creating a public and private nuisance. A bill in equity by a party injured against all the parties thus contributing to the nuisance, to enjoin, it is not demurrable as being multifarious, or for a misjoinder of parties defendant. The parties thus creating the nuisance may be joined in equity, both on the ground that they co-operate in fact, and actually contribute to the nuisance, the injury being the single result of the action of the debris combined, and operating together long before it reaches the place where the injury is effected; also, on the ground of avoiding a multiplicity of suits. One tenant in common of land, injured by a public and private nuisance, may sue to enjoin the nuisance without making his co-tenant a party, either as complainant or defendant. In Thorpe v. Brumfitt, L. R., 8 Ch. App. 656, a bill was supported against several parties acting individually and severally, in blocking up the passage to an inn by loading and unloading wagons in it, in the prosecution of their several callings. Chipman v. Palmer, 77 N. Y. 56, expressly recoguizes the rule that "an equitable action will lie to restrain parties who severally contribute to a nuisance, while it holds that they cannot be joined in an action at law." So does Crossley v. Lightowler, L. R., 3 Eq. 279, and Duke of Buccleugh v. Cowan, 5 Sess. Cas. (3d series) 214. See White v. Jameson, L. R., 18 Eq. 303. Keyes v. Little York, G. W. & W. Co., 53 Cal. 724, is in conflict with the other cases, but is substantially overruled by the present Supreme Court in the subsequent case of Hillman v. Newington, 57 Cal. 56. See also Mayor of York v. Pilkington, 1 Atk. 283; Sheffield Water-works v. Yeomans, L. R., 8 Ch. 8, 11; Ware v. Horwood, 14 Ves. 28-33; Supervisors v. Deyoe, 77 N. Y. 219; Schuyler Fraud Cases, 17 N. Y. 592; Central Pacific Railroad Co. v. Dyer, 1 Sawy. 650; Gaines v. Chew, 2 How. 642; and Oliver v. Piatt, 3 id. 412. U. S. Circ. Ct., California, April 9, 1883. Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Mining Co. Opinion by Sawyer, J.

TEXAS SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

CARRIER-EXEMPTION BY CONTRACT FROM LIABILITY. It has been generally held that where there is no express statute forbidding it, a carrier may contract not to be liable for damages which do not occur from the negligence of himself or his servant or agents. Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Hooper v. Wells, 27 Cal. 11; Adams' Express v. Fendick, 38 Ind. 150; Rhodes v. Louisville & C. R. Co., 9 Bush, 688. When he undertakes to carry goods, not ouly over his own route, but over connecting lines, he cannot contract that his responsibility may terminate at the end of his own line. Lawson on Carriers, § 235. He will still be held responsible for the negligence, not only of himself and servants, but of the connecting lines, they being considered his agents for carrying out the particular contract. Bank of Kentucky v. Adams' Express Co., 93 U. S. 174. The exemption from liability is however available where the carrier forwards the goods consigned to him in the manner and by the route with reference to which the contract is made. If he deviates from his route, or forward the goods by different conveyances from those contemplated by his agreement, he becomes an insurer of the goods, and cannot avail himself of any exceptions made in his behalf in the contract. Fatman v. Cincinnati R. Co., 2 Dis. 248; Robinson v. Merchants' Dispatch Tran. Co., 45 Iowa, 470. Accordingly, held, that under a contract by a railroad company to forward melons by cars on which they were loaded from Galveston to Chicago without change, and the cars were changed while upon a connecting line, the risk of safe transportation was assumed by the

company's agents, the connecting line where the change occurred for the company, and it became liable, notwithstanding the stipulation against damage beyond its own terminus. A case in point is that of Stewart v. Merchants' Dispatch Co., 47 Iowa, 229. There goods were delivered to a transportation company at Worcester, Mass., to be taken to Muscatine, Iowa, through without transfer, in cars owned and controlled by the company, and the contract contained a clause of exemption against liability for loss by fire. When the goods reached Chicago they were transferred to a warehouse and consumed by fire the same day. It was held that the company were liable for the loss, notwithstanding the exemption. Galveston, Houston, etc., R. Co. v. Allison. Opinion by Willie, C. J.

