the crime charged.

It is contended by some that no change in the rule heretofore existing was intended, while others contend that to assume that a conviction can be had for any crime "necessarily included," etc., where the crime does consist of different degrees, is to override a plain statutory provision, which limits that rule to cases other than those mentioned in section 444.

1. On an indictment for murder can there be a conviction for manslaughter?

2. On such an indictment can there be a conviction for an assault in the third degree?

Section 35 of the Penal Code seems to limit convictions to the crime charged therein," "a lesser degree of the same crime," "an attempt to commit the crime so charged," and "an attempt to commit a lesser degree of the same crime."

The fact that section 36 of the Penal Code does not mention crimes "necessarily included therein" may throw light on the inquiry.

BRASHER FALLS, N. Y., Oct. 22, 1883.

L. C. LANG.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

WOOD'S BROWNE ON CARRIERS.

Wood's Browne on the Law of Carriers of goods and passengers by land and water. By J. H. Balfour Browne, Esq., with notes and references to American cases, by H. G. Wood. New York and Albany: Banks & Broth ers, 1883. Pp. xxxi, 771.

This book is not according to our ideal, that is to say, in our opinion, an original work by a competent hand is generally preferable to a work written by one competent hand and annotated by another, especially when the original is English and the annotation is American. But Mr. Browne's book is good, and Mr. Wood's annotations are here, as everywhere else, excellent, and the work may safely be recommended for all that Mr. Wood claims for it, namely, "not to sup. plant the various excellent American treatises upon this subject," but as "a convenient and necessary adjunct thereto." The printing is excellent.

OVERTON ON LIENS.

A Treatise on the Law of Liens, at common law, equity, statutory and maritime. By D. Y. Overton. New York and Albany: Banks & Brothers, 1883. Pp. xlviii, 817. As the author says, this is "a first essay in a hitherto almost untrodden path of legal text writing." The

necessarily slight examination which we have been able to give it results in a highly favorable impression. The topic is certainly very important, and the writer has treated it as he professes,-not merely thrown together a mass of authorities. The arrangement is orderly, the discussion is clear and discreet, and the citations are sufficient to illustrate and not enough to swamp or confuse the text. Here within a very moderate compass the practitioner can find the law of lien applicable to a great number of subjects of every-day inquiry, and we shall be surprised if the essay does not meet very general approval.

CROOKE JAMES' CURIOSITIES OF LAW AND LAWYERS.

This is a very interesting and amusing melange of anecdotes, incidents, facts, fancies, opinions, suggestions, and historical information. Most of the matter is familiar, but it is derived from many sources, and it is convenient to have it gathered into the compass of 500 well-printed pages. The collector well describes the contents as "favorite sayings, standard illustrations, golden sentences, exploits of legal heroes, explanations of curious and memorable doctrines and incidents." Most of the anecdotes are English, but there are a few good ones of American parentage. The index is very good, for a wouder. Published by Banks & Brothers, New York and Albany.

SUPPLEMENT TO BURROUGHS ON TAXATION.

A Supplement to a Treatise on the Law of Taxation as imposed by the State and their municipalities, or cther sub-divisions, and as exercised by the government of the United States, particularly in the customs and internal revenue; being a digest of cases decided between August, 1877, and January 1, 1883 By W. H. Burroughs. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1883. Pp. xxvi, 126.

This seems a thorough compend of the cases decided since the issue of Mr. Burroughs' excellent work. The matter is well arranged, and there are tables of contents and cases.

HIRSCHL ON FRATERNITIES AND SOCIETIES. The Law of Fraternities and Societies. A book of interest to Masons, Odd Fellows, Red Men, Druids, Chosen Friends, Foresters, Knights of Pythias, Members of A. O. U. W., Royal Arcanum, K. of H., L. of H., and of all similar organizations, with special reference to the insurance feature. By A. J. Hirschl. St. Louis. W. H. Stevenson, 1883. Pp. vi, 74.

The title-page reads like a joke, but we suppose it all serious. What the "Red Men can "insure," except tomahawking and scalping, and what "A. O). U. W." can mean unless cats in convention, we cannot imag ine. Every thing seems to be covered unless it is the "K. K. K." There is a great deal of tom-foolery about many of these societies, and a great deal of money is wasted upon them by confiding members, but it is well to know what the law about them is, and Mr. Hirschl seems to have collected it industriously and intelligently, and arranged it methodically. The book certainly has a place. Apart from its evident legal merits, the profession should buy it because of a peculiarity which we judge to be unique--it has no preface.

BENJAMIN ON SALES.

