the Grumman Engineering Corporation, the Case Institute of Technology, the Clevite Research Center, the General Tire and Rubber Company, Brush Electronics Company, Hazeltine Corporation, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Rheem Manufacturing Company, the Burroughs Corporation, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the Garrett Corporation. Some firms taking the opposite view are the Philco Corporation, Curtiss-Wright Corporation, and the Chance-Vought Aircraft, Inc.

Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, Calif., felt that the procedures do impede, but not seriously; but, the Garrett Corporation, Los Angeles, Calif., air research manufacturing company, felt that the procedures result in a general slowing up. The Goodyear Aircraft Corporation, Akron, Ohio, did not feel that clearance procedures represented restriction on the proper interchange of ideas; however, engineers at Goodyear Aircraft utilized common sense in matters pertaining to these procedures. Chance-Vought, manufacturers of aircraft, aircraft components and electronic equipment, stated that clearance procedures posed no problems at their plant. Republic Aviation Corporation stated that procedures should be modified so that persons on the same classification levels could discuss freely research and development ideas except on special projects which are highly classified; and although this would possibly be a calculated risk, it would not be to any great degree.

Much duplication of effort is due to the difficulty of obtaining background data, especially where an engineer is denied data because he is not currently working in that field and, therefore, lacks requisite need to know. Further, all of the services seem to apply the principle differently. If clearance procedures are strictly interpreted, they do represent a restriction of inventive and creative thought. Progress would be impaired if the regula tions were strictly followed. Procedures shall be modified but not to the extent, however, where any unnecessary risk would be involved. A modified need-to-know could serve as a basis for a more generous interchange of ideas with a minimum of risk, and should allow discussions in related categories. In unrelated categories or unrelated subjects, a specific need-toknow should be established. There would be no additional risk involved if a person is kept within related categories, and there might even be some special advantages involved in procuring outside advice or outside thoughts on special projects. Engineers and scientists working too closely with a project are apt to become so closely associated with that particular item that outside thoughts or outside advice would help them to a great extent.

The strength of this country rests, to an important degree, on the continued advance in scientific knowledge, an advance which is accelerated by a free exchange of views, wide discussion, and critical examination of findings by our fellow scientists. For this reason it is urged that continued attention be given the problem of declassification of information, particularly of a scientific nature, whenever possible. It is believed that this will actually increase the country's military security if classification is confined only to those matters regarding which a policy of secrecy is clearly of the

direct military importance as narrowly construed. This opinion applies to all types of restriction, such as visit authorizations and travel, as well as to the classification of documents and restriction of areas.

First and foremost, our security program must not in any way inhibit these technological achievements, or restrict the interchange of technical information between the specialists of known integrity, who are responsible in these fields. On the other hand, if this vital information is readily available to a potential enemy, we have sacrificed lead time and minimized the importance of the new developments to our defense efforts. Our security program has been established primarily to maintain as large a lead time for our scientists and technicians as must be realized, without interfering with their progress.

Under the present system, it is believed that a high percentage of the classified matter in industry is not vital or, in many cases, even significant information. No change in the systems will be effective until a new overall policy establishes exactly what information is vital to our national defense, based on the theory that classified matter must be held to the very minimum. Once this new method is evolved, it should be disseminated to the employee who creates classified information in the performance of his duties. We should insure that information which is not vital does not burden the security system.

Document Classification 63

The Commission recommends the abolition of the "confidential” classification as to all future information and materials.

By confining the above recommendation to prospective application, there should be no need for immediate review of documents already classified "confidential," but a gradual review and declassification of such documents should be carried on.

The Commission further recommends that industry be permitted immediately to discontinue clearance of employees for access to contracts already classified "confidential."

The definitions of secret and top secret, in Executive Order 10501, are adequate to protect the national security. Only information and materials which clearly come within such definitions should be so classified.

The fact that the Government now permits private industry to clear employees for access to confidential information and materials, without requiring a security investigation of any sort and merely on the basis of a statement of citizenship, indicates that the degree of risk to the national security is not substantial.

63 See full discussion of this topic on p. 151.

It may be expected that large business corporations will continue to screen their employees as a matter of sound personnel practice.

In the light of information available to the Commission from the Department of Defense, it is the opinion of the Commission that the risk is so small, considering the cost and delays incurred in the program, that the program is unjustified.

There have been many confidential documents made available to the Commission which, in the light of the definition of "confidential" within Executive Order 10501, could be so classified only by the greatest stretch of the imagination.

The industrial process is such that the various phases of a confidential contract are so dispersed that it would be virtually impossible for an employee to assemble this information to the detriment of the national security.

"Secret" and "Top Secret"

The Commission recommends that only the "secret" and "top secret" categories of defense information, as defined in section 1 of Executive Order 10501, remain as at present.

