sonnel. A Central Review Board would review cases, on the record, as appealed from adverse decisions of the heads of agencies. Decisions of both hearing examiners and the Central Review Board would be advisory only to agency heads. The various loyalty and security programs of the Government would be reviewed and inspected to insure uniformity of rules, regulations and procedures; however, the Central Security Office would not have authority to review secret or other files of any agency. Complaints from industry relating to the various industrial security programs would be received and, through conferences with industry and the interested Government agencies, inconsistencies and duplications would be corrected.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S LIST.-The Commission believes that the Attorney General's list of proscribed organizations, or something similar to it, is essential to the administration of the Federal loyalty and security programs. While it therefore recommends continuance of the list, the Commission also recommends a number of major changes to minimize possible abuses. The Commission recommends a statutory basis for the list and that future listings be authorized only after FBI investigation and an opportunity for the organization to be heard by examiners of the Central Security Office, with the right of appeal to the Central Review Board. Decisions of the examiners and the Central Review Board would be advisory to the Attorney General.

SUBPENA POWER.-In the past, neither the Government nor any person involved in loyalty or security cases could compel attendance of witnesses at hearings. The Commission would give the hearing examiners the power of subpena, with wide discretionary latitude to prevent excessive costs, unnecessary delays, and obstructive tactics. Witnesses would be allowed travel and per diem expenses. The Government would pay witness costs only for an individual who was cleared by the hearing.

CONFRONTATION.-The Commission recommends that confrontation and cross-examination be extended to persons subject to loyalty investigations whenever it can be done without endangering the national security. Those whose livelihood and reputation may be affected by such loyalty investigations are entitled to fair hearings and to decisions which are neither capricious nor arbitrary. It is the prime duty of Government to preserve itself, and in the carrying out of this duty it has the indisputable obligation to avail itself of all information obtainable, including information from confidential sources. Full confrontation, therefore, would be obviously impossible without exposing the Government's counterintelligence operations and personnel with resulting paralysis of the Government's efforts to protect the national security. The Commission recommends that, where loyalty charges are involved, no derogatory information, except that supplied by a regularly established confidential informant engaged in intelligence work for the Government whose identity may not be disclosed without compromising the national security, shall be considered over the objection of the individual involved unless such individual is given the opportunity to cross-examine under oath the person supplying such derogatory information. Where the informant

is not available for process by reason of incompetence, death or other cause, the derogatory information may be considered, but due regard must be given to the absence of opportunity to cross-examine.

FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES.-The program recommended for civilian Government employees consists of a loyalty program applicable to all positions and a suitability program within the framework of civil service regulations. In the executive branch, the Commission would exclude the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency from the program. The Commission recommends changes in civil service regulations to allow the transfer of "loyal security risks" to nonsensitive positions or their dismissal under normal civil service procedures. The Commission recommends equal treatment on loyalty and suitability grounds for veterans and nonveterans in Federal employ. The Commission has also strongly urged that all departments of Government be treated alike and therefore the legis lative and judicial branches should develop loyalty and security programs. MILITARY PERSONNEL.-The Commission recommends that the standard and criteria for separation, for denial of enlistment, induction, appointment, or recall to active duty in the Armed Forces, including the Coast Guard, should be that on all the available information there is a reasonable doubt as to loyalty. The Commission recommends that the opportunity for a hearing presently afforded inductees rejected for security reasons be extended to enlistees who are rejected on loyalty grounds, if requested. The cost of such hearings should be borne by the Government and military counsel should be assigned, if requested. The recommendations in other programs for subpena and confrontation would also apply in the military personnel program. The Commission also recommends that in loyalty separations, the type of discharge given a serviceman should depend solely upon the conduct of such serviceman during the term of his military service, including the period of membership in the active or inactive reserve, and that, except to the extent that there has been falsification of his official papers, preservice conduct should not be considered in determining the type of discharge to be given.

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION.-The changes recommended by the Commission in the present program for classification of documents and other material are of major importance. The most important change is that the Confidential classification be abolished. The Commission is convinced that retention of this classification serves no useful purpose which could not be covered by the Top Secret or Secret classification. Since the recommendation is not retroactive, it eliminates the immediate task of declassifying material now classified Confidential. The Commission also recommends abolition of the requirement for a personnel security check for access to documents or material classified Confidential. The danger inherent in such access is not significant and the present clearance requirements afford no real security-clearance check.

The report of the Commission stresses the dangers to national security that arise out of overclassification of information which retards scientific and technological progress, and thus tend to deprive the country of the lead time that results from the free exchange of ideas and information.

ATOMIC ENERGY.-The Atomic Energy Commission is an employer of Federal civilian workers and also operates an industrial security program. In general, the Commission's recommendations are designed to bring both AEC's Federal civilian employee and its industrial security programs in line with the comprehensive programs planned for general application throughout the Government.

INDUSTRIAL SECURITY.-Uniformity of regulations, of procedures and their application, and of administration appeared as the needed goal of any reform of the present industrial security program. Therefore, the Commission recommends the establishment of a Central Security Office in the executive branch of the Government, as previously noted. With this arrangement, the hazards of consolidation of all industrial security programs into a single agency are avoided, but the benefits of a unified program will be available by means of a monitoring system exercised through such a central office. The Director of the Central Security Office will advise with the heads of the various government agencies as to issuance of uniform regulations, the interchangeability and transference of clearances from one agency to another, the adoption and use of uniform forms for applicants for clearance, and the provision for hearing officers to preside over hearings afforded applicants for clearance whose clearance has been denied or revoked.