This is the "fourth American from latest English edition," with notes by Prof. Bennett. Of the third edition, published two years ago, we spoke in terms of the warmest praise, in 24 Alb. Law Jour, 379. This

People, ex rel. Daniel D. Comstock, respondent, v. John Lucas et al., appellants.-Motion to vacate judgment taken by default-Matthew B. Almon et al. v. James G. Hamilton et al.-Granted on condition that the appellants file the return to the court within twenty days from the date of this order, and within the same time pay to the respondent twenty dollars costs of motion in each case-Bank of Nova Scotia v. James G. Hamilton et al. - Motion to amend remittitur granted with costs in this court and the courts be

Motion to amend remittitur granted without costsIn the Matter of Ferdinand S. Hahn, an attorney.Motion to dismiss appeals denied with ten dollars costs-Henry Stedeker v. Henry O. Bernard; Christiana Harrison v. The Brooklyn, Bath and Coney Island Railroad Company.

MERWIN'S PATENTABILITY OF INVENTIONS. This volume, by Henry Childs Merwin, discusses the subject under the divisions of Invention and Discovery, Anticipation or Identity, Ingenuity, New Use and Double Use, Combination, Substitution, Principle, Prior Knowledge or Use, Prior Invention, Prior Patent or Publication. It consists mainly in abstracts of adjudged cases, but each division is prefaced by a general statement of the principles governing the particular topic. It seems to be a very complete resume, and to be very intelligently executed at all points. Published by Little, Brown & Co., Boston, pp. xxx, 759.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

HE following decisions were handed down Friday, October 26, 1883.

Judgment affirmed with costs-The East River GasLight Company, appellant, v. Michael Donnelly et al., respondents; Jacob Carpenter, appellant, v. William Le Counte, respondent; Daniel Goldschmidt, respondent, v. Claude Chaffanjon, impleaded, etc., appellants; Glideon Godefroy Girard, Jr., appellant, v. Ann Elizabeth Campbell as administratrix, respondent.-Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide the event-James Talcott, respondent, v. Jacob Harris et ano., appellants. Judgment affirmed with costsBenjamin T. Robbins, respondent, v. Jesse Carll, appellant; Philip H. Adee, receiver, etc., appellant, v. Charles G. Cornell, assignee, etc., respondent.-Appeal dismissed with costs-Martin E. Lees, respondent, v. Theodore F. Lees, appellant.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Adolph Woolner, appellant, v. Edgar P. Hill et al., respondents.--. -Appeals dismissed with costs-Lewis Brownell et al., respondents, v. The National Bank of Gloversville et al., appellants; The MacKinnon Pen Company and ors., respondents, v. The Fountain Ink Company and ors., appellants; Augusta Edwards et al., appellants, v. Wm. B. Weaver, impleaded, etc., respondent; Herman Veeder, respondent, v. Wm. Mudgett et al., appellants: Julius Forstmann et al., respondents, v. Herman Schulting, appellant; First National Bank of Ithaca v. Joseph McGraw, respondent, and Ezra Cornell, appellant.- -Appeal dismissed without costsIthaca Gas-Light Company, appellant, v. Leonard Tremain et al., respondents.-Judgment affirmed with costs-Henry Amy and ano., respondents, v. Abram Stein and ano., appellants; Kate A. Sperry, respondent, v. George Gardner, appellant; John W. Dean, appellant, v. David S. Biggs, respondent.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event

UR lively contemporary the ALBANY LAW JOURsional tilt his wit is keen, and his repartee, though sharp, good natured) waxes even more funny than usual over the absurdity of Lord Coleridge "endangering his health by any such hyperborean journeys as the Canadians would gladly tempt him to. They might persuade his lordship into an Arctic exploring expedition." The intoxication resulting from the presence of a real live lord all

to themselves seems to have been too much for our Republican friends. ""Twas ever thus," however. We have no doubt their distinguished guest will have many a good story to tell of men and things in that connection, when he returns to his ain fireside. As for ourselves, we suppose living so near the North Pole keeps us cool in the presence of one with a long handle to his name, to say nothing of our being necessarily somewhat more used to it. The writer also tells us that the chief justice had all his expenses paid by the New York Bar Association 'from his own door" until his return, $2,500 being appropriated for the purpose. Jumbo would have cost more, but would have drawn a larger, though not such a select crowd. Waiving the question as to the good taste of the Lord Chief Justice of England accepting the invitation on such terms, we can join with Punch (probably the best exponent of English sentiment on such a proceeding) in hoping that the "large takings confidently expected" by the managers have been duly realized.-Canada Law Journal. —— This is the question that troubles a French justice of the peace: A drover and a butcher in the market adjusting their accounts went to a tavern to dine together. Dur ing the meal the butcher took from his pocket a bank note of one hundred francs value wherewith to pay the drover, but in handing it over let it fall in a dish of gravy. He snatched it out, and holding it between a thumb and forefinger, waived it to and fro to dry it. The drover's dog accepting this movement as a friendly invitation, and liking the smell of the saturated note, made a spring at it and swallowed it. The butcher was furious. "Give me my money," he demanded: "Kill the dog and open him." "Not by a great sight," replied the drover: "my dog is worth more than 100 francs." "Then I owe you nothing. Your dog has collected for you before witnesses." "My dog is not my cashier. And besides, where is your receipt." "The justice will have to settle this." And now for weeks the justice has vainly been seeking law or precedent for such a case, and the townsmen have been on the verge of a riot over it again and again.