[Decided May 1, 1883.]

EMINENT DOMAIN-LAND-OWNER NOT CONFINED TO STATUTE PROCEEDING FOR COMPENSATION.-When a railroad company enters upon land without condemnation, the land-owner is entitled to bring action for its value in the courts, and it is not a defense to his action that he has not sought relief under a statute for condemning land. It is held by the great weight of authority, that when a statute provides a tribunal and mode of procedure by which property may be condemned to a public use, such tribunal has an exclusive jurisdiction, and that the person or corporation, to whom the statute gives the right to institute a proceeding to condemn land, cannot resort to any other. In this State, the right to institute a proceeding to condemn land for the roadway of a railroad is given to the company seeking it, and to no other person (R. S. 4182); and if a company fails to avail itself of this right, and without the consent of the owner, enters upon his land, such owner is entitled to resort to any court having jurisdiction, by reason of the amount of damage claimed, for redress of the wrong. Sherman v. Milwaukee, etc., R. Co., 40 Wis. 652; Bliss v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 43 id. 192; Kansas Pacific R. Co. v. Steeter, 8 Kans. 135; Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 146; Goulard v. City of St. Louis, 36 Mo. 532. International, etc., Railroad Co. v. Venitos. Opinion by Stayton, J. [Decided April 27, 1883.]

INFANCY-MINOR'S CONTRACT VOIDABLE NOT VOIDRATIFICATION AFTER MAJORITY.-A charge that when a contract is made with a minor, either party may disavow the contract wheu the minor attains his ma

jority, held error. "The disability of infancy is the personal privilege of the infant himself, and none but himself, or his legal representative, can take advan tage of it. Therefore other parties who contract with an infant are bound by it, although it be voidable by him. Were it otherwise, this disability might be of no advantage to him, but the reverse." It is held that when an infant who has purchased property disposes of it after coming of age, this must be regarded as a confirmation of the contract. Cheshire v. Barnett, 4 McCord, 241. So when an infant has sold property and afterward reclaims it, this would be regarded as a disavowal of the contract, and he must restore the purchase-money. It seems that an infant may disaffirm a sale of personal property before he attains his majority, though the rule is otherwise as to real estate. Cummings y. Powell, 8 Tex. 80. But the authorities assert that acts of ownership to amount to a disavowal of the previous sale must be distinct and unequivocal. Harris v. Musgrove. Opinion by Delany, J.

[Decided May 8, 1883.]

NEW JERSEY COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS ABSTRACT.

