direct and the most effectual, while it does not interfere with any substantial rights of the libellant, nor impose upon him any additional burdens, embarrassments, or obligations on the trial of the cause. If the libellant may be subjected to the additional liability of an appeal by two defendants instead of one, this consideration is, it seems to me, quite overborne by the far more urgent considerations which require the rights of the parties, in this class of cases, to be heard and adjudicated in the same cause in accordance with the general rule in equity and the practice approved by modern legislation. The libellant's right is not a right by any express contract, and it should be administered with due regard to the rights of others: and this requires, in the peculiar and exceptional class of cases under consideration, that any other vessel liable for the same damages should be brought into the cause, if application therefor be made. Such application, to avoid embarrassment to the libellant, should ordinarily be made before answering, unless the delay be excused. In the present case, as the question is new, the application will not be denied on the ground of laches; but special terms will be imposed, which may be suggested by the libellant on the settlement, on notice, of an order in conformity with this decision. UNITED STATES CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT ABSTRACT. * was CORPORATION PRODUCTION OF BOOKS FOR THIRD PARTIES LITIGANT.-A corporation may be compelled to produce its books and papers in evidence, which may be necessary and vital to the rights of litigants, and considerations of inconvenience must give way to the paramount rights of parties to the litigation. In Bank of Utica v. Hillard, 5 Cow. 153, where a clerk of the bank refused to produce the books, Savage, C. J., said: "The obligation of the witness to produce the books upon the duces tecum depends upon the question whether they were in his possession or under his control;" and the obligation denied because he was a mere clerk of the corporation. The same case was before the court again, 5 Cow. 419, upon a motion to attach the cashier of the bank, who had refused to produce the books under the subpoena, and was denied because the bank could not be required to produce evidence against itself as a party to the action. Both of these cases, by the strongest implication, concede the power to compel the production of the books by an officer when the corporation is not a party. Thirty years later the point arose again in La Farge v. La Farge Fire Ins. Co., 14 How. 26, upon a motion for an attachment against the president of the defendant for refusing to produce its books under a subpoena duces tecum and the motion was denied upon the authority of the cases in 5 Cow. The precedent thus established was recognized incidentally or directly in several subsequent cases, and was assumed to apply whether the corporation was a party or not a party to the suit. The question was never considered by the courts of last resort, and was put at rest by section 868 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which expressly conferred the right theretofore denied. Notwithstanding these cases, it is believed to have been the common practice in this State to subpoena officers as witnesses to produce the books of their corporations in actions between third persons. In other States, so far as is known, the right to do so has never been controverted. There has been strenuous opposition on the part of corporations to the production of * Appearing in 15 Federal Reporter. their papers and records in suits to which they were not parties. The effort of telegraph companies to maintain the privacy of their messages is an illustration. See Henisler v. Freedman, 2 Pars. Select Cas. 274; United States v. Babcock, 3 Dill. 566. U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D. New York, Feb. 17, 1883. Wertheim v. Continental Railway and Trust Co. Opinion by Wallace, J. COURT. NATIONAL BANK RIGHT TO SUE IN FEDERAL The act of Congress of July 12, 1882, to enable National banks to extend their corporate existence, placed National and other banks, as to their right to sue in the Federal courts, on the same footing, and consequently a National bank cannot, in virtue of a mere corporate right, sue in such courts. But National banks may, like other banks and citizens, sue in such courts, whenever the subject-matter of litiga tion involves some element of Federal jurisdiction. Thus a suit by a National bank against a county treasurer, to enjoin the collection of an excessive tax upon its personal property, alleged to be made in violation of the act of Congress permitting the State to tax National banks, presents a case arising under a law of Congress, aud is therefore maintainable in a Federal court. U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D. Ohio, March 26, 1883. Union National Bank v. Miller. Opinion by Baxter, J. or TITLE EQUITIES AS BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE ASSIGNEES OF CHOSE IN ACTION.