"Let him."

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, NOVEMBER 10, 1883.

DURING

CURRENT TOPICS.

URING the progress of the Guiteau trial severe censure was visited upon the presiding justice for the extraordinary license and disorder which at times characterized the investigation. In a recent work by Dr. Buckham, entitled "Insanity in its Medico-Legal Relations," the author reviews these comments as follows: "It was alleged, during the trial, that unless extraordinary license were given to Guiteau to enable the experts, then and there, to study his mental condition, grave doubts existed as to whether the assassin could be convicted. We do not vouch for the truth of the allegation, but it is charitable to believe that either that or some other equally cogent and weighty reason induced the learned judge to waive, during the trial, the usually severe decorum of a court of justice, engaged in determining the guilt or innocence, sanity or insanity, of a prisoner charged with the commission of a crime the most heinous known to the law. The proceedings during that memorable trial were characterized by the conspicuous absence of gravity, dignity and order, and had, to the eyes of those who did not divine the intention of the court, the appearance of a burlesque or the enactment of a farce, rather than of a solemn trial for the deliberate, unprovoked murder of an innocent person (waiving all mention of the exalted rank and responsible official position of that individual). It is not creditable to the United States that its judicial machinery is so defective, that for the purpose of securing justice in the case of the murderer of its chief executive the court had to allow the prisoner such license as brought the court to the verge of contempt." And the doctor thinks it would have been much more dignified and decorous to have sent Guiteau to an asylum and to have allowed "the medical experts to study him thoroughly," and determine concerning his mental condition. Perhaps so, but the experts would never have agreed, as the trial itself shows, and the trial itself demonstrated in the most satisfactory and public manner, and as no other test could have done, the prisoner's capacity to distinguish between right and wrong and to control his actious. As we said during the trial, courts of law are not schools of manners but tribunals of justice, and dignity and decorum must yield to the exceptional necessities of such cases as the one in question. We can imagine nothing more uncertain, capricious and inconclusive than an investigation of medical experts on such a question. Every man ought to have the right to demand that the question of his mental responsibility shall be determined in public and by men who are not theorists and partisans. We hope to be spared any more experts or expertness, especially on the subject VOL. 28 No. 19.

in question. If we must have experts, let us have them as witnesses and not as judges or jurors.

It is interesting to learn what a great judge of another country thinks of the conduct of the Guiteau trial, especially when he is of a country where trials are conducted with peculiar decorum and dignity, and where any innovation on the established conduct of the court would be most jealously regarded. York, I met Lord Coleridge, and during the conA correspondent writes us: "When I was in New versation some one asked what he thought of the Guiteau trial, and Lord Coleridge said that he read the account of the trial entirely, and that he approved of the course of Justice Cox throughout. He said that he thought at the time that he would have acted differently in one or two instances had he been the presiding justice, but that he was by no means certain that he would. He said the position of the justice presiding at the trial was a trying one, and that in his judgment Justice Cox acted admirably throughout."

The Louisiana judges are not mealy-mouthed. In Young v. Bridges, 34 La. Ann. 333, the plaintiff, a strong man of 35, had assaulted and cruelly beaten the defendant, his father-in-law, a weak man of 60, and the latter thereupon called him a 'thieving puppy and villain," and the plaintiff sued him for slander. The court mildly observed: "We cannot refrain from an expression of our regret at the appearance of such a cause on our docket, which teems with cases involving important and scientific questions of law, the decision of which will settle rights of vast magnitude, and will contribute to settle points of great interest in our jurisprudence. Like our learned brothers, in disposing of the case reported in 9 Ann. 358, we think that 'it is not fit that such cases as this record presents should be brought before the courts. Better far would it have been for the credit of the parties and the cause of justice, if the matters disclosed had been permitted to remain only in the knowledge of the by-standers, than to have blazoned them on the records of the tribunals.' In the interest of society and of peace in the State, we indulge the hope that our learned brothers of the law profession will lend their influence to the suppression of such litigation." Again, in Marshall v. Pearce, id. 557, they observe: "With great respect for the ability usually displayed by the judges who participated in that decision, we are compelled to say that the proposition on which it rests is so preposterously untenable, that we can only characterize it as an example of Homeric nodding." This is not quite so polite as the judges usually are in overruling one another. They have also some sense of humor. Speaking of certain provisions of the Federal Constitution, they say, in Favrot v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, id. 491: "Those who invoke that protection must be panoplied from top to toe.