MARCH TERM, 1883.*

SLANDER OF TITLE-WHAT ESSENTIAL TO ACTION.In an action for slander of title malice is of the gist of the action, and the real point on the question of malice is whether the defendant made the statement bona fide and under an honest impression of its truth, or whether he made it maliciously for the purpose of slandering the plaintiff's title. When the publication of a notice of defect of title is brought within the limits of a privileged communication, the burden of proving malice in fact is thrown upon the plaintiff. This may be done either by extrinsic evidence, or from the language of the communication itself, as if its terms be disproportioned to the exigencies of the occasion, or if the language used be unnecessarily excessive or more defamatory than the occasion require. If there be any evidence of malice, either extrinsic or intrinsic, in answer to the immunity claimed by reason of the occasion, the question of malice should be submitted to the jury. Where a defendant published in the notice of the defect of title of the plaintiff “that a final injunction and decree were obtained against the plaintiff in the Circuit Court of the United States," whereas, in fact, no final decree ever had been made in the suit, which was discontinued by consent of the parties before the publication of the notice, and the only decree made was a mere ex parte order for a preliminary injunction, held such allegation was in excess of the occasion and entirely unwarranted, either to the protection of the interests of the corporation represented by the defendants, or for warning the public against danger of litigation and loss in case of infringement of the company's patents. Such allegation was not a mere assertion of a supposed right, but an unfounded attack on the title of the plaintiff. Pitt v. Donovan, 1 M. & S. 639. In Cook v. Wildes, 5 E. & B. 328, Lord Campbell says: "We are of opinion that wherever there is evidence of malice, either extrinsic or intrinsic, in answer to the immunity claimed by reason of the occasion, a question arises which the jury, and the jury only, ought to determine." To the same effect are the cases of Wright v. Woodgate, 2 Cr., M. & R. 573; Gilpin v. Fowler, 9 Ex. 615; White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266, and Like v. McKinstry, 3 Abb. Pr. 62. In Gassett v. Gilbert, 6 Gray, 94, the court, after holding that the defendants were justified in publishing a notice in proper and necessary language, make the following remarks as to the proof of actual malice by intrinsic evidence: "But it does not follow that there was no evidence in the case upon which it was proper for the jury to pass as showing the existence of actual malice on the part of the defendants. They cannot be justified if they have included in their notice any statements of a defamatory nature not warranted by the occasion which called forth the publication. The privilege must be limited by the exigency, and if the defendants, by the terms of the notice, exceeded the just limits which were necessary and proper to accomplish the legitimate purpose of protecting the corporation and the public from the unauthorized acts of the plaintiff, it will be evidence of malice proper to be weighed by the jury. We are therefore of opinion that the case must be submitted to the jury to determine the question whether, under all the circumstances, the defendants have not exceeded the just bounds of their privilege and been actuated, not by an honest purpose to protect the interests of the corporation, but by a malicious design to defame the plaintiff." The same doctrine is held in Swan v. Tappan, 5 Cush. 104, and in Brow v. Hatha

*To appear in 16 Vroom's (45 N. J. Law) Reports.

way, 13 Allen, 239. Andrew v. Deshler. Opinion by Green, J.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-CONSTRUCTION WHERE AMBIGUITY.-A statute passed after certain road im. provements were completed by a special commission, authorized the commissioners, who were to assess the expenses thereof, to determine what amount of such expenses should be paid by the county of Hudson, and directed that the sum so determined should be raised by general taxation, as other county taxes are raised, and when collected, should be paid over to the treasurer of the commission. Held, that the sum so determined was not a general debt of the county, and that the county officers were not bound to raise by tax or to pay any interest on said sum. The rule for the construction of such statutes is thus laid down by Dwarris (Potter's Dwar. on Stat. 255): "Acts of Parliament which impose a duty upon the public will be critically construed with reference to the particular language in which they are expressed. When there is any ambiguity found, the construction must be in favor of the public; because it is a general rule that where the public are to be charged with a burden, the intention of the legislature to impose that burden must be explicitly and distinctly shown." Justice Cooley, quoting the foregoing extract (Cooley on Tax., 201), says: "This statement of the general rule expresses the view which it is believed has always prevailed in England. It is also that which has been adopted in the several States. Like views have been frequently expressed by the Federal courts." State of New Jersey v. Freeholders of Hudson. Opinion by Dixon, J.

NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT

ABSTRACT.

FEBRUARY TERM, 1883.*

INFANT VOLUNTARY DEED TO-SUBSEQUENT CONVEYANCE BY GRANTOR TO ANOTHER.-A deed to the plaintiff (a minor) was delivered to his father to keep for him, and a few days thereafter, in pursuance of a certain arrangement intended to give ease and favor to the father, the deed was destroyed without having been registered, and the land conveyed by the same grantor to the defendant. Held, in an action for the land, etc.: (1) The plaintiff, being an infant, was incapable of parting with the estate conveyed, or of assenting to the destruction of the deed. (2) Equity will restore the plaintiff to the position he was in before the destruction of his muniment of title. (3) Payment of the land by relatives of the plaintiff is a sufficient consideration to support the conveyance. (4) To entitle the defendant to priority over the plaintiff, he must show that he is not only a purchaser for value, but also without notice of the plaintiff's equity. Tolar v. Tolar, 1 Dev. Eq. 456; Plummer v. Baskerville, 1 Ired. Eq. 252; Walker v. Coltraine, 6 id. 79; Crump v. Black, id. 321; May v. Hanks, Phil. Eq. 310. Brendle v. Heron. Opinion by Ruffin, J.