-A subsequent bona fide assignee of a chose in action, who for a valuable consideration, after due inquiry, and without notice of any prior assignment, gives immediate notice of the assignment to the debtor, or trustee of the fund, and takes possession of the evidences of debt, has a superior equity over a prior assignee of the same debt fund, who leaves the evidences of the debt with the assignor, and gives no notice of the assignment to the debtor or trustee. According to Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill, 228, and Cooper v. Fynmore, 3 Russ. 60, the one prior in time would have the prior right. On the other hand, the case last cited is overruled in England in Dearle v. Hall and Loveridge v. Cooper, 3 Russ. 1, and the principle of these cases has been repeatedly adopted and approved by the Supreme Court, as shown by the cases of Judson v. Corcoran, 17 How. 612, 615; by Marshall, C. J., in Hopkirk v. Page, 2 Brock. 20, 41; in Spain v. Hamilton's Adm'r., 1 Wall. 604, and Nat. Bank v. Texas, 20 id. 72, 89. In Judson v. Corcoran, the court say: "There may be cases in which a purchaser, by sustaining the character of a bona fide assignee, will be in a better situation than the person was of whom he bought; as for instance, where the purchaser, who alone had made inquiry and given notice to the debtor, or to a trustee holding the fund, (as in this instance), would be preferred over the prior purchaser who neglected to give notice of his assignment and warn others not to buy." In Loveridge v. Cooper, 3 Russ. 58, it is said: "Where personal property is assigned, delivery is necessary to complete the transaction, not as between the vendor and the vendee, but as to third persons, in order that they may not be deceived by apparent possession and ownership remaining in a person, who in fact is not the owner. This doctrine is not confined to chattels in possession, but extends to choses in action, bonds, etc. In Ryall v. Rolles, 1 Ves. Sr. 348, it is expressly applied to bonds, simple contract debts, and other choses in action. In cases like the present, the act of giving the trustee notice is in a certain degree taking possession of the fund; it is going as far toward equitable possession as it is possible to go; for after notice given, the trustee of the fund becomes a trustee for the assignee who has given him notice." The principle of all these latter cases is that the first purchaser of the chose in action, who neglects to give notice to the debtor, or trustee holding the fund, and does not take possession of the evidences of the debt, acquires but an imperfect title as respects third persons, and by his laches is, in a sense, a contributory party to the fraud perpetrated by his vendor in the subsequent sale to another purchaser of the same debt or fund; and where the latter has used all due diligence by inquiry and notice, the equity of the latter is to be preferred over that of the former. 1 Dan. Neg. Inst., § 748a. Many of the authorities upon this general subject are reviewed in McNeil v. Tenth Nat. Bank, 46 N. Y. 325. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. New York, March 17, 1883. Matter of Gillespie. Opinion by Brown, J. TEXAS SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT INFANCY EXECUTION SALE OF INFANTS' LANDS VALID.-A sheriff's sale and deed under an execution against an infant, held, to vest a good title in the purchaser to the land sold. See Tucker v. Brackett, 28 v. Brackett, id. 446. In Thacher Tex. 339; Moke v. Dinsmore, 5 Mass. 299, it was held that an execution could issue against the estate of a lunatic. Ex parte eighton, 14 Mass. 207, is to the same effect. In Fox v. Hatch, 14 Vt. 340, it was decided that an execution could run against a married woman. See Charles v. Lowenstein, 26 How. Pr. 29, and Moncrief v. Ward, 16 Ab. Pr. 354, (uote). "Those disabilities arising from infancy, from coverture, or from mental infirmities, which render persons incapable of being bound by their contracts, do not have the effect of excepting any person from the control of courts." Freem. Judg., $142. It would be a contradiction of terms to say that all persons may be bound by judgments, and then declare that some persons are exempted from having executions issued against them." Freem. Ec., § 22. Femes covert, infants and lunatics, the estates of the living and the dead, are all alike comprehended within the broad and general terms used in the statute. In such cases it is