strikes' in defense plants. . . ." The Court concluded that the first amendment does not require that a Communist "be permitted to be the keeper of the arsenal."

For a number of years, the National Labor Relations Board took the position, based on the language and legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act, that it did not have the function of investigating and passing on the truthfulness of affidavits which had been filed. This was regarded as a matter for the Attorney General and the courts. (See Craddock-Terry Shoe Corporation, 21 LRRM 1194).

In 1952, however, the NLRB began to take some further steps to deny its processes to unions whose officers were involved in false affidavits prosecutions. The Department of Justice had instituted false affidavit proceedings against certain officers of the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America and several other unions, and although the grand jury failed to indict, it sent word to the NLRB that the officers had declined to affirm the affidavits then on file with the Board. The NLRB then sent questionnaires to these officials asking them to reaffirm their oaths and to provide additional data on possible connections with the Communist Party. The Board indicated that it would void all certifications held by the unions and forbid their taking cases to the Board if the questionnaires were not answered satisfactorily.

A Federal district court enjoined the NLRB from proceeding with the questionnaires, ruling that the Board had no authority to inquire into the truth of the affidavits, and the decision was affirmed on appeal. Electrical Workers v. Herzog, 33 LRRM 2301, 33 LRRM 2197.

The NLRB then adopted a policy of denying the use of election machinery to unions with officials under indictment for false non-Communist affidavits, but the Federal courts held that the Board does not have authority to deny a union its compliance status by inquiring into the falsity of an affidavit filed by one of its officers. The rationale was that the Act does not deprive a union of its statutory benefits, because an officer had deceived the union as well as the Board by filing a false affidavit. Farmer v. United Electrical Workers, 33 LRRM 2196, 33 LRRM 2821.

The NLRB and a Federal district court later worked out a distinction that, where the union membership was shown to be aware of the fact that the union officer had filed a false affidavit, the union's compliance status could be withdrawn by the Board and the union could be deprived of its rights under the Taft-Hartley Act.

However, the Supreme Court has recently ruled that the Board does not have the power to take such action against the union. The Court said, "the only remedy for the filing of a false affidavit is the criminal penalty. . we cannot find an additional sanction which in practical effect would run against the members of the union, not their guilty officers." Meat Cutters v. The United States, 39 LRRM 2149, 2150 (December 10, 1956); Leedom v. Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, 39 LRRM 2146, 2147, 2149 (December 10, 1956).

Investigations

The Commission recommends that investigation should be conducted according to a uniform procedure, and that the procedure should be as follows:

In the case of clearance for secret:

A national agency check conducted by the responsible industrial facility agency;

If derogatory subversive information is developed by the national agency check requiring further investigation, reference to the FBI for a full field investigation;

If nonsubversive derogatory information is developed by the national agency check requiring further investigation, such further investigation should be conducted by the investigative branch utilized by the responsible agency.

In the case of defense industrial contracts, the Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense should assign the investigation to the appropriate military investigative branch—i. e., OSI, ONI, G–2, or CIC.

In the case of other agency industrial contracts the investigative branch of such agency should make such further investigation; if it has none, such further investigation should be made by the Civil Service Commission.

In the case of clearance for top secret:

Each responsible agency through its investigative branch shall conduct a full field (background) investigation.

In the case of defense industrial contracts, such full field investigation should be assigned by the Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the appropriate military investigative branch-i. e., OSI, ONI, G-2, or CIC.

In the case of other agency industrial contracts, the investigative branch of such agency shall make the full field investigation; if it has none, such investigation shall be made by the Civil Service Commission.

If during the course of any full field investigation conducted by any of the above agencies there is developed derogatory subversive information, such investigatory branch should cease its investigation and transmit the case for full investigation by the FBI.

The Commission believes that the investigating agency should evaluate the need for classifying the informant as "confidential,” as well as the reliability of the informant, but not evaluate the information provided by the informant.

Investigations by Government agencies should be conducted according to a uniform procedure,59 but they should not all be performed by a single agency, nor should investigating agencies be required to evaluate the information; however, they should evaluate the sources.

Investigative reports in instances have been incomplete, or out of date, or based merely on a record check. The adoption of uniform investigative procedures and outlined in the foregoing recommendation will do much to eliminate these defects.

Screening Function-Charges

The Commission recommends that centralization of the screening authority for clearance is not necessary or proper, except that there should be a central screening program in the Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

As recommended by the Commission the screening board function should be retained in the Department of Defense industrial security program and:

It should be a segment of the Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and

It should process its work directly with the recommended security office within the Department of Defense rather than through service command channels.

Where there is derogatory information which has not been satisfactorily explained, the screening officer should send the employee a letter of charges and advise him of his right to a hearing. The applicant, within time prescribed by regu lations, should file a sworn answer thereto together with any affidavits or other statements he may desire to submit. If he requests such a hearing, the screening board in the Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense should send the letter of charges and the reply thereto together with the file to the Director of the Central Security Office who should assign it to a hearing examiner. The decision of the hearing examiner should be advisory to the head of the responsible agency whose decision shall be final. An adverse decision by the head of the responsible agency may be appealed to the Central Review Board at the request of the employee within time and subject to procedures to be prescribed.