SHERIFF'S DEED-WHEN IT TAKES EFFECT-ADVERSE POSSESSION. A sheriff's deed, made in pursuance of an execution sale, operates from the day of sale, not from the date of the deed. In such case, the purchaser, being clothed with the legal title from the day. of sale, is also subjected to the consequences attending" a possession, under color, held adversely to him. Hoke v. Henderson, 3 Dev. 12; Dobson v. Erwin, 4 Dev. & Bat. 201; Flynn v. Williams, 7 Ired. 32; Davidson v. Frew, 3 Dev. 3; Testerman v. Poe, 2 Dev. & Bat. 103; Presnell v. Ramsour, 8 Ired. 505; Woodey v. Gilliam, 67 N. C., 237; Dobson v. Murphy, 1 Dev. & Bat. 586; *Appearing in 88 North Carolina Reports.

Pickett v. Pickett, 3 Dev. 6. Cowles v. Coffey. Opinion by Ruffin, J.

SURETYSHIP-ADDITIONAL SECURITY WILL NOT DISCHARGE SURETY.-Where additional security is given by the principal debtor, with no understanding for further time, and the remedy to enforce collection remains as before, held, that the surety is not thereby discharged; such security inures to the advantage of the surety. "It is a well settled principle of equity as between creditor and surety, that where the creditor by a binding contract, and not a mere nudum pactum, gives further time to the principal debtor, the surety is discharged by matter in país, as it is termed in the books." Howerton v. Sprague, 64 N. C. 451. "It must be a valid contract with the principal debtor without the assent of the surety, by which the rights or liabilities of the surety are injuriously affected, to exonerate the latter. Deal v. Cochran, 66 N. C. 269. Even a usurious contract, at least where the consideration is executed, though avoidable by the creditor, will have the like effect. Pippin v. Bond, 5 Ired. Eq. 91; Scott v. Harris, 76 N. C. 205; Carter v. Duncan, 84 id. 676; Bank v. Lineberger, 83 id. 454. Such an agreement to suspend or delay will not be inferred from the mere giving the collateral security with the power to sell the same at a certain time, if the debt be not paid. 2 Pars. Cont. 685. In Eures v. Widdowson, 4 C. & P. 151, an assignment of property was made to secure sums due and future demands, with a power of sale not to be executed until after six months' notice. An action was brought on two bills of exchange protected in the assignment, which was set up as a defense, and Tindal, C. J., says: "I am of opinion that such an assignment can only be considered as a collateral security, and that the personal remedy is not suspended, as there is not any clause to that effect in the deed." Stallings v. Lane. Opinion by Smith, C. J.

WEST VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.*

HIGHWAY-ESTABLISHMENT OF.- A public highway under the direct control of the public and kept in repair by it, and which no individual can obstruct without being liable to punishment, may, if the Legislature by law so authorize, be established, though it be had only from a public road to the dwelling or farm of a single person. If the power conferred on a County Court to open such public highway be general, no limitation of this power will be placed by the courts because of the degree of accommodation which such public road may afford to the public at large. That is a matter in such case which addresses itself, not to the authority, but the discretion, of the County Court. Verner v. Martin. Opinion by Green, J.

[Decided April 21, 1883.]

NAVIGABLE RIVER - OHIO RIPARIAN OWNERS

RIVER RIGHTS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION

WHARF.-The Ohio river is navigable and a public highway in the highest and broadest intendment possible. Riparian owners of land on the Ohio river as against the State of West Virginia, hold their titles to ordinary high-water mark only. The bed, bank and shores of the Ohio river are held by the State in trust for the public. It is competent for the Legislature to confer on municipal corporations, in aid of the navigation of said river, the exclusive right to construct wharves within their corporate limits between ordinary high-water mark and low-water mark, without compensation to the adjacent lot-owner for the land so taken for that purpose. The act of the Legislature *To appear in 21 West Virginia Reports.

denying the right of a riparian owner of a lot in an incorporated town or city to make a wharf or bulk-head on the space between ordinary high-water mark and low-water mark adjacent to his lot, without the consent of the council of said town or city, is constitu. tional. Where a lot owner under such circumstances does attempt to erect such wharf, etc., without the consent of the council of the city or town, the city or town may enjoin him from so doing. Town of Ravenswood v. Flemming. Opinion by Johnson, J. [Decided July 7, 1883.]