not for courts to engraft exceptions upon a statute when the law-making power has not seen fit to do so. De Leon v. Owen, 3 Tex. 153. In Upshur v. Pace, 15 Tex. 532, this court held that minors were not exempt from the penalty of forfeiture for failure to return field notes to the general land office within a prescribed period of time fixed by a statute, because they were not in terms excepted from its operation. In Warfield v. Fox, 53 Penn. St. 382, it was held that a general statute of limitations, there being in it no express exceptions of such persons, bound minors and married women, though not named. In Encking v. Simmons, 28 Wis. 272, it was held that a statute authorizing in general terms the foreclosure of mortgages by advertisement and sale applied to a case where the mortgagor was insane at the time of foreclosure. Dwarris lays it down as a general rule of construction that infants when not excepted specially are bound by all acts of Parliament, except those inflicting corporal punishment, and cites the doctor and student as authority. Potter's Dwarris, 122; Tyman v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634; Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43. Laughter v. Seele. Opinion by West, J. [Decided March 27, 1883.] LIMITATION IMPLIED TRUST. One obtaining property belonging to another without consideration becomes chargeable as a trustee, and the statute of limitations runs as to such trusts. "While the statute of limitations may have no application to a technical and continuing trust, which is subject to inquiry in a court of equity only, and the question arises between the trustee and the cestui que trust, yet it does apply to a trust, in respect to which there is a 066 remedy at law." Governor v. Woodworth, 63 Ill. 254. It has been repeatedly held that a trust raised by implication of law is within the operation of the statute of limitations. In cases of implied, or constructive trust, where it is sought for the purpose of maintaining the remedy to force upon the defendant the character of trustee, such courts will apply the same limitation as provided for actions at law. Beaubien v. Beaubein, 24 How. 207; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 10 Wheat. 152, 177; Sloan v. Graham, 85 Ill. 26. See also Miller v. McIntyre, 6 Pet. 61; Nimmo v. Stewart, 21 Ala. 682. Where a person claiming personal property or the profits of real estate is turned into a trustee by implication or by operation of law, the right of action by the cestui que trust will, as a general rule, be subject to the same limitation as a demand purely legal. See Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Conn. 717; Martin v. Bank, 31 Ala. 115; Ashurst's Appeal, 60 Penn. St. 290. Baker v. Kennedy. Opinion by Walker, P. J. [Decided March 20, 1883.] REMOVAL OF CAUSE THAT CORPORATION DEFENDANT, CHARTERED BY UNITED STATES, HAS DEFENSE UNDER CHARTER, WHEN NOT GROUND FOR.→ In an application for a removal to the Federal court by a corporation chartered by the United States that it has a defense under its act of incorporation, when neither the said act nor any of the papers or proceedings in the cause show that such defense exists or can possibly arise upon the trial, is not sufficient to entitle the applicant to a removal. The language of the court in Railroad Company v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 14, is: That when a sufficient case for removal is made in the State court, the rightful jurisdiction of that court comes to an end, and no further jurisdiction can be had there unless in some form its jurisdiction is restored." In Kern v. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 485, the court say, following the decision of Insurance Co. v. Dunn, 19 Wall. 214. "If the cause is removable and the statute is complied with, no order of the State court for its removal is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court of the United States, and no refusal of such an order can prevent that jurisdiction from attaching;" and further, they say that "when the prerequisites for removal have been performed, the paramount law of the land says that the case shall be removed." In Removal Causes, 100 U. S. 457, the court say: "The petition filed in this case was sufficient in form; enough appeared on its face to entitle the petitioner to his removal;" but in another part of the opinion they also say: "We fully recognize the principle heretofore asserted in many cases that the State court is not required to let go its jurisdiction until a case is made which upon its face shows that the petition can remove the cause as a matter of right." These decisions all leave a discretion with the State court to at least pass upon the sufficiency of the case made by the petition. They do not require that it should surrender its jurisdiction until a petition complying with the provisions of the statute is presented to the court. And it was expressly held in Insurance Co. v. Pechner, 95 U. S. 185, that "the right of removal is statutory. Before a party can avail himself of it, he must show upon the record that his is a case that comes within the statute. If he fails in this he has not in law shown to the court that it cannot proceed further with the cause. Having once acquired jurisdiction, the court may proceed until it is judicially informed that its power over the cause is suspended." Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Mc Allister. Opinion by Willie, C. J. [Decided May 1, 1883.] MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT ABSTRACT. JANUARY, 1883. EASEMENT RIGHT TO COLLECT WATER AND DISCHARGE ON ANOTHER'S LAND RAILROAD. Defendant, the manager of a railroad, claimed the right to collect water in a ditch and discharge it upon the lands of a plaintiff where it had not been accustomed to flow, on the ground that it was necessary to the proper construction and maintenance of the railroad. Held, that if the right existed it constituted an easement to which plaintiff's land was subject. As between the owners of contiguous estates, it is settled in this Commonwealth that the right of an owner of land to occupy and improve it as he may see fit, either by erecting structures or by changing the surface, is not restricted by the fact that such use of his own land will cause surface water to flow over adjoining lands in greater quantities or in other directions than it was accustomed to flow. If by this use the adjoining land is damaged, it is damnum absque injuria. Gannon v. Hargadon, 10 Allen, 106. This right exists in the owner by virtue of his dominion over his own soil, and not by virtue of any easement or servitude over the lower land. That this is so is clear from the fact that the adjoining owner may himself erect such structures or take such measures as he sees fit on his own land to divert the surface water and prevent its flowing upon his land, and in so doing he does not violate or obstruct any easement of the owner whose land is of a higher level. Bates v. Smith, 100 Mass. 181. See Parks v. Newburyport, 10 Gray, 28. But there is the well settled distinction, that although a man may make any fit use of his own land] which he deems best, and will not be responsible for any damages caused by the natural flow of the surface water incident thereto, yet he has not the right to collect the surface water on his own land into a ditch, culvert or other artificial channel and discharge it upon the lower land to 'its injury. And if he does this, and continues it adversely under a claim of right for more than twenty years, he thereby acquires a right which is in the nature of a servitude or easement upon the lower land. White v. Chapin, 12 Allen, 516; Curtis v. Eastern R. Co., 14 id. 55, and 98 Mass. 428. As between adjoining land owners, therefore, if one owner thus discharged water through an artificial channel upon the lower land of the other and if he claimed the right to do so, either by grant or prescription, the right to an easement would be concerned in the case. Ratlike v. Gardner. Opinion by Morton, C. J. SUNDAY NEGLIGENT AND MALICIOUS INJURY TO ONE TRAVELLING ON IN BOAT-MASTER AND SERVANT - LIABILITY FOR SERVANT'S ACTS.-(1) Where a plaintiff who was sailing his yacht on Sunday in violation of the statute was run into by the steamboat of defendant, he cannot recover if defendant was negligent. Where the illegal act of a plaintiff contributes to the injury he cannot recover, but if that act was independent of the injury he is not thereby precluded from recovering though at the time he was violating the law. Mc Grath v. Merwin, 112 Mass. 467; Lyons v. De. Sotelle, 124 id. 387. The illegal act, though contemporaueous is then a] condition merely, and not a contributory cause of the injury. White v. Lang, 128 Mass. 598. There is no distinction between travellers in boats and those in vehicles in the highway. In case the injury was caused by the malice of defendant, although the plaintiff was in violation of the law forbidding travelling upon the Lord's day, his title to an action would be independent of his unlawful act. would not thereby forfeit the general protection of the law, and the injury in such supposed case would He proceed solely from the wrongful act of the defendant. Kidder v. Dunstable, 11 Gray, 342; Damon v. Scituate, 119 Mass. 66; Smith v. Conway, 121 id. 216. (2) And in a case when the boat was in charge of defendant's servants in defendant's regular business, defendant would be liable for a wanton and malicious act of the servants within