The Department of Defense has issued a First Annual Report, dated September 13, 1956, titled Industrial Personnel Security Review Program. It contains charts and statistics on the accomplishments of the current hear

50 See full discussion and recommendations on Central Security Office, p. 89.

ing and review program and offers comparisons between the current and the superseded program. In the appendix of this document may be seen the full hearing and review regulations, 5220.6. On page 3, the report

states:

THE SCREENING FUNCTION

One area to which we have devoted careful attention relates to the Screening func tion-the initial determination, after a case is submitted by the Services, that either a clearance may issue, or that recourse must be had to a formal hearing. This area of the program is vital because it is at this point that a private citizen seeking clearance first becomes an active party to the proceedings. It is here that it may be necessary to tell him that his security status is in doubt. Then the results of investigation and the deliberations of Government may have their initial impact external to the Government. Here lies the threshhold to reaction at the job, family, and community levels. Because this stage is of key importance, and because a denial results in the initiation of formal procedures with their inevitable consequences to the individual concerned, both financially and otherwise, this determination is now entrusted to the collective judgment of a central Screening Board. . . . Since this central Screening Board is located in Washington, it has been possible to develop a comprehensive liaison with the investigative agencies involved, and to create a working relationship which has meant that more detailed and specific information is more readily available. . . Under our current procedures, approximately 60 percent of all the cases considered by that Board have resulted in a clearance for the individual concerned at that level. . . . Significantly, suspension of an individual's clearance unnecessarily is avoided, and the serious reactions to such a suspension in terms of earning power, family tension, repect in the community and other adverse factors are minimized. (Under the provision of paragraph 26 of the regulation (industrial personnel security review regulation, February 2, 1955, No. 5220.6), a respondent who ultimately receives a determination in his favor is reimbursed for loss of earnings during the period his clearance was suspended.) Neither the fact that the Government has questioned an individual's security status, nor the specific information which has provoked these doubts, escape from the hands of the Department of Defense. The entire process is held confidential between the individual and his Government, and no one else, not even the employer, need be involved in any way when the case is closed by a clearance at the Screening Board Level. . . .

...

STATEMENT OF REASONS

Improved screening procedures have had their effect in another important area, that of informing the individual concerned, specifically and in detail, of the information which has led the Screening Board to withhold clearance.

In each case where the Screening Board determines that the record before it will not support a decision to grant access, formal proceedings are begun by providing the individual concerned with a statement of reasons. Prepared collectively by the Screening Board, this statement of reasons sets out the information supporting the decision that a clearance is not warranted, and states the issues in the case. It is the vehicle whereby the individual concerned is informed of the information which raises the security question. The more complete it is, the greater his ability to prepare himself fully, and to produce facts basic to a sound decision his case reaches the hearing level.

Through this machinery, the issues to be considered are sharpened and made more precise and definite. A foundation is thus laid which materially assists the Hearing Board members to render a fair and impartial judgment. Obviously, these results are as important to the Department of Defense as to the individual.

We have made striking progress in this area.

SUSPENSION

Suspension of Clearance for Access to Classified Material

The Commission believes that where an employee has once been granted clearance, and derogatory information is received about him, present provisions for suspension are adequate for safeguarding:

The national security, and

That the individual's rights are not prejudiced pending a well-considered evaluation of the derogatory information. The Commission believes that suspension for clearance should not in and of itself be the basis for discharge of an employee. While the employer has the legal right to discharge, it is believed that no person should be discharged merely on the ground that his clearance has been suspended. Under such circumstances an employee who has been removed from access under the suspension order may work on nonclassified information and materials.

The Commission believes that Government field offices should not exercise the power to make emergency suspensions, but that suspensions should be accomplished only at the Office of Security in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Commission believes that at this juncture of proceedings, the reasons for suspension need not be complete and specific for within a reasonable time after the suspension and completion of any necessary investigation (and if not cleared by such investigation) an appropriate letter of charges will issue. Priority should be given to suspension cases.

Wherever possible in the light of the emergency requiring immediate suspension, an oral interview should be granted but should not be mandatory.

The first and most important distinction to be made between the Federal civilian employees security program and the DOD industrial security program is that in the latter program clearance relates only to access to classified defense information. Consequently, denial or revocation of a clearance to a contractor employee does not preclude his being employed on nonclassified work in the same plant or facility; however, if the only work that is being done at the industrial facility is of a classified nature, then suspension of clearance means loss of employment. (See industrial security manual for safeguarding classified information, DOD, September 21, 1956, section 1-3 (b).) Thus, the DOD industrial security program, and DOD regulations issued pursuant thereto, do not interfere with the contractors' prerogative of hiring, firing, promoting, or transferring for their own purposes. The