RECORD-IMPUTATION OF ABSOLUTE VERITY INTERLINEATIONS AND ERASURES.- A record imports such absolute verity that no person against whom it is pronounced shall be permitted to aver or prove any thing against it. The record to which such absolute verity is imputed consists not only of what is written on the record book and authenticated by the signature of the judge, but also all indictments and pleadings and papers referred to by the record book and thereby made a part of the record. But if a record is interlined or erased in a material matter, and it is alleged that this was done after the record was made by some unauthorized person, such alteration constitutes no part of the record, and an inquiry may be made into the genuineness of such altered record, and it may be proven by parol that such alteration was thus made by one not authorized to make it. This is not controverting the absolute verity of the record, but simply inquiring what really constitutes the record. If this were not allowed, the absolute verity attributed to a record could be used to give sanction to a forgery or to a fraudulent erasure of the record. State of West Virginia v. West. Opinion by Green, J. [Decided June 30, 1883.]

SURETYSHIP-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO SURETY. -If a surety extinguishes the debt of his principal, in whole or in part, for any sum less than the full amount so extinguished, he can, in the absence of an express contract, only recover from his principal the amount actually paid by him. The implied contract in such case is, that the surety shall be indemnified only, and he will not be allowed to speculate out of his principal; consequently, if a surety obtains a credit on the debt of his principal without pecuniary cost, loss or damage to him, he will not be entitled to recover any thing for procuring such credit, although his principal avails himself of the benefit of such credit and the same is allowed to him by the creditors. Mathews v. Hall. Opinion b Sneider, J. [Decided April 21, 1883.]

RHODE ISLAND SUPREME

ABSTRACT.*

COURT

DOMICILE-MEANING OF RESIDENCE -VOTING.In the Constitution of Rhode Island, article 2, sections 1 and 2, the word "residence" means domicile or home, not the place of actual habitancy. Hence, when a qualified citizen had his domicile in the town of L., but for temporary purposes was residing in another town, held, that he had the right to vote in the town of L. Domicile is not changed by mere change of habitancy without an intent to change the domicile. White v. Brown, 1 Wall. C. C. 217; Hodgson v. De Beauchesne, 12 Moore P. C. C. 285; Harvard College v. Gore, 5 Pick. 369; Horne v. Horne, 9 Ind. 99; Folger v. Slaughter, 19 La. Ann. 323; Udny v. Udny, L. R., 1 Sc. App. 441, 448. State of Rhode Island v. Aldrich. Opinion by Durfee, C. J.

[Decided May 31, 1883.]

*To appear in 14 Rhode Island Reports.

[Decided May 31, 1883.]

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-NEGLIGENCE-NOTICEKNOWLEDGE OF POLICEMAN.-A. and B. were injured by driving into a pile of gravel in a highway, and brought suit against the town in which the highway was situated. The pile of gravel had been accumulating in the highway during an afternoon. To establish the negligence of the town authorities the plaintiff introduced in evidence the police regulations of the town, which made it the duty of the police patrolmen to note and report without delay all obstructions in the street. Held, that the evidence was properly admitted. Had the police patrol performed its duty the obstruction could have been made innocuous. See Rehberg v. Mayor of New York, 15 Rep. 310. Bowman v. Tripp. Opinion by Carpenter, J. [Decided July 14, 1883.]

MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE-DEFECTIVE ELEVATOR CHAIN- FELLOW SERVANT. (1) A., a workman in the employ of B., was injured by the break of an elevator chain and the fall of the elevator in B.'s machine shop. A.'s business was to load the elevator on the lower floor and unload it on the upper. A staircase near the elevator connected the two floors, and A. was injured while riding with his load on the elevator. It appearing that the chain had broken some six weeks before and had been repaired, and the evidence being conflicting whether B.'s superintendent had been notified of the break, and it also appearing that the ratch. ets to arrest the fall of the elevator were not in working order: Held, that the question of B.'s negligence was for the jury. (2) Held, further, that B. was not relieved from liability if the defective condition of the chain and ratchets arose from the negligence of one of A.'s fellow workmen, whose duty it was to care for them. A master cannot delegate to another his obligation to keep the machinery operated by his servants reasonably safe. Ford v. Fitchburg R. Co., 110 Mass. 240; Laning v. New York Cent. R. Co., 49 N. Y. 521; Chicago and N. W. R. Co. v. Jackson, 55 Ill. 492; Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517, 520; 17 Am. Rep. 369; Harper v. Indianapolis and St. Louis R. Co., 47 Mo. 567; Brickner v. New York Cent. R. Co., 2 Lans. 506; affirmed by Court of Appeals, 49 N. Y. 672; Flike v. Boston and Albany R. Co., 53 id. 549. Mulbey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works. Opinion by Durkee, C. J.

[Decided June 30, 1883.]

INSURANCE LAW.

FIRE POLICY-WAIVER OF CONDITIONS BY PAROL.— There are many adjudged cases which hold that certain conditions of a policy of insurance may be waived by parol. These cases include such provisions as the time of the payment of premiums, the production of proofs of loss, the breach of any condition in the policy as against the increase of risk, or the keeping of

hazardous goods or the like. In this court it has been held that an increase of risk may be waived by an agent by parol. Viele v. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Iowa, 9. That the time for the payment of the premium may be waived. Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., 45 Iowa, 377. But the conditions of a policy as to the subject of the insurance, -the property insured and the ownership thereof may not be waived by parol. Iowa Supreme Court, June 14, 1883. Fuller v. Phoenix Ins. Co. Opinion by Rothrock, J.

FIRE POLICY-NATURE OF INSURABLE INTERESTBAILEE ADMINISTRATOR -AGENCY REMOVAL

WAIVER.—(1) A policy of insurance against fire is a contract of indemnity, and the assured must have an insurable interest in the property when it is insured, and when the loss by fire occurs. But if the policy on its face sets out such an iusurable interest as by stating that that property assured is the property of the insured, this alone establishes that the assured has prima fucie an insurable interest, and if disputed the insurance company must by proper proof show that he had not an insurable interest. If a party has the care and custody of property, he may insure it in his own name, even though he be not responsible for its safety if he really insured it for the owner, though this be not expressed on the face of the policy, for in such case he has an insurable interest, and in general to give a party an insurable interest in property it is not necessary that he should have any actual right of property, either legal or equitable, in the subject insured, but it is sufficient if he or those he represents will suffer any sort of loss by its destruction. If the administrator of a decedent has such insurable interest he has a right to recover on the policy in case of loss by fires, though when the loss occurs there are abundant real assets to pay all the decedent's debts, if they have not been actually paid. (2) An insurance company which establishes a local agency is responsible for all the acts and declarations of its agent within the scope of his apparent authority. The ques tion in such cases is not what authority he in fact has, but what were his apparent powers-that is, what powers had the assured a right to believe were given the agent. (3) A policy of insurance may be continued in force by a subsequent contract made before, at the time of, or after the policy had expired. Such a continuance in force of a policy differs from a new coutract of insurance, as by it the original contract is kept up, and in case of loss the original policy is the basis of action in connection with the contract of renewal or continuance; and if changes are intended to be made, it is properly done by simply expressing the changes in the renewal or continuance receipt. If such receipt be ambiguous on its face, it may be explained by the situation of the parties or by the surrounding circumstances existing when it was executed, but not by verbal declarations of the parties. (4) A denial by an insurance company of its liability on other grounds before any preliminary proofs are made, and before the time within which such proofs are to be made by the terms of the policy, is in law a waiver of the conditions of a policy requiring such proof. West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. April 7, 1883. Sheppard v. Peabody Ins. Co. Opinion by Green, J. (21 W. Va.)