the general scope of its business. There are respectable authorities, such as Richmond Co. v. Vanderbilt, 1 Hill, 480, and Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343, which hold that when the acts of a servaut are willful, the master is not responsible, even if they are done in the performance of his business, because such willful acts are held to be a departure from the master's business. These with many other authorities were carefully considered in Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen, 49, and it was there held that if the act of the servant was "done in the execution of the authority given him by the master, and for the purpose of performing what the master directed, the master will be responsible, whether the wrong done be occasioned by negligence or by a wanton and reckless purpose to accomplish the master's business in an unlawful manner." That case has been since repeatedly recognized, and seems to express the true rule upon the subject to which it relates. Ramsden v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 104 Mass. 117; Levi v. Brooks, 121 id. 501: George v. Gobey, 128 id. 289 Wallace v. Merrimac River Navigation Co. Opinion by Devens, J. WATER EASEMENT TO MAINTAIN AQUEDUCT. A grant to a company of the right to construct and repair an aqueduct across lands of grantor, held to give the right and privilege of laying a line of pipes across the land in such direction as was convenient; but having located the aqeduct, the company had not the right afterward to change the location and carry it across other parts of the land. Jennison v. Walker, 11 Gray, 423; Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct, 125 Mass. 544. Marsh v. Haverhill Aqueduct Co. Opinion by Morton, C. J. PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT. LIMITATION — ATTORNEY'S CLAIM FOR SERVICE.The statute of limitations does not begin to run against the claim of an attorney for professional services so long as the debt which he seeks to recover for his client remains unpaid. Foster v. Jack, 4 Watts, 334. It runs against such claim as soon as the services are finished, and the relation of attorney in a litigated case will not prevent the claim for services generally from being barred by the statute, though it may be for services rendered in and during the progress of that particular case. "Services rendered in any stage of the conduct of a single suit may well be regarded as rendered in pursuance of the same contract; but advice or services at different times and respecting various matters cannot." Where an attorney advises or renders services respecting some matters of business, it does not prevent the statute from running against his claim for other finished services. Hale v. Ard, 48 Penn. St. 22. The doctrine of that case accords with Lichty v. Hugues, 55 Penn. St. 334, for Hugues' claim was for services in a single suit. Mosgrove v. Golden. Opinion by Trunkey, J. [Decided Dec. 30, 1882.] MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-ADVICE OF JUSTICE OF PEACE NO DEFENSE.-The advice of a justice of the peace to institute a prosecution is inadmisible to protect a defendant in an action for malicious prosecution. To maintain an action for malicious prosecu The tion the plaintiff must prove the prosecution to have SURETYSHIP-PASSIVE NEGLECT OF CREDITOR TO .-The ENFORCE SECURITY DOES NOT RELEASE SURETY. neglect of a creditor to revive a judgment will not discharge a surety. In United States v. Simpson, 3 Penn. St. 437, it was held that when the judgment creditor suffered the len of the judgment to expire without revival, the surety was not discharged. Gibson, C. J., said: "The rule is well settled that mere forbearance, however prejudicial to the surety, will not discharge him. It is his peculiar business to judge of the danger to be apprehended from delay, and to quicken the creditor, where the occasion requires is, in the way known to the law, in default of which the loss incurred is necessarily to be attributed to his own supineness." In Mundorf v. Singer, 5 W. 172, it was held that if an obligee in a bond obtain a judgment against the principal, and suffer it to remain without revival until the lien on his lands be lost, and after. ward sue the surety on the same bond, the latter cannot avail himself of the negligence of the plaintiff as a defense. This principle has been followed in many cases, among which the latest is that of Winton v. Little, 13 Norr. 61, in which Trunkey, J., says: "Mere forbearance, however prejudicial to the surety, will not discharge him. This rule applies where a creditor suffers a judgment to lose its lien for want of revival against the principal debtor, and thereby subsequent creditors are enabled to take the land." Kindt's Ap- TRUST-FREE FROM LIABILITY FOR BENEFICIARY'S MISSOURI SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.