Executive Order 10501, section 1, provides that:

Official information which requires protection in the interests of national defense shall be limited to three categories of classification, which in descending order of importance shall carry one of the following deignations; top secret, secret, or confidential. No other designation shall be used to classify defense information, including military information, as requiring protection in the interests of national defense, except as expressly provided by statute. These categories are defined as follows:

(a) Top secret.-Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of the classification top secret shall be authorized, by appropriate authority, only for defense information or material which requires the highest degree of protection. The top secret classification shall be applied only to that information or material the defense aspect of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation such as leading to a definite break in diplomatic relations affecting the defense of the United States, an armed attack against the United States or its allies, a war, or the compromise of military or defense plans, or intelligence operations, or scientific or technological developments vital to the national defense.

(b) Secret.-Except as may be expressly provided by statute, the use of the classification secret shall be authorized, by appropriate authority, only for defense information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Nation, such as by jeopardizing the international relations of the United States, endangering the effectiveness of a program or policy of vital importance to the national defense, or compromising important military or defense plans, scientific or technological developments important to national defense, or information revealing important intelligence operations.

Unclassified Defense Information

The Commission believes that there should be no Government regulation of defense information which is not classified. Therefore, it recommends abolition of the Office of Strategic Information in the Department of Commerce, unless other and logical reasons can be advanced for its continued existence.

The Office of Strategic Information (OSI) of the Department of Commerce furnishes, with interagency consultation, guidance to executive branch agencies on the publication of nonclassified information which may be prejudicial to the United States defense interest; coordinates government policies on the international exchange of nonclassified information with the Soviet Bloc; and furnishes guidance for the voluntary use of business and industry on problems relating to publication and exchange of such information.

Representatives of Soviet Bloc Missions are actively engaged in obtaining such unclassified information as industrial brochures and catalogs, production charts, blueprints and lay-outs, technical and research reports, aerial photographs of plants, etc. OSI advises United States industry that while there is no legal restriction on furnishing unclassified information to Communist countries, it is requested that an attempt be made to obtain useful information in return. OSI maintains a list of needed Communist documents. assisted in its program by the Library of Congress. The Library reports that it has been active in the field of international exchange since 1800, and that the program has been successful.

OSI is

The Commission is of the opinion that except in time of war there should be no agency of Government censoring unclassified information and materials. It is unrealistic to believe that technical publications and catalogs of American industry, available to the public in the United States, would not be available to agents of foreign governments. To the extent that the Office of Strategic Information prevents the publication of unclassified material, it thereby impedes the free flow of scientific data to the American public and American industry. To the extent that the Office of Strategic Information seeks to prevent the distribution of information already published, it is unrealistic to believe that this restricts the flow of such information to hostile countries. The costs of the Office of Strategic Information are therefore unjustified. Adequate provision has already been made in other recommendations for the protection of any information the classification of which is necessary in the interests of the common defense and national security.

Uniformity, Reduction, and Review of Classified Material

The Commission recommends that the effort should be intensified to:

Insure uniformity of classification;

Reduce the amount of classified material;

Insure periodic review of classified material; and

Insure proper control and disposition of classified material.

Many of the problems connected with the safeguarding of classified matter in industry are probably due to the volume of such classified matter.

Greater caution should be exercised in the assignment of classification; classification should be evaluated on a more realistic basis. Attempts through classification to "hide the elephant in the middle of the prairie" serve only to weaken the entire security system by trying to safeguard more than it is possible to safeguard properly. A detailed classification system should be developed for all branches of the Department of Defense and other Government agencies having industrial security programs.

The Small Business Administration has reported that, in response to a questionnaire submitted by it to members of its Advisory Boards throughout the United States, 208 questionnaires being completed and returned, the answer to the following question: "20. Is overclassification of material prevalent in the industrial security system?"; Yes-74; No-44; No opinion— 72; No answer-18. In response to the following question: "21. Is declassification generally found to be too slow?", the following replies were received: Yes-89; No-21; No opinion-76; No answer-22.

Alien Owned or Operated Facilities

The Commission believes that there is inadequate protection of classified matter in contracts made with or involving facilities in which aliens hold ownership or operating positions.

The Department of Defense does not know of any way to ascertain true ownership of a corporation if some device similar to the use of Swiss banks is utilized in obtaining ownership in American corporations. In spite of this, however, it is felt in DOD that there is no serious leakage of classified information to foreign sources because of this fact. This opinion is based on current precautions to investigate ownership and control of corporations. The present system, however, rests upon the requirement imposed upon cleared persons who later receive classified material, namely, that they shall not divulge any classified information or material to uncleared personnel or to unauthorized organizations. The device used is that of requiring a