LIFE POLICY -- INSURABLE INTEREST ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY AND DEBTOR.-An assignee in bankruptcy has no insurable interest in the life of a bankrupt, at least after his discharge. Upon a policy ou the life of the bankrupt, payable at his death to his executors, administrators or assigns, with an equal premium payable annually during the bankrupt's life, the only beneficial interest which passes to the assignee in bankruptcy is its surrender value or net reserve at the time of the bankruptcy. Beyond that interest the

policy, so far as respects any future insurance under it, would be a burden rather than a benefit, which the assignee is not authorized to continue, and the assignee takes the legal title to the policy for the purpose of making the surrender value or net reserve available to the estate. Copeland v. Stephens, 1 Barn. & Ald. 594; Hanson v. Stevenson, id. 304; Lewis v. Burr, 8 Bosw. 140; Journeay v. Brackley, 1 Hilt. 447. The assignee, moreover, could have no right to use the moneys of the estate to pay premiums during the bankrupt's life, and thus keep the estate unsettled for an indefinite period, for the mere purpose of speculating upon the chances of the bankrupt's early death. In re Newland, 7 N. B. R. 477. The speedy settlement of the estates of bankrupts, as contemplated by law, is incompatible with such dealings. Where the bankrupt, holding such a policy at the time of his bankruptcy, was afterward discharged from his debts and died several years after, his wife having kept the policy alive by payment of premiums subsequent to the bankruptcy, supposing that the policy was for her benefit, held, that the assignee should be authorized to surrender the policy on payment of the full net reserve or surrender value at the time of the bankruptcy. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York, March 16, 1883. Matter of Mc Kinney. Opinion by Brown, J. (15 F. R. 539).

MARINE POLICY - LIABILITY FOR FREIGHT.-A vessel owned by plaintiff, loaded with coal, met with disaster in a heavy storm in Long Island Sound, within six miles of New Haven, which was the port of destination. She lost two planks in her bow, and sank in forty feet of water. A buoy was attached to her bow before she sank, so that the spot where she lay might be readily found. The plaintiff offered to abandon the vessel to the insurers if they would pay as for a total loss, which they would not. The defendants who were insurers of the cargo, after they were subrogated to the rights of the owner, united with the insurers of the vessel in accepting the proposal of wreckers to raise her for $1,000, to be apportioned between the boat and the cargo, the raising to be, as the policy upon the vessel expressed it, "for the benefit of all concerned, without prejudice to the rights of either party." The president of defendant, while the vessel was in the possession of the wreckers (though told by plaintiff not to take it), directed them to sell the coal, which they did, and after deducting $1,000, paid over the residue to the defendant. Held, that plaintiff had not abandoned the coal to defendant, and thereby relinquished the freight, and there never was an abandonment of the vessel or cargo; that the act of defendant in selling the coal was wrongful, and as it destroyed plaintiff's lien for freight, he can recover of defendant as his damages the amount of his lien and interest. United States Ins. Co. v. Lenox, 1 Johns. Ch. 377: Davy v. Hallett, 3 K. 20; Coolidge v. Gloucester Ins. Co., 15 Mass. 341; Hubbell v. Great Western Ins. Co., 74 N. Y. 260; Heyliger v. New York Fireman's Ins. Co., 11 Johns. 85; Bradhurst v. Col. Ins. Co., 9 id. 14; Briggs v. Merchant Ass. Co., 13 Q. B. 137; Job v. Langton, 6 Ellis & B. 179; Allen v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 44 id. 437; Franklin v. Neate, 13 M. & W. 481; Richards v. Simons, A. & E. (N. S.) 99; Reeves v. Capper, 5 Bing. N. C. 136; 6 Scott, 877; 1 Arn. 40; Tuttle V. Wheeler, 6 Barb. 364; Hale v. Omaha National Bank, 49 N. Y. 631; Mears v. London R. Co., 11 C. B. 850: Tancred v. Allgood, 4 H. & N. 438; 28 Law J. Exch. 362; Reeves v. Cappers, 5 Bing. N. C. 36; Mayhew v. Herrick, 7 C. B. 229. The case at bar is distinguishable from Goulet v. Asser, 22 N. Y. 225, and the cases upon which it was founded, of Hull v. Carnley, 17 N. Y. 202; Van Antwerp v. Newman, 2 Cow. 543; Carpenter v. Town, Lalor, 72, and Gordon v. Harper, 7 T. R. 99; Tancred v. Allgood, 4 Hurlst. & N.