* CONVERSION-SALE ON TRIAL-VENDOR'S REMEDIES ON CONTRACT.-Plaintiff sold defendant a machine with warranty, to be paid for if upon trial it proved to be as warranted. After trying it, defeudant declined to take it, and so notified plaintiff, but continued to use it for some days. He then offered to return it to plaintiff, but plaintiff refused to receive it, and thereupon defendant left it on the sidewalk in front of plaintiff's store-room. Held, that these facts would not sustain an action for conversion. If the machine was really what it was warranted to be, plaintiff's remedy was by action on the contract for the purchaseprice, if not he could still have recovered for the use of the machine after defendant gave notice that he would not take it. McCormack v. Gilliland. Opinion by Hough, J. INFANCY-FATHER'S RIGHT TO CUSTODY-CHILD'S WELFARE. (1) In a contest for the possession of the person of a minor child, the welfare of the child is always the controlling consideration with the courts. If the contest is by a father seeking to regain his child, as he is its natural guardian and as such entitled to the custody of its person, it will be awarded to him, unless he is shown to be, for some reason, unfit or incompetent to take charge of the child, or unless the welfare of the child, for some special or ex traordinary reason, demands a different disposition. Schouler Domestic Relations, 342, 343; Hurd Hab. Corp. 461; Rust v. Van Vacter, 9 W. Va. 600; Com. v. Briggs, 16 Pick. 203; Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill, 399; Ordronaux v. Chegaray, 18 Wend. 637; Rex v. De Manneville, 5 East, 221; Herrick v. Richardson, 40 N. H. 272; Baird v. Baird, 18 N. J. Eq. 195; Paine v. Paine, 4 Humph. 523; Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 263; Mayne v. Baldwin, 1 Halst. Ch. 454; distinguishing Pool v. Gott, 14 L. R. 269. (2) By the common law, a father cannot irrevocably divest himself of his right and duty to have the custody of his child. They spring *To appear in 76 Missouri Reports. from the law of nature, and public policy, for the good of society, will not permit him to abandon them. Matter of Scarritt. Opinion by Ray, J. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION - TWO INDICTMENTS CRIMINAL LAW. EVIDENCE-CONDUCT OF PARTY AFTER ARREST.In a criminal action, testimony to prove the conduct, WHEN AND WHERE NOT SEPARATE CAUSES OF ACTION-flight and recapture of the defendant immediately WHEN MALICE QUESTION OF LAW-ADVICE OF COUNSEL -GOOD FAITH.-(1) When two indictments are found for the same offense, and the second is preferred solely on account of some formal defect in the first, and the first is thereby suspended and is quashed, no action for malicious prosecution can be based upon the order of the court discharging the prisoner from the first. Even if the first be quashed before the second is found, if the court commits or recognizes the prisoner to answer a new indictment, such new indictment could not be regarded as the institution of a new prosecution, but as a continuation of the proceedings under the first indictment. Bacon v. Towne, 4 Cush. 217. (2) In an action for malicious prosecution it should not be left to the jury to determine what facts will warrant the inference of malice. This is a question of law for the court. The proper way is to instruct the jury what facts, if found by them, will warrant the inference. (3) The discharge of the prisoner by the committing magistrate is prima facie evidence of want of probable cause, although counsel may have advised that he was criminally liable; and although the prosecutor may have communicated to counsel all the facts and circumstances bearing upon the guilt or innocence of the prisoner, which he knew or by reasonable diligence could have ascertained, yet if notwithstanding the advice of counsel he believed that the prosecution must fail, and was actuated not simply by angry passions or hostile feelings, but by a desire to injure and wrong the prisoner, he cannot be said to have consulted counsel in good faith, and a jury will be warranted in finding that the prosecution is malicious. Sharpe v. Johnston. Opinion by Hough, J. after his arrest, held admissible. It is the animus with which an act is done which constitutes its crimin. ality. There must be a joint union of act and intention in every crime, and the intention, like the act may be proved by direct or indirect evidence of the circumstances connected with the crime. Hence the conduct of a party before and after the principal fact in issue is admissible, not as a part of the res gestæ, but as a circumstance connected with the act indicating the guilty intent. People v. Strong, 46 Cal. 302; People v. Stanley, 47 id. 114; People v. Collins, 48 id. 277; People v. Wong Ah Ngow, 54 id. 151; Fox v. People, 95 Ill. 71; Cummings v. People, 42 Mich. 142; Mathews v. State, 9 Tex. App. 138. California Supreme Court, February 16, 1883. People of California v, Welsh. Opinion by McKee, J. PUBLIC OFFICERS-THEIR COMPENSATION.