To insure uniformity within the armed services with respect to the Department of Defense Industrial Security Programs, the Commission recommends establishment of an Office of Security within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This office would integrate, control, and supervise the industrial security programs of the three services, thus eliminating duplicate clearances, investigations, fingerprinting and repetitious execution of clearance applicant and related forms, and accomplishing a streamlined administrative pattern eliminating delay resulting from use of chain-of-command communications regarding security matters. Classification guides would be issued by such office, and close scrutiny maintained on the classification of materials contracted for by the services. Downgrading and declassification programs would be monitored from this office, as well as disposition of classified material upon completion of contracts.

Confrontation and subpena powers are recommended as discussed in the Commission's general recommendations on that subject.

Replacement of the present security standard by a more practical and positively worded one is recommended, namely, that clearance for access to classified material should be denied or revoked if it is determined on the basis of all available information that "access to classified information and materials will endanger the common defense and security." Also, ambiguous

criteria relative to associations are omitted in the Commission's recommendation, and the test of refusal to testify at an authorized inquiry has been added.

PORT SECURITY.-The Commission's study revealed defects in the regulations and the operation of the port security program. The Commission therefore recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard be vested with full jurisdiction to administer the program with the exception that designated Army and Navy installations continue to be administered by the cognizant military authority. The Commission further recommends that clearances for port workers by the Coast Guard, Army, and Navy be interchangeable.

The Commission emphasizes the importance of administration by recommending that personnel of the Coast Guard assigned to duties in the security program be thoroughly trained in security matters and be assigned to duty in the program on a full-time basis.

One of the problems which has arisen in the administration of the security program by the Coast Guard has been the failure to give an applicant for clearance adequate notice of the reasons for a denial of clearance. The Commission recommends that in the future the applicant be given specific and detailed notice to the extent that the interests of national security permit. The Commission recommends that standards and criteria for clearance in the Coast Guard be uniform with the standards in other major security programs. The Commission also recommends that hearings heretofore conducted by the Coast Guard be the responsibility in the future, of the Central Security Office. Compliance with this recommendation will promote uniformity in standards and procedure throughout the Government.

AIR TRANSPORT SECURITY.-The Commission recommendations for a security program in civil air transport recognizes the need for initial Federal action at the industrywide level in this important field. At present, only the employees of CAA, CAB, or other Federal agencies involved in air transport are subject to the formal program, required under Executive Order 10450. The Commission has recommended, however, that only those employees actually in a position to do substantial damage should be included in the program.

The recommendation that CAB have final authority as to admission to "restricted" facilities under its jurisdiction reflects the opinion of the Commission that, when such authority is divided among CAA, CAB, and military agencies sharing civil air transport facilities, there is strong likelihood that overall national security interest cannot be adequately protected. The agency which has the responsibility for such protection should have sole authority for implementing measures for that protection. The Commission, however, recognizes the important dual interests of CAA and CAB in national security in civil air transport and recommends that, subject to other recommendations, the Secretary of Commerce and the CAB should have joint responsibility for airport security.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.-The existing loyalty program for United States nationals employed by international organizations should be continued, but the standard should be broadened to include those who are security risks for reasons other than doubtful loyalty. The standard should be whether or not, on all the information, there is reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person to the Government of the United States or reasonable ground for believing the person might engage in subversive activities against the United States.

The Commission is recommending amplification of the criteria, reconstitution of the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board and streamlining of its operations to minimize delays, and the rights of subpena and confrontation applicable to other programs.

PASSPORT SECURITY. In the passport field, Congress should enact legislation defining the standards and criteria for a permanent passport security program. The procedures would continue to be defined by regulation.

Proposed amendments to the criminal statutes would make it unlawful for a United States citizen to travel to any country for which his passport is declared invalid, and would penalize willful refusal to surrender a passport lawfully revoked.

The Commission also recommends that the legal adviser of the Department of State determine the legal sufficiency of all passport denial cases before final action by the Secretary.

In the operational phase, the Commission recommends that, at all levels, there be strict compliance with the provision of the regulations that notice in writing and the reasons for decisions shall be stated as specifically as security considerations permit. An applicant would also be required to state whether, as the result of any security investigation or proceedings, he has been advised of an adverse finding. The Commission also proposes that a single fingerprint be required on the application and on the passport itself.

The Commission believes also that qualifications should be specified for Passport Office employees charged with responsibility for security decisions and that there should be a training program for such employees.

IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY.-The Commission recommends in the field of immigration and nationality that the functions of visa control, except for diplomatic and official visas, be transferred from the Department of State to the Department of Justice and that the Attorney General be authorized by law to maintain personnel abroad to carry out these functions.

The Commission also found that the admission to the United States of any large group of aliens en masse creates a serious security problem. It, accordingly, recommends (1) that the parole provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 be amended to clarify with greater specificity the intent of Congress relative to its use, (2) that the status of refugees admitted under such emergency conditions not be changed until all have been adequately screened, and (3) that the Government sponsor an Americanization program for all refugees ultimately granted permanent status.