438; Hale v. Omaha Nat. Bank, 49 N. Y. 631. New York Common Pleas, March 15, 1883. Hughes v. Sun Mutual Insurance Co. Opinion by Daly, C. J. (23 N. Y. Reg. 801).

INSURABLE INTEREST

JUDGMENT

FIRE POLICY CREDITOR.-A contract for insurance against loss by fire is a contract of indemnity; and a contract to that end with a person who has no insurable interest in the property, or cannot sustain any pecuniary loss by injury thereto, is a mere wager, contrary to public policy and void. Rohrbach v. Germania Ins. Co., 62 N. Y. 52; Grevemeyer v. Sun Ins. Co., 62 Penn. St. 340; McDonald v. Black, 20 Ohio, 191; Carter v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 12 Iowa, 287; Godin v. London Assur. Co., 1 Burr. 490; Hancox v. Fishing Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 134. Any person who has a legal or equitable interest in property, or is so related to it that an injury to it may cause him pecuniary loss, has an insurable interest therein. A judgment creditor may have an insurable interest in the property of his debtor, but if such property is destroyed it is not necessarily a loss to himThat depends upon the condition in which it left the debtor. If he still has sufficient property liable to an execution wherewith to satisfy the judgment, the creditor loses nothing by the fire. U. S. Circ. Ct., Oregon, March 28, 1883. Spare v. Home Mutual Insurance Co. Opinion by Deady, J. (15 Fed Rep. 707.)

CRIMINAL LAW.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASE -LIQUOR PROSECUTION—MEANING OF "JURY."— (1) A Vermont statute provides thus: "No appeal shall be allowed in a criminal cause where the respondent is acquitted; but the respondent may appeal from any judgment or sentence of a justice against him, if the appeal is claimed within two hours after the rendition of judgment." The next section provides that in criminal cases the party appealing shall, at the time of the appeal, give security by way of recognizance, conditioned "that the appellant will personally appear before the County Court, and there prosecute his appeal to effect and abide the order of court thereon;" and further provides, that if the appellant fails to enter his appeal in that court the appellee may do so for affirmance. Held, that a respondent is under this statute entitled to an appeal to the County Court from the judgment of a justice of the peace, if claimed within two hours, although he neglects to procure the bail demanded for his appearance. In such a case the appeal should be granted, and the respondent held in custody for his appearance at court. (2) The Vermont Constitution provides that "in all prosecutions for criminal offenses a person hath a right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the country"; "nor can any person be justly deprived of his liberty, except by the laws of the land, or the judgment of his peers." Held, that the "jury" here referred to is the common-law jury of twelve men. It has many times been held by the court that if an appeal be accorded to respondents who are in the first instance brought to trial before justices of the peace with a jury of six men, this article of the Bill of Rights is not infringed; and it is equally clear that if no appeal is allowed, the respondent is deprived of the mode of trial given him by the organic law. Vermont Sup. Ct., Jan. Term, 1883. Matter of Kennedy. (55 Vt. 1.)

CRIMINAL CAPACITY OF INFANTS.-An infant between the ages of seven and fourteen is presumed to be incapable of committing crime, and the onus is on the State to prove his criminal capacity. Citing 4 Blackst. Com. 24; Bishop Crim. Law, 284, 285; State v. Hundley, 4 Harr. 566; Angelo v. People, 96 Ill. 209.