-The right of a public officer to compensation for his services is derived from the statute. Unless that gives it, he must perform his duties without compensation. Gammon v. Lafayette County. Opinion by Henry, J. ous. LARCENY-CONVERSION OF MONEY INTRUSTED FOR CHANGING PLEADING.-(1) If the owner of goods alleged to have been stolen parts with both the possession and the title to the goods to the alleged thief, then neither the taking nor the conversion is feloniIt can but amount to a fraud. If however the owner parts with the possession voluntarily, but does not part with the title, expecting and intending that the same thing shall be returned to him, or that it shall be disposed of on his account, or in a particular way, as directed or agreed upon, for his benefit, then the goods may be feloniously converted by the bailee, so as to relate back and make the taking and conversion a larceny. On the trial of a person on an indictment for larceny, the facts, as shown by the prosecution, were that one C. entered a place of business kept article desired. The buyer, not having the exact by one F., to make a purchase, and procured the amount of money with which to pay for the article purchased, handed the proprietor a twenty dollar gold coin for the purpose of making change." The proprietor on looking over his money on hand, said he could not "change" it, and thereupon pushed the coin toward the accused, who was standing near, and requested him to go and get the coin "changed." The SURETYSHIP OFFICIAL BOND — OBLIGATION CONFINED TO EXPRESS TERMS.-Under the charter of the city of H. the marshal was required to give bond in a sum not exceeding $2,000 for the faithful perform-accused took the coin, left the room, and never reance of his duties as city marshal." The marshal was also made ex-officio collector, and required to give such bond as the city council should direct. A bond for the sum of $3,000, after reciting that one P. had been elected marshal of the city of H., provided that P. should discharge all the duties of said office and should pay over to the proper persons and the city of H. "all moneys and effects to them or her in anywise belonging or pertaining that may come into his hands." P. collected a large amount of city taxes which he failed to pay over. Held, that the sureties on this bond were not liable. The obligations of sureties are strictly construed, and the fact that the bond was for $1,000 in excess of the amount required of the marshal did not extend the liability of the sureties. City of Harrisonville v. Porter. Opinion by Hough, C. J. CARRIER OF LIVE STOCK-SPECIAL CONTRACT.-The liability of carriers of live stock may be limited by a special contract, whereby the shipper agrees that his claim for damages under the contract, if any, shall be made in writing to the general freight agent of the carrier within five days after the live stock shall have been unloaded or delivered at the point of destination. Citing Rice v. K. P. Ry. Co., 63 Mo. 314. Dawson v. St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Ry. Co. Opinion by Norton, J. turned or accounted for the coin. It was held these facts made a case under the indictment. (2) Under the facts given, the property in the coin was properly laid in the indictment as being in C., the buyer. In an indictment for larceny, the property alleged to have been stolen may be laid as being the property of the real owner, or of any person having a special property in it as bailee. But in this case no title passed from C., the buyer, to either F.. the proprietor, or to the accused. It may be however that if the property had been alleged to be in F., the proprietor, the accused could not have objected to his title, but that would furnish no objection to the property being alleged in the real owner. Illinois Sup. Ct., November 20, 1882. Murphy v. People of Illinois. Opinion by Scholfield, J. (105 Ill.) MURDER-QUESTION OF FACT-THREATS-EVIDENCE -CHARACTER OF DECEASED.—(1) Whenever death is caused by the use of a deadly weapon, it must be for the jury to say, under the evidence, whether there existed a willful, deliberate and premeditated intention to take the life of the deceased." (2) General threats to kill somebody are admissible as evidence of an intention to pick a quarrel and kill somebody. Such was the case in Hopkins v. Commonwealth, 14 Wright, 9. But threats against a particular person with whom |