'If there's a hole in a' your coats,
I rede ye tent it.""

And in State v. Cognovitch, id. 529, holding that an information for assault by willful shooting need not allege the use of a dangerous weapon, they say: "The common sense of prosecuting officers, judges and juries may be relied upon to protect persons from imprisonment in the penitentiary for shooting with pop-guns, or like innocent playthings." So there is no help for the man who has his eye put out by the small boy's bean-blower.

It is to be feared that we are to have in this country a counter-part of the libel suit of Belt v. Lawes, which recently engrossed so much of the time of the courts of England, and in which a new trial has been granted. Mr. Belt sued Mr. Lawes for saying that Mr. Belt did not make the busts which he pretended to make. And now Mr. Feuardent has sued General Cesnola for libel in respect to the collection of Cypriote curiosities which the latter persuaded the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York to buy. The plaintiff charged that General Cesnola had mended and restored many of the battered and abortive images in question, so as to make them presentable and interesting, representing that such was their original condition. The General says in substance that Mr. Feuardent is a liar. And now Mr. F. sues him. The newspapers some time ago were filled with a wearisome discussion of this matter. We hope the time of the courts is not to be taken up with it. The collection is extremely devoid of entertaintment; one example of this archaic art is as good as a score, and there are scores in different degrees of dilapidation and grinning idiocy. We really wish the wager of battle could be restored for once, so that these two dilletante could fight the matter out without expense to the public, which cares very little which is right.

The most curious corporation we ever heard of is the American Society of Professors of Dancing, organized to secure the advancement of the art of dancing, to correct and remedy certain abuses, to compose dances and publish them, and to promote the social intercourse of members, which filed its certificate of incorporation last week. What these "abuses" in question are we do not know, but we hope the corporation will take measures to eliminate hugging from the waltz, and if it could render it unfashionable for women to go to balls in a degree of undress which they would shriek at being caught in by a man in private, they would do a good thing.

Dr. John P. Gray thinks that lawyers disagree as often as doctors. In an address at the Albany Medical College in September last he said: Among physicians I doubt whether there are any more blunders or blunderers than among lawyers. Iknow there is a sort of proverb that doctors disagree. This, gentlemen, was undoubtedly written and promulgated by a lawyer and on the diversion principle of stop thief.' We do not pretend to encourage you

in the idea that you must always be in accord, but in agreement and harmony. You will be in harmony when you are honestly seeking the truth in any case. To see from different standpoints of knowledge or judgment is not disagreement. Here is where a lawyer does not apprehend or understand the physician. He does not discriminate, in a given case, between medicine as a science and the different opinions of physicians in their recognition and interpretation of the symptoms of the case under question. Any lawyer might recall the difference among his brethren in the application of principles of law to particular cases and the conflicting opinions as to how the facts in evidence should be read or construed in the light of legal science. We might cite the differing opinions on the same matters of judges of courts, men equally eminent, to prove that of all professions the law is not only the one in which the accuracy of human judgment is the most uncertain, but conspicuously it is the profession in which there is to be found the widest disagreement in the interpretation of facts, and their classification and application under rules of evidence. They have courts of error to adjust these matters, and I anticipate their reply that the final medical court of error, unhappily, lies beyond the jurisdiction of men." There is a good deal of truth in this, but doctors frequently carry their disagreements into the domain of feeling, which lawyers very seldom do. And again, agreement among lawyers is much less practicable in the nature of things, for it involves agreement upon the principles of justice — what is right in a given case, the facts being conceded.

IN

NOTES OF CASES.

TN Shoulters v. Allen, Michigan Supreme Court, October 17, 1883, 16 N. W. Rep. 888, the court, without deciding the point, considered evidence of business incapacity in the following terms: "The showing of mental incompetency on the part of the defense is apparently very strong. Witnesses testify that Allen attended school, but could not get beyond learning the alphabet. He could not count, some say five, others say twenty. He knew nothing of the value of money, and would take a silver piece in preference to one of gold if it were larger. He would eat whatever was put upon his plate, be it much or little. Whoever was confided in by him could do what he pleased with him, and he had no capacity whatever of self-protection against overreaching. On the other hand, it was shown, mainly by defendant's witnesses, that he was industrious, and had cleared up his farm by his own labor and by exchanging with others, and that until after this note was given no guardian had been appointed for him. His neighbors dealt with him in a small way, apparently without any sense of wrong. George E. Taylor, one of the defendant's witnesses, had dealt with him on fifteen or twenty occasions, and once, as agent for